[P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials #270

Open
Open
[P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials#270
Labels
area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task

Description

@jjoonleo
jjoonleo
opened on May 7, 2026

Problem

The backend currently relies on credential-bearing files and hard-coded fallback secrets in the application configuration. The local audit found .env, Firebase service account JSON, Apple private key material, and static fallback database/JWT values in or under the app workspace. src/main/resources/application.properties also defines fallback DB credentials and a static JWT secret.

Why this is not production ready

If any of these values are real or reused, they must be considered compromised. Shipping secrets inside the application artifact or keeping long-lived fallbacks in code makes accidental exposure likely and makes rotation difficult during incidents.

Evidence

  • ontime-back/src/main/resources/application.properties contains fallback DB password and static JWT secret.
  • ontime-back/src/main/resources/ontime-c63f1-firebase-adminsdk-fbsvc-a043cdc829.json exists in the runtime resources path.
  • ontime-back/src/main/resources/key/AuthKey_743M7R5W3W.p8 exists in the runtime resources path.
  • ontime-back/.env contains database/JWT/OAuth values in the local workspace.
  • .gitignore ignores several of these files, but secrets are still present locally and can be copied into images through resource mounts or packaging.

Required work

  • Rotate all potentially exposed Firebase, Apple, Google OAuth, JWT, and database credentials.
  • Remove secret files from application resources and deployment bind mounts.
  • Load secrets from a production secret manager or controlled environment variables only.
  • Make the app fail startup when required production secrets are missing.
  • Add a documented local-development sample config that contains no real secrets.

Acceptance criteria

  • No private keys, service account JSON, OAuth client secrets, DB passwords, or JWT signing secrets exist under src/main/resources or committed files.
  • Production startup requires externally supplied secrets and refuses known placeholder/default values.
  • Rotated credentials are confirmed in each external provider.
  • A fresh clone can run locally using documented fake/sample config without exposing real credentials.

Activity

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      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
       blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

      Skip to content
      [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials #270
      Open
      Open
      [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials#270
      Labels
      area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
      Description
      @jjoonleo
      jjoonleo
      opened on May 7, 2026
      Problem
      The backend currently relies on credential-bearing files and hard-coded fallback secrets in the application configuration. The local audit found .env, Firebase service account JSON, Apple private key material, and static fallback database/JWT values in or under the app workspace. src/main/resources/application.properties also defines fallback DB credentials and a static JWT secret.
      Why this is not production ready
      If any of these values are real or reused, they must be considered compromised. Shipping secrets inside the application artifact or keeping long-lived fallbacks in code makes accidental exposure likely and makes rotation difficult during incidents.
      Evidence
      • ontime-back/src/main/resources/application.properties contains fallback DB password and static JWT secret.
      • ontime-back/src/main/resources/ontime-c63f1-firebase-adminsdk-fbsvc-a043cdc829.json exists in the runtime resources path.
      • ontime-back/src/main/resources/key/AuthKey_743M7R5W3W.p8 exists in the runtime resources path.
      • ontime-back/.env contains database/JWT/OAuth values in the local workspace.
      • .gitignore ignores several of these files, but secrets are still present locally and can be copied into images through resource mounts or packaging.
      Required work
      • Rotate all potentially exposed Firebase, Apple, Google OAuth, JWT, and database credentials.
      • Remove secret files from application resources and deployment bind mounts.
      • Load secrets from a production secret manager or controlled environment variables only.
      • Make the app fail startup when required production secrets are missing.
      • Add a documented local-development sample config that contains no real secrets.
      Acceptance criteria
      • No private keys, service account JSON, OAuth client secrets, DB passwords, or JWT signing secrets exist under src/main/resources or committed files.
      • Production startup requires externally supplied secrets and refuses known placeholder/default values.
      • Rotated credentials are confirmed in each external provider.
      • A fresh clone can run locally using documented fake/sample config without exposing real credentials.
      Activity
      Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      No one assigned
        Labels
        area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

          Skip to content
          [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials #270
          Open
          Open
          [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials#270
          Labels
          area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
          Description
          @jjoonleo
          jjoonleo
          opened on May 7, 2026
          Problem
          The backend currently relies on credential-bearing files and hard-coded fallback secrets in the application configuration. The local audit found .env, Firebase service account JSON, Apple private key material, and static fallback database/JWT values in or under the app workspace. src/main/resources/application.properties also defines fallback DB credentials and a static JWT secret.
          Why this is not production ready
          If any of these values are real or reused, they must be considered compromised. Shipping secrets inside the application artifact or keeping long-lived fallbacks in code makes accidental exposure likely and makes rotation difficult during incidents.
          Evidence
          • ontime-back/src/main/resources/application.properties contains fallback DB password and static JWT secret.
          • ontime-back/src/main/resources/ontime-c63f1-firebase-adminsdk-fbsvc-a043cdc829.json exists in the runtime resources path.
          • ontime-back/src/main/resources/key/AuthKey_743M7R5W3W.p8 exists in the runtime resources path.
          • ontime-back/.env contains database/JWT/OAuth values in the local workspace.
          • .gitignore ignores several of these files, but secrets are still present locally and can be copied into images through resource mounts or packaging.
          Required work
          • Rotate all potentially exposed Firebase, Apple, Google OAuth, JWT, and database credentials.
          • Remove secret files from application resources and deployment bind mounts.
          • Load secrets from a production secret manager or controlled environment variables only.
          • Make the app fail startup when required production secrets are missing.
          • Add a documented local-development sample config that contains no real secrets.
          Acceptance criteria
          • No private keys, service account JSON, OAuth client secrets, DB passwords, or JWT signing secrets exist under src/main/resources or committed files.
          • Production startup requires externally supplied secrets and refuses known placeholder/default values.
          • Rotated credentials are confirmed in each external provider.
          • A fresh clone can run locally using documented fake/sample config without exposing real credentials.
          Activity
          Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          No one assigned
            Labels
            area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials #270
              Open
              Open
              [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials#270
              Labels
              area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
              Description
              @jjoonleo
              jjoonleo
              opened on May 7, 2026
              Problem
              The backend currently relies on credential-bearing files and hard-coded fallback secrets in the application configuration. The local audit found .env, Firebase service account JSON, Apple private key material, and static fallback database/JWT values in or under the app workspace. src/main/resources/application.properties also defines fallback DB credentials and a static JWT secret.
              Why this is not production ready
              If any of these values are real or reused, they must be considered compromised. Shipping secrets inside the application artifact or keeping long-lived fallbacks in code makes accidental exposure likely and makes rotation difficult during incidents.
              Evidence
              • ontime-back/src/main/resources/application.properties contains fallback DB password and static JWT secret.
              • ontime-back/src/main/resources/ontime-c63f1-firebase-adminsdk-fbsvc-a043cdc829.json exists in the runtime resources path.
              • ontime-back/src/main/resources/key/AuthKey_743M7R5W3W.p8 exists in the runtime resources path.
              • ontime-back/.env contains database/JWT/OAuth values in the local workspace.
              • .gitignore ignores several of these files, but secrets are still present locally and can be copied into images through resource mounts or packaging.
              Required work
              • Rotate all potentially exposed Firebase, Apple, Google OAuth, JWT, and database credentials.
              • Remove secret files from application resources and deployment bind mounts.
              • Load secrets from a production secret manager or controlled environment variables only.
              • Make the app fail startup when required production secrets are missing.
              • Add a documented local-development sample config that contains no real secrets.
              Acceptance criteria
              • No private keys, service account JSON, OAuth client secrets, DB passwords, or JWT signing secrets exist under src/main/resources or committed files.
              • Production startup requires externally supplied secrets and refuses known placeholder/default values.
              • Rotated credentials are confirmed in each external provider.
              • A fresh clone can run locally using documented fake/sample config without exposing real credentials.
              Activity
              Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              No one assigned
                Labels
                area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
                Type
                No type
                Projects
                No projects
                  Milestone
                  No milestone
                  Relationships
                  None yet
                  Development
                  No branches or pull requests
                  Issue actions
                  
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

                  Skip to content
                  [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials #270
                  Open
                  Open
                  [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials#270
                  Labels
                  area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
                  Description
                  @jjoonleo
                  jjoonleo
                  opened on May 7, 2026
                  Problem
                  The backend currently relies on credential-bearing files and hard-coded fallback secrets in the application configuration. The local audit found .env, Firebase service account JSON, Apple private key material, and static fallback database/JWT values in or under the app workspace. src/main/resources/application.properties also defines fallback DB credentials and a static JWT secret.
                  Why this is not production ready
                  If any of these values are real or reused, they must be considered compromised. Shipping secrets inside the application artifact or keeping long-lived fallbacks in code makes accidental exposure likely and makes rotation difficult during incidents.
                  Evidence
                  • ontime-back/src/main/resources/application.properties contains fallback DB password and static JWT secret.
                  • ontime-back/src/main/resources/ontime-c63f1-firebase-adminsdk-fbsvc-a043cdc829.json exists in the runtime resources path.
                  • ontime-back/src/main/resources/key/AuthKey_743M7R5W3W.p8 exists in the runtime resources path.
                  • ontime-back/.env contains database/JWT/OAuth values in the local workspace.
                  • .gitignore ignores several of these files, but secrets are still present locally and can be copied into images through resource mounts or packaging.
                  Required work
                  • Rotate all potentially exposed Firebase, Apple, Google OAuth, JWT, and database credentials.
                  • Remove secret files from application resources and deployment bind mounts.
                  • Load secrets from a production secret manager or controlled environment variables only.
                  • Make the app fail startup when required production secrets are missing.
                  • Add a documented local-development sample config that contains no real secrets.
                  Acceptance criteria
                  • No private keys, service account JSON, OAuth client secrets, DB passwords, or JWT signing secrets exist under src/main/resources or committed files.
                  • Production startup requires externally supplied secrets and refuses known placeholder/default values.
                  • Rotated credentials are confirmed in each external provider.
                  • A fresh clone can run locally using documented fake/sample config without exposing real credentials.
                  Activity
                  Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
                  Metadata
                  Metadata
                  Assignees
                  No one assigned
                    Labels
                    area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
                    Type
                    No type
                    Projects
                    No projects
                      Milestone
                      No milestone
                      Relationships
                      None yet
                      Development
                      No branches or pull requests
                      Issue actions
                      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                      Skip to content
                      [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials #270
                      Open
                      Open
                      [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials#270
                      Labels
                      area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
                      Description
                      @jjoonleo
                      jjoonleo
                      opened on May 7, 2026
                      Problem
                      The backend currently relies on credential-bearing files and hard-coded fallback secrets in the application configuration. The local audit found .env, Firebase service account JSON, Apple private key material, and static fallback database/JWT values in or under the app workspace. src/main/resources/application.properties also defines fallback DB credentials and a static JWT secret.
                      Why this is not production ready
                      If any of these values are real or reused, they must be considered compromised. Shipping secrets inside the application artifact or keeping long-lived fallbacks in code makes accidental exposure likely and makes rotation difficult during incidents.
                      Evidence
                      • ontime-back/src/main/resources/application.properties contains fallback DB password and static JWT secret.
                      • ontime-back/src/main/resources/ontime-c63f1-firebase-adminsdk-fbsvc-a043cdc829.json exists in the runtime resources path.
                      • ontime-back/src/main/resources/key/AuthKey_743M7R5W3W.p8 exists in the runtime resources path.
                      • ontime-back/.env contains database/JWT/OAuth values in the local workspace.
                      • .gitignore ignores several of these files, but secrets are still present locally and can be copied into images through resource mounts or packaging.
                      Required work
                      • Rotate all potentially exposed Firebase, Apple, Google OAuth, JWT, and database credentials.
                      • Remove secret files from application resources and deployment bind mounts.
                      • Load secrets from a production secret manager or controlled environment variables only.
                      • Make the app fail startup when required production secrets are missing.
                      • Add a documented local-development sample config that contains no real secrets.
                      Acceptance criteria
                      • No private keys, service account JSON, OAuth client secrets, DB passwords, or JWT signing secrets exist under src/main/resources or committed files.
                      • Production startup requires externally supplied secrets and refuses known placeholder/default values.
                      • Rotated credentials are confirmed in each external provider.
                      • A fresh clone can run locally using documented fake/sample config without exposing real credentials.
                      Activity
                      Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
                      Metadata
                      Metadata
                      Assignees
                      No one assigned
                        Labels
                        area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
                        Type
                        No type
                        Projects
                        No projects
                          Milestone
                          No milestone
                          Relationships
                          None yet
                          Development
                          No branches or pull requests
                          Issue actions
                          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                          Skip to content
                          [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials #270
                          Open
                          Open
                          [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials#270
                          Labels
                          area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
                          Description
                          @jjoonleo
                          jjoonleo
                          opened on May 7, 2026
                          Problem
                          The backend currently relies on credential-bearing files and hard-coded fallback secrets in the application configuration. The local audit found .env, Firebase service account JSON, Apple private key material, and static fallback database/JWT values in or under the app workspace. src/main/resources/application.properties also defines fallback DB credentials and a static JWT secret.
                          Why this is not production ready
                          If any of these values are real or reused, they must be considered compromised. Shipping secrets inside the application artifact or keeping long-lived fallbacks in code makes accidental exposure likely and makes rotation difficult during incidents.
                          Evidence
                          • ontime-back/src/main/resources/application.properties contains fallback DB password and static JWT secret.
                          • ontime-back/src/main/resources/ontime-c63f1-firebase-adminsdk-fbsvc-a043cdc829.json exists in the runtime resources path.
                          • ontime-back/src/main/resources/key/AuthKey_743M7R5W3W.p8 exists in the runtime resources path.
                          • ontime-back/.env contains database/JWT/OAuth values in the local workspace.
                          • .gitignore ignores several of these files, but secrets are still present locally and can be copied into images through resource mounts or packaging.
                          Required work
                          • Rotate all potentially exposed Firebase, Apple, Google OAuth, JWT, and database credentials.
                          • Remove secret files from application resources and deployment bind mounts.
                          • Load secrets from a production secret manager or controlled environment variables only.
                          • Make the app fail startup when required production secrets are missing.
                          • Add a documented local-development sample config that contains no real secrets.
                          Acceptance criteria
                          • No private keys, service account JSON, OAuth client secrets, DB passwords, or JWT signing secrets exist under src/main/resources or committed files.
                          • Production startup requires externally supplied secrets and refuses known placeholder/default values.
                          • Rotated credentials are confirmed in each external provider.
                          • A fresh clone can run locally using documented fake/sample config without exposing real credentials.
                          Activity
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                            area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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                              [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials #270
                              Open
                              Open
                              [P0] Rotate exposed secrets and externalize all runtime credentials#270
                              Labels
                              area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
                              Description
                              @jjoonleo
                              jjoonleo
                              opened on May 7, 2026
                              Problem
                              The backend currently relies on credential-bearing files and hard-coded fallback secrets in the application configuration. The local audit found .env, Firebase service account JSON, Apple private key material, and static fallback database/JWT values in or under the app workspace. src/main/resources/application.properties also defines fallback DB credentials and a static JWT secret.
                              Why this is not production ready
                              If any of these values are real or reused, they must be considered compromised. Shipping secrets inside the application artifact or keeping long-lived fallbacks in code makes accidental exposure likely and makes rotation difficult during incidents.
                              Evidence
                              • ontime-back/src/main/resources/application.properties contains fallback DB password and static JWT secret.
                              • ontime-back/src/main/resources/ontime-c63f1-firebase-adminsdk-fbsvc-a043cdc829.json exists in the runtime resources path.
                              • ontime-back/src/main/resources/key/AuthKey_743M7R5W3W.p8 exists in the runtime resources path.
                              • ontime-back/.env contains database/JWT/OAuth values in the local workspace.
                              • .gitignore ignores several of these files, but secrets are still present locally and can be copied into images through resource mounts or packaging.
                              Required work
                              • Rotate all potentially exposed Firebase, Apple, Google OAuth, JWT, and database credentials.
                              • Remove secret files from application resources and deployment bind mounts.
                              • Load secrets from a production secret manager or controlled environment variables only.
                              • Make the app fail startup when required production secrets are missing.
                              • Add a documented local-development sample config that contains no real secrets.
                              Acceptance criteria
                              • No private keys, service account JSON, OAuth client secrets, DB passwords, or JWT signing secrets exist under src/main/resources or committed files.
                              • Production startup requires externally supplied secrets and refuses known placeholder/default values.
                              • Rotated credentials are confirmed in each external provider.
                              • A fresh clone can run locally using documented fake/sample config without exposing real credentials.
                              Activity
                              Sign up for free to join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment
                              Metadata
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                                Labels
                                area:deploymentBuild, config, deployment, infrastructurearea:securitySecurity, privacy, auth, or secretspriority:P0Critical: blocks safe production launchproduction-readinessProduction readiness audit itemtype:hardeningSecurity/stability hardening task
                                Type
                                No type
                                Projects
                                No projects
                                  Milestone
                                  No milestone
                                  Relationships
                                  None yet
                                  Development
                                  No branches or pull requests
                                  Issue actions