Commit 15da4a1

Browse files
pimterryaduh95
pimterry
authored and
aduh95
committed
tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption
Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert, but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS 1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant: authorized state after resume should always match the initial state. Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <pimterry@gmail.com> PR-URL: #64677 Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
1 parent ca88587 commit 15da4a1

2 files changed

Lines changed: 206 additions & 0 deletions

File tree

‎lib/internal/tls/wrap.js‎

Lines changed: 7 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1320,6 +1320,13 @@ function onServerSocketSecure() {
13201320
if(verifyError){
13211321
this.authorizationError=verifyError.code;
13221322

1323+
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
1324+
this.destroy();
1325+
}elseif(!this._handle.getPeerX509Certificate()){
1326+
// Ncrypto reports X509_V_OK for TLS 1.3 resumption without a peer
1327+
// certificate, as it uses PSKs. Require one to authorize the socket.
1328+
this.authorizationError='UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT';
1329+
13231330
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
13241331
this.destroy();
13251332
}else{

‎test/parallel/test-tls-client-cert-resumption.js‎

Lines changed: 199 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
constcommon=require('../common');
3+
if(!common.hasCrypto)
4+
common.skip('missing crypto');
5+
6+
// Server-side client-certificate authorization must survive TLS session
7+
// resumption. On a resumed handshake the client does not re-send its
8+
// certificate, so the server has to report the same authorization state it
9+
// derived from the original full handshake:
10+
//
11+
// - a trusted certificate stays authorized,
12+
// - an untrusted certificate stays unauthorized with its verification error,
13+
// - a missing certificate stays unauthorized (UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT).
14+
//
15+
// The missing-certificate case is special on TLS 1.3: ncrypto reports X509_V_OK
16+
// for the resumed PSK handshake even though no certificate was presented, so
17+
// the absence has to be detected explicitly (see onServerSocketSecure() in
18+
// lib/internal/tls/wrap.js). The final case checks that such a certificate-less
19+
// resumed session is rejected outright when rejectUnauthorized is set.
20+
21+
constassert=require('assert');
22+
constcrypto=require('crypto');
23+
consttls=require('tls');
24+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
25+
const{ once }=require('events');
26+
27+
constca=fixtures.readKey('ca1-cert.pem');
28+
constserverCert={
29+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent2-key.pem'),
30+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent2-cert.pem'),
31+
};
32+
33+
// Client certificate variants, keyed by the peer state they produce.
34+
constCLIENTS={
35+
trusted: {// Signed by ca1
36+
creds: {
37+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
38+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
39+
},
40+
authorized: true,
41+
authorizationError: null,
42+
peerCN: 'agent1',
43+
},
44+
untrusted: {// Signed by ca2, not trusted
45+
creds: {
46+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent3-key.pem'),
47+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent3-cert.pem'),
48+
},
49+
authorized: false,
50+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE',
51+
peerCN: 'agent3',
52+
},
53+
missing: {// No client certificate
54+
creds: {},
55+
authorized: false,
56+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT',
57+
peerCN: undefined,
58+
},
59+
};
60+
61+
asyncfunctionhandshake(options,captureSession){
62+
constsocket=tls.connect(options);
63+
constsessionPromise=captureSession ?
64+
once(socket,'session').then(([session])=>session) : null;
65+
66+
socket.resume();
67+
awaitonce(socket,'secureConnect');
68+
69+
constclosePromise=once(socket,'close');
70+
constsession=sessionPromise ? awaitsessionPromise : undefined;
71+
socket.end();
72+
awaitclosePromise;
73+
returnsession;
74+
}
75+
76+
// Test a single resumption configuration and expected result:
77+
asyncfunctiontestResumption(version,name){
78+
const{ creds, authorized, authorizationError, peerCN }=CLIENTS[name];
79+
80+
letconnections=0;
81+
constserver=tls.createServer({
82+
...serverCert,
83+
ca,
84+
requestCert: true,
85+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
86+
minVersion: version,
87+
maxVersion: version,
88+
},common.mustCall((socket)=>{
89+
// 2nd conn must resume:
90+
constresumed=connections++===1;
91+
constwhere=`${version}${name}${resumed ? 'resumed' : 'new'}`;
92+
assert.strictEqual(socket.isSessionReused(),resumed,where);
93+
94+
// Both conns must report same expected auth state:
95+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,authorized,where);
96+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,authorizationError,where);
97+
constpeer=socket.getPeerCertificate();
98+
if(peerCN===undefined)
99+
assert.deepStrictEqual(peer,{},where);
100+
else
101+
assert.strictEqual(peer.subject.CN,peerCN,where);
102+
103+
// N.b. BoringSSL only sends a ticket after a write:
104+
socket.end('.');
105+
},2));
106+
107+
server.listen(0);
108+
awaitonce(server,'listening');
109+
110+
constoptions={
111+
port: server.address().port,
112+
host: '127.0.0.1',
113+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
114+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
115+
minVersion: version,
116+
maxVersion: version,
117+
...creds,
118+
};
119+
120+
try{
121+
constsession=awaithandshake(options,true);
122+
assert(session);
123+
awaithandshake({ ...options, session });
124+
}finally{
125+
server.close();
126+
awaitonce(server,'close');
127+
}
128+
}
129+
130+
// Test the special case of resumption from rejectUnauthorized:false to
131+
// rejectUnauthorized:true, which must be rejected even though the original
132+
// session worked initially.
133+
asyncfunctiontestRejectResumedWithoutCert(){
134+
constoptions={
135+
...serverCert,
136+
ca,
137+
requestCert: true,
138+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
139+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
140+
ticketKeys: crypto.randomBytes(48),
141+
};
142+
constlenient=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: false});
143+
lenient.on('secureConnection',common.mustCall((socket)=>{
144+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,false);
145+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT');
146+
socket.end('.');
147+
}));
148+
149+
conststrict=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: true});
150+
strict.on('secureConnection',common.mustNotCall());
151+
152+
constclientOptions=(port)=>({
153+
port,
154+
host: '127.0.0.1',
155+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
156+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
157+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
158+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
159+
});
160+
161+
lenient.listen(0);
162+
awaitonce(lenient,'listening');
163+
constsession=awaithandshake(clientOptions(lenient.address().port),true);
164+
assert(session);
165+
lenient.close();
166+
awaitonce(lenient,'close');
167+
168+
strict.listen(0);
169+
awaitonce(strict,'listening');
170+
171+
constresumed=tls.connect({ ...clientOptions(strict.address().port), session });
172+
resumed.on('error',()=>{});// May observe the server's reset.
173+
resumed.resume();
174+
175+
// The client completes the resumed handshake (it has the server's Finished)
176+
// before the server's reset can arrive, so this asserts the strict server
177+
// actually resumed rather than falling back to a rejected full handshake.
178+
awaitonce(resumed,'secureConnect');
179+
assert.strictEqual(resumed.isSessionReused(),true);
180+
181+
// Then the socket is destroyed during 'secure', which surfaces as a reset
182+
// rather than a handshake failure.
183+
const[err]=awaitonce(strict,'tlsClientError');
184+
assert.strictEqual(err.code,'ECONNRESET');
185+
186+
resumed.destroy();
187+
strict.close();
188+
awaitonce(strict,'close');
189+
}
190+
191+
(asyncfunction(){
192+
// Run the full matrix of configurations:
193+
for(constversionof['TLSv1.2','TLSv1.3'])
194+
for(constnameofObject.keys(CLIENTS))
195+
awaittestResumption(version,name);
196+
197+
// Validate the rejectUnauth:false->true case
198+
awaittestRejectResumedWithoutCert();
199+
})().then(common.mustCall());

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}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Commit 15da4a1
Browse files
pimterryaduh95
pimterry
authored and
aduh95
committed
tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption
Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.
Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <pimterry@gmail.com>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
1 parent ca88587 commit 15da4a1
2 files changed
Lines changed: 206 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎lib/internal/tls/wrap.js‎
Lines changed: 7 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1320,6 +1320,13 @@ function onServerSocketSecure() {
13201320
if(verifyError){
13211321
this.authorizationError=verifyError.code;
13221322

1323+
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
1324+
this.destroy();
1325+
}elseif(!this._handle.getPeerX509Certificate()){
1326+
// Ncrypto reports X509_V_OK for TLS 1.3 resumption without a peer
1327+
// certificate, as it uses PSKs. Require one to authorize the socket.
1328+
this.authorizationError='UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT';
1329+
13231330
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
13241331
this.destroy();
13251332
}else{
‎test/parallel/test-tls-client-cert-resumption.js‎
Lines changed: 199 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
constcommon=require('../common');
3+
if(!common.hasCrypto)
4+
common.skip('missing crypto');
5+
6+
// Server-side client-certificate authorization must survive TLS session
7+
// resumption. On a resumed handshake the client does not re-send its
8+
// certificate, so the server has to report the same authorization state it
9+
// derived from the original full handshake:
10+
//
11+
// - a trusted certificate stays authorized,
12+
// - an untrusted certificate stays unauthorized with its verification error,
13+
// - a missing certificate stays unauthorized (UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT).
14+
//
15+
// The missing-certificate case is special on TLS 1.3: ncrypto reports X509_V_OK
16+
// for the resumed PSK handshake even though no certificate was presented, so
17+
// the absence has to be detected explicitly (see onServerSocketSecure() in
18+
// lib/internal/tls/wrap.js). The final case checks that such a certificate-less
19+
// resumed session is rejected outright when rejectUnauthorized is set.
20+
21+
constassert=require('assert');
22+
constcrypto=require('crypto');
23+
consttls=require('tls');
24+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
25+
const{ once }=require('events');
26+
27+
constca=fixtures.readKey('ca1-cert.pem');
28+
constserverCert={
29+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent2-key.pem'),
30+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent2-cert.pem'),
31+
};
32+
33+
// Client certificate variants, keyed by the peer state they produce.
34+
constCLIENTS={
35+
trusted: {// Signed by ca1
36+
creds: {
37+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
38+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
39+
},
40+
authorized: true,
41+
authorizationError: null,
42+
peerCN: 'agent1',
43+
},
44+
untrusted: {// Signed by ca2, not trusted
45+
creds: {
46+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent3-key.pem'),
47+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent3-cert.pem'),
48+
},
49+
authorized: false,
50+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE',
51+
peerCN: 'agent3',
52+
},
53+
missing: {// No client certificate
54+
creds: {},
55+
authorized: false,
56+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT',
57+
peerCN: undefined,
58+
},
59+
};
60+
61+
asyncfunctionhandshake(options,captureSession){
62+
constsocket=tls.connect(options);
63+
constsessionPromise=captureSession ?
64+
once(socket,'session').then(([session])=>session) : null;
65+
66+
socket.resume();
67+
awaitonce(socket,'secureConnect');
68+
69+
constclosePromise=once(socket,'close');
70+
constsession=sessionPromise ? awaitsessionPromise : undefined;
71+
socket.end();
72+
awaitclosePromise;
73+
returnsession;
74+
}
75+
76+
// Test a single resumption configuration and expected result:
77+
asyncfunctiontestResumption(version,name){
78+
const{ creds, authorized, authorizationError, peerCN }=CLIENTS[name];
79+
80+
letconnections=0;
81+
constserver=tls.createServer({
82+
 ...serverCert,
83+
 ca,
84+
requestCert: true,
85+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
86+
minVersion: version,
87+
maxVersion: version,
88+
},common.mustCall((socket)=>{
89+
// 2nd conn must resume:
90+
constresumed=connections++===1;
91+
constwhere=`${version}${name}${resumed ? 'resumed' : 'new'}`;
92+
assert.strictEqual(socket.isSessionReused(),resumed,where);
93+
94+
// Both conns must report same expected auth state:
95+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,authorized,where);
96+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,authorizationError,where);
97+
constpeer=socket.getPeerCertificate();
98+
if(peerCN===undefined)
99+
assert.deepStrictEqual(peer,{},where);
100+
else
101+
assert.strictEqual(peer.subject.CN,peerCN,where);
102+
103+
// N.b. BoringSSL only sends a ticket after a write:
104+
socket.end('.');
105+
},2));
106+
107+
server.listen(0);
108+
awaitonce(server,'listening');
109+
110+
constoptions={
111+
port: server.address().port,
112+
host: '127.0.0.1',
113+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
114+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
115+
minVersion: version,
116+
maxVersion: version,
117+
 ...creds,
118+
};
119+
120+
try{
121+
constsession=awaithandshake(options,true);
122+
assert(session);
123+
awaithandshake({ ...options, session });
124+
}finally{
125+
server.close();
126+
awaitonce(server,'close');
127+
}
128+
}
129+
130+
// Test the special case of resumption from rejectUnauthorized:false to
131+
// rejectUnauthorized:true, which must be rejected even though the original
132+
// session worked initially.
133+
asyncfunctiontestRejectResumedWithoutCert(){
134+
constoptions={
135+
 ...serverCert,
136+
 ca,
137+
requestCert: true,
138+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
139+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
140+
ticketKeys: crypto.randomBytes(48),
141+
};
142+
constlenient=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: false});
143+
lenient.on('secureConnection',common.mustCall((socket)=>{
144+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,false);
145+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT');
146+
socket.end('.');
147+
}));
148+
149+
conststrict=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: true});
150+
strict.on('secureConnection',common.mustNotCall());
151+
152+
constclientOptions=(port)=>({
153+
 port,
154+
host: '127.0.0.1',
155+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
156+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
157+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
158+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
159+
});
160+
161+
lenient.listen(0);
162+
awaitonce(lenient,'listening');
163+
constsession=awaithandshake(clientOptions(lenient.address().port),true);
164+
assert(session);
165+
lenient.close();
166+
awaitonce(lenient,'close');
167+
168+
strict.listen(0);
169+
awaitonce(strict,'listening');
170+
171+
constresumed=tls.connect({ ...clientOptions(strict.address().port), session });
172+
resumed.on('error',()=>{});// May observe the server's reset.
173+
resumed.resume();
174+
175+
// The client completes the resumed handshake (it has the server's Finished)
176+
// before the server's reset can arrive, so this asserts the strict server
177+
// actually resumed rather than falling back to a rejected full handshake.
178+
awaitonce(resumed,'secureConnect');
179+
assert.strictEqual(resumed.isSessionReused(),true);
180+
181+
// Then the socket is destroyed during 'secure', which surfaces as a reset
182+
// rather than a handshake failure.
183+
const[err]=awaitonce(strict,'tlsClientError');
184+
assert.strictEqual(err.code,'ECONNRESET');
185+
186+
resumed.destroy();
187+
strict.close();
188+
awaitonce(strict,'close');
189+
}
190+
191+
(asyncfunction(){
192+
// Run the full matrix of configurations:
193+
for(constversionof['TLSv1.2','TLSv1.3'])
194+
for(constnameofObject.keys(CLIENTS))
195+
awaittestResumption(version,name);
196+
197+
// Validate the rejectUnauth:false->true case
198+
awaittestRejectResumedWithoutCert();
199+
})().then(common.mustCall());
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Comments
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if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
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try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Commit 15da4a1
Browse files
pimterryaduh95
pimterry
authored and
aduh95
committed
tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption
Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.
Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <pimterry@gmail.com>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
1 parent ca88587 commit 15da4a1
2 files changed
Lines changed: 206 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎lib/internal/tls/wrap.js‎
Lines changed: 7 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1320,6 +1320,13 @@ function onServerSocketSecure() {
13201320
if(verifyError){
13211321
this.authorizationError=verifyError.code;
13221322

1323+
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
1324+
this.destroy();
1325+
}elseif(!this._handle.getPeerX509Certificate()){
1326+
// Ncrypto reports X509_V_OK for TLS 1.3 resumption without a peer
1327+
// certificate, as it uses PSKs. Require one to authorize the socket.
1328+
this.authorizationError='UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT';
1329+
13231330
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
13241331
this.destroy();
13251332
}else{
‎test/parallel/test-tls-client-cert-resumption.js‎
Lines changed: 199 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
constcommon=require('../common');
3+
if(!common.hasCrypto)
4+
common.skip('missing crypto');
5+
6+
// Server-side client-certificate authorization must survive TLS session
7+
// resumption. On a resumed handshake the client does not re-send its
8+
// certificate, so the server has to report the same authorization state it
9+
// derived from the original full handshake:
10+
//
11+
// - a trusted certificate stays authorized,
12+
// - an untrusted certificate stays unauthorized with its verification error,
13+
// - a missing certificate stays unauthorized (UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT).
14+
//
15+
// The missing-certificate case is special on TLS 1.3: ncrypto reports X509_V_OK
16+
// for the resumed PSK handshake even though no certificate was presented, so
17+
// the absence has to be detected explicitly (see onServerSocketSecure() in
18+
// lib/internal/tls/wrap.js). The final case checks that such a certificate-less
19+
// resumed session is rejected outright when rejectUnauthorized is set.
20+
21+
constassert=require('assert');
22+
constcrypto=require('crypto');
23+
consttls=require('tls');
24+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
25+
const{ once }=require('events');
26+
27+
constca=fixtures.readKey('ca1-cert.pem');
28+
constserverCert={
29+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent2-key.pem'),
30+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent2-cert.pem'),
31+
};
32+
33+
// Client certificate variants, keyed by the peer state they produce.
34+
constCLIENTS={
35+
trusted: {// Signed by ca1
36+
creds: {
37+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
38+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
39+
},
40+
authorized: true,
41+
authorizationError: null,
42+
peerCN: 'agent1',
43+
},
44+
untrusted: {// Signed by ca2, not trusted
45+
creds: {
46+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent3-key.pem'),
47+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent3-cert.pem'),
48+
},
49+
authorized: false,
50+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE',
51+
peerCN: 'agent3',
52+
},
53+
missing: {// No client certificate
54+
creds: {},
55+
authorized: false,
56+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT',
57+
peerCN: undefined,
58+
},
59+
};
60+
61+
asyncfunctionhandshake(options,captureSession){
62+
constsocket=tls.connect(options);
63+
constsessionPromise=captureSession ?
64+
once(socket,'session').then(([session])=>session) : null;
65+
66+
socket.resume();
67+
awaitonce(socket,'secureConnect');
68+
69+
constclosePromise=once(socket,'close');
70+
constsession=sessionPromise ? awaitsessionPromise : undefined;
71+
socket.end();
72+
awaitclosePromise;
73+
returnsession;
74+
}
75+
76+
// Test a single resumption configuration and expected result:
77+
asyncfunctiontestResumption(version,name){
78+
const{ creds, authorized, authorizationError, peerCN }=CLIENTS[name];
79+
80+
letconnections=0;
81+
constserver=tls.createServer({
82+
 ...serverCert,
83+
 ca,
84+
requestCert: true,
85+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
86+
minVersion: version,
87+
maxVersion: version,
88+
},common.mustCall((socket)=>{
89+
// 2nd conn must resume:
90+
constresumed=connections++===1;
91+
constwhere=`${version}${name}${resumed ? 'resumed' : 'new'}`;
92+
assert.strictEqual(socket.isSessionReused(),resumed,where);
93+
94+
// Both conns must report same expected auth state:
95+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,authorized,where);
96+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,authorizationError,where);
97+
constpeer=socket.getPeerCertificate();
98+
if(peerCN===undefined)
99+
assert.deepStrictEqual(peer,{},where);
100+
else
101+
assert.strictEqual(peer.subject.CN,peerCN,where);
102+
103+
// N.b. BoringSSL only sends a ticket after a write:
104+
socket.end('.');
105+
},2));
106+
107+
server.listen(0);
108+
awaitonce(server,'listening');
109+
110+
constoptions={
111+
port: server.address().port,
112+
host: '127.0.0.1',
113+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
114+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
115+
minVersion: version,
116+
maxVersion: version,
117+
 ...creds,
118+
};
119+
120+
try{
121+
constsession=awaithandshake(options,true);
122+
assert(session);
123+
awaithandshake({ ...options, session });
124+
}finally{
125+
server.close();
126+
awaitonce(server,'close');
127+
}
128+
}
129+
130+
// Test the special case of resumption from rejectUnauthorized:false to
131+
// rejectUnauthorized:true, which must be rejected even though the original
132+
// session worked initially.
133+
asyncfunctiontestRejectResumedWithoutCert(){
134+
constoptions={
135+
 ...serverCert,
136+
 ca,
137+
requestCert: true,
138+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
139+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
140+
ticketKeys: crypto.randomBytes(48),
141+
};
142+
constlenient=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: false});
143+
lenient.on('secureConnection',common.mustCall((socket)=>{
144+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,false);
145+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT');
146+
socket.end('.');
147+
}));
148+
149+
conststrict=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: true});
150+
strict.on('secureConnection',common.mustNotCall());
151+
152+
constclientOptions=(port)=>({
153+
 port,
154+
host: '127.0.0.1',
155+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
156+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
157+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
158+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
159+
});
160+
161+
lenient.listen(0);
162+
awaitonce(lenient,'listening');
163+
constsession=awaithandshake(clientOptions(lenient.address().port),true);
164+
assert(session);
165+
lenient.close();
166+
awaitonce(lenient,'close');
167+
168+
strict.listen(0);
169+
awaitonce(strict,'listening');
170+
171+
constresumed=tls.connect({ ...clientOptions(strict.address().port), session });
172+
resumed.on('error',()=>{});// May observe the server's reset.
173+
resumed.resume();
174+
175+
// The client completes the resumed handshake (it has the server's Finished)
176+
// before the server's reset can arrive, so this asserts the strict server
177+
// actually resumed rather than falling back to a rejected full handshake.
178+
awaitonce(resumed,'secureConnect');
179+
assert.strictEqual(resumed.isSessionReused(),true);
180+
181+
// Then the socket is destroyed during 'secure', which surfaces as a reset
182+
// rather than a handshake failure.
183+
const[err]=awaitonce(strict,'tlsClientError');
184+
assert.strictEqual(err.code,'ECONNRESET');
185+
186+
resumed.destroy();
187+
strict.close();
188+
awaitonce(strict,'close');
189+
}
190+
191+
(asyncfunction(){
192+
// Run the full matrix of configurations:
193+
for(constversionof['TLSv1.2','TLSv1.3'])
194+
for(constnameofObject.keys(CLIENTS))
195+
awaittestResumption(version,name);
196+
197+
// Validate the rejectUnauth:false->true case
198+
awaittestRejectResumedWithoutCert();
199+
})().then(common.mustCall());
0 commit comments
Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Commit 15da4a1
Browse files
pimterryaduh95
pimterry
authored and
aduh95
committed
tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption
Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.
Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <pimterry@gmail.com>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
1 parent ca88587 commit 15da4a1
2 files changed
Lines changed: 206 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎lib/internal/tls/wrap.js‎
Lines changed: 7 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1320,6 +1320,13 @@ function onServerSocketSecure() {
13201320
if(verifyError){
13211321
this.authorizationError=verifyError.code;
13221322

1323+
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
1324+
this.destroy();
1325+
}elseif(!this._handle.getPeerX509Certificate()){
1326+
// Ncrypto reports X509_V_OK for TLS 1.3 resumption without a peer
1327+
// certificate, as it uses PSKs. Require one to authorize the socket.
1328+
this.authorizationError='UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT';
1329+
13231330
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
13241331
this.destroy();
13251332
}else{
‎test/parallel/test-tls-client-cert-resumption.js‎
Lines changed: 199 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
constcommon=require('../common');
3+
if(!common.hasCrypto)
4+
common.skip('missing crypto');
5+
6+
// Server-side client-certificate authorization must survive TLS session
7+
// resumption. On a resumed handshake the client does not re-send its
8+
// certificate, so the server has to report the same authorization state it
9+
// derived from the original full handshake:
10+
//
11+
// - a trusted certificate stays authorized,
12+
// - an untrusted certificate stays unauthorized with its verification error,
13+
// - a missing certificate stays unauthorized (UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT).
14+
//
15+
// The missing-certificate case is special on TLS 1.3: ncrypto reports X509_V_OK
16+
// for the resumed PSK handshake even though no certificate was presented, so
17+
// the absence has to be detected explicitly (see onServerSocketSecure() in
18+
// lib/internal/tls/wrap.js). The final case checks that such a certificate-less
19+
// resumed session is rejected outright when rejectUnauthorized is set.
20+
21+
constassert=require('assert');
22+
constcrypto=require('crypto');
23+
consttls=require('tls');
24+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
25+
const{ once }=require('events');
26+
27+
constca=fixtures.readKey('ca1-cert.pem');
28+
constserverCert={
29+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent2-key.pem'),
30+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent2-cert.pem'),
31+
};
32+
33+
// Client certificate variants, keyed by the peer state they produce.
34+
constCLIENTS={
35+
trusted: {// Signed by ca1
36+
creds: {
37+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
38+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
39+
},
40+
authorized: true,
41+
authorizationError: null,
42+
peerCN: 'agent1',
43+
},
44+
untrusted: {// Signed by ca2, not trusted
45+
creds: {
46+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent3-key.pem'),
47+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent3-cert.pem'),
48+
},
49+
authorized: false,
50+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE',
51+
peerCN: 'agent3',
52+
},
53+
missing: {// No client certificate
54+
creds: {},
55+
authorized: false,
56+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT',
57+
peerCN: undefined,
58+
},
59+
};
60+
61+
asyncfunctionhandshake(options,captureSession){
62+
constsocket=tls.connect(options);
63+
constsessionPromise=captureSession ?
64+
once(socket,'session').then(([session])=>session) : null;
65+
66+
socket.resume();
67+
awaitonce(socket,'secureConnect');
68+
69+
constclosePromise=once(socket,'close');
70+
constsession=sessionPromise ? awaitsessionPromise : undefined;
71+
socket.end();
72+
awaitclosePromise;
73+
returnsession;
74+
}
75+
76+
// Test a single resumption configuration and expected result:
77+
asyncfunctiontestResumption(version,name){
78+
const{ creds, authorized, authorizationError, peerCN }=CLIENTS[name];
79+
80+
letconnections=0;
81+
constserver=tls.createServer({
82+
 ...serverCert,
83+
 ca,
84+
requestCert: true,
85+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
86+
minVersion: version,
87+
maxVersion: version,
88+
},common.mustCall((socket)=>{
89+
// 2nd conn must resume:
90+
constresumed=connections++===1;
91+
constwhere=`${version}${name}${resumed ? 'resumed' : 'new'}`;
92+
assert.strictEqual(socket.isSessionReused(),resumed,where);
93+
94+
// Both conns must report same expected auth state:
95+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,authorized,where);
96+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,authorizationError,where);
97+
constpeer=socket.getPeerCertificate();
98+
if(peerCN===undefined)
99+
assert.deepStrictEqual(peer,{},where);
100+
else
101+
assert.strictEqual(peer.subject.CN,peerCN,where);
102+
103+
// N.b. BoringSSL only sends a ticket after a write:
104+
socket.end('.');
105+
},2));
106+
107+
server.listen(0);
108+
awaitonce(server,'listening');
109+
110+
constoptions={
111+
port: server.address().port,
112+
host: '127.0.0.1',
113+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
114+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
115+
minVersion: version,
116+
maxVersion: version,
117+
 ...creds,
118+
};
119+
120+
try{
121+
constsession=awaithandshake(options,true);
122+
assert(session);
123+
awaithandshake({ ...options, session });
124+
}finally{
125+
server.close();
126+
awaitonce(server,'close');
127+
}
128+
}
129+
130+
// Test the special case of resumption from rejectUnauthorized:false to
131+
// rejectUnauthorized:true, which must be rejected even though the original
132+
// session worked initially.
133+
asyncfunctiontestRejectResumedWithoutCert(){
134+
constoptions={
135+
 ...serverCert,
136+
 ca,
137+
requestCert: true,
138+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
139+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
140+
ticketKeys: crypto.randomBytes(48),
141+
};
142+
constlenient=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: false});
143+
lenient.on('secureConnection',common.mustCall((socket)=>{
144+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,false);
145+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT');
146+
socket.end('.');
147+
}));
148+
149+
conststrict=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: true});
150+
strict.on('secureConnection',common.mustNotCall());
151+
152+
constclientOptions=(port)=>({
153+
 port,
154+
host: '127.0.0.1',
155+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
156+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
157+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
158+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
159+
});
160+
161+
lenient.listen(0);
162+
awaitonce(lenient,'listening');
163+
constsession=awaithandshake(clientOptions(lenient.address().port),true);
164+
assert(session);
165+
lenient.close();
166+
awaitonce(lenient,'close');
167+
168+
strict.listen(0);
169+
awaitonce(strict,'listening');
170+
171+
constresumed=tls.connect({ ...clientOptions(strict.address().port), session });
172+
resumed.on('error',()=>{});// May observe the server's reset.
173+
resumed.resume();
174+
175+
// The client completes the resumed handshake (it has the server's Finished)
176+
// before the server's reset can arrive, so this asserts the strict server
177+
// actually resumed rather than falling back to a rejected full handshake.
178+
awaitonce(resumed,'secureConnect');
179+
assert.strictEqual(resumed.isSessionReused(),true);
180+
181+
// Then the socket is destroyed during 'secure', which surfaces as a reset
182+
// rather than a handshake failure.
183+
const[err]=awaitonce(strict,'tlsClientError');
184+
assert.strictEqual(err.code,'ECONNRESET');
185+
186+
resumed.destroy();
187+
strict.close();
188+
awaitonce(strict,'close');
189+
}
190+
191+
(asyncfunction(){
192+
// Run the full matrix of configurations:
193+
for(constversionof['TLSv1.2','TLSv1.3'])
194+
for(constnameofObject.keys(CLIENTS))
195+
awaittestResumption(version,name);
196+
197+
// Validate the rejectUnauth:false->true case
198+
awaittestRejectResumedWithoutCert();
199+
})().then(common.mustCall());
0 commit comments
Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Commit 15da4a1
Browse files
pimterryaduh95
pimterry
authored and
aduh95
committed
tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption
Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.
Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <pimterry@gmail.com>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
1 parent ca88587 commit 15da4a1
2 files changed
Lines changed: 206 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎lib/internal/tls/wrap.js‎
Lines changed: 7 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1320,6 +1320,13 @@ function onServerSocketSecure() {
13201320
if(verifyError){
13211321
this.authorizationError=verifyError.code;
13221322

1323+
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
1324+
this.destroy();
1325+
}elseif(!this._handle.getPeerX509Certificate()){
1326+
// Ncrypto reports X509_V_OK for TLS 1.3 resumption without a peer
1327+
// certificate, as it uses PSKs. Require one to authorize the socket.
1328+
this.authorizationError='UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT';
1329+
13231330
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
13241331
this.destroy();
13251332
}else{
‎test/parallel/test-tls-client-cert-resumption.js‎
Lines changed: 199 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
constcommon=require('../common');
3+
if(!common.hasCrypto)
4+
common.skip('missing crypto');
5+
6+
// Server-side client-certificate authorization must survive TLS session
7+
// resumption. On a resumed handshake the client does not re-send its
8+
// certificate, so the server has to report the same authorization state it
9+
// derived from the original full handshake:
10+
//
11+
// - a trusted certificate stays authorized,
12+
// - an untrusted certificate stays unauthorized with its verification error,
13+
// - a missing certificate stays unauthorized (UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT).
14+
//
15+
// The missing-certificate case is special on TLS 1.3: ncrypto reports X509_V_OK
16+
// for the resumed PSK handshake even though no certificate was presented, so
17+
// the absence has to be detected explicitly (see onServerSocketSecure() in
18+
// lib/internal/tls/wrap.js). The final case checks that such a certificate-less
19+
// resumed session is rejected outright when rejectUnauthorized is set.
20+
21+
constassert=require('assert');
22+
constcrypto=require('crypto');
23+
consttls=require('tls');
24+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
25+
const{ once }=require('events');
26+
27+
constca=fixtures.readKey('ca1-cert.pem');
28+
constserverCert={
29+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent2-key.pem'),
30+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent2-cert.pem'),
31+
};
32+
33+
// Client certificate variants, keyed by the peer state they produce.
34+
constCLIENTS={
35+
trusted: {// Signed by ca1
36+
creds: {
37+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
38+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
39+
},
40+
authorized: true,
41+
authorizationError: null,
42+
peerCN: 'agent1',
43+
},
44+
untrusted: {// Signed by ca2, not trusted
45+
creds: {
46+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent3-key.pem'),
47+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent3-cert.pem'),
48+
},
49+
authorized: false,
50+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE',
51+
peerCN: 'agent3',
52+
},
53+
missing: {// No client certificate
54+
creds: {},
55+
authorized: false,
56+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT',
57+
peerCN: undefined,
58+
},
59+
};
60+
61+
asyncfunctionhandshake(options,captureSession){
62+
constsocket=tls.connect(options);
63+
constsessionPromise=captureSession ?
64+
once(socket,'session').then(([session])=>session) : null;
65+
66+
socket.resume();
67+
awaitonce(socket,'secureConnect');
68+
69+
constclosePromise=once(socket,'close');
70+
constsession=sessionPromise ? awaitsessionPromise : undefined;
71+
socket.end();
72+
awaitclosePromise;
73+
returnsession;
74+
}
75+
76+
// Test a single resumption configuration and expected result:
77+
asyncfunctiontestResumption(version,name){
78+
const{ creds, authorized, authorizationError, peerCN }=CLIENTS[name];
79+
80+
letconnections=0;
81+
constserver=tls.createServer({
82+
 ...serverCert,
83+
 ca,
84+
requestCert: true,
85+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
86+
minVersion: version,
87+
maxVersion: version,
88+
},common.mustCall((socket)=>{
89+
// 2nd conn must resume:
90+
constresumed=connections++===1;
91+
constwhere=`${version}${name}${resumed ? 'resumed' : 'new'}`;
92+
assert.strictEqual(socket.isSessionReused(),resumed,where);
93+
94+
// Both conns must report same expected auth state:
95+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,authorized,where);
96+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,authorizationError,where);
97+
constpeer=socket.getPeerCertificate();
98+
if(peerCN===undefined)
99+
assert.deepStrictEqual(peer,{},where);
100+
else
101+
assert.strictEqual(peer.subject.CN,peerCN,where);
102+
103+
// N.b. BoringSSL only sends a ticket after a write:
104+
socket.end('.');
105+
},2));
106+
107+
server.listen(0);
108+
awaitonce(server,'listening');
109+
110+
constoptions={
111+
port: server.address().port,
112+
host: '127.0.0.1',
113+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
114+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
115+
minVersion: version,
116+
maxVersion: version,
117+
 ...creds,
118+
};
119+
120+
try{
121+
constsession=awaithandshake(options,true);
122+
assert(session);
123+
awaithandshake({ ...options, session });
124+
}finally{
125+
server.close();
126+
awaitonce(server,'close');
127+
}
128+
}
129+
130+
// Test the special case of resumption from rejectUnauthorized:false to
131+
// rejectUnauthorized:true, which must be rejected even though the original
132+
// session worked initially.
133+
asyncfunctiontestRejectResumedWithoutCert(){
134+
constoptions={
135+
 ...serverCert,
136+
 ca,
137+
requestCert: true,
138+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
139+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
140+
ticketKeys: crypto.randomBytes(48),
141+
};
142+
constlenient=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: false});
143+
lenient.on('secureConnection',common.mustCall((socket)=>{
144+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,false);
145+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT');
146+
socket.end('.');
147+
}));
148+
149+
conststrict=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: true});
150+
strict.on('secureConnection',common.mustNotCall());
151+
152+
constclientOptions=(port)=>({
153+
 port,
154+
host: '127.0.0.1',
155+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
156+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
157+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
158+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
159+
});
160+
161+
lenient.listen(0);
162+
awaitonce(lenient,'listening');
163+
constsession=awaithandshake(clientOptions(lenient.address().port),true);
164+
assert(session);
165+
lenient.close();
166+
awaitonce(lenient,'close');
167+
168+
strict.listen(0);
169+
awaitonce(strict,'listening');
170+
171+
constresumed=tls.connect({ ...clientOptions(strict.address().port), session });
172+
resumed.on('error',()=>{});// May observe the server's reset.
173+
resumed.resume();
174+
175+
// The client completes the resumed handshake (it has the server's Finished)
176+
// before the server's reset can arrive, so this asserts the strict server
177+
// actually resumed rather than falling back to a rejected full handshake.
178+
awaitonce(resumed,'secureConnect');
179+
assert.strictEqual(resumed.isSessionReused(),true);
180+
181+
// Then the socket is destroyed during 'secure', which surfaces as a reset
182+
// rather than a handshake failure.
183+
const[err]=awaitonce(strict,'tlsClientError');
184+
assert.strictEqual(err.code,'ECONNRESET');
185+
186+
resumed.destroy();
187+
strict.close();
188+
awaitonce(strict,'close');
189+
}
190+
191+
(asyncfunction(){
192+
// Run the full matrix of configurations:
193+
for(constversionof['TLSv1.2','TLSv1.3'])
194+
for(constnameofObject.keys(CLIENTS))
195+
awaittestResumption(version,name);
196+
197+
// Validate the rejectUnauth:false->true case
198+
awaittestRejectResumedWithoutCert();
199+
})().then(common.mustCall());
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Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Commit 15da4a1
Browse files
pimterryaduh95
pimterry
authored and
aduh95
committed
tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption
Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.
Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <pimterry@gmail.com>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
1 parent ca88587 commit 15da4a1
2 files changed
Lines changed: 206 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎lib/internal/tls/wrap.js‎
Lines changed: 7 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1320,6 +1320,13 @@ function onServerSocketSecure() {
13201320
if(verifyError){
13211321
this.authorizationError=verifyError.code;
13221322

1323+
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
1324+
this.destroy();
1325+
}elseif(!this._handle.getPeerX509Certificate()){
1326+
// Ncrypto reports X509_V_OK for TLS 1.3 resumption without a peer
1327+
// certificate, as it uses PSKs. Require one to authorize the socket.
1328+
this.authorizationError='UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT';
1329+
13231330
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
13241331
this.destroy();
13251332
}else{
‎test/parallel/test-tls-client-cert-resumption.js‎
Lines changed: 199 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
constcommon=require('../common');
3+
if(!common.hasCrypto)
4+
common.skip('missing crypto');
5+
6+
// Server-side client-certificate authorization must survive TLS session
7+
// resumption. On a resumed handshake the client does not re-send its
8+
// certificate, so the server has to report the same authorization state it
9+
// derived from the original full handshake:
10+
//
11+
// - a trusted certificate stays authorized,
12+
// - an untrusted certificate stays unauthorized with its verification error,
13+
// - a missing certificate stays unauthorized (UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT).
14+
//
15+
// The missing-certificate case is special on TLS 1.3: ncrypto reports X509_V_OK
16+
// for the resumed PSK handshake even though no certificate was presented, so
17+
// the absence has to be detected explicitly (see onServerSocketSecure() in
18+
// lib/internal/tls/wrap.js). The final case checks that such a certificate-less
19+
// resumed session is rejected outright when rejectUnauthorized is set.
20+
21+
constassert=require('assert');
22+
constcrypto=require('crypto');
23+
consttls=require('tls');
24+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
25+
const{ once }=require('events');
26+
27+
constca=fixtures.readKey('ca1-cert.pem');
28+
constserverCert={
29+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent2-key.pem'),
30+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent2-cert.pem'),
31+
};
32+
33+
// Client certificate variants, keyed by the peer state they produce.
34+
constCLIENTS={
35+
trusted: {// Signed by ca1
36+
creds: {
37+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
38+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
39+
},
40+
authorized: true,
41+
authorizationError: null,
42+
peerCN: 'agent1',
43+
},
44+
untrusted: {// Signed by ca2, not trusted
45+
creds: {
46+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent3-key.pem'),
47+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent3-cert.pem'),
48+
},
49+
authorized: false,
50+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE',
51+
peerCN: 'agent3',
52+
},
53+
missing: {// No client certificate
54+
creds: {},
55+
authorized: false,
56+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT',
57+
peerCN: undefined,
58+
},
59+
};
60+
61+
asyncfunctionhandshake(options,captureSession){
62+
constsocket=tls.connect(options);
63+
constsessionPromise=captureSession ?
64+
once(socket,'session').then(([session])=>session) : null;
65+
66+
socket.resume();
67+
awaitonce(socket,'secureConnect');
68+
69+
constclosePromise=once(socket,'close');
70+
constsession=sessionPromise ? awaitsessionPromise : undefined;
71+
socket.end();
72+
awaitclosePromise;
73+
returnsession;
74+
}
75+
76+
// Test a single resumption configuration and expected result:
77+
asyncfunctiontestResumption(version,name){
78+
const{ creds, authorized, authorizationError, peerCN }=CLIENTS[name];
79+
80+
letconnections=0;
81+
constserver=tls.createServer({
82+
 ...serverCert,
83+
 ca,
84+
requestCert: true,
85+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
86+
minVersion: version,
87+
maxVersion: version,
88+
},common.mustCall((socket)=>{
89+
// 2nd conn must resume:
90+
constresumed=connections++===1;
91+
constwhere=`${version}${name}${resumed ? 'resumed' : 'new'}`;
92+
assert.strictEqual(socket.isSessionReused(),resumed,where);
93+
94+
// Both conns must report same expected auth state:
95+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,authorized,where);
96+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,authorizationError,where);
97+
constpeer=socket.getPeerCertificate();
98+
if(peerCN===undefined)
99+
assert.deepStrictEqual(peer,{},where);
100+
else
101+
assert.strictEqual(peer.subject.CN,peerCN,where);
102+
103+
// N.b. BoringSSL only sends a ticket after a write:
104+
socket.end('.');
105+
},2));
106+
107+
server.listen(0);
108+
awaitonce(server,'listening');
109+
110+
constoptions={
111+
port: server.address().port,
112+
host: '127.0.0.1',
113+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
114+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
115+
minVersion: version,
116+
maxVersion: version,
117+
 ...creds,
118+
};
119+
120+
try{
121+
constsession=awaithandshake(options,true);
122+
assert(session);
123+
awaithandshake({ ...options, session });
124+
}finally{
125+
server.close();
126+
awaitonce(server,'close');
127+
}
128+
}
129+
130+
// Test the special case of resumption from rejectUnauthorized:false to
131+
// rejectUnauthorized:true, which must be rejected even though the original
132+
// session worked initially.
133+
asyncfunctiontestRejectResumedWithoutCert(){
134+
constoptions={
135+
 ...serverCert,
136+
 ca,
137+
requestCert: true,
138+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
139+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
140+
ticketKeys: crypto.randomBytes(48),
141+
};
142+
constlenient=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: false});
143+
lenient.on('secureConnection',common.mustCall((socket)=>{
144+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,false);
145+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT');
146+
socket.end('.');
147+
}));
148+
149+
conststrict=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: true});
150+
strict.on('secureConnection',common.mustNotCall());
151+
152+
constclientOptions=(port)=>({
153+
 port,
154+
host: '127.0.0.1',
155+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
156+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
157+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
158+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
159+
});
160+
161+
lenient.listen(0);
162+
awaitonce(lenient,'listening');
163+
constsession=awaithandshake(clientOptions(lenient.address().port),true);
164+
assert(session);
165+
lenient.close();
166+
awaitonce(lenient,'close');
167+
168+
strict.listen(0);
169+
awaitonce(strict,'listening');
170+
171+
constresumed=tls.connect({ ...clientOptions(strict.address().port), session });
172+
resumed.on('error',()=>{});// May observe the server's reset.
173+
resumed.resume();
174+
175+
// The client completes the resumed handshake (it has the server's Finished)
176+
// before the server's reset can arrive, so this asserts the strict server
177+
// actually resumed rather than falling back to a rejected full handshake.
178+
awaitonce(resumed,'secureConnect');
179+
assert.strictEqual(resumed.isSessionReused(),true);
180+
181+
// Then the socket is destroyed during 'secure', which surfaces as a reset
182+
// rather than a handshake failure.
183+
const[err]=awaitonce(strict,'tlsClientError');
184+
assert.strictEqual(err.code,'ECONNRESET');
185+
186+
resumed.destroy();
187+
strict.close();
188+
awaitonce(strict,'close');
189+
}
190+
191+
(asyncfunction(){
192+
// Run the full matrix of configurations:
193+
for(constversionof['TLSv1.2','TLSv1.3'])
194+
for(constnameofObject.keys(CLIENTS))
195+
awaittestResumption(version,name);
196+
197+
// Validate the rejectUnauth:false->true case
198+
awaittestRejectResumedWithoutCert();
199+
})().then(common.mustCall());
0 commit comments
Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Commit 15da4a1
Browse files
pimterryaduh95
pimterry
authored and
aduh95
committed
tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption
Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.
Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <pimterry@gmail.com>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
1 parent ca88587 commit 15da4a1
2 files changed
Lines changed: 206 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎lib/internal/tls/wrap.js‎
Lines changed: 7 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1320,6 +1320,13 @@ function onServerSocketSecure() {
13201320
if(verifyError){
13211321
this.authorizationError=verifyError.code;
13221322

1323+
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
1324+
this.destroy();
1325+
}elseif(!this._handle.getPeerX509Certificate()){
1326+
// Ncrypto reports X509_V_OK for TLS 1.3 resumption without a peer
1327+
// certificate, as it uses PSKs. Require one to authorize the socket.
1328+
this.authorizationError='UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT';
1329+
13231330
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
13241331
this.destroy();
13251332
}else{
‎test/parallel/test-tls-client-cert-resumption.js‎
Lines changed: 199 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
constcommon=require('../common');
3+
if(!common.hasCrypto)
4+
common.skip('missing crypto');
5+
6+
// Server-side client-certificate authorization must survive TLS session
7+
// resumption. On a resumed handshake the client does not re-send its
8+
// certificate, so the server has to report the same authorization state it
9+
// derived from the original full handshake:
10+
//
11+
// - a trusted certificate stays authorized,
12+
// - an untrusted certificate stays unauthorized with its verification error,
13+
// - a missing certificate stays unauthorized (UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT).
14+
//
15+
// The missing-certificate case is special on TLS 1.3: ncrypto reports X509_V_OK
16+
// for the resumed PSK handshake even though no certificate was presented, so
17+
// the absence has to be detected explicitly (see onServerSocketSecure() in
18+
// lib/internal/tls/wrap.js). The final case checks that such a certificate-less
19+
// resumed session is rejected outright when rejectUnauthorized is set.
20+
21+
constassert=require('assert');
22+
constcrypto=require('crypto');
23+
consttls=require('tls');
24+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
25+
const{ once }=require('events');
26+
27+
constca=fixtures.readKey('ca1-cert.pem');
28+
constserverCert={
29+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent2-key.pem'),
30+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent2-cert.pem'),
31+
};
32+
33+
// Client certificate variants, keyed by the peer state they produce.
34+
constCLIENTS={
35+
trusted: {// Signed by ca1
36+
creds: {
37+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
38+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
39+
},
40+
authorized: true,
41+
authorizationError: null,
42+
peerCN: 'agent1',
43+
},
44+
untrusted: {// Signed by ca2, not trusted
45+
creds: {
46+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent3-key.pem'),
47+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent3-cert.pem'),
48+
},
49+
authorized: false,
50+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE',
51+
peerCN: 'agent3',
52+
},
53+
missing: {// No client certificate
54+
creds: {},
55+
authorized: false,
56+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT',
57+
peerCN: undefined,
58+
},
59+
};
60+
61+
asyncfunctionhandshake(options,captureSession){
62+
constsocket=tls.connect(options);
63+
constsessionPromise=captureSession ?
64+
once(socket,'session').then(([session])=>session) : null;
65+
66+
socket.resume();
67+
awaitonce(socket,'secureConnect');
68+
69+
constclosePromise=once(socket,'close');
70+
constsession=sessionPromise ? awaitsessionPromise : undefined;
71+
socket.end();
72+
awaitclosePromise;
73+
returnsession;
74+
}
75+
76+
// Test a single resumption configuration and expected result:
77+
asyncfunctiontestResumption(version,name){
78+
const{ creds, authorized, authorizationError, peerCN }=CLIENTS[name];
79+
80+
letconnections=0;
81+
constserver=tls.createServer({
82+
 ...serverCert,
83+
 ca,
84+
requestCert: true,
85+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
86+
minVersion: version,
87+
maxVersion: version,
88+
},common.mustCall((socket)=>{
89+
// 2nd conn must resume:
90+
constresumed=connections++===1;
91+
constwhere=`${version}${name}${resumed ? 'resumed' : 'new'}`;
92+
assert.strictEqual(socket.isSessionReused(),resumed,where);
93+
94+
// Both conns must report same expected auth state:
95+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,authorized,where);
96+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,authorizationError,where);
97+
constpeer=socket.getPeerCertificate();
98+
if(peerCN===undefined)
99+
assert.deepStrictEqual(peer,{},where);
100+
else
101+
assert.strictEqual(peer.subject.CN,peerCN,where);
102+
103+
// N.b. BoringSSL only sends a ticket after a write:
104+
socket.end('.');
105+
},2));
106+
107+
server.listen(0);
108+
awaitonce(server,'listening');
109+
110+
constoptions={
111+
port: server.address().port,
112+
host: '127.0.0.1',
113+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
114+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
115+
minVersion: version,
116+
maxVersion: version,
117+
 ...creds,
118+
};
119+
120+
try{
121+
constsession=awaithandshake(options,true);
122+
assert(session);
123+
awaithandshake({ ...options, session });
124+
}finally{
125+
server.close();
126+
awaitonce(server,'close');
127+
}
128+
}
129+
130+
// Test the special case of resumption from rejectUnauthorized:false to
131+
// rejectUnauthorized:true, which must be rejected even though the original
132+
// session worked initially.
133+
asyncfunctiontestRejectResumedWithoutCert(){
134+
constoptions={
135+
 ...serverCert,
136+
 ca,
137+
requestCert: true,
138+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
139+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
140+
ticketKeys: crypto.randomBytes(48),
141+
};
142+
constlenient=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: false});
143+
lenient.on('secureConnection',common.mustCall((socket)=>{
144+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,false);
145+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT');
146+
socket.end('.');
147+
}));
148+
149+
conststrict=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: true});
150+
strict.on('secureConnection',common.mustNotCall());
151+
152+
constclientOptions=(port)=>({
153+
 port,
154+
host: '127.0.0.1',
155+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
156+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
157+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
158+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
159+
});
160+
161+
lenient.listen(0);
162+
awaitonce(lenient,'listening');
163+
constsession=awaithandshake(clientOptions(lenient.address().port),true);
164+
assert(session);
165+
lenient.close();
166+
awaitonce(lenient,'close');
167+
168+
strict.listen(0);
169+
awaitonce(strict,'listening');
170+
171+
constresumed=tls.connect({ ...clientOptions(strict.address().port), session });
172+
resumed.on('error',()=>{});// May observe the server's reset.
173+
resumed.resume();
174+
175+
// The client completes the resumed handshake (it has the server's Finished)
176+
// before the server's reset can arrive, so this asserts the strict server
177+
// actually resumed rather than falling back to a rejected full handshake.
178+
awaitonce(resumed,'secureConnect');
179+
assert.strictEqual(resumed.isSessionReused(),true);
180+
181+
// Then the socket is destroyed during 'secure', which surfaces as a reset
182+
// rather than a handshake failure.
183+
const[err]=awaitonce(strict,'tlsClientError');
184+
assert.strictEqual(err.code,'ECONNRESET');
185+
186+
resumed.destroy();
187+
strict.close();
188+
awaitonce(strict,'close');
189+
}
190+
191+
(asyncfunction(){
192+
// Run the full matrix of configurations:
193+
for(constversionof['TLSv1.2','TLSv1.3'])
194+
for(constnameofObject.keys(CLIENTS))
195+
awaittestResumption(version,name);
196+
197+
// Validate the rejectUnauth:false->true case
198+
awaittestRejectResumedWithoutCert();
199+
})().then(common.mustCall());
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Commit 15da4a1
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pimterryaduh95
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authored and
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committed
tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption
Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert,
but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false
the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS
1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our
internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly
report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection
in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant:
authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.
Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <pimterry@gmail.com>
PR-URL: #64677
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
1 parent ca88587 commit 15da4a1
2 files changed
Lines changed: 206 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎lib/internal/tls/wrap.js‎
Lines changed: 7 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1320,6 +1320,13 @@ function onServerSocketSecure() {
13201320
if(verifyError){
13211321
this.authorizationError=verifyError.code;
13221322

1323+
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
1324+
this.destroy();
1325+
}elseif(!this._handle.getPeerX509Certificate()){
1326+
// Ncrypto reports X509_V_OK for TLS 1.3 resumption without a peer
1327+
// certificate, as it uses PSKs. Require one to authorize the socket.
1328+
this.authorizationError='UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT';
1329+
13231330
if(this._rejectUnauthorized)
13241331
this.destroy();
13251332
}else{
‎test/parallel/test-tls-client-cert-resumption.js‎
Lines changed: 199 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
constcommon=require('../common');
3+
if(!common.hasCrypto)
4+
common.skip('missing crypto');
5+
6+
// Server-side client-certificate authorization must survive TLS session
7+
// resumption. On a resumed handshake the client does not re-send its
8+
// certificate, so the server has to report the same authorization state it
9+
// derived from the original full handshake:
10+
//
11+
// - a trusted certificate stays authorized,
12+
// - an untrusted certificate stays unauthorized with its verification error,
13+
// - a missing certificate stays unauthorized (UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT).
14+
//
15+
// The missing-certificate case is special on TLS 1.3: ncrypto reports X509_V_OK
16+
// for the resumed PSK handshake even though no certificate was presented, so
17+
// the absence has to be detected explicitly (see onServerSocketSecure() in
18+
// lib/internal/tls/wrap.js). The final case checks that such a certificate-less
19+
// resumed session is rejected outright when rejectUnauthorized is set.
20+
21+
constassert=require('assert');
22+
constcrypto=require('crypto');
23+
consttls=require('tls');
24+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
25+
const{ once }=require('events');
26+
27+
constca=fixtures.readKey('ca1-cert.pem');
28+
constserverCert={
29+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent2-key.pem'),
30+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent2-cert.pem'),
31+
};
32+
33+
// Client certificate variants, keyed by the peer state they produce.
34+
constCLIENTS={
35+
trusted: {// Signed by ca1
36+
creds: {
37+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent1-key.pem'),
38+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent1-cert.pem'),
39+
},
40+
authorized: true,
41+
authorizationError: null,
42+
peerCN: 'agent1',
43+
},
44+
untrusted: {// Signed by ca2, not trusted
45+
creds: {
46+
key: fixtures.readKey('agent3-key.pem'),
47+
cert: fixtures.readKey('agent3-cert.pem'),
48+
},
49+
authorized: false,
50+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE',
51+
peerCN: 'agent3',
52+
},
53+
missing: {// No client certificate
54+
creds: {},
55+
authorized: false,
56+
authorizationError: 'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT',
57+
peerCN: undefined,
58+
},
59+
};
60+
61+
asyncfunctionhandshake(options,captureSession){
62+
constsocket=tls.connect(options);
63+
constsessionPromise=captureSession ?
64+
once(socket,'session').then(([session])=>session) : null;
65+
66+
socket.resume();
67+
awaitonce(socket,'secureConnect');
68+
69+
constclosePromise=once(socket,'close');
70+
constsession=sessionPromise ? awaitsessionPromise : undefined;
71+
socket.end();
72+
awaitclosePromise;
73+
returnsession;
74+
}
75+
76+
// Test a single resumption configuration and expected result:
77+
asyncfunctiontestResumption(version,name){
78+
const{ creds, authorized, authorizationError, peerCN }=CLIENTS[name];
79+
80+
letconnections=0;
81+
constserver=tls.createServer({
82+
 ...serverCert,
83+
 ca,
84+
requestCert: true,
85+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
86+
minVersion: version,
87+
maxVersion: version,
88+
},common.mustCall((socket)=>{
89+
// 2nd conn must resume:
90+
constresumed=connections++===1;
91+
constwhere=`${version}${name}${resumed ? 'resumed' : 'new'}`;
92+
assert.strictEqual(socket.isSessionReused(),resumed,where);
93+
94+
// Both conns must report same expected auth state:
95+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,authorized,where);
96+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,authorizationError,where);
97+
constpeer=socket.getPeerCertificate();
98+
if(peerCN===undefined)
99+
assert.deepStrictEqual(peer,{},where);
100+
else
101+
assert.strictEqual(peer.subject.CN,peerCN,where);
102+
103+
// N.b. BoringSSL only sends a ticket after a write:
104+
socket.end('.');
105+
},2));
106+
107+
server.listen(0);
108+
awaitonce(server,'listening');
109+
110+
constoptions={
111+
port: server.address().port,
112+
host: '127.0.0.1',
113+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
114+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
115+
minVersion: version,
116+
maxVersion: version,
117+
 ...creds,
118+
};
119+
120+
try{
121+
constsession=awaithandshake(options,true);
122+
assert(session);
123+
awaithandshake({ ...options, session });
124+
}finally{
125+
server.close();
126+
awaitonce(server,'close');
127+
}
128+
}
129+
130+
// Test the special case of resumption from rejectUnauthorized:false to
131+
// rejectUnauthorized:true, which must be rejected even though the original
132+
// session worked initially.
133+
asyncfunctiontestRejectResumedWithoutCert(){
134+
constoptions={
135+
 ...serverCert,
136+
 ca,
137+
requestCert: true,
138+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
139+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
140+
ticketKeys: crypto.randomBytes(48),
141+
};
142+
constlenient=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: false});
143+
lenient.on('secureConnection',common.mustCall((socket)=>{
144+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorized,false);
145+
assert.strictEqual(socket.authorizationError,'UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT');
146+
socket.end('.');
147+
}));
148+
149+
conststrict=tls.createServer({ ...options,rejectUnauthorized: true});
150+
strict.on('secureConnection',common.mustNotCall());
151+
152+
constclientOptions=(port)=>({
153+
 port,
154+
host: '127.0.0.1',
155+
rejectUnauthorized: false,
156+
checkServerIdentity: ()=>undefined,
157+
minVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
158+
maxVersion: 'TLSv1.3',
159+
});
160+
161+
lenient.listen(0);
162+
awaitonce(lenient,'listening');
163+
constsession=awaithandshake(clientOptions(lenient.address().port),true);
164+
assert(session);
165+
lenient.close();
166+
awaitonce(lenient,'close');
167+
168+
strict.listen(0);
169+
awaitonce(strict,'listening');
170+
171+
constresumed=tls.connect({ ...clientOptions(strict.address().port), session });
172+
resumed.on('error',()=>{});// May observe the server's reset.
173+
resumed.resume();
174+
175+
// The client completes the resumed handshake (it has the server's Finished)
176+
// before the server's reset can arrive, so this asserts the strict server
177+
// actually resumed rather than falling back to a rejected full handshake.
178+
awaitonce(resumed,'secureConnect');
179+
assert.strictEqual(resumed.isSessionReused(),true);
180+
181+
// Then the socket is destroyed during 'secure', which surfaces as a reset
182+
// rather than a handshake failure.
183+
const[err]=awaitonce(strict,'tlsClientError');
184+
assert.strictEqual(err.code,'ECONNRESET');
185+
186+
resumed.destroy();
187+
strict.close();
188+
awaitonce(strict,'close');
189+
}
190+
191+
(asyncfunction(){
192+
// Run the full matrix of configurations:
193+
for(constversionof['TLSv1.2','TLSv1.3'])
194+
for(constnameofObject.keys(CLIENTS))
195+
awaittestResumption(version,name);
196+
197+
// Validate the rejectUnauth:false->true case
198+
awaittestRejectResumedWithoutCert();
199+
})().then(common.mustCall());
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