tls: remove prototype primordials

Co-authored-by: Yagiz Nizipli <yagiz@nizipli.com>
PR-URL: #53699
Reviewed-By: Moshe Atlow <moshe@atlow.co.il>
Reviewed-By: Yagiz Nizipli <yagiz.nizipli@sentry.io>
Reviewed-By: Marco Ippolito <marcoippolito54@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Benjamin Gruenbaum <benjamingr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Matteo Collina <matteo.collina@gmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Rafael Gonzaga <rafael.nunu@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-By: Chemi Atlow <chemi@atlow.co.il>
Reviewed-By: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>

Author: 2 people

doc/contributing/primordials.md

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ important than reliability against prototype pollution:
 
 *`node:http`
 *`node:http2`
+*`node:tls`
 
 Usage of primordials should be preferred for new code in other areas, but
 replacing current code with primordials should be

lib/_tls_common.js

@@ -24,9 +24,7 @@
 consttls=require('tls');
 
 const{
- ArrayPrototypePush,
  JSONParse,
- RegExpPrototypeSymbolReplace,
 }=primordials;
 
 const{
@@ -133,21 +131,21 @@ function translatePeerCertificate(c) {
 c.infoAccess={__proto__: null};
 
 // XXX: More key validation?
-RegExpPrototypeSymbolReplace(/([^\n:]*):([^\n]*)(?:\n|$)/g,info,
-(all,key,val)=>{
-if(val.charCodeAt(0)===0x22){
-// The translatePeerCertificate function is only
-// used on internally created legacy certificate
-// objects, and any value that contains a quote
-// will always be a valid JSON string literal,
-// so this should never throw.
-val=JSONParse(val);
-}
-if(keyinc.infoAccess)
-ArrayPrototypePush(c.infoAccess[key],val);
-else
-c.infoAccess[key]=[val];
-});
+info.replace(/([^\n:]*):([^\n]*)(?:\n|$)/g,
+(all,key,val)=>{
+if(val.charCodeAt(0)===0x22){
+// The translatePeerCertificate function is only
+// used on internally created legacy certificate
+// objects, and any value that contains a quote
+// will always be a valid JSON string literal,
+// so this should never throw.
+val=JSONParse(val);
+}
+if(keyinc.infoAccess)
+c.infoAccess[key].push(val);
+else
+c.infoAccess[key]=[val];
+});
 }
 returnc;
 }

lib/_tls_wrap.js

@@ -22,19 +22,11 @@
 'use strict';
 
 const{
- ArrayPrototypeForEach,
- ArrayPrototypeJoin,
- ArrayPrototypePush,
- FunctionPrototype,
  ObjectAssign,
  ObjectDefineProperty,
  ObjectSetPrototypeOf,
  ReflectApply,
  RegExp,
- RegExpPrototypeExec,
- RegExpPrototypeSymbolReplace,
- StringPrototypeReplaceAll,
- StringPrototypeSlice,
  Symbol,
  SymbolFor,
 }=primordials;
@@ -117,7 +109,7 @@ const kPskIdentityHint = Symbol('pskidentityhint');
 constkPendingSession=Symbol('pendingSession');
 constkIsVerified=Symbol('verified');
 
-constnoop=FunctionPrototype;
+constnoop=()=>{};
 
 letipServernameWarned=false;
 lettlsTracingWarned=false;
@@ -473,8 +465,7 @@ function onerror(err) {
 owner.destroy(err);
 }elseif(owner._tlsOptions?.isServer&&
 owner._rejectUnauthorized&&
-RegExpPrototypeExec(/peerdidnotreturnacertificate/,
-err.message)!==null){
+/peerdidnotreturnacertificate/.test(err.message)){
 // Ignore server's authorization errors
 owner.destroy();
 }else{
@@ -1171,7 +1162,7 @@ function makeSocketMethodProxy(name) {
 };
 }
 
-ArrayPrototypeForEach([
+[
 'getCipher',
 'getSharedSigalgs',
 'getEphemeralKeyInfo',
@@ -1182,7 +1173,7 @@ ArrayPrototypeForEach([
 'getTLSTicket',
 'isSessionReused',
 'enableTrace',
-],(method)=>{
+].forEach((method)=>{
 TLSSocket.prototype[method]=makeSocketMethodProxy(method);
 });
 
@@ -1479,10 +1470,10 @@ Server.prototype.setSecureContext = function(options) {
 if(options.sessionIdContext){
 this.sessionIdContext=options.sessionIdContext;
 }else{
-this.sessionIdContext=StringPrototypeSlice(
-crypto.createHash('sha1')
-.update(ArrayPrototypeJoin(process.argv,' '))
-.digest('hex'),0,32);
+this.sessionIdContext=crypto.createHash('sha1')
+.update(process.argv.join(' '))
+.digest('hex')
+.slice(0,32);
 }
 
 if(options.sessionTimeout)
@@ -1577,10 +1568,10 @@ Server.prototype.setOptions = deprecate(function(options) {
 if(options.sessionIdContext){
 this.sessionIdContext=options.sessionIdContext;
 }else{
-this.sessionIdContext=StringPrototypeSlice(
-crypto.createHash('sha1')
-.update(ArrayPrototypeJoin(process.argv,' '))
-.digest('hex'),0,32);
+this.sessionIdContext=crypto.createHash('sha1')
+.update(process.argv.join(' '))
+.digest('hex')
+.slice(0,32);
 }
 if(options.pskCallback)this[kPskCallback]=options.pskCallback;
 if(options.pskIdentityHint)this[kPskIdentityHint]=options.pskIdentityHint;
@@ -1597,14 +1588,15 @@ Server.prototype.addContext = function(servername, context) {
 thrownewERR_TLS_REQUIRED_SERVER_NAME();
 }
 
-constre=newRegExp('^'+StringPrototypeReplaceAll(
-RegExpPrototypeSymbolReplace(/([.^$+?\-\\[\]{}])/g,servername,'\\$1'),
-'*','[^.]*',
-)+'$');
+constre=newRegExp(`^${
+servername
+.replace(/([.^$+?\-\\[\]{}])/g,'\\$1')
+.replaceAll('*','[^.]*')
+}$`);
 
 constsecureContext=
 contextinstanceofcommon.SecureContext ? context : tls.createSecureContext(context);
-ArrayPrototypePush(this._contexts,[re,secureContext.context]);
+this._contexts.push([re,secureContext.context]);
 };
 
 Server.prototype[EE.captureRejectionSymbol]=function(
@@ -1625,7 +1617,7 @@ function SNICallback(servername, callback) {
 
 for(leti=contexts.length-1;i>=0;--i){
 constelem=contexts[i];
-if(RegExpPrototypeExec(elem[0],servername)!==null){
+if(elem[0].test(servername)){
 callback(null,elem[1]);
 return;
 }

lib/tls.js

@@ -24,26 +24,10 @@
 const{
  Array,
  ArrayIsArray,
- ArrayPrototypeForEach,
- ArrayPrototypeIncludes,
- ArrayPrototypeJoin,
- ArrayPrototypePush,
- ArrayPrototypeReduce,
- ArrayPrototypeSome,
  JSONParse,
  ObjectDefineProperty,
  ObjectFreeze,
- RegExpPrototypeExec,
- RegExpPrototypeSymbolReplace,
  StringFromCharCode,
- StringPrototypeCharCodeAt,
- StringPrototypeEndsWith,
- StringPrototypeIncludes,
- StringPrototypeIndexOf,
- StringPrototypeSlice,
- StringPrototypeSplit,
- StringPrototypeStartsWith,
- StringPrototypeSubstring,
 }=primordials;
 
 const{
@@ -122,7 +106,7 @@ ObjectDefineProperty(exports, 'rootCertificates', {
 // ("\x06spdy/2\x08http/1.1\x08http/1.0")
 functionconvertProtocols(protocols){
 constlens=newArray(protocols.length);
-constbuff=Buffer.allocUnsafe(ArrayPrototypeReduce(protocols,(p,c,i)=>{
+constbuff=Buffer.allocUnsafe(protocols.reduce((p,c,i)=>{
 constlen=Buffer.byteLength(c);
 if(len>255){
 thrownewERR_OUT_OF_RANGE('The byte length of the protocol at index '+
@@ -158,20 +142,17 @@ exports.convertALPNProtocols = function convertALPNProtocols(protocols, out) {
 };
 
 functionunfqdn(host){
-returnRegExpPrototypeSymbolReplace(/[.]$/,host,'');
+returnhost.replace(/[.]$/,'');
 }
 
 // String#toLowerCase() is locale-sensitive so we use
 // a conservative version that only lowercases A-Z.
 functiontoLowerCase(c){
-returnStringFromCharCode(32+StringPrototypeCharCodeAt(c,0));
+returnStringFromCharCode(32+c.charCodeAt(0));
 }
 
 functionsplitHost(host){
-returnStringPrototypeSplit(
-RegExpPrototypeSymbolReplace(/[A-Z]/g,unfqdn(host),toLowerCase),
-'.',
-);
+returnunfqdn(host).replace(/[A-Z]/g,toLowerCase).split('.');
 }
 
 functioncheck(hostParts,pattern,wildcards){
@@ -185,15 +166,15 @@ function check(hostParts, pattern, wildcards) {
 returnfalse;
 
 // Pattern has empty components, e.g. "bad..example.com".
-if(ArrayPrototypeIncludes(patternParts,''))
+if(patternParts.includes(''))
 returnfalse;
 
 // RFC 6125 allows IDNA U-labels (Unicode) in names but we have no
 // good way to detect their encoding or normalize them so we simply
 // reject them. Control characters and blanks are rejected as well
 // because nothing good can come from accepting them.
-constisBad=(s)=>RegExpPrototypeExec(/[^\u0021-\u007F]/u,s)!==null;
-if(ArrayPrototypeSome(patternParts,isBad))
+constisBad=(s)=>/[^\u0021-\u007F]/u.test(s);
+if(patternParts.some(isBad))
 returnfalse;
 
 // Check host parts from right to left first.
@@ -204,13 +185,13 @@ function check(hostParts, pattern, wildcards) {
 
 consthostSubdomain=hostParts[0];
 constpatternSubdomain=patternParts[0];
-constpatternSubdomainParts=StringPrototypeSplit(patternSubdomain,'*');
+constpatternSubdomainParts=patternSubdomain.split('*');
 
 // Short-circuit when the subdomain does not contain a wildcard.
 // RFC 6125 does not allow wildcard substitution for components
 // containing IDNA A-labels (Punycode) so match those verbatim.
 if(patternSubdomainParts.length===1||
-StringPrototypeIncludes(patternSubdomain,'xn--'))
+patternSubdomain.includes('xn--'))
 returnhostSubdomain===patternSubdomain;
 
 if(!wildcards)
@@ -229,10 +210,10 @@ function check(hostParts, pattern, wildcards) {
 if(prefix.length+suffix.length>hostSubdomain.length)
 returnfalse;
 
-if(!StringPrototypeStartsWith(hostSubdomain,prefix))
+if(!hostSubdomain.startsWith(prefix))
 returnfalse;
 
-if(!StringPrototypeEndsWith(hostSubdomain,suffix))
+if(!hostSubdomain.endsWith(suffix))
 returnfalse;
 
 returntrue;
@@ -250,30 +231,29 @@ function splitEscapedAltNames(altNames) {
 letcurrentToken='';
 letoffset=0;
 while(offset!==altNames.length){
-constnextSep=StringPrototypeIndexOf(altNames,', ',offset);
-constnextQuote=StringPrototypeIndexOf(altNames,'"',offset);
+constnextSep=altNames.indexOf(',',offset);
+constnextQuote=altNames.indexOf('"',offset);
 if(nextQuote!==-1&&(nextSep===-1||nextQuote<nextSep)){
 // There is a quote character and there is no separator before the quote.
-currentToken+=StringPrototypeSubstring(altNames,offset,nextQuote);
-constmatch=RegExpPrototypeExec(
-jsonStringPattern,StringPrototypeSubstring(altNames,nextQuote));
+currentToken+=altNames.substring(offset,nextQuote);
+constmatch=jsonStringPattern.exec(altNames.substring(nextQuote));
 if(!match){
 thrownewERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_FORMAT();
 }
 currentToken+=JSONParse(match[0]);
 offset=nextQuote+match[0].length;
 }elseif(nextSep!==-1){
 // There is a separator and no quote before it.
-currentToken+=StringPrototypeSubstring(altNames,offset,nextSep);
-ArrayPrototypePush(result,currentToken);
+currentToken+=altNames.substring(offset,nextSep);
+result.push(currentToken);
 currentToken='';
 offset=nextSep+2;
 }else{
-currentToken+=StringPrototypeSubstring(altNames,offset);
+currentToken+=altNames.substring(offset);
 offset=altNames.length;
 }
 }
-ArrayPrototypePush(result,currentToken);
+result.push(currentToken);
 returnresult;
 }
 
@@ -286,14 +266,14 @@ exports.checkServerIdentity = function checkServerIdentity(hostname, cert) {
 hostname=''+hostname;
 
 if(altNames){
-constsplitAltNames=StringPrototypeIncludes(altNames,'"') ?
+constsplitAltNames=altNames.includes('"') ?
 splitEscapedAltNames(altNames) :
-StringPrototypeSplit(altNames,', ');
-ArrayPrototypeForEach(splitAltNames,(name)=>{
-if(StringPrototypeStartsWith(name,'DNS:')){
-ArrayPrototypePush(dnsNames,StringPrototypeSlice(name,4));
-}elseif(StringPrototypeStartsWith(name,'IP Address:')){
-ArrayPrototypePush(ips,canonicalizeIP(StringPrototypeSlice(name,11)));
+altNames.split(', ');
+splitAltNames.forEach((name)=>{
+if(name.startsWith('DNS:')){
+dnsNames.push(name.slice(4));
+}elseif(name.startsWith('IP Address:')){
+ips.push(canonicalizeIP(name.slice(11)));
 }
 });
 }
@@ -304,16 +284,15 @@ exports.checkServerIdentity = function checkServerIdentity(hostname, cert) {
 hostname=unfqdn(hostname);// Remove trailing dot for error messages.
 
 if(net.isIP(hostname)){
-valid=ArrayPrototypeIncludes(ips,canonicalizeIP(hostname));
+valid=ips.includes(canonicalizeIP(hostname));
 if(!valid)
-reason=`IP: ${hostname} is not in the cert's list: `+
-ArrayPrototypeJoin(ips,', ');
+reason=`IP: ${hostname} is not in the cert's list: `+ips.join(', ');
 }elseif(dnsNames.length>0||subject?.CN){
 consthostParts=splitHost(hostname);
 constwildcard=(pattern)=>check(hostParts,pattern,true);
 
 if(dnsNames.length>0){
-valid=ArrayPrototypeSome(dnsNames,wildcard);
+valid=dnsNames.some(wildcard);
 if(!valid)
 reason=
 `Host: ${hostname}. is not in the cert's altnames: ${altNames}`;
@@ -322,7 +301,7 @@ exports.checkServerIdentity = function checkServerIdentity(hostname, cert) {
 constcn=subject.CN;
 
 if(ArrayIsArray(cn))
-valid=ArrayPrototypeSome(cn,wildcard);
+valid=cn.some(wildcard);
 elseif(cn)
 valid=wildcard(cn);