Commit d53d582

Browse files
edsadraduh95
authored andcommitted
src,permission: do not throw on denied access in audit mode
The THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS and ASYNC_THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS macros called ThrowAccessDenied/AsyncThrowAccessDenied unconditionally and only guarded the `return` with `warning_only()`. ERR_ACCESS_DENIED_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS had no `warning_only()` guard at all β€” it always set the access-denied error and returned. As a result, running with `--permission-audit` still produced ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on any denied operation (fs, net, child_process, worker, addon, ffi, inspector, wasi), defeating the audit-only purpose of the flag. Guard the denied-error path behind `!warning_only()` in all three macros. In audit mode, the diagnostics-channel message is published (already done in Permission::is_scope_granted) and execution continues; in enforce mode (`--permission`), behavior is unchanged β€” the error is raised and the call returns. The tests cover both the direct (top-level) call and an `eval()`-wrapped call: the direct call exercises the normal script path, and the `eval()`-wrapped call exercises the V8 script-context boundary (the diagnostics subscriber is registered in the outer module context while the denied operation runs inside an eval'd string). Refs: 9ddd1a9 Signed-off-by: Adrian Estrada <edsadr@gmail.com> PR-URL: #64426 Backport-PR-URL: #65354 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
1 parent c40d147 commit d53d582

2 files changed

Lines changed: 79 additions & 13 deletions

File tree

β€Žsrc/permission/permission.hβ€Ž

Lines changed: 20 additions & 13 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -35,9 +35,11 @@ namespace permission {
3535
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
3636
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
3737
[[unlikely]] { \
38-
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
39-
env__, perm__, resource__); \
40-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
38+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
39+
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
40+
env__, perm__, resource__); \
41+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
42+
} \
4143
} \
4244
} while (0)
4345

@@ -49,9 +51,11 @@ namespace permission {
4951
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
5052
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
5153
[[unlikely]] { \
52-
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
53-
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
54-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
54+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
55+
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
56+
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
57+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
58+
} \
5559
} \
5660
} while (0)
5761

@@ -63,14 +67,17 @@ namespace permission {
6367
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
6468
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
6569
[[unlikely]] { \
66-
Local<Value> err_access; \
67-
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError(env__, perm__, resource__) \
68-
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
69-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
70-
} else { \
71-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
70+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
71+
Local<Value> err_access; \
72+
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError( \
73+
env__, perm__, resource__) \
74+
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
75+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
76+
} else { \
77+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
78+
} \
79+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7280
} \
73-
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7481
} \
7582
} while (0)
7683

Lines changed: 59 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
3+
constcommon=require('../common');
4+
const{ isMainThread }=require('worker_threads');
5+
6+
if(!isMainThread){
7+
common.skip('This test only works on a main thread');
8+
}
9+
10+
constassert=require('assert');
11+
const{ spawnSync }=require('child_process');
12+
const{ test }=require('node:test');
13+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
14+
15+
constblockedFile=fixtures.path('permission','deny','protected-file.md');
16+
17+
functionrunAudit(mode){
18+
constchildScript=`
19+
const dc = require('node:diagnostics_channel');
20+
const msgs = [];
21+
dc.subscribe('node:permission-model:fs', (m) => msgs.push({
22+
permission: m.permission,
23+
resource: m.resource,
24+
}));
25+
try {
26+
${mode==='eval' ?
27+
`eval('require("node:fs").readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE)');` :
28+
`require('node:fs').readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE);`}
29+
console.log('RESULT NO_THROW');
30+
} catch (e) {
31+
console.log('RESULT THREW ' + e.code);
32+
}
33+
console.log('AUDIT ' + JSON.stringify(msgs));
34+
`;
35+
36+
constenv={ ...process.env,BLOCKED_FILE: blockedFile};
37+
const{ status, stdout, stderr }=spawnSync(
38+
process.execPath,
39+
['--permission-audit','-e',childScript],
40+
{encoding: 'utf8', env },
41+
);
42+
assert.strictEqual(status,0,stderr);
43+
constlines=stdout.split('\n');
44+
assert.ok(lines.includes('RESULT NO_THROW'),stdout);
45+
constauditLine=lines.find((l)=>l.startsWith('AUDIT '));
46+
assert.ok(auditLine,stdout);
47+
constmsgs=JSON.parse(auditLine.replace('AUDIT ',''));
48+
assert.strictEqual(msgs.length,1);
49+
assert.strictEqual(msgs[0].permission,'FileSystemRead');
50+
assert.ok(msgs[0].resource.endsWith('protected-file.md'));
51+
}
52+
53+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing',()=>{
54+
runAudit('direct');
55+
});
56+
57+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing (eval)',()=>{
58+
runAudit('eval');
59+
});

0 commit comments

Comments
Β (0)
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
Skip to content

Commit d53d582

Browse files
edsadraduh95
authored andcommitted
src,permission: do not throw on denied access in audit mode
The THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS and ASYNC_THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS macros called ThrowAccessDenied/AsyncThrowAccessDenied unconditionally and only guarded the `return` with `warning_only()`. ERR_ACCESS_DENIED_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS had no `warning_only()` guard at all β€” it always set the access-denied error and returned. As a result, running with `--permission-audit` still produced ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on any denied operation (fs, net, child_process, worker, addon, ffi, inspector, wasi), defeating the audit-only purpose of the flag. Guard the denied-error path behind `!warning_only()` in all three macros. In audit mode, the diagnostics-channel message is published (already done in Permission::is_scope_granted) and execution continues; in enforce mode (`--permission`), behavior is unchanged β€” the error is raised and the call returns. The tests cover both the direct (top-level) call and an `eval()`-wrapped call: the direct call exercises the normal script path, and the `eval()`-wrapped call exercises the V8 script-context boundary (the diagnostics subscriber is registered in the outer module context while the denied operation runs inside an eval'd string). Refs: 9ddd1a9 Signed-off-by: Adrian Estrada <edsadr@gmail.com> PR-URL: #64426 Backport-PR-URL: #65354 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
1 parent c40d147 commit d53d582

2 files changed

Lines changed: 79 additions & 13 deletions

File tree

β€Žsrc/permission/permission.hβ€Ž

Lines changed: 20 additions & 13 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -35,9 +35,11 @@ namespace permission {
3535
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
3636
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
3737
[[unlikely]] { \
38-
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
39-
env__, perm__, resource__); \
40-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
38+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
39+
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
40+
env__, perm__, resource__); \
41+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
42+
} \
4143
} \
4244
} while (0)
4345

@@ -49,9 +51,11 @@ namespace permission {
4951
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
5052
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
5153
[[unlikely]] { \
52-
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
53-
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
54-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
54+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
55+
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
56+
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
57+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
58+
} \
5559
} \
5660
} while (0)
5761

@@ -63,14 +67,17 @@ namespace permission {
6367
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
6468
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
6569
[[unlikely]] { \
66-
Local<Value> err_access; \
67-
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError(env__, perm__, resource__) \
68-
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
69-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
70-
} else { \
71-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
70+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
71+
Local<Value> err_access; \
72+
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError( \
73+
env__, perm__, resource__) \
74+
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
75+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
76+
} else { \
77+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
78+
} \
79+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7280
} \
73-
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7481
} \
7582
} while (0)
7683

Lines changed: 59 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
3+
constcommon=require('../common');
4+
const{ isMainThread }=require('worker_threads');
5+
6+
if(!isMainThread){
7+
common.skip('This test only works on a main thread');
8+
}
9+
10+
constassert=require('assert');
11+
const{ spawnSync }=require('child_process');
12+
const{ test }=require('node:test');
13+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
14+
15+
constblockedFile=fixtures.path('permission','deny','protected-file.md');
16+
17+
functionrunAudit(mode){
18+
constchildScript=`
19+
const dc = require('node:diagnostics_channel');
20+
const msgs = [];
21+
dc.subscribe('node:permission-model:fs', (m) => msgs.push({
22+
permission: m.permission,
23+
resource: m.resource,
24+
}));
25+
try {
26+
${mode==='eval' ?
27+
`eval('require("node:fs").readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE)');` :
28+
`require('node:fs').readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE);`}
29+
console.log('RESULT NO_THROW');
30+
} catch (e) {
31+
console.log('RESULT THREW ' + e.code);
32+
}
33+
console.log('AUDIT ' + JSON.stringify(msgs));
34+
`;
35+
36+
constenv={ ...process.env,BLOCKED_FILE: blockedFile};
37+
const{ status, stdout, stderr }=spawnSync(
38+
process.execPath,
39+
['--permission-audit','-e',childScript],
40+
{encoding: 'utf8', env },
41+
);
42+
assert.strictEqual(status,0,stderr);
43+
constlines=stdout.split('\n');
44+
assert.ok(lines.includes('RESULT NO_THROW'),stdout);
45+
constauditLine=lines.find((l)=>l.startsWith('AUDIT '));
46+
assert.ok(auditLine,stdout);
47+
constmsgs=JSON.parse(auditLine.replace('AUDIT ',''));
48+
assert.strictEqual(msgs.length,1);
49+
assert.strictEqual(msgs[0].permission,'FileSystemRead');
50+
assert.ok(msgs[0].resource.endsWith('protected-file.md'));
51+
}
52+
53+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing',()=>{
54+
runAudit('direct');
55+
});
56+
57+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing (eval)',()=>{
58+
runAudit('eval');
59+
});

0 commit comments

Comments
Β (0)
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Commit d53d582

Browse files
edsadraduh95
authored andcommitted
src,permission: do not throw on denied access in audit mode
The THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS and ASYNC_THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS macros called ThrowAccessDenied/AsyncThrowAccessDenied unconditionally and only guarded the `return` with `warning_only()`. ERR_ACCESS_DENIED_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS had no `warning_only()` guard at all β€” it always set the access-denied error and returned. As a result, running with `--permission-audit` still produced ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on any denied operation (fs, net, child_process, worker, addon, ffi, inspector, wasi), defeating the audit-only purpose of the flag. Guard the denied-error path behind `!warning_only()` in all three macros. In audit mode, the diagnostics-channel message is published (already done in Permission::is_scope_granted) and execution continues; in enforce mode (`--permission`), behavior is unchanged β€” the error is raised and the call returns. The tests cover both the direct (top-level) call and an `eval()`-wrapped call: the direct call exercises the normal script path, and the `eval()`-wrapped call exercises the V8 script-context boundary (the diagnostics subscriber is registered in the outer module context while the denied operation runs inside an eval'd string). Refs: 9ddd1a9 Signed-off-by: Adrian Estrada <edsadr@gmail.com> PR-URL: #64426 Backport-PR-URL: #65354 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
1 parent c40d147 commit d53d582

2 files changed

Lines changed: 79 additions & 13 deletions

File tree

β€Žsrc/permission/permission.hβ€Ž

Lines changed: 20 additions & 13 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -35,9 +35,11 @@ namespace permission {
3535
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
3636
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
3737
[[unlikely]] { \
38-
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
39-
env__, perm__, resource__); \
40-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
38+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
39+
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
40+
env__, perm__, resource__); \
41+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
42+
} \
4143
} \
4244
} while (0)
4345

@@ -49,9 +51,11 @@ namespace permission {
4951
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
5052
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
5153
[[unlikely]] { \
52-
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
53-
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
54-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
54+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
55+
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
56+
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
57+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
58+
} \
5559
} \
5660
} while (0)
5761

@@ -63,14 +67,17 @@ namespace permission {
6367
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
6468
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
6569
[[unlikely]] { \
66-
Local<Value> err_access; \
67-
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError(env__, perm__, resource__) \
68-
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
69-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
70-
} else { \
71-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
70+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
71+
Local<Value> err_access; \
72+
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError( \
73+
env__, perm__, resource__) \
74+
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
75+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
76+
} else { \
77+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
78+
} \
79+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7280
} \
73-
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7481
} \
7582
} while (0)
7683

Lines changed: 59 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
3+
constcommon=require('../common');
4+
const{ isMainThread }=require('worker_threads');
5+
6+
if(!isMainThread){
7+
common.skip('This test only works on a main thread');
8+
}
9+
10+
constassert=require('assert');
11+
const{ spawnSync }=require('child_process');
12+
const{ test }=require('node:test');
13+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
14+
15+
constblockedFile=fixtures.path('permission','deny','protected-file.md');
16+
17+
functionrunAudit(mode){
18+
constchildScript=`
19+
const dc = require('node:diagnostics_channel');
20+
const msgs = [];
21+
dc.subscribe('node:permission-model:fs', (m) => msgs.push({
22+
permission: m.permission,
23+
resource: m.resource,
24+
}));
25+
try {
26+
${mode==='eval' ?
27+
`eval('require("node:fs").readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE)');` :
28+
`require('node:fs').readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE);`}
29+
console.log('RESULT NO_THROW');
30+
} catch (e) {
31+
console.log('RESULT THREW ' + e.code);
32+
}
33+
console.log('AUDIT ' + JSON.stringify(msgs));
34+
`;
35+
36+
constenv={ ...process.env,BLOCKED_FILE: blockedFile};
37+
const{ status, stdout, stderr }=spawnSync(
38+
process.execPath,
39+
['--permission-audit','-e',childScript],
40+
{encoding: 'utf8', env },
41+
);
42+
assert.strictEqual(status,0,stderr);
43+
constlines=stdout.split('\n');
44+
assert.ok(lines.includes('RESULT NO_THROW'),stdout);
45+
constauditLine=lines.find((l)=>l.startsWith('AUDIT '));
46+
assert.ok(auditLine,stdout);
47+
constmsgs=JSON.parse(auditLine.replace('AUDIT ',''));
48+
assert.strictEqual(msgs.length,1);
49+
assert.strictEqual(msgs[0].permission,'FileSystemRead');
50+
assert.ok(msgs[0].resource.endsWith('protected-file.md'));
51+
}
52+
53+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing',()=>{
54+
runAudit('direct');
55+
});
56+
57+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing (eval)',()=>{
58+
runAudit('eval');
59+
});

0 commit comments

Comments
Β (0)
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Commit d53d582

Browse files
edsadraduh95
authored andcommitted
src,permission: do not throw on denied access in audit mode
The THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS and ASYNC_THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS macros called ThrowAccessDenied/AsyncThrowAccessDenied unconditionally and only guarded the `return` with `warning_only()`. ERR_ACCESS_DENIED_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS had no `warning_only()` guard at all β€” it always set the access-denied error and returned. As a result, running with `--permission-audit` still produced ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on any denied operation (fs, net, child_process, worker, addon, ffi, inspector, wasi), defeating the audit-only purpose of the flag. Guard the denied-error path behind `!warning_only()` in all three macros. In audit mode, the diagnostics-channel message is published (already done in Permission::is_scope_granted) and execution continues; in enforce mode (`--permission`), behavior is unchanged β€” the error is raised and the call returns. The tests cover both the direct (top-level) call and an `eval()`-wrapped call: the direct call exercises the normal script path, and the `eval()`-wrapped call exercises the V8 script-context boundary (the diagnostics subscriber is registered in the outer module context while the denied operation runs inside an eval'd string). Refs: 9ddd1a9 Signed-off-by: Adrian Estrada <edsadr@gmail.com> PR-URL: #64426 Backport-PR-URL: #65354 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
1 parent c40d147 commit d53d582

2 files changed

Lines changed: 79 additions & 13 deletions

File tree

β€Žsrc/permission/permission.hβ€Ž

Lines changed: 20 additions & 13 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -35,9 +35,11 @@ namespace permission {
3535
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
3636
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
3737
[[unlikely]] { \
38-
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
39-
env__, perm__, resource__); \
40-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
38+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
39+
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
40+
env__, perm__, resource__); \
41+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
42+
} \
4143
} \
4244
} while (0)
4345

@@ -49,9 +51,11 @@ namespace permission {
4951
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
5052
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
5153
[[unlikely]] { \
52-
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
53-
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
54-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
54+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
55+
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
56+
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
57+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
58+
} \
5559
} \
5660
} while (0)
5761

@@ -63,14 +67,17 @@ namespace permission {
6367
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
6468
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
6569
[[unlikely]] { \
66-
Local<Value> err_access; \
67-
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError(env__, perm__, resource__) \
68-
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
69-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
70-
} else { \
71-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
70+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
71+
Local<Value> err_access; \
72+
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError( \
73+
env__, perm__, resource__) \
74+
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
75+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
76+
} else { \
77+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
78+
} \
79+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7280
} \
73-
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7481
} \
7582
} while (0)
7683

Lines changed: 59 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
3+
constcommon=require('../common');
4+
const{ isMainThread }=require('worker_threads');
5+
6+
if(!isMainThread){
7+
common.skip('This test only works on a main thread');
8+
}
9+
10+
constassert=require('assert');
11+
const{ spawnSync }=require('child_process');
12+
const{ test }=require('node:test');
13+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
14+
15+
constblockedFile=fixtures.path('permission','deny','protected-file.md');
16+
17+
functionrunAudit(mode){
18+
constchildScript=`
19+
const dc = require('node:diagnostics_channel');
20+
const msgs = [];
21+
dc.subscribe('node:permission-model:fs', (m) => msgs.push({
22+
permission: m.permission,
23+
resource: m.resource,
24+
}));
25+
try {
26+
${mode==='eval' ?
27+
`eval('require("node:fs").readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE)');` :
28+
`require('node:fs').readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE);`}
29+
console.log('RESULT NO_THROW');
30+
} catch (e) {
31+
console.log('RESULT THREW ' + e.code);
32+
}
33+
console.log('AUDIT ' + JSON.stringify(msgs));
34+
`;
35+
36+
constenv={ ...process.env,BLOCKED_FILE: blockedFile};
37+
const{ status, stdout, stderr }=spawnSync(
38+
process.execPath,
39+
['--permission-audit','-e',childScript],
40+
{encoding: 'utf8', env },
41+
);
42+
assert.strictEqual(status,0,stderr);
43+
constlines=stdout.split('\n');
44+
assert.ok(lines.includes('RESULT NO_THROW'),stdout);
45+
constauditLine=lines.find((l)=>l.startsWith('AUDIT '));
46+
assert.ok(auditLine,stdout);
47+
constmsgs=JSON.parse(auditLine.replace('AUDIT ',''));
48+
assert.strictEqual(msgs.length,1);
49+
assert.strictEqual(msgs[0].permission,'FileSystemRead');
50+
assert.ok(msgs[0].resource.endsWith('protected-file.md'));
51+
}
52+
53+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing',()=>{
54+
runAudit('direct');
55+
});
56+
57+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing (eval)',()=>{
58+
runAudit('eval');
59+
});

0 commit comments

Comments
Β (0)
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
Skip to content

Commit d53d582

Browse files
edsadraduh95
authored andcommitted
src,permission: do not throw on denied access in audit mode
The THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS and ASYNC_THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS macros called ThrowAccessDenied/AsyncThrowAccessDenied unconditionally and only guarded the `return` with `warning_only()`. ERR_ACCESS_DENIED_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS had no `warning_only()` guard at all β€” it always set the access-denied error and returned. As a result, running with `--permission-audit` still produced ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on any denied operation (fs, net, child_process, worker, addon, ffi, inspector, wasi), defeating the audit-only purpose of the flag. Guard the denied-error path behind `!warning_only()` in all three macros. In audit mode, the diagnostics-channel message is published (already done in Permission::is_scope_granted) and execution continues; in enforce mode (`--permission`), behavior is unchanged β€” the error is raised and the call returns. The tests cover both the direct (top-level) call and an `eval()`-wrapped call: the direct call exercises the normal script path, and the `eval()`-wrapped call exercises the V8 script-context boundary (the diagnostics subscriber is registered in the outer module context while the denied operation runs inside an eval'd string). Refs: 9ddd1a9 Signed-off-by: Adrian Estrada <edsadr@gmail.com> PR-URL: #64426 Backport-PR-URL: #65354 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
1 parent c40d147 commit d53d582

2 files changed

Lines changed: 79 additions & 13 deletions

File tree

β€Žsrc/permission/permission.hβ€Ž

Lines changed: 20 additions & 13 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -35,9 +35,11 @@ namespace permission {
3535
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
3636
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
3737
[[unlikely]] { \
38-
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
39-
env__, perm__, resource__); \
40-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
38+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
39+
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
40+
env__, perm__, resource__); \
41+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
42+
} \
4143
} \
4244
} while (0)
4345

@@ -49,9 +51,11 @@ namespace permission {
4951
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
5052
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
5153
[[unlikely]] { \
52-
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
53-
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
54-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
54+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
55+
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
56+
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
57+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
58+
} \
5559
} \
5660
} while (0)
5761

@@ -63,14 +67,17 @@ namespace permission {
6367
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
6468
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
6569
[[unlikely]] { \
66-
Local<Value> err_access; \
67-
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError(env__, perm__, resource__) \
68-
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
69-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
70-
} else { \
71-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
70+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
71+
Local<Value> err_access; \
72+
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError( \
73+
env__, perm__, resource__) \
74+
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
75+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
76+
} else { \
77+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
78+
} \
79+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7280
} \
73-
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7481
} \
7582
} while (0)
7683

Lines changed: 59 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
3+
constcommon=require('../common');
4+
const{ isMainThread }=require('worker_threads');
5+
6+
if(!isMainThread){
7+
common.skip('This test only works on a main thread');
8+
}
9+
10+
constassert=require('assert');
11+
const{ spawnSync }=require('child_process');
12+
const{ test }=require('node:test');
13+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
14+
15+
constblockedFile=fixtures.path('permission','deny','protected-file.md');
16+
17+
functionrunAudit(mode){
18+
constchildScript=`
19+
const dc = require('node:diagnostics_channel');
20+
const msgs = [];
21+
dc.subscribe('node:permission-model:fs', (m) => msgs.push({
22+
permission: m.permission,
23+
resource: m.resource,
24+
}));
25+
try {
26+
${mode==='eval' ?
27+
`eval('require("node:fs").readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE)');` :
28+
`require('node:fs').readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE);`}
29+
console.log('RESULT NO_THROW');
30+
} catch (e) {
31+
console.log('RESULT THREW ' + e.code);
32+
}
33+
console.log('AUDIT ' + JSON.stringify(msgs));
34+
`;
35+
36+
constenv={ ...process.env,BLOCKED_FILE: blockedFile};
37+
const{ status, stdout, stderr }=spawnSync(
38+
process.execPath,
39+
['--permission-audit','-e',childScript],
40+
{encoding: 'utf8', env },
41+
);
42+
assert.strictEqual(status,0,stderr);
43+
constlines=stdout.split('\n');
44+
assert.ok(lines.includes('RESULT NO_THROW'),stdout);
45+
constauditLine=lines.find((l)=>l.startsWith('AUDIT '));
46+
assert.ok(auditLine,stdout);
47+
constmsgs=JSON.parse(auditLine.replace('AUDIT ',''));
48+
assert.strictEqual(msgs.length,1);
49+
assert.strictEqual(msgs[0].permission,'FileSystemRead');
50+
assert.ok(msgs[0].resource.endsWith('protected-file.md'));
51+
}
52+
53+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing',()=>{
54+
runAudit('direct');
55+
});
56+
57+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing (eval)',()=>{
58+
runAudit('eval');
59+
});

0 commit comments

Comments
Β (0)
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Commit d53d582

Browse files
edsadraduh95
authored andcommitted
src,permission: do not throw on denied access in audit mode
The THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS and ASYNC_THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS macros called ThrowAccessDenied/AsyncThrowAccessDenied unconditionally and only guarded the `return` with `warning_only()`. ERR_ACCESS_DENIED_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS had no `warning_only()` guard at all β€” it always set the access-denied error and returned. As a result, running with `--permission-audit` still produced ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on any denied operation (fs, net, child_process, worker, addon, ffi, inspector, wasi), defeating the audit-only purpose of the flag. Guard the denied-error path behind `!warning_only()` in all three macros. In audit mode, the diagnostics-channel message is published (already done in Permission::is_scope_granted) and execution continues; in enforce mode (`--permission`), behavior is unchanged β€” the error is raised and the call returns. The tests cover both the direct (top-level) call and an `eval()`-wrapped call: the direct call exercises the normal script path, and the `eval()`-wrapped call exercises the V8 script-context boundary (the diagnostics subscriber is registered in the outer module context while the denied operation runs inside an eval'd string). Refs: 9ddd1a9 Signed-off-by: Adrian Estrada <edsadr@gmail.com> PR-URL: #64426 Backport-PR-URL: #65354 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
1 parent c40d147 commit d53d582

2 files changed

Lines changed: 79 additions & 13 deletions

File tree

β€Žsrc/permission/permission.hβ€Ž

Lines changed: 20 additions & 13 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -35,9 +35,11 @@ namespace permission {
3535
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
3636
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
3737
[[unlikely]] { \
38-
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
39-
env__, perm__, resource__); \
40-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
38+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
39+
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
40+
env__, perm__, resource__); \
41+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
42+
} \
4143
} \
4244
} while (0)
4345

@@ -49,9 +51,11 @@ namespace permission {
4951
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
5052
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
5153
[[unlikely]] { \
52-
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
53-
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
54-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
54+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
55+
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
56+
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
57+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
58+
} \
5559
} \
5660
} while (0)
5761

@@ -63,14 +67,17 @@ namespace permission {
6367
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
6468
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
6569
[[unlikely]] { \
66-
Local<Value> err_access; \
67-
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError(env__, perm__, resource__) \
68-
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
69-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
70-
} else { \
71-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
70+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
71+
Local<Value> err_access; \
72+
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError( \
73+
env__, perm__, resource__) \
74+
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
75+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
76+
} else { \
77+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
78+
} \
79+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7280
} \
73-
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7481
} \
7582
} while (0)
7683

Lines changed: 59 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
3+
constcommon=require('../common');
4+
const{ isMainThread }=require('worker_threads');
5+
6+
if(!isMainThread){
7+
common.skip('This test only works on a main thread');
8+
}
9+
10+
constassert=require('assert');
11+
const{ spawnSync }=require('child_process');
12+
const{ test }=require('node:test');
13+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
14+
15+
constblockedFile=fixtures.path('permission','deny','protected-file.md');
16+
17+
functionrunAudit(mode){
18+
constchildScript=`
19+
const dc = require('node:diagnostics_channel');
20+
const msgs = [];
21+
dc.subscribe('node:permission-model:fs', (m) => msgs.push({
22+
permission: m.permission,
23+
resource: m.resource,
24+
}));
25+
try {
26+
${mode==='eval' ?
27+
`eval('require("node:fs").readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE)');` :
28+
`require('node:fs').readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE);`}
29+
console.log('RESULT NO_THROW');
30+
} catch (e) {
31+
console.log('RESULT THREW ' + e.code);
32+
}
33+
console.log('AUDIT ' + JSON.stringify(msgs));
34+
`;
35+
36+
constenv={ ...process.env,BLOCKED_FILE: blockedFile};
37+
const{ status, stdout, stderr }=spawnSync(
38+
process.execPath,
39+
['--permission-audit','-e',childScript],
40+
{encoding: 'utf8', env },
41+
);
42+
assert.strictEqual(status,0,stderr);
43+
constlines=stdout.split('\n');
44+
assert.ok(lines.includes('RESULT NO_THROW'),stdout);
45+
constauditLine=lines.find((l)=>l.startsWith('AUDIT '));
46+
assert.ok(auditLine,stdout);
47+
constmsgs=JSON.parse(auditLine.replace('AUDIT ',''));
48+
assert.strictEqual(msgs.length,1);
49+
assert.strictEqual(msgs[0].permission,'FileSystemRead');
50+
assert.ok(msgs[0].resource.endsWith('protected-file.md'));
51+
}
52+
53+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing',()=>{
54+
runAudit('direct');
55+
});
56+
57+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing (eval)',()=>{
58+
runAudit('eval');
59+
});

0 commit comments

Comments
Β (0)
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Commit d53d582

Browse files
edsadraduh95
authored andcommitted
src,permission: do not throw on denied access in audit mode
The THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS and ASYNC_THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS macros called ThrowAccessDenied/AsyncThrowAccessDenied unconditionally and only guarded the `return` with `warning_only()`. ERR_ACCESS_DENIED_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS had no `warning_only()` guard at all β€” it always set the access-denied error and returned. As a result, running with `--permission-audit` still produced ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on any denied operation (fs, net, child_process, worker, addon, ffi, inspector, wasi), defeating the audit-only purpose of the flag. Guard the denied-error path behind `!warning_only()` in all three macros. In audit mode, the diagnostics-channel message is published (already done in Permission::is_scope_granted) and execution continues; in enforce mode (`--permission`), behavior is unchanged β€” the error is raised and the call returns. The tests cover both the direct (top-level) call and an `eval()`-wrapped call: the direct call exercises the normal script path, and the `eval()`-wrapped call exercises the V8 script-context boundary (the diagnostics subscriber is registered in the outer module context while the denied operation runs inside an eval'd string). Refs: 9ddd1a9 Signed-off-by: Adrian Estrada <edsadr@gmail.com> PR-URL: #64426 Backport-PR-URL: #65354 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
1 parent c40d147 commit d53d582

2 files changed

Lines changed: 79 additions & 13 deletions

File tree

β€Žsrc/permission/permission.hβ€Ž

Lines changed: 20 additions & 13 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -35,9 +35,11 @@ namespace permission {
3535
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
3636
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
3737
[[unlikely]] { \
38-
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
39-
env__, perm__, resource__); \
40-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
38+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
39+
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
40+
env__, perm__, resource__); \
41+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
42+
} \
4143
} \
4244
} while (0)
4345

@@ -49,9 +51,11 @@ namespace permission {
4951
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
5052
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
5153
[[unlikely]] { \
52-
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
53-
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
54-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
54+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
55+
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
56+
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
57+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
58+
} \
5559
} \
5660
} while (0)
5761

@@ -63,14 +67,17 @@ namespace permission {
6367
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
6468
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
6569
[[unlikely]] { \
66-
Local<Value> err_access; \
67-
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError(env__, perm__, resource__) \
68-
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
69-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
70-
} else { \
71-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
70+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
71+
Local<Value> err_access; \
72+
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError( \
73+
env__, perm__, resource__) \
74+
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
75+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
76+
} else { \
77+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
78+
} \
79+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7280
} \
73-
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7481
} \
7582
} while (0)
7683

Lines changed: 59 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
3+
constcommon=require('../common');
4+
const{ isMainThread }=require('worker_threads');
5+
6+
if(!isMainThread){
7+
common.skip('This test only works on a main thread');
8+
}
9+
10+
constassert=require('assert');
11+
const{ spawnSync }=require('child_process');
12+
const{ test }=require('node:test');
13+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
14+
15+
constblockedFile=fixtures.path('permission','deny','protected-file.md');
16+
17+
functionrunAudit(mode){
18+
constchildScript=`
19+
const dc = require('node:diagnostics_channel');
20+
const msgs = [];
21+
dc.subscribe('node:permission-model:fs', (m) => msgs.push({
22+
permission: m.permission,
23+
resource: m.resource,
24+
}));
25+
try {
26+
${mode==='eval' ?
27+
`eval('require("node:fs").readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE)');` :
28+
`require('node:fs').readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE);`}
29+
console.log('RESULT NO_THROW');
30+
} catch (e) {
31+
console.log('RESULT THREW ' + e.code);
32+
}
33+
console.log('AUDIT ' + JSON.stringify(msgs));
34+
`;
35+
36+
constenv={ ...process.env,BLOCKED_FILE: blockedFile};
37+
const{ status, stdout, stderr }=spawnSync(
38+
process.execPath,
39+
['--permission-audit','-e',childScript],
40+
{encoding: 'utf8', env },
41+
);
42+
assert.strictEqual(status,0,stderr);
43+
constlines=stdout.split('\n');
44+
assert.ok(lines.includes('RESULT NO_THROW'),stdout);
45+
constauditLine=lines.find((l)=>l.startsWith('AUDIT '));
46+
assert.ok(auditLine,stdout);
47+
constmsgs=JSON.parse(auditLine.replace('AUDIT ',''));
48+
assert.strictEqual(msgs.length,1);
49+
assert.strictEqual(msgs[0].permission,'FileSystemRead');
50+
assert.ok(msgs[0].resource.endsWith('protected-file.md'));
51+
}
52+
53+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing',()=>{
54+
runAudit('direct');
55+
});
56+
57+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing (eval)',()=>{
58+
runAudit('eval');
59+
});

0 commit comments

Comments
Β (0)
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
Skip to content

Commit d53d582

Browse files
edsadraduh95
authored andcommitted
src,permission: do not throw on denied access in audit mode
The THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS and ASYNC_THROW_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS macros called ThrowAccessDenied/AsyncThrowAccessDenied unconditionally and only guarded the `return` with `warning_only()`. ERR_ACCESS_DENIED_IF_INSUFFICIENT_PERMISSIONS had no `warning_only()` guard at all β€” it always set the access-denied error and returned. As a result, running with `--permission-audit` still produced ERR_ACCESS_DENIED on any denied operation (fs, net, child_process, worker, addon, ffi, inspector, wasi), defeating the audit-only purpose of the flag. Guard the denied-error path behind `!warning_only()` in all three macros. In audit mode, the diagnostics-channel message is published (already done in Permission::is_scope_granted) and execution continues; in enforce mode (`--permission`), behavior is unchanged β€” the error is raised and the call returns. The tests cover both the direct (top-level) call and an `eval()`-wrapped call: the direct call exercises the normal script path, and the `eval()`-wrapped call exercises the V8 script-context boundary (the diagnostics subscriber is registered in the outer module context while the denied operation runs inside an eval'd string). Refs: 9ddd1a9 Signed-off-by: Adrian Estrada <edsadr@gmail.com> PR-URL: #64426 Backport-PR-URL: #65354 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com>
1 parent c40d147 commit d53d582

2 files changed

Lines changed: 79 additions & 13 deletions

File tree

β€Žsrc/permission/permission.hβ€Ž

Lines changed: 20 additions & 13 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -35,9 +35,11 @@ namespace permission {
3535
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
3636
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
3737
[[unlikely]] { \
38-
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
39-
env__, perm__, resource__); \
40-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
38+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
39+
node::permission::Permission::ThrowAccessDenied( \
40+
env__, perm__, resource__); \
41+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
42+
} \
4143
} \
4244
} while (0)
4345

@@ -49,9 +51,11 @@ namespace permission {
4951
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
5052
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
5153
[[unlikely]] { \
52-
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
53-
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
54-
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) return __VA_ARGS__; \
54+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
55+
node::permission::Permission::AsyncThrowAccessDenied( \
56+
env__, (wrap), perm__, resource__); \
57+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
58+
} \
5559
} \
5660
} while (0)
5761

@@ -63,14 +67,17 @@ namespace permission {
6367
constauto resource__ = (resource); \
6468
if (!env__->permission()->is_granted(env__, perm__, resource__)) \
6569
[[unlikely]] { \
66-
Local<Value> err_access; \
67-
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError(env__, perm__, resource__) \
68-
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
69-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
70-
} else { \
71-
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
70+
if (!env__->permission()->warning_only()) { \
71+
Local<Value> err_access; \
72+
if (node::permission::CreateAccessDeniedError( \
73+
env__, perm__, resource__) \
74+
.ToLocal(&err_access)) { \
75+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(err_access); \
76+
} else { \
77+
args.GetReturnValue().Set(UV_EACCES); \
78+
} \
79+
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7280
} \
73-
return __VA_ARGS__; \
7481
} \
7582
} while (0)
7683

Lines changed: 59 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
1+
'use strict';
2+
3+
constcommon=require('../common');
4+
const{ isMainThread }=require('worker_threads');
5+
6+
if(!isMainThread){
7+
common.skip('This test only works on a main thread');
8+
}
9+
10+
constassert=require('assert');
11+
const{ spawnSync }=require('child_process');
12+
const{ test }=require('node:test');
13+
constfixtures=require('../common/fixtures');
14+
15+
constblockedFile=fixtures.path('permission','deny','protected-file.md');
16+
17+
functionrunAudit(mode){
18+
constchildScript=`
19+
const dc = require('node:diagnostics_channel');
20+
const msgs = [];
21+
dc.subscribe('node:permission-model:fs', (m) => msgs.push({
22+
permission: m.permission,
23+
resource: m.resource,
24+
}));
25+
try {
26+
${mode==='eval' ?
27+
`eval('require("node:fs").readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE)');` :
28+
`require('node:fs').readFileSync(process.env.BLOCKED_FILE);`}
29+
console.log('RESULT NO_THROW');
30+
} catch (e) {
31+
console.log('RESULT THREW ' + e.code);
32+
}
33+
console.log('AUDIT ' + JSON.stringify(msgs));
34+
`;
35+
36+
constenv={ ...process.env,BLOCKED_FILE: blockedFile};
37+
const{ status, stdout, stderr }=spawnSync(
38+
process.execPath,
39+
['--permission-audit','-e',childScript],
40+
{encoding: 'utf8', env },
41+
);
42+
assert.strictEqual(status,0,stderr);
43+
constlines=stdout.split('\n');
44+
assert.ok(lines.includes('RESULT NO_THROW'),stdout);
45+
constauditLine=lines.find((l)=>l.startsWith('AUDIT '));
46+
assert.ok(auditLine,stdout);
47+
constmsgs=JSON.parse(auditLine.replace('AUDIT ',''));
48+
assert.strictEqual(msgs.length,1);
49+
assert.strictEqual(msgs[0].permission,'FileSystemRead');
50+
assert.ok(msgs[0].resource.endsWith('protected-file.md'));
51+
}
52+
53+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing',()=>{
54+
runAudit('direct');
55+
});
56+
57+
test('permission-audit logs fs denial without throwing (eval)',()=>{
58+
runAudit('eval');
59+
});

0 commit comments

Comments
Β (0)