harness: a sandboxed child that dies without sending escapes as a bare EOFError, so the agent is told 'TOOL_ERROR:' and nothing else #111

Description

@Shashankss1205

What happens

SandboxedExecutor.run guards the wait with poll() and then reads:

ifnotparent_conn.poll(spec.timeout_seconds):
self._kill(proc)
raiseSandboxViolation(f"tool {spec.name!r} exceeded its {spec.timeout_seconds}s timeout")
kind, payload=parent_conn.recv()

poll() returns true when the pipe is readable, and a closed pipe is readable. So a child that died without sending — os._exit, a segfault, an OOM-kill, anything that kills the process rather than raising inside spec.fn — falls straight through into recv(), which raises a bare EOFError:

importos, tempfilefromgrapharc.harnessimportToolSpecfromgrapharc.harness.executorimportSandboxedExecutordefsuicidal(**kwargs):
os._exit(1)
ex=SandboxedExecutor(workspace=tempfile.mkdtemp())
ex.run(ToolSpec(name="suicidal", description="", fn=suicidal), {})
RAISED builtins.EOFError: ''
does the message name the tool? False

Why it matters

run has two documented failure shapes and this is neither: SandboxViolation for a confinement breach, and RuntimeError(f"tool {name!r} failed: ...") for the tool's own exception. An EOFError with an empty string for a message is not attributable to anything.

Downstream is where it bites. AgentNode's tool-call loop catches it under the blanket clause:

exceptExceptionasexc: # noqa: BLE001 — a broken tool must not end the runstatus, detail=ToolCallStatus.ERROR, f"TOOL_ERROR: {exc}"

str(EOFError('')) is '', so the model is handed literally:

TOOL_ERROR:

Nothing after the colon. The model is told its call failed and given no way to tell why, which tool, or whether retrying could help — and the same text goes into the trace, so the audit trail records a failure it cannot explain either.

This is the same shape as a defect this repo already closed: "a phase the budget curtailed reported nothing at all … so a curtailed phase wrote [budget_exhausted] with nothing after it." Same empty-message failure, one layer down.

The _CALL_SHAPE_ERROR hint machinery right below that except also can't fire, since it pattern-matches on message text and there is no message.

Where in the code

  • grapharc/harness/executor.pySandboxedExecutor.run, the poll() / recv() pair
  • grapharc/harness/executor.py_child_main's finally: conn.close(), and the ("ok"|"violation"|"error") protocol the parent expects
  • grapharc/harness/agent.py — the blanket except Exception that renders TOOL_ERROR: {exc}
  • grapharc/harness/core.pyHarness.call, the single caller of executor.run

What to change

Catch EOFError around recv() and raise the failure shape callers already handle: a RuntimeError naming the tool and saying the child exited without sending, with the exit code — a negative one being the signal that killed it, which is what distinguishes an OOM-kill from a deliberate _exit.

It should stay a RuntimeError rather than becoming a SandboxViolation: a child dying is not evidence it tried to escape confinement, and a violation is a specific accusation that ends up in the trace as one.

Acceptance criteria

  • A sandboxed tool whose child dies without sending raises an error naming the tool, not a bare EOFError
  • A signal death is distinguishable from a clean non-zero exit in the message
  • It is not reported as a SandboxViolation
  • The normal return path, the tool-raises path and the timeout path are unchanged
  • uv run pytest green, uv run ruff check . clean

Activity

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      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
       blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
      }
      } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
      })();
      (function(){
      try {
      var __m = "github.com";
      var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
      
      Skip to content

      harness: a sandboxed child that dies without sending escapes as a bare EOFError, so the agent is told 'TOOL_ERROR:' and nothing else #111

      Description

      @Shashankss1205

      What happens

      SandboxedExecutor.run guards the wait with poll() and then reads:

      ifnotparent_conn.poll(spec.timeout_seconds):
      self._kill(proc)
      raiseSandboxViolation(f"tool {spec.name!r} exceeded its {spec.timeout_seconds}s timeout")
      kind, payload=parent_conn.recv()

      poll() returns true when the pipe is readable, and a closed pipe is readable. So a child that died without sending — os._exit, a segfault, an OOM-kill, anything that kills the process rather than raising inside spec.fn — falls straight through into recv(), which raises a bare EOFError:

      importos, tempfilefromgrapharc.harnessimportToolSpecfromgrapharc.harness.executorimportSandboxedExecutordefsuicidal(**kwargs):
      os._exit(1)
      ex=SandboxedExecutor(workspace=tempfile.mkdtemp())
      ex.run(ToolSpec(name="suicidal", description="", fn=suicidal), {})
      RAISED builtins.EOFError: ''
      does the message name the tool? False
      

      Why it matters

      run has two documented failure shapes and this is neither: SandboxViolation for a confinement breach, and RuntimeError(f"tool {name!r} failed: ...") for the tool's own exception. An EOFError with an empty string for a message is not attributable to anything.

      Downstream is where it bites. AgentNode's tool-call loop catches it under the blanket clause:

      exceptExceptionasexc: # noqa: BLE001 — a broken tool must not end the runstatus, detail=ToolCallStatus.ERROR, f"TOOL_ERROR: {exc}"

      str(EOFError('')) is '', so the model is handed literally:

      TOOL_ERROR:
      

      Nothing after the colon. The model is told its call failed and given no way to tell why, which tool, or whether retrying could help — and the same text goes into the trace, so the audit trail records a failure it cannot explain either.

      This is the same shape as a defect this repo already closed: "a phase the budget curtailed reported nothing at all … so a curtailed phase wrote [budget_exhausted] with nothing after it." Same empty-message failure, one layer down.

      The _CALL_SHAPE_ERROR hint machinery right below that except also can't fire, since it pattern-matches on message text and there is no message.

      Where in the code

      • grapharc/harness/executor.pySandboxedExecutor.run, the poll() / recv() pair
      • grapharc/harness/executor.py_child_main's finally: conn.close(), and the ("ok"|"violation"|"error") protocol the parent expects
      • grapharc/harness/agent.py — the blanket except Exception that renders TOOL_ERROR: {exc}
      • grapharc/harness/core.pyHarness.call, the single caller of executor.run

      What to change

      Catch EOFError around recv() and raise the failure shape callers already handle: a RuntimeError naming the tool and saying the child exited without sending, with the exit code — a negative one being the signal that killed it, which is what distinguishes an OOM-kill from a deliberate _exit.

      It should stay a RuntimeError rather than becoming a SandboxViolation: a child dying is not evidence it tried to escape confinement, and a violation is a specific accusation that ends up in the trace as one.

      Acceptance criteria

      • A sandboxed tool whose child dies without sending raises an error naming the tool, not a bare EOFError
      • A signal death is distinguishable from a clean non-zero exit in the message
      • It is not reported as a SandboxViolation
      • The normal return path, the tool-raises path and the timeout path are unchanged
      • uv run pytest green, uv run ruff check . clean

      Activity

      Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

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          , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
          Skip to content

          harness: a sandboxed child that dies without sending escapes as a bare EOFError, so the agent is told 'TOOL_ERROR:' and nothing else #111

          Description

          @Shashankss1205

          What happens

          SandboxedExecutor.run guards the wait with poll() and then reads:

          ifnotparent_conn.poll(spec.timeout_seconds):
          self._kill(proc)
          raiseSandboxViolation(f"tool {spec.name!r} exceeded its {spec.timeout_seconds}s timeout")
          kind, payload=parent_conn.recv()

          poll() returns true when the pipe is readable, and a closed pipe is readable. So a child that died without sending — os._exit, a segfault, an OOM-kill, anything that kills the process rather than raising inside spec.fn — falls straight through into recv(), which raises a bare EOFError:

          importos, tempfilefromgrapharc.harnessimportToolSpecfromgrapharc.harness.executorimportSandboxedExecutordefsuicidal(**kwargs):
          os._exit(1)
          ex=SandboxedExecutor(workspace=tempfile.mkdtemp())
          ex.run(ToolSpec(name="suicidal", description="", fn=suicidal), {})
          RAISED builtins.EOFError: ''
          does the message name the tool? False
          

          Why it matters

          run has two documented failure shapes and this is neither: SandboxViolation for a confinement breach, and RuntimeError(f"tool {name!r} failed: ...") for the tool's own exception. An EOFError with an empty string for a message is not attributable to anything.

          Downstream is where it bites. AgentNode's tool-call loop catches it under the blanket clause:

          exceptExceptionasexc: # noqa: BLE001 — a broken tool must not end the runstatus, detail=ToolCallStatus.ERROR, f"TOOL_ERROR: {exc}"

          str(EOFError('')) is '', so the model is handed literally:

          TOOL_ERROR:
          

          Nothing after the colon. The model is told its call failed and given no way to tell why, which tool, or whether retrying could help — and the same text goes into the trace, so the audit trail records a failure it cannot explain either.

          This is the same shape as a defect this repo already closed: "a phase the budget curtailed reported nothing at all … so a curtailed phase wrote [budget_exhausted] with nothing after it." Same empty-message failure, one layer down.

          The _CALL_SHAPE_ERROR hint machinery right below that except also can't fire, since it pattern-matches on message text and there is no message.

          Where in the code

          • grapharc/harness/executor.pySandboxedExecutor.run, the poll() / recv() pair
          • grapharc/harness/executor.py_child_main's finally: conn.close(), and the ("ok"|"violation"|"error") protocol the parent expects
          • grapharc/harness/agent.py — the blanket except Exception that renders TOOL_ERROR: {exc}
          • grapharc/harness/core.pyHarness.call, the single caller of executor.run

          What to change

          Catch EOFError around recv() and raise the failure shape callers already handle: a RuntimeError naming the tool and saying the child exited without sending, with the exit code — a negative one being the signal that killed it, which is what distinguishes an OOM-kill from a deliberate _exit.

          It should stay a RuntimeError rather than becoming a SandboxViolation: a child dying is not evidence it tried to escape confinement, and a violation is a specific accusation that ends up in the trace as one.

          Acceptance criteria

          • A sandboxed tool whose child dies without sending raises an error naming the tool, not a bare EOFError
          • A signal death is distinguishable from a clean non-zero exit in the message
          • It is not reported as a SandboxViolation
          • The normal return path, the tool-raises path and the timeout path are unchanged
          • uv run pytest green, uv run ruff check . clean

          Activity

          Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

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            Labels

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              No milestone

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              None yet

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              No branches or pull requests

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              , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
              Skip to content

              harness: a sandboxed child that dies without sending escapes as a bare EOFError, so the agent is told 'TOOL_ERROR:' and nothing else #111

              Description

              @Shashankss1205

              What happens

              SandboxedExecutor.run guards the wait with poll() and then reads:

              ifnotparent_conn.poll(spec.timeout_seconds):
              self._kill(proc)
              raiseSandboxViolation(f"tool {spec.name!r} exceeded its {spec.timeout_seconds}s timeout")
              kind, payload=parent_conn.recv()

              poll() returns true when the pipe is readable, and a closed pipe is readable. So a child that died without sending — os._exit, a segfault, an OOM-kill, anything that kills the process rather than raising inside spec.fn — falls straight through into recv(), which raises a bare EOFError:

              importos, tempfilefromgrapharc.harnessimportToolSpecfromgrapharc.harness.executorimportSandboxedExecutordefsuicidal(**kwargs):
              os._exit(1)
              ex=SandboxedExecutor(workspace=tempfile.mkdtemp())
              ex.run(ToolSpec(name="suicidal", description="", fn=suicidal), {})
              RAISED builtins.EOFError: ''
              does the message name the tool? False
              

              Why it matters

              run has two documented failure shapes and this is neither: SandboxViolation for a confinement breach, and RuntimeError(f"tool {name!r} failed: ...") for the tool's own exception. An EOFError with an empty string for a message is not attributable to anything.

              Downstream is where it bites. AgentNode's tool-call loop catches it under the blanket clause:

              exceptExceptionasexc: # noqa: BLE001 — a broken tool must not end the runstatus, detail=ToolCallStatus.ERROR, f"TOOL_ERROR: {exc}"

              str(EOFError('')) is '', so the model is handed literally:

              TOOL_ERROR:
              

              Nothing after the colon. The model is told its call failed and given no way to tell why, which tool, or whether retrying could help — and the same text goes into the trace, so the audit trail records a failure it cannot explain either.

              This is the same shape as a defect this repo already closed: "a phase the budget curtailed reported nothing at all … so a curtailed phase wrote [budget_exhausted] with nothing after it." Same empty-message failure, one layer down.

              The _CALL_SHAPE_ERROR hint machinery right below that except also can't fire, since it pattern-matches on message text and there is no message.

              Where in the code

              • grapharc/harness/executor.pySandboxedExecutor.run, the poll() / recv() pair
              • grapharc/harness/executor.py_child_main's finally: conn.close(), and the ("ok"|"violation"|"error") protocol the parent expects
              • grapharc/harness/agent.py — the blanket except Exception that renders TOOL_ERROR: {exc}
              • grapharc/harness/core.pyHarness.call, the single caller of executor.run

              What to change

              Catch EOFError around recv() and raise the failure shape callers already handle: a RuntimeError naming the tool and saying the child exited without sending, with the exit code — a negative one being the signal that killed it, which is what distinguishes an OOM-kill from a deliberate _exit.

              It should stay a RuntimeError rather than becoming a SandboxViolation: a child dying is not evidence it tried to escape confinement, and a violation is a specific accusation that ends up in the trace as one.

              Acceptance criteria

              • A sandboxed tool whose child dies without sending raises an error naming the tool, not a bare EOFError
              • A signal death is distinguishable from a clean non-zero exit in the message
              • It is not reported as a SandboxViolation
              • The normal return path, the tool-raises path and the timeout path are unchanged
              • uv run pytest green, uv run ruff check . clean

              Activity

              Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

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              Metadata

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              No one assigned

                Labels

                No labels
                No labels

                Type

                No type

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                  No milestone

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                  None yet

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                  No branches or pull requests

                  Issue actions

                  , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
                  Skip to content

                  harness: a sandboxed child that dies without sending escapes as a bare EOFError, so the agent is told 'TOOL_ERROR:' and nothing else #111

                  Description

                  @Shashankss1205

                  What happens

                  SandboxedExecutor.run guards the wait with poll() and then reads:

                  ifnotparent_conn.poll(spec.timeout_seconds):
                  self._kill(proc)
                  raiseSandboxViolation(f"tool {spec.name!r} exceeded its {spec.timeout_seconds}s timeout")
                  kind, payload=parent_conn.recv()

                  poll() returns true when the pipe is readable, and a closed pipe is readable. So a child that died without sending — os._exit, a segfault, an OOM-kill, anything that kills the process rather than raising inside spec.fn — falls straight through into recv(), which raises a bare EOFError:

                  importos, tempfilefromgrapharc.harnessimportToolSpecfromgrapharc.harness.executorimportSandboxedExecutordefsuicidal(**kwargs):
                  os._exit(1)
                  ex=SandboxedExecutor(workspace=tempfile.mkdtemp())
                  ex.run(ToolSpec(name="suicidal", description="", fn=suicidal), {})
                  RAISED builtins.EOFError: ''
                  does the message name the tool? False
                  

                  Why it matters

                  run has two documented failure shapes and this is neither: SandboxViolation for a confinement breach, and RuntimeError(f"tool {name!r} failed: ...") for the tool's own exception. An EOFError with an empty string for a message is not attributable to anything.

                  Downstream is where it bites. AgentNode's tool-call loop catches it under the blanket clause:

                  exceptExceptionasexc: # noqa: BLE001 — a broken tool must not end the runstatus, detail=ToolCallStatus.ERROR, f"TOOL_ERROR: {exc}"

                  str(EOFError('')) is '', so the model is handed literally:

                  TOOL_ERROR:
                  

                  Nothing after the colon. The model is told its call failed and given no way to tell why, which tool, or whether retrying could help — and the same text goes into the trace, so the audit trail records a failure it cannot explain either.

                  This is the same shape as a defect this repo already closed: "a phase the budget curtailed reported nothing at all … so a curtailed phase wrote [budget_exhausted] with nothing after it." Same empty-message failure, one layer down.

                  The _CALL_SHAPE_ERROR hint machinery right below that except also can't fire, since it pattern-matches on message text and there is no message.

                  Where in the code

                  • grapharc/harness/executor.pySandboxedExecutor.run, the poll() / recv() pair
                  • grapharc/harness/executor.py_child_main's finally: conn.close(), and the ("ok"|"violation"|"error") protocol the parent expects
                  • grapharc/harness/agent.py — the blanket except Exception that renders TOOL_ERROR: {exc}
                  • grapharc/harness/core.pyHarness.call, the single caller of executor.run

                  What to change

                  Catch EOFError around recv() and raise the failure shape callers already handle: a RuntimeError naming the tool and saying the child exited without sending, with the exit code — a negative one being the signal that killed it, which is what distinguishes an OOM-kill from a deliberate _exit.

                  It should stay a RuntimeError rather than becoming a SandboxViolation: a child dying is not evidence it tried to escape confinement, and a violation is a specific accusation that ends up in the trace as one.

                  Acceptance criteria

                  • A sandboxed tool whose child dies without sending raises an error naming the tool, not a bare EOFError
                  • A signal death is distinguishable from a clean non-zero exit in the message
                  • It is not reported as a SandboxViolation
                  • The normal return path, the tool-raises path and the timeout path are unchanged
                  • uv run pytest green, uv run ruff check . clean

                  Activity

                  Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

                  Metadata

                  Metadata

                  Assignees

                  No one assigned

                    Labels

                    No labels
                    No labels

                    Type

                    No type

                    Projects

                    No projects

                      Milestone

                      No milestone

                      Relationships

                      None yet

                      Development

                      No branches or pull requests

                      Issue actions

                      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
                      Skip to content

                      harness: a sandboxed child that dies without sending escapes as a bare EOFError, so the agent is told 'TOOL_ERROR:' and nothing else #111

                      Description

                      @Shashankss1205

                      What happens

                      SandboxedExecutor.run guards the wait with poll() and then reads:

                      ifnotparent_conn.poll(spec.timeout_seconds):
                      self._kill(proc)
                      raiseSandboxViolation(f"tool {spec.name!r} exceeded its {spec.timeout_seconds}s timeout")
                      kind, payload=parent_conn.recv()

                      poll() returns true when the pipe is readable, and a closed pipe is readable. So a child that died without sending — os._exit, a segfault, an OOM-kill, anything that kills the process rather than raising inside spec.fn — falls straight through into recv(), which raises a bare EOFError:

                      importos, tempfilefromgrapharc.harnessimportToolSpecfromgrapharc.harness.executorimportSandboxedExecutordefsuicidal(**kwargs):
                      os._exit(1)
                      ex=SandboxedExecutor(workspace=tempfile.mkdtemp())
                      ex.run(ToolSpec(name="suicidal", description="", fn=suicidal), {})
                      RAISED builtins.EOFError: ''
                      does the message name the tool? False
                      

                      Why it matters

                      run has two documented failure shapes and this is neither: SandboxViolation for a confinement breach, and RuntimeError(f"tool {name!r} failed: ...") for the tool's own exception. An EOFError with an empty string for a message is not attributable to anything.

                      Downstream is where it bites. AgentNode's tool-call loop catches it under the blanket clause:

                      exceptExceptionasexc: # noqa: BLE001 — a broken tool must not end the runstatus, detail=ToolCallStatus.ERROR, f"TOOL_ERROR: {exc}"

                      str(EOFError('')) is '', so the model is handed literally:

                      TOOL_ERROR:
                      

                      Nothing after the colon. The model is told its call failed and given no way to tell why, which tool, or whether retrying could help — and the same text goes into the trace, so the audit trail records a failure it cannot explain either.

                      This is the same shape as a defect this repo already closed: "a phase the budget curtailed reported nothing at all … so a curtailed phase wrote [budget_exhausted] with nothing after it." Same empty-message failure, one layer down.

                      The _CALL_SHAPE_ERROR hint machinery right below that except also can't fire, since it pattern-matches on message text and there is no message.

                      Where in the code

                      • grapharc/harness/executor.pySandboxedExecutor.run, the poll() / recv() pair
                      • grapharc/harness/executor.py_child_main's finally: conn.close(), and the ("ok"|"violation"|"error") protocol the parent expects
                      • grapharc/harness/agent.py — the blanket except Exception that renders TOOL_ERROR: {exc}
                      • grapharc/harness/core.pyHarness.call, the single caller of executor.run

                      What to change

                      Catch EOFError around recv() and raise the failure shape callers already handle: a RuntimeError naming the tool and saying the child exited without sending, with the exit code — a negative one being the signal that killed it, which is what distinguishes an OOM-kill from a deliberate _exit.

                      It should stay a RuntimeError rather than becoming a SandboxViolation: a child dying is not evidence it tried to escape confinement, and a violation is a specific accusation that ends up in the trace as one.

                      Acceptance criteria

                      • A sandboxed tool whose child dies without sending raises an error naming the tool, not a bare EOFError
                      • A signal death is distinguishable from a clean non-zero exit in the message
                      • It is not reported as a SandboxViolation
                      • The normal return path, the tool-raises path and the timeout path are unchanged
                      • uv run pytest green, uv run ruff check . clean

                      Activity

                      Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

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                          , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
                          Skip to content

                          harness: a sandboxed child that dies without sending escapes as a bare EOFError, so the agent is told 'TOOL_ERROR:' and nothing else #111

                          Description

                          @Shashankss1205

                          What happens

                          SandboxedExecutor.run guards the wait with poll() and then reads:

                          ifnotparent_conn.poll(spec.timeout_seconds):
                          self._kill(proc)
                          raiseSandboxViolation(f"tool {spec.name!r} exceeded its {spec.timeout_seconds}s timeout")
                          kind, payload=parent_conn.recv()

                          poll() returns true when the pipe is readable, and a closed pipe is readable. So a child that died without sending — os._exit, a segfault, an OOM-kill, anything that kills the process rather than raising inside spec.fn — falls straight through into recv(), which raises a bare EOFError:

                          importos, tempfilefromgrapharc.harnessimportToolSpecfromgrapharc.harness.executorimportSandboxedExecutordefsuicidal(**kwargs):
                          os._exit(1)
                          ex=SandboxedExecutor(workspace=tempfile.mkdtemp())
                          ex.run(ToolSpec(name="suicidal", description="", fn=suicidal), {})
                          RAISED builtins.EOFError: ''
                          does the message name the tool? False
                          

                          Why it matters

                          run has two documented failure shapes and this is neither: SandboxViolation for a confinement breach, and RuntimeError(f"tool {name!r} failed: ...") for the tool's own exception. An EOFError with an empty string for a message is not attributable to anything.

                          Downstream is where it bites. AgentNode's tool-call loop catches it under the blanket clause:

                          exceptExceptionasexc: # noqa: BLE001 — a broken tool must not end the runstatus, detail=ToolCallStatus.ERROR, f"TOOL_ERROR: {exc}"

                          str(EOFError('')) is '', so the model is handed literally:

                          TOOL_ERROR:
                          

                          Nothing after the colon. The model is told its call failed and given no way to tell why, which tool, or whether retrying could help — and the same text goes into the trace, so the audit trail records a failure it cannot explain either.

                          This is the same shape as a defect this repo already closed: "a phase the budget curtailed reported nothing at all … so a curtailed phase wrote [budget_exhausted] with nothing after it." Same empty-message failure, one layer down.

                          The _CALL_SHAPE_ERROR hint machinery right below that except also can't fire, since it pattern-matches on message text and there is no message.

                          Where in the code

                          • grapharc/harness/executor.pySandboxedExecutor.run, the poll() / recv() pair
                          • grapharc/harness/executor.py_child_main's finally: conn.close(), and the ("ok"|"violation"|"error") protocol the parent expects
                          • grapharc/harness/agent.py — the blanket except Exception that renders TOOL_ERROR: {exc}
                          • grapharc/harness/core.pyHarness.call, the single caller of executor.run

                          What to change

                          Catch EOFError around recv() and raise the failure shape callers already handle: a RuntimeError naming the tool and saying the child exited without sending, with the exit code — a negative one being the signal that killed it, which is what distinguishes an OOM-kill from a deliberate _exit.

                          It should stay a RuntimeError rather than becoming a SandboxViolation: a child dying is not evidence it tried to escape confinement, and a violation is a specific accusation that ends up in the trace as one.

                          Acceptance criteria

                          • A sandboxed tool whose child dies without sending raises an error naming the tool, not a bare EOFError
                          • A signal death is distinguishable from a clean non-zero exit in the message
                          • It is not reported as a SandboxViolation
                          • The normal return path, the tool-raises path and the timeout path are unchanged
                          • uv run pytest green, uv run ruff check . clean

                          Activity

                          Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

                          Metadata

                          Metadata

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                          No one assigned

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                            No labels
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                            No type

                            Projects

                            No projects

                              Milestone

                              No milestone

                              Relationships

                              None yet

                              Development

                              No branches or pull requests

                              Issue actions

                              , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
                              Skip to content

                              harness: a sandboxed child that dies without sending escapes as a bare EOFError, so the agent is told 'TOOL_ERROR:' and nothing else #111

                              Description

                              @Shashankss1205

                              What happens

                              SandboxedExecutor.run guards the wait with poll() and then reads:

                              ifnotparent_conn.poll(spec.timeout_seconds):
                              self._kill(proc)
                              raiseSandboxViolation(f"tool {spec.name!r} exceeded its {spec.timeout_seconds}s timeout")
                              kind, payload=parent_conn.recv()

                              poll() returns true when the pipe is readable, and a closed pipe is readable. So a child that died without sending — os._exit, a segfault, an OOM-kill, anything that kills the process rather than raising inside spec.fn — falls straight through into recv(), which raises a bare EOFError:

                              importos, tempfilefromgrapharc.harnessimportToolSpecfromgrapharc.harness.executorimportSandboxedExecutordefsuicidal(**kwargs):
                              os._exit(1)
                              ex=SandboxedExecutor(workspace=tempfile.mkdtemp())
                              ex.run(ToolSpec(name="suicidal", description="", fn=suicidal), {})
                              RAISED builtins.EOFError: ''
                              does the message name the tool? False
                              

                              Why it matters

                              run has two documented failure shapes and this is neither: SandboxViolation for a confinement breach, and RuntimeError(f"tool {name!r} failed: ...") for the tool's own exception. An EOFError with an empty string for a message is not attributable to anything.

                              Downstream is where it bites. AgentNode's tool-call loop catches it under the blanket clause:

                              exceptExceptionasexc: # noqa: BLE001 — a broken tool must not end the runstatus, detail=ToolCallStatus.ERROR, f"TOOL_ERROR: {exc}"

                              str(EOFError('')) is '', so the model is handed literally:

                              TOOL_ERROR:
                              

                              Nothing after the colon. The model is told its call failed and given no way to tell why, which tool, or whether retrying could help — and the same text goes into the trace, so the audit trail records a failure it cannot explain either.

                              This is the same shape as a defect this repo already closed: "a phase the budget curtailed reported nothing at all … so a curtailed phase wrote [budget_exhausted] with nothing after it." Same empty-message failure, one layer down.

                              The _CALL_SHAPE_ERROR hint machinery right below that except also can't fire, since it pattern-matches on message text and there is no message.

                              Where in the code

                              • grapharc/harness/executor.pySandboxedExecutor.run, the poll() / recv() pair
                              • grapharc/harness/executor.py_child_main's finally: conn.close(), and the ("ok"|"violation"|"error") protocol the parent expects
                              • grapharc/harness/agent.py — the blanket except Exception that renders TOOL_ERROR: {exc}
                              • grapharc/harness/core.pyHarness.call, the single caller of executor.run

                              What to change

                              Catch EOFError around recv() and raise the failure shape callers already handle: a RuntimeError naming the tool and saying the child exited without sending, with the exit code — a negative one being the signal that killed it, which is what distinguishes an OOM-kill from a deliberate _exit.

                              It should stay a RuntimeError rather than becoming a SandboxViolation: a child dying is not evidence it tried to escape confinement, and a violation is a specific accusation that ends up in the trace as one.

                              Acceptance criteria

                              • A sandboxed tool whose child dies without sending raises an error naming the tool, not a bare EOFError
                              • A signal death is distinguishable from a clean non-zero exit in the message
                              • It is not reported as a SandboxViolation
                              • The normal return path, the tool-raises path and the timeout path are unchanged
                              • uv run pytest green, uv run ruff check . clean

                              Activity

                              Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

                              Metadata

                              Metadata

                              Assignees

                              No one assigned

                                Labels

                                No labels
                                No labels

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                                Projects

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                                  Issue actions