Commit 3b7f4fc

Browse files
3zrvaduh95
3zrv
authored and
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committed
quic: drop version negotiation packets with oversized CIDs
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Sayed <k@3zrv.com> PR-URL: #64228 Backport-PR-URL: #64675 Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com> Reviewed-By: Stephen Belanger <admin@stephenbelanger.com> Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
1 parent bd477a3 commit 3b7f4fc

2 files changed

Lines changed: 107 additions & 0 deletions

File tree

‎src/quic/endpoint.cc‎

Lines changed: 18 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1801,6 +1801,24 @@ void Endpoint::Receive(const uint8_t* data,
18011801
// successfully decoded. Send a Version Negotiation response
18021802
// per RFC 9000 Section 6. The VN packet's DCID is the client's
18031803
// SCID and vice versa (mirrored back to the client).
1804+
//
1805+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() only enforces the
1806+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN limit for *supported* versions; for an
1807+
// unsupported version it returns the raw connection ID lengths
1808+
// taken from the single-byte length fields on the wire, which can
1809+
// be up to 255. Constructing a CID -- backed by a fixed
1810+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN-byte buffer -- from such a length writes past
1811+
// the buffer (an assertion abort in release builds). A single
1812+
// unauthenticated UDP datagram could therefore crash the endpoint
1813+
// before any handshake. Drop these packets, mirroring the
1814+
// CID-length policy applied below for supported versions.
1815+
if (pversion_cid.dcidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN ||
1816+
pversion_cid.scidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN) {
1817+
Debug(this,
1818+
"Version negotiation packet had incorrectly sized CIDs, "
1819+
"ignoring");
1820+
return;
1821+
}
18041822
Debug(this,
18051823
"Packet version %d is not supported, sending version negotiation",
18061824
pversion_cid.version);

‎test/parallel/test-quic-version-negotiation-oversized-cid.mjs‎

Lines changed: 89 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
1+
// Flags: --experimental-quic --no-warnings
2+
3+
// Regression test for an unauthenticated remote crash in the QUIC Version
4+
// Negotiation path.
5+
//
6+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() does not clamp the connection ID lengths
7+
// to NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN (20) when the packet's version is unsupported -- it
8+
// returns the raw single-byte length fields from the wire, which can be up
9+
// to 255. Endpoint::Receive() used to build CID objects (each backed by a
10+
// fixed 20-byte buffer) directly from those lengths before any bound check,
11+
// so a single crafted UDP datagram with an oversized DCID/SCID length would
12+
// overflow the buffer and abort the process before the handshake.
13+
//
14+
// This test sends such a datagram directly with node:dgram and asserts the
15+
// endpoint drops it without crashing, while a well-formed unsupported-version
16+
// datagram still produces exactly one Version Negotiation response.
17+
18+
import{hasQuic,skip,mustNotCall}from'../common/index.mjs';
19+
importassertfrom'node:assert';
20+
21+
const{ strictEqual }=assert;
22+
23+
if(!hasQuic){
24+
skip('QUIC is not enabled');
25+
}
26+
27+
const{ createSocket }=awaitimport('node:dgram');
28+
const{ listen }=awaitimport('../common/quic.mjs');
29+
30+
// A long-header QUIC packet must be at least NGTCP2_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE
31+
// (1200) bytes for an unsupported version to decode as a VN trigger.
32+
constPACKET_SIZE=1200;
33+
34+
// Build a QUIC long-header packet with an unsupported version and the given
35+
// DCID/SCID lengths. Lengths greater than 20 are only expressible because the
36+
// on-wire length field is a single byte (0-255).
37+
functionbuildLongHeaderPacket(dcidLen,scidLen){
38+
constpacket=Buffer.alloc(PACKET_SIZE);
39+
// Header form bit (0x80) + fixed bit (0x40).
40+
packet[0]=0xc0;
41+
// Version 0x0a0a0a0a: nonzero (so it is not a real VN packet) and not a
42+
// version Node supports, which forces the NGTCP2_ERR_VERSION_NEGOTIATION
43+
// decode path.
44+
packet.writeUInt32BE(0x0a0a0a0a,1);
45+
packet[5]=dcidLen;// DCID length byte
46+
// DCID bytes occupy [6, 6 + dcidLen); SCID length byte follows them.
47+
packet[6+dcidLen]=scidLen;
48+
// Remaining bytes stay zero-filled as padding to reach PACKET_SIZE.
49+
returnpacket;
50+
}
51+
52+
// No handshake ever completes: the test only sends raw datagrams, so the
53+
// session callback must never fire.
54+
constserverEndpoint=awaitlisten(mustNotCall());
55+
const{ address, port }=serverEndpoint.address;
56+
57+
constsocket=createSocket('udp4');
58+
59+
functionsend(packet){
60+
returnnewPromise((resolve,reject)=>{
61+
socket.send(packet,port,address,(err)=>{
62+
if(err)reject(err);
63+
elseresolve();
64+
});
65+
});
66+
}
67+
68+
// 1. Oversized DCID (21 > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN). Before the fix this aborted the
69+
// process. After the fix it must be dropped silently.
70+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(21,0));
71+
72+
// 2. A well-formed unsupported-version packet with valid (<= 20 byte) CIDs.
73+
// This must still elicit exactly one Version Negotiation response, proving
74+
// the fix did not break legitimate version negotiation.
75+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(8,8));
76+
77+
// Poll until the valid packet has been processed into a VN response.
78+
constdeadline=Date.now()+2000;
79+
while(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount===0n){
80+
if(Date.now()>deadline)break;
81+
awaitnewPromise((resolve)=>setTimeout(resolve,25));
82+
}
83+
84+
// Exactly one VN response: the oversized packet was dropped (not crashed, not
85+
// negotiated), the valid packet was negotiated.
86+
strictEqual(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount,1n);
87+
88+
socket.close();
89+
awaitserverEndpoint.close();

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Comments
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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
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}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Commit 3b7f4fc
Browse files
3zrvaduh95
3zrv
authored and
aduh95
committed
quic: drop version negotiation packets with oversized CIDs
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Sayed <k@3zrv.com>
PR-URL: #64228
Backport-PR-URL: #64675
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Stephen Belanger <admin@stephenbelanger.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
1 parent bd477a3 commit 3b7f4fc
2 files changed
Lines changed: 107 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎src/quic/endpoint.cc‎
Lines changed: 18 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1801,6 +1801,24 @@ void Endpoint::Receive(const uint8_t* data,
18011801
// successfully decoded. Send a Version Negotiation response
18021802
// per RFC 9000 Section 6. The VN packet's DCID is the client's
18031803
// SCID and vice versa (mirrored back to the client).
1804+
//
1805+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() only enforces the
1806+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN limit for *supported* versions; for an
1807+
// unsupported version it returns the raw connection ID lengths
1808+
// taken from the single-byte length fields on the wire, which can
1809+
// be up to 255. Constructing a CID -- backed by a fixed
1810+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN-byte buffer -- from such a length writes past
1811+
// the buffer (an assertion abort in release builds). A single
1812+
// unauthenticated UDP datagram could therefore crash the endpoint
1813+
// before any handshake. Drop these packets, mirroring the
1814+
// CID-length policy applied below for supported versions.
1815+
if (pversion_cid.dcidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN ||
1816+
 pversion_cid.scidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN) {
1817+
Debug(this,
1818+
"Version negotiation packet had incorrectly sized CIDs, "
1819+
"ignoring");
1820+
return;
1821+
 }
18041822
Debug(this,
18051823
"Packet version %d is not supported, sending version negotiation",
18061824
 pversion_cid.version);
‎test/parallel/test-quic-version-negotiation-oversized-cid.mjs‎
Lines changed: 89 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
1+
// Flags: --experimental-quic --no-warnings
2+
3+
// Regression test for an unauthenticated remote crash in the QUIC Version
4+
// Negotiation path.
5+
//
6+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() does not clamp the connection ID lengths
7+
// to NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN (20) when the packet's version is unsupported -- it
8+
// returns the raw single-byte length fields from the wire, which can be up
9+
// to 255. Endpoint::Receive() used to build CID objects (each backed by a
10+
// fixed 20-byte buffer) directly from those lengths before any bound check,
11+
// so a single crafted UDP datagram with an oversized DCID/SCID length would
12+
// overflow the buffer and abort the process before the handshake.
13+
//
14+
// This test sends such a datagram directly with node:dgram and asserts the
15+
// endpoint drops it without crashing, while a well-formed unsupported-version
16+
// datagram still produces exactly one Version Negotiation response.
17+
18+
import{hasQuic,skip,mustNotCall}from'../common/index.mjs';
19+
importassertfrom'node:assert';
20+
21+
const{ strictEqual }=assert;
22+
23+
if(!hasQuic){
24+
skip('QUIC is not enabled');
25+
}
26+
27+
const{ createSocket }=awaitimport('node:dgram');
28+
const{ listen }=awaitimport('../common/quic.mjs');
29+
30+
// A long-header QUIC packet must be at least NGTCP2_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE
31+
// (1200) bytes for an unsupported version to decode as a VN trigger.
32+
constPACKET_SIZE=1200;
33+
34+
// Build a QUIC long-header packet with an unsupported version and the given
35+
// DCID/SCID lengths. Lengths greater than 20 are only expressible because the
36+
// on-wire length field is a single byte (0-255).
37+
functionbuildLongHeaderPacket(dcidLen,scidLen){
38+
constpacket=Buffer.alloc(PACKET_SIZE);
39+
// Header form bit (0x80) + fixed bit (0x40).
40+
packet[0]=0xc0;
41+
// Version 0x0a0a0a0a: nonzero (so it is not a real VN packet) and not a
42+
// version Node supports, which forces the NGTCP2_ERR_VERSION_NEGOTIATION
43+
// decode path.
44+
packet.writeUInt32BE(0x0a0a0a0a,1);
45+
packet[5]=dcidLen;// DCID length byte
46+
// DCID bytes occupy [6, 6 + dcidLen); SCID length byte follows them.
47+
packet[6+dcidLen]=scidLen;
48+
// Remaining bytes stay zero-filled as padding to reach PACKET_SIZE.
49+
returnpacket;
50+
}
51+
52+
// No handshake ever completes: the test only sends raw datagrams, so the
53+
// session callback must never fire.
54+
constserverEndpoint=awaitlisten(mustNotCall());
55+
const{ address, port }=serverEndpoint.address;
56+
57+
constsocket=createSocket('udp4');
58+
59+
functionsend(packet){
60+
returnnewPromise((resolve,reject)=>{
61+
socket.send(packet,port,address,(err)=>{
62+
if(err)reject(err);
63+
elseresolve();
64+
});
65+
});
66+
}
67+
68+
// 1. Oversized DCID (21 > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN). Before the fix this aborted the
69+
// process. After the fix it must be dropped silently.
70+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(21,0));
71+
72+
// 2. A well-formed unsupported-version packet with valid (<= 20 byte) CIDs.
73+
// This must still elicit exactly one Version Negotiation response, proving
74+
// the fix did not break legitimate version negotiation.
75+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(8,8));
76+
77+
// Poll until the valid packet has been processed into a VN response.
78+
constdeadline=Date.now()+2000;
79+
while(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount===0n){
80+
if(Date.now()>deadline)break;
81+
awaitnewPromise((resolve)=>setTimeout(resolve,25));
82+
}
83+
84+
// Exactly one VN response: the oversized packet was dropped (not crashed, not
85+
// negotiated), the valid packet was negotiated.
86+
strictEqual(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount,1n);
87+
88+
socket.close();
89+
awaitserverEndpoint.close();
0 commit comments
Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Commit 3b7f4fc
Browse files
3zrvaduh95
3zrv
authored and
aduh95
committed
quic: drop version negotiation packets with oversized CIDs
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Sayed <k@3zrv.com>
PR-URL: #64228
Backport-PR-URL: #64675
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Stephen Belanger <admin@stephenbelanger.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
1 parent bd477a3 commit 3b7f4fc
2 files changed
Lines changed: 107 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎src/quic/endpoint.cc‎
Lines changed: 18 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1801,6 +1801,24 @@ void Endpoint::Receive(const uint8_t* data,
18011801
// successfully decoded. Send a Version Negotiation response
18021802
// per RFC 9000 Section 6. The VN packet's DCID is the client's
18031803
// SCID and vice versa (mirrored back to the client).
1804+
//
1805+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() only enforces the
1806+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN limit for *supported* versions; for an
1807+
// unsupported version it returns the raw connection ID lengths
1808+
// taken from the single-byte length fields on the wire, which can
1809+
// be up to 255. Constructing a CID -- backed by a fixed
1810+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN-byte buffer -- from such a length writes past
1811+
// the buffer (an assertion abort in release builds). A single
1812+
// unauthenticated UDP datagram could therefore crash the endpoint
1813+
// before any handshake. Drop these packets, mirroring the
1814+
// CID-length policy applied below for supported versions.
1815+
if (pversion_cid.dcidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN ||
1816+
 pversion_cid.scidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN) {
1817+
Debug(this,
1818+
"Version negotiation packet had incorrectly sized CIDs, "
1819+
"ignoring");
1820+
return;
1821+
 }
18041822
Debug(this,
18051823
"Packet version %d is not supported, sending version negotiation",
18061824
 pversion_cid.version);
‎test/parallel/test-quic-version-negotiation-oversized-cid.mjs‎
Lines changed: 89 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
1+
// Flags: --experimental-quic --no-warnings
2+
3+
// Regression test for an unauthenticated remote crash in the QUIC Version
4+
// Negotiation path.
5+
//
6+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() does not clamp the connection ID lengths
7+
// to NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN (20) when the packet's version is unsupported -- it
8+
// returns the raw single-byte length fields from the wire, which can be up
9+
// to 255. Endpoint::Receive() used to build CID objects (each backed by a
10+
// fixed 20-byte buffer) directly from those lengths before any bound check,
11+
// so a single crafted UDP datagram with an oversized DCID/SCID length would
12+
// overflow the buffer and abort the process before the handshake.
13+
//
14+
// This test sends such a datagram directly with node:dgram and asserts the
15+
// endpoint drops it without crashing, while a well-formed unsupported-version
16+
// datagram still produces exactly one Version Negotiation response.
17+
18+
import{hasQuic,skip,mustNotCall}from'../common/index.mjs';
19+
importassertfrom'node:assert';
20+
21+
const{ strictEqual }=assert;
22+
23+
if(!hasQuic){
24+
skip('QUIC is not enabled');
25+
}
26+
27+
const{ createSocket }=awaitimport('node:dgram');
28+
const{ listen }=awaitimport('../common/quic.mjs');
29+
30+
// A long-header QUIC packet must be at least NGTCP2_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE
31+
// (1200) bytes for an unsupported version to decode as a VN trigger.
32+
constPACKET_SIZE=1200;
33+
34+
// Build a QUIC long-header packet with an unsupported version and the given
35+
// DCID/SCID lengths. Lengths greater than 20 are only expressible because the
36+
// on-wire length field is a single byte (0-255).
37+
functionbuildLongHeaderPacket(dcidLen,scidLen){
38+
constpacket=Buffer.alloc(PACKET_SIZE);
39+
// Header form bit (0x80) + fixed bit (0x40).
40+
packet[0]=0xc0;
41+
// Version 0x0a0a0a0a: nonzero (so it is not a real VN packet) and not a
42+
// version Node supports, which forces the NGTCP2_ERR_VERSION_NEGOTIATION
43+
// decode path.
44+
packet.writeUInt32BE(0x0a0a0a0a,1);
45+
packet[5]=dcidLen;// DCID length byte
46+
// DCID bytes occupy [6, 6 + dcidLen); SCID length byte follows them.
47+
packet[6+dcidLen]=scidLen;
48+
// Remaining bytes stay zero-filled as padding to reach PACKET_SIZE.
49+
returnpacket;
50+
}
51+
52+
// No handshake ever completes: the test only sends raw datagrams, so the
53+
// session callback must never fire.
54+
constserverEndpoint=awaitlisten(mustNotCall());
55+
const{ address, port }=serverEndpoint.address;
56+
57+
constsocket=createSocket('udp4');
58+
59+
functionsend(packet){
60+
returnnewPromise((resolve,reject)=>{
61+
socket.send(packet,port,address,(err)=>{
62+
if(err)reject(err);
63+
elseresolve();
64+
});
65+
});
66+
}
67+
68+
// 1. Oversized DCID (21 > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN). Before the fix this aborted the
69+
// process. After the fix it must be dropped silently.
70+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(21,0));
71+
72+
// 2. A well-formed unsupported-version packet with valid (<= 20 byte) CIDs.
73+
// This must still elicit exactly one Version Negotiation response, proving
74+
// the fix did not break legitimate version negotiation.
75+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(8,8));
76+
77+
// Poll until the valid packet has been processed into a VN response.
78+
constdeadline=Date.now()+2000;
79+
while(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount===0n){
80+
if(Date.now()>deadline)break;
81+
awaitnewPromise((resolve)=>setTimeout(resolve,25));
82+
}
83+
84+
// Exactly one VN response: the oversized packet was dropped (not crashed, not
85+
// negotiated), the valid packet was negotiated.
86+
strictEqual(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount,1n);
87+
88+
socket.close();
89+
awaitserverEndpoint.close();
0 commit comments
Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Commit 3b7f4fc
Browse files
3zrvaduh95
3zrv
authored and
aduh95
committed
quic: drop version negotiation packets with oversized CIDs
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Sayed <k@3zrv.com>
PR-URL: #64228
Backport-PR-URL: #64675
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Stephen Belanger <admin@stephenbelanger.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
1 parent bd477a3 commit 3b7f4fc
2 files changed
Lines changed: 107 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎src/quic/endpoint.cc‎
Lines changed: 18 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1801,6 +1801,24 @@ void Endpoint::Receive(const uint8_t* data,
18011801
// successfully decoded. Send a Version Negotiation response
18021802
// per RFC 9000 Section 6. The VN packet's DCID is the client's
18031803
// SCID and vice versa (mirrored back to the client).
1804+
//
1805+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() only enforces the
1806+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN limit for *supported* versions; for an
1807+
// unsupported version it returns the raw connection ID lengths
1808+
// taken from the single-byte length fields on the wire, which can
1809+
// be up to 255. Constructing a CID -- backed by a fixed
1810+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN-byte buffer -- from such a length writes past
1811+
// the buffer (an assertion abort in release builds). A single
1812+
// unauthenticated UDP datagram could therefore crash the endpoint
1813+
// before any handshake. Drop these packets, mirroring the
1814+
// CID-length policy applied below for supported versions.
1815+
if (pversion_cid.dcidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN ||
1816+
 pversion_cid.scidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN) {
1817+
Debug(this,
1818+
"Version negotiation packet had incorrectly sized CIDs, "
1819+
"ignoring");
1820+
return;
1821+
 }
18041822
Debug(this,
18051823
"Packet version %d is not supported, sending version negotiation",
18061824
 pversion_cid.version);
‎test/parallel/test-quic-version-negotiation-oversized-cid.mjs‎
Lines changed: 89 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
1+
// Flags: --experimental-quic --no-warnings
2+
3+
// Regression test for an unauthenticated remote crash in the QUIC Version
4+
// Negotiation path.
5+
//
6+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() does not clamp the connection ID lengths
7+
// to NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN (20) when the packet's version is unsupported -- it
8+
// returns the raw single-byte length fields from the wire, which can be up
9+
// to 255. Endpoint::Receive() used to build CID objects (each backed by a
10+
// fixed 20-byte buffer) directly from those lengths before any bound check,
11+
// so a single crafted UDP datagram with an oversized DCID/SCID length would
12+
// overflow the buffer and abort the process before the handshake.
13+
//
14+
// This test sends such a datagram directly with node:dgram and asserts the
15+
// endpoint drops it without crashing, while a well-formed unsupported-version
16+
// datagram still produces exactly one Version Negotiation response.
17+
18+
import{hasQuic,skip,mustNotCall}from'../common/index.mjs';
19+
importassertfrom'node:assert';
20+
21+
const{ strictEqual }=assert;
22+
23+
if(!hasQuic){
24+
skip('QUIC is not enabled');
25+
}
26+
27+
const{ createSocket }=awaitimport('node:dgram');
28+
const{ listen }=awaitimport('../common/quic.mjs');
29+
30+
// A long-header QUIC packet must be at least NGTCP2_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE
31+
// (1200) bytes for an unsupported version to decode as a VN trigger.
32+
constPACKET_SIZE=1200;
33+
34+
// Build a QUIC long-header packet with an unsupported version and the given
35+
// DCID/SCID lengths. Lengths greater than 20 are only expressible because the
36+
// on-wire length field is a single byte (0-255).
37+
functionbuildLongHeaderPacket(dcidLen,scidLen){
38+
constpacket=Buffer.alloc(PACKET_SIZE);
39+
// Header form bit (0x80) + fixed bit (0x40).
40+
packet[0]=0xc0;
41+
// Version 0x0a0a0a0a: nonzero (so it is not a real VN packet) and not a
42+
// version Node supports, which forces the NGTCP2_ERR_VERSION_NEGOTIATION
43+
// decode path.
44+
packet.writeUInt32BE(0x0a0a0a0a,1);
45+
packet[5]=dcidLen;// DCID length byte
46+
// DCID bytes occupy [6, 6 + dcidLen); SCID length byte follows them.
47+
packet[6+dcidLen]=scidLen;
48+
// Remaining bytes stay zero-filled as padding to reach PACKET_SIZE.
49+
returnpacket;
50+
}
51+
52+
// No handshake ever completes: the test only sends raw datagrams, so the
53+
// session callback must never fire.
54+
constserverEndpoint=awaitlisten(mustNotCall());
55+
const{ address, port }=serverEndpoint.address;
56+
57+
constsocket=createSocket('udp4');
58+
59+
functionsend(packet){
60+
returnnewPromise((resolve,reject)=>{
61+
socket.send(packet,port,address,(err)=>{
62+
if(err)reject(err);
63+
elseresolve();
64+
});
65+
});
66+
}
67+
68+
// 1. Oversized DCID (21 > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN). Before the fix this aborted the
69+
// process. After the fix it must be dropped silently.
70+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(21,0));
71+
72+
// 2. A well-formed unsupported-version packet with valid (<= 20 byte) CIDs.
73+
// This must still elicit exactly one Version Negotiation response, proving
74+
// the fix did not break legitimate version negotiation.
75+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(8,8));
76+
77+
// Poll until the valid packet has been processed into a VN response.
78+
constdeadline=Date.now()+2000;
79+
while(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount===0n){
80+
if(Date.now()>deadline)break;
81+
awaitnewPromise((resolve)=>setTimeout(resolve,25));
82+
}
83+
84+
// Exactly one VN response: the oversized packet was dropped (not crashed, not
85+
// negotiated), the valid packet was negotiated.
86+
strictEqual(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount,1n);
87+
88+
socket.close();
89+
awaitserverEndpoint.close();
0 commit comments
Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Commit 3b7f4fc
Browse files
3zrvaduh95
3zrv
authored and
aduh95
committed
quic: drop version negotiation packets with oversized CIDs
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Sayed <k@3zrv.com>
PR-URL: #64228
Backport-PR-URL: #64675
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Stephen Belanger <admin@stephenbelanger.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
1 parent bd477a3 commit 3b7f4fc
2 files changed
Lines changed: 107 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎src/quic/endpoint.cc‎
Lines changed: 18 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1801,6 +1801,24 @@ void Endpoint::Receive(const uint8_t* data,
18011801
// successfully decoded. Send a Version Negotiation response
18021802
// per RFC 9000 Section 6. The VN packet's DCID is the client's
18031803
// SCID and vice versa (mirrored back to the client).
1804+
//
1805+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() only enforces the
1806+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN limit for *supported* versions; for an
1807+
// unsupported version it returns the raw connection ID lengths
1808+
// taken from the single-byte length fields on the wire, which can
1809+
// be up to 255. Constructing a CID -- backed by a fixed
1810+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN-byte buffer -- from such a length writes past
1811+
// the buffer (an assertion abort in release builds). A single
1812+
// unauthenticated UDP datagram could therefore crash the endpoint
1813+
// before any handshake. Drop these packets, mirroring the
1814+
// CID-length policy applied below for supported versions.
1815+
if (pversion_cid.dcidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN ||
1816+
 pversion_cid.scidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN) {
1817+
Debug(this,
1818+
"Version negotiation packet had incorrectly sized CIDs, "
1819+
"ignoring");
1820+
return;
1821+
 }
18041822
Debug(this,
18051823
"Packet version %d is not supported, sending version negotiation",
18061824
 pversion_cid.version);
‎test/parallel/test-quic-version-negotiation-oversized-cid.mjs‎
Lines changed: 89 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
1+
// Flags: --experimental-quic --no-warnings
2+
3+
// Regression test for an unauthenticated remote crash in the QUIC Version
4+
// Negotiation path.
5+
//
6+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() does not clamp the connection ID lengths
7+
// to NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN (20) when the packet's version is unsupported -- it
8+
// returns the raw single-byte length fields from the wire, which can be up
9+
// to 255. Endpoint::Receive() used to build CID objects (each backed by a
10+
// fixed 20-byte buffer) directly from those lengths before any bound check,
11+
// so a single crafted UDP datagram with an oversized DCID/SCID length would
12+
// overflow the buffer and abort the process before the handshake.
13+
//
14+
// This test sends such a datagram directly with node:dgram and asserts the
15+
// endpoint drops it without crashing, while a well-formed unsupported-version
16+
// datagram still produces exactly one Version Negotiation response.
17+
18+
import{hasQuic,skip,mustNotCall}from'../common/index.mjs';
19+
importassertfrom'node:assert';
20+
21+
const{ strictEqual }=assert;
22+
23+
if(!hasQuic){
24+
skip('QUIC is not enabled');
25+
}
26+
27+
const{ createSocket }=awaitimport('node:dgram');
28+
const{ listen }=awaitimport('../common/quic.mjs');
29+
30+
// A long-header QUIC packet must be at least NGTCP2_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE
31+
// (1200) bytes for an unsupported version to decode as a VN trigger.
32+
constPACKET_SIZE=1200;
33+
34+
// Build a QUIC long-header packet with an unsupported version and the given
35+
// DCID/SCID lengths. Lengths greater than 20 are only expressible because the
36+
// on-wire length field is a single byte (0-255).
37+
functionbuildLongHeaderPacket(dcidLen,scidLen){
38+
constpacket=Buffer.alloc(PACKET_SIZE);
39+
// Header form bit (0x80) + fixed bit (0x40).
40+
packet[0]=0xc0;
41+
// Version 0x0a0a0a0a: nonzero (so it is not a real VN packet) and not a
42+
// version Node supports, which forces the NGTCP2_ERR_VERSION_NEGOTIATION
43+
// decode path.
44+
packet.writeUInt32BE(0x0a0a0a0a,1);
45+
packet[5]=dcidLen;// DCID length byte
46+
// DCID bytes occupy [6, 6 + dcidLen); SCID length byte follows them.
47+
packet[6+dcidLen]=scidLen;
48+
// Remaining bytes stay zero-filled as padding to reach PACKET_SIZE.
49+
returnpacket;
50+
}
51+
52+
// No handshake ever completes: the test only sends raw datagrams, so the
53+
// session callback must never fire.
54+
constserverEndpoint=awaitlisten(mustNotCall());
55+
const{ address, port }=serverEndpoint.address;
56+
57+
constsocket=createSocket('udp4');
58+
59+
functionsend(packet){
60+
returnnewPromise((resolve,reject)=>{
61+
socket.send(packet,port,address,(err)=>{
62+
if(err)reject(err);
63+
elseresolve();
64+
});
65+
});
66+
}
67+
68+
// 1. Oversized DCID (21 > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN). Before the fix this aborted the
69+
// process. After the fix it must be dropped silently.
70+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(21,0));
71+
72+
// 2. A well-formed unsupported-version packet with valid (<= 20 byte) CIDs.
73+
// This must still elicit exactly one Version Negotiation response, proving
74+
// the fix did not break legitimate version negotiation.
75+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(8,8));
76+
77+
// Poll until the valid packet has been processed into a VN response.
78+
constdeadline=Date.now()+2000;
79+
while(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount===0n){
80+
if(Date.now()>deadline)break;
81+
awaitnewPromise((resolve)=>setTimeout(resolve,25));
82+
}
83+
84+
// Exactly one VN response: the oversized packet was dropped (not crashed, not
85+
// negotiated), the valid packet was negotiated.
86+
strictEqual(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount,1n);
87+
88+
socket.close();
89+
awaitserverEndpoint.close();
0 commit comments
Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Commit 3b7f4fc
Browse files
3zrvaduh95
3zrv
authored and
aduh95
committed
quic: drop version negotiation packets with oversized CIDs
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Sayed <k@3zrv.com>
PR-URL: #64228
Backport-PR-URL: #64675
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Stephen Belanger <admin@stephenbelanger.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
1 parent bd477a3 commit 3b7f4fc
2 files changed
Lines changed: 107 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎src/quic/endpoint.cc‎
Lines changed: 18 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1801,6 +1801,24 @@ void Endpoint::Receive(const uint8_t* data,
18011801
// successfully decoded. Send a Version Negotiation response
18021802
// per RFC 9000 Section 6. The VN packet's DCID is the client's
18031803
// SCID and vice versa (mirrored back to the client).
1804+
//
1805+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() only enforces the
1806+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN limit for *supported* versions; for an
1807+
// unsupported version it returns the raw connection ID lengths
1808+
// taken from the single-byte length fields on the wire, which can
1809+
// be up to 255. Constructing a CID -- backed by a fixed
1810+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN-byte buffer -- from such a length writes past
1811+
// the buffer (an assertion abort in release builds). A single
1812+
// unauthenticated UDP datagram could therefore crash the endpoint
1813+
// before any handshake. Drop these packets, mirroring the
1814+
// CID-length policy applied below for supported versions.
1815+
if (pversion_cid.dcidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN ||
1816+
 pversion_cid.scidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN) {
1817+
Debug(this,
1818+
"Version negotiation packet had incorrectly sized CIDs, "
1819+
"ignoring");
1820+
return;
1821+
 }
18041822
Debug(this,
18051823
"Packet version %d is not supported, sending version negotiation",
18061824
 pversion_cid.version);
‎test/parallel/test-quic-version-negotiation-oversized-cid.mjs‎
Lines changed: 89 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
1+
// Flags: --experimental-quic --no-warnings
2+
3+
// Regression test for an unauthenticated remote crash in the QUIC Version
4+
// Negotiation path.
5+
//
6+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() does not clamp the connection ID lengths
7+
// to NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN (20) when the packet's version is unsupported -- it
8+
// returns the raw single-byte length fields from the wire, which can be up
9+
// to 255. Endpoint::Receive() used to build CID objects (each backed by a
10+
// fixed 20-byte buffer) directly from those lengths before any bound check,
11+
// so a single crafted UDP datagram with an oversized DCID/SCID length would
12+
// overflow the buffer and abort the process before the handshake.
13+
//
14+
// This test sends such a datagram directly with node:dgram and asserts the
15+
// endpoint drops it without crashing, while a well-formed unsupported-version
16+
// datagram still produces exactly one Version Negotiation response.
17+
18+
import{hasQuic,skip,mustNotCall}from'../common/index.mjs';
19+
importassertfrom'node:assert';
20+
21+
const{ strictEqual }=assert;
22+
23+
if(!hasQuic){
24+
skip('QUIC is not enabled');
25+
}
26+
27+
const{ createSocket }=awaitimport('node:dgram');
28+
const{ listen }=awaitimport('../common/quic.mjs');
29+
30+
// A long-header QUIC packet must be at least NGTCP2_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE
31+
// (1200) bytes for an unsupported version to decode as a VN trigger.
32+
constPACKET_SIZE=1200;
33+
34+
// Build a QUIC long-header packet with an unsupported version and the given
35+
// DCID/SCID lengths. Lengths greater than 20 are only expressible because the
36+
// on-wire length field is a single byte (0-255).
37+
functionbuildLongHeaderPacket(dcidLen,scidLen){
38+
constpacket=Buffer.alloc(PACKET_SIZE);
39+
// Header form bit (0x80) + fixed bit (0x40).
40+
packet[0]=0xc0;
41+
// Version 0x0a0a0a0a: nonzero (so it is not a real VN packet) and not a
42+
// version Node supports, which forces the NGTCP2_ERR_VERSION_NEGOTIATION
43+
// decode path.
44+
packet.writeUInt32BE(0x0a0a0a0a,1);
45+
packet[5]=dcidLen;// DCID length byte
46+
// DCID bytes occupy [6, 6 + dcidLen); SCID length byte follows them.
47+
packet[6+dcidLen]=scidLen;
48+
// Remaining bytes stay zero-filled as padding to reach PACKET_SIZE.
49+
returnpacket;
50+
}
51+
52+
// No handshake ever completes: the test only sends raw datagrams, so the
53+
// session callback must never fire.
54+
constserverEndpoint=awaitlisten(mustNotCall());
55+
const{ address, port }=serverEndpoint.address;
56+
57+
constsocket=createSocket('udp4');
58+
59+
functionsend(packet){
60+
returnnewPromise((resolve,reject)=>{
61+
socket.send(packet,port,address,(err)=>{
62+
if(err)reject(err);
63+
elseresolve();
64+
});
65+
});
66+
}
67+
68+
// 1. Oversized DCID (21 > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN). Before the fix this aborted the
69+
// process. After the fix it must be dropped silently.
70+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(21,0));
71+
72+
// 2. A well-formed unsupported-version packet with valid (<= 20 byte) CIDs.
73+
// This must still elicit exactly one Version Negotiation response, proving
74+
// the fix did not break legitimate version negotiation.
75+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(8,8));
76+
77+
// Poll until the valid packet has been processed into a VN response.
78+
constdeadline=Date.now()+2000;
79+
while(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount===0n){
80+
if(Date.now()>deadline)break;
81+
awaitnewPromise((resolve)=>setTimeout(resolve,25));
82+
}
83+
84+
// Exactly one VN response: the oversized packet was dropped (not crashed, not
85+
// negotiated), the valid packet was negotiated.
86+
strictEqual(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount,1n);
87+
88+
socket.close();
89+
awaitserverEndpoint.close();
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Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Commit 3b7f4fc
Browse files
3zrvaduh95
3zrv
authored and
aduh95
committed
quic: drop version negotiation packets with oversized CIDs
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Sayed <k@3zrv.com>
PR-URL: #64228
Backport-PR-URL: #64675
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Stephen Belanger <admin@stephenbelanger.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
1 parent bd477a3 commit 3b7f4fc
2 files changed
Lines changed: 107 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎src/quic/endpoint.cc‎
Lines changed: 18 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1801,6 +1801,24 @@ void Endpoint::Receive(const uint8_t* data,
18011801
// successfully decoded. Send a Version Negotiation response
18021802
// per RFC 9000 Section 6. The VN packet's DCID is the client's
18031803
// SCID and vice versa (mirrored back to the client).
1804+
//
1805+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() only enforces the
1806+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN limit for *supported* versions; for an
1807+
// unsupported version it returns the raw connection ID lengths
1808+
// taken from the single-byte length fields on the wire, which can
1809+
// be up to 255. Constructing a CID -- backed by a fixed
1810+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN-byte buffer -- from such a length writes past
1811+
// the buffer (an assertion abort in release builds). A single
1812+
// unauthenticated UDP datagram could therefore crash the endpoint
1813+
// before any handshake. Drop these packets, mirroring the
1814+
// CID-length policy applied below for supported versions.
1815+
if (pversion_cid.dcidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN ||
1816+
 pversion_cid.scidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN) {
1817+
Debug(this,
1818+
"Version negotiation packet had incorrectly sized CIDs, "
1819+
"ignoring");
1820+
return;
1821+
 }
18041822
Debug(this,
18051823
"Packet version %d is not supported, sending version negotiation",
18061824
 pversion_cid.version);
‎test/parallel/test-quic-version-negotiation-oversized-cid.mjs‎
Lines changed: 89 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
1+
// Flags: --experimental-quic --no-warnings
2+
3+
// Regression test for an unauthenticated remote crash in the QUIC Version
4+
// Negotiation path.
5+
//
6+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() does not clamp the connection ID lengths
7+
// to NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN (20) when the packet's version is unsupported -- it
8+
// returns the raw single-byte length fields from the wire, which can be up
9+
// to 255. Endpoint::Receive() used to build CID objects (each backed by a
10+
// fixed 20-byte buffer) directly from those lengths before any bound check,
11+
// so a single crafted UDP datagram with an oversized DCID/SCID length would
12+
// overflow the buffer and abort the process before the handshake.
13+
//
14+
// This test sends such a datagram directly with node:dgram and asserts the
15+
// endpoint drops it without crashing, while a well-formed unsupported-version
16+
// datagram still produces exactly one Version Negotiation response.
17+
18+
import{hasQuic,skip,mustNotCall}from'../common/index.mjs';
19+
importassertfrom'node:assert';
20+
21+
const{ strictEqual }=assert;
22+
23+
if(!hasQuic){
24+
skip('QUIC is not enabled');
25+
}
26+
27+
const{ createSocket }=awaitimport('node:dgram');
28+
const{ listen }=awaitimport('../common/quic.mjs');
29+
30+
// A long-header QUIC packet must be at least NGTCP2_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE
31+
// (1200) bytes for an unsupported version to decode as a VN trigger.
32+
constPACKET_SIZE=1200;
33+
34+
// Build a QUIC long-header packet with an unsupported version and the given
35+
// DCID/SCID lengths. Lengths greater than 20 are only expressible because the
36+
// on-wire length field is a single byte (0-255).
37+
functionbuildLongHeaderPacket(dcidLen,scidLen){
38+
constpacket=Buffer.alloc(PACKET_SIZE);
39+
// Header form bit (0x80) + fixed bit (0x40).
40+
packet[0]=0xc0;
41+
// Version 0x0a0a0a0a: nonzero (so it is not a real VN packet) and not a
42+
// version Node supports, which forces the NGTCP2_ERR_VERSION_NEGOTIATION
43+
// decode path.
44+
packet.writeUInt32BE(0x0a0a0a0a,1);
45+
packet[5]=dcidLen;// DCID length byte
46+
// DCID bytes occupy [6, 6 + dcidLen); SCID length byte follows them.
47+
packet[6+dcidLen]=scidLen;
48+
// Remaining bytes stay zero-filled as padding to reach PACKET_SIZE.
49+
returnpacket;
50+
}
51+
52+
// No handshake ever completes: the test only sends raw datagrams, so the
53+
// session callback must never fire.
54+
constserverEndpoint=awaitlisten(mustNotCall());
55+
const{ address, port }=serverEndpoint.address;
56+
57+
constsocket=createSocket('udp4');
58+
59+
functionsend(packet){
60+
returnnewPromise((resolve,reject)=>{
61+
socket.send(packet,port,address,(err)=>{
62+
if(err)reject(err);
63+
elseresolve();
64+
});
65+
});
66+
}
67+
68+
// 1. Oversized DCID (21 > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN). Before the fix this aborted the
69+
// process. After the fix it must be dropped silently.
70+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(21,0));
71+
72+
// 2. A well-formed unsupported-version packet with valid (<= 20 byte) CIDs.
73+
// This must still elicit exactly one Version Negotiation response, proving
74+
// the fix did not break legitimate version negotiation.
75+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(8,8));
76+
77+
// Poll until the valid packet has been processed into a VN response.
78+
constdeadline=Date.now()+2000;
79+
while(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount===0n){
80+
if(Date.now()>deadline)break;
81+
awaitnewPromise((resolve)=>setTimeout(resolve,25));
82+
}
83+
84+
// Exactly one VN response: the oversized packet was dropped (not crashed, not
85+
// negotiated), the valid packet was negotiated.
86+
strictEqual(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount,1n);
87+
88+
socket.close();
89+
awaitserverEndpoint.close();
0 commit comments
Comments
 (0)

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

Skip to content
Commit 3b7f4fc
Browse files
3zrvaduh95
3zrv
authored and
aduh95
committed
quic: drop version negotiation packets with oversized CIDs
Signed-off-by: Mohamed Sayed <k@3zrv.com>
PR-URL: #64228
Backport-PR-URL: #64675
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Stephen Belanger <admin@stephenbelanger.com>
Reviewed-By: Anna Henningsen <anna@addaleax.net>
1 parent bd477a3 commit 3b7f4fc
2 files changed
Lines changed: 107 additions & 0 deletions
File tree
‎src/quic/endpoint.cc‎
Lines changed: 18 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -1801,6 +1801,24 @@ void Endpoint::Receive(const uint8_t* data,
18011801
// successfully decoded. Send a Version Negotiation response
18021802
// per RFC 9000 Section 6. The VN packet's DCID is the client's
18031803
// SCID and vice versa (mirrored back to the client).
1804+
//
1805+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() only enforces the
1806+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN limit for *supported* versions; for an
1807+
// unsupported version it returns the raw connection ID lengths
1808+
// taken from the single-byte length fields on the wire, which can
1809+
// be up to 255. Constructing a CID -- backed by a fixed
1810+
// NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN-byte buffer -- from such a length writes past
1811+
// the buffer (an assertion abort in release builds). A single
1812+
// unauthenticated UDP datagram could therefore crash the endpoint
1813+
// before any handshake. Drop these packets, mirroring the
1814+
// CID-length policy applied below for supported versions.
1815+
if (pversion_cid.dcidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN ||
1816+
 pversion_cid.scidlen > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN) {
1817+
Debug(this,
1818+
"Version negotiation packet had incorrectly sized CIDs, "
1819+
"ignoring");
1820+
return;
1821+
 }
18041822
Debug(this,
18051823
"Packet version %d is not supported, sending version negotiation",
18061824
 pversion_cid.version);
‎test/parallel/test-quic-version-negotiation-oversized-cid.mjs‎
Lines changed: 89 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
1+
// Flags: --experimental-quic --no-warnings
2+
3+
// Regression test for an unauthenticated remote crash in the QUIC Version
4+
// Negotiation path.
5+
//
6+
// ngtcp2_pkt_decode_version_cid() does not clamp the connection ID lengths
7+
// to NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN (20) when the packet's version is unsupported -- it
8+
// returns the raw single-byte length fields from the wire, which can be up
9+
// to 255. Endpoint::Receive() used to build CID objects (each backed by a
10+
// fixed 20-byte buffer) directly from those lengths before any bound check,
11+
// so a single crafted UDP datagram with an oversized DCID/SCID length would
12+
// overflow the buffer and abort the process before the handshake.
13+
//
14+
// This test sends such a datagram directly with node:dgram and asserts the
15+
// endpoint drops it without crashing, while a well-formed unsupported-version
16+
// datagram still produces exactly one Version Negotiation response.
17+
18+
import{hasQuic,skip,mustNotCall}from'../common/index.mjs';
19+
importassertfrom'node:assert';
20+
21+
const{ strictEqual }=assert;
22+
23+
if(!hasQuic){
24+
skip('QUIC is not enabled');
25+
}
26+
27+
const{ createSocket }=awaitimport('node:dgram');
28+
const{ listen }=awaitimport('../common/quic.mjs');
29+
30+
// A long-header QUIC packet must be at least NGTCP2_MAX_UDP_PAYLOAD_SIZE
31+
// (1200) bytes for an unsupported version to decode as a VN trigger.
32+
constPACKET_SIZE=1200;
33+
34+
// Build a QUIC long-header packet with an unsupported version and the given
35+
// DCID/SCID lengths. Lengths greater than 20 are only expressible because the
36+
// on-wire length field is a single byte (0-255).
37+
functionbuildLongHeaderPacket(dcidLen,scidLen){
38+
constpacket=Buffer.alloc(PACKET_SIZE);
39+
// Header form bit (0x80) + fixed bit (0x40).
40+
packet[0]=0xc0;
41+
// Version 0x0a0a0a0a: nonzero (so it is not a real VN packet) and not a
42+
// version Node supports, which forces the NGTCP2_ERR_VERSION_NEGOTIATION
43+
// decode path.
44+
packet.writeUInt32BE(0x0a0a0a0a,1);
45+
packet[5]=dcidLen;// DCID length byte
46+
// DCID bytes occupy [6, 6 + dcidLen); SCID length byte follows them.
47+
packet[6+dcidLen]=scidLen;
48+
// Remaining bytes stay zero-filled as padding to reach PACKET_SIZE.
49+
returnpacket;
50+
}
51+
52+
// No handshake ever completes: the test only sends raw datagrams, so the
53+
// session callback must never fire.
54+
constserverEndpoint=awaitlisten(mustNotCall());
55+
const{ address, port }=serverEndpoint.address;
56+
57+
constsocket=createSocket('udp4');
58+
59+
functionsend(packet){
60+
returnnewPromise((resolve,reject)=>{
61+
socket.send(packet,port,address,(err)=>{
62+
if(err)reject(err);
63+
elseresolve();
64+
});
65+
});
66+
}
67+
68+
// 1. Oversized DCID (21 > NGTCP2_MAX_CIDLEN). Before the fix this aborted the
69+
// process. After the fix it must be dropped silently.
70+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(21,0));
71+
72+
// 2. A well-formed unsupported-version packet with valid (<= 20 byte) CIDs.
73+
// This must still elicit exactly one Version Negotiation response, proving
74+
// the fix did not break legitimate version negotiation.
75+
awaitsend(buildLongHeaderPacket(8,8));
76+
77+
// Poll until the valid packet has been processed into a VN response.
78+
constdeadline=Date.now()+2000;
79+
while(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount===0n){
80+
if(Date.now()>deadline)break;
81+
awaitnewPromise((resolve)=>setTimeout(resolve,25));
82+
}
83+
84+
// Exactly one VN response: the oversized packet was dropped (not crashed, not
85+
// negotiated), the valid packet was negotiated.
86+
strictEqual(serverEndpoint.stats.versionNegotiationCount,1n);
87+
88+
socket.close();
89+
awaitserverEndpoint.close();
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 (0)