doDomain Python SDK

Official Python SDK for doDomain — connect your customers' custom domains without becoming a DNS support desk.

You mint a connect session, send the customer to a hosted flow that detects their DNS provider and walks them through (or one-clicks) the records, and you get a signed webhook when the domain goes live.

This SDK covers all 16 callable REST operations, sync and async, plus webhook signature verification. (The API's other four routes are browser navigations that answer 302 on every path; the SDK exposes them as URL builders and never fetches them.)

Install

pip install dodomain-sdk

Requires Python 3.10+. The only runtime dependency is httpx.

The distribution is published as dodomain-sdk, but the import package is dodomain — pip install dodomain-sdk, then from dodomain import DoDomain.

Authentication

Every authenticated call takes your app's secret key — a dd_sk_… value from the doDomain dashboard (your app → API keys). Keep it server-side and read it from the environment:

export DODOMAIN_SECRET_KEY="dd_sk_live_…"

importosfromdodomainimportDoDomainclient=DoDomain(secret_key=os.environ["DODOMAIN_SECRET_KEY"])

A secret key is app-scoped — the app is implicit in the key. If you are integrating through OAuth instead (the MCP/agent path), pass the access token as secret_key; the SDK detects it, and app_id then becomes required on sessions.create because an OAuth token is team-scoped.

Quickstart

importosfromdodomainimportDoDomain, DnsRecordclient=DoDomain(secret_key=os.environ["DODOMAIN_SECRET_KEY"])
session=client.sessions.create(
domain="app.customer.com",
records=[DnsRecord(type="CNAME", host="app", value="cname.dodomain.io")],
return_url="https://customer.com/settings/domains",
)
print(session.connect_url) # send your customer hereprint(session.expires_at) # 24 hours from now, timezone-awareforrecordinsession.records:
print(record.fqdn) # the name we will actually verify — check this

Render session.connect_url as a link or redirect. When the customer finishes, doDomain fires a connection.verified webhook carrying session.id as sessionId, so you can correlate it back to the row you just wrote.

Read session.records before you show the customer anything. The API composes each host under your domain, so domain="links.acme.com" with host="links" is verified at links.links.acme.com — a doubled label that used to surface only as a mysteriously failing verify. session.warnings carries advisories about a request that was accepted anyway (duplicate_host_label is the one that exists today); a warning never changes the status code.

Reading a session back

Two different reads, and the difference matters. From your server, use sessions.get(session_id) — it takes your credential, it is addressable by the sessionId every webhook carries, and it still answers after the session expired:

state=client.sessions.get("cs_01HZX")
state.status# "verified"state.expired# True once the 24h TTL passed — even before the reaper catches upstate.connection_id# the DomainConnection id, or None if it never finalizedstate.records# composed names (type/host/fqdn) — no `value` on this arm

The token-public routes are the other read: they take the session token in the path as the capability, send no credential at all, and are what a browser or a customer-side process can call:

public=client.sessions.retrieve(session.token) # status, records, detected tierdetected=client.sessions.detect(session.token) # provider, tier, manual guideresult=client.sessions.verify(session.token) # check live DNS nowforrecordinresult.records:
print(record.fqdn, record.type, record.outcome)

retrieve raises ExpiredError forever once the TTL passes — correct for a capability URL, useless for support, which is exactly why get exists.

Two endpoints are browser navigations, not API calls — they answer 302 on every path. The SDK exposes them as URL builders so you can render your own CTA, and never fetches them:

session.cloudflare_start_url# tier-1 Cloudflare OAuth flowsession.domain_connect_start_url# tier-2 Domain Connect one-click

Async

AsyncDoDomain has the identical resource tree, arguments and return types — every method is awaitable and list_all is an async iterator.

importasyncioimportosfromdodomainimportAsyncDoDomain, DnsRecordasyncdefmain() ->None:
asyncwithAsyncDoDomain(secret_key=os.environ["DODOMAIN_SECRET_KEY"]) asclient:
session=awaitclient.sessions.create(
domain="app.customer.com",
records=[DnsRecord(type="CNAME", host="app", value="cname.dodomain.io")],
)
print(session.connect_url)
asyncforconnectioninclient.connections.list_all():
print(connection.id, connection.status)
asyncio.run(main())

Connections

A connection is a customer domain that went live. doDomain keeps checking its DNS and tells you when it drifts.

# Hold an id from a webhook? Read that one connection directly.conn=client.connections.get("conn_123")
conn.status# "active" | "broken"conn.record_fqdns# ("status.customer.com",) — the names we actually monitorconn.disconnected_at# not None => monitoring stoppedpage=client.connections.list(limit=100)
page.connections# tuple[Connection, ...]page.next_cursor# str | None — opaque, pass it straight backpage.has_more# bool# Auto-paginating iterator — the ergonomic default.forconnectioninclient.connections.list_all(domain="app.customer.com"):
print(connection.id, connection.status, connection.verified_at)
# Include the ones you disconnected, to reconcile against the archive.forconnectioninclient.connections.list_all(include_disconnected=True):
print(connection.id, connection.disconnected_at)

The cursor is opaque by contract. Pass next_cursor back unchanged; never construct, parse or persist its internals.

# Ask for an on-demand DNS re-check. Answers 202 — the outcome arrives as a# connection.verified / connection.failed webhook, not in this response.client.connections.reverify("conn_123")
# Stop monitoring a domain the customer removed from your product.result=client.connections.disconnect("conn_123")
result.disconnected_at# datetimeresult.already_disconnected# False on the call that did it, True on a repeat

disconnect is idempotent by construction: a repeat returns the originaldisconnected_at and emits no second webhook.

A connection owned by another app or team answers 404, never 403 — the API refuses to confirm that someone else's id exists, and this SDK does not reinterpret that as a permission problem. get is the exception to the list's default in one way: it does return a disconnected connection, because a caller naming an id already knows the row exists.

Read record_fqdns, not fqdn.Connection.fqdn has always been written as the session's domain, so a connection verified for status.acme.com reports fqdn="acme.com". It cannot be fixed in place — a session may carry several records, so there is no single honest "the" fqdn — and it keeps its value for the integrators already reading it. record_fqdns carries the real answer: every name doDomain monitors for that connection.

Webhook endpoints

Manage delivery targets from CI or IaC instead of the dashboard. Secret-key only — an OAuth token is refused with a 403 whose exc.secret_key_required is True.

endpoint=client.webhook_endpoints.create(url="https://acme.example/webhooks/dodomain")
endpoint.secret# "whsec_…" — SHOWN ONCE. Store it now.foreinclient.webhook_endpoints.list():
print(e.id, e.url) # never carries a secretclient.webhook_endpoints.update("whe_123", url="https://acme.example/v2") # secret unchangedrotated=client.webhook_endpoints.rotate_secret("whe_123")
rotated.secret# the new one, also shown onceclient.webhook_endpoints.delete("whe_123")

Three things that will bite if assumed away:

• The signing secret is show-once.create and rotate_secret return it and nothing else ever does. It is kept out of the object's repr so a traceback cannot spill it into your logs; read it off .secret.
• Rotation is an immediate cutover. There is no dual-secret window: signatures switch the moment the call returns, including retries of deliveries created before it. Deploy the new secret to your receiver first.
• get(endpoint_id) is a client-side lookup over list() — the API has no read-one route — so it costs one list request, and the NotFoundError it raises carries status_code == 0 because no 404 came back from the server.

Rotating your secret key

rotated=client.keys.rotate()
rotated.secret_key# the NEW dd_sk_… — the only copy that will ever existrotated.public_key# unchanged, so CI can assert it rewrote the right approtated.previous_key_expires_at# None: the old key is already dead

The default is an immediate cutover. The key you authenticated the call with stops working the instant the response is produced. Write rotated.secret_key to your secret store before doing anything else — drop it and you are locked out until you rotate again from the dashboard. The client you called it on still holds the old key; build a new one from the result.

Rotating with no downtime

If you cannot deploy the new key in the same breath, ask for an overlap window and both keys authenticate until it closes:

rotated=client.keys.rotate(overlap_hours=24) # 0 (default), 1 or 24rotated.previous_key_expires_at# when the OLD key stops working

Rotate, ship rotated.secret_key everywhere, and let the old one lapse on its own. Three things to hold on to:

• Exactly one previous key is ever kept. Rotating again overwrites that slot and kills key n-1 immediately, whatever was left of its window — so the safe rhythm is rotate, deploy, then rotate again, never two rotations in a row.
• A zero-overlap rotation is the kill switch.keys.rotate() with the default also terminates a window still running from an earlier rotation, which is how you revoke a previous key early.
• The client you called it on keeps using the key it was built with, so within a window it keeps working; past the window its next call is a 401.

There is deliberately no keys.create, keys.list or keys.revoke: key inventory stays behind a human dashboard session, so a stolen key can never mint a second hidden credential that survives you rotating the one you know about. Rotating is the revoke.

Domain pre-flight check

Find out how a domain would connect before you create anything. Stateless, persists nothing, available on every plan:

check=client.domains.check(domain="app.customer.com")
check.zone# "customer.com" — the registrable apex DNS is managed atcheck.provider# "cloudflare"check.tier# 1 | 2 | 3check.method# "oauth" | "domain-connect" | "guided"check.confidence# "high" | "medium" | "low"check.guide.steps# copy-ready manual instructions

Your apps

forappinclient.apps.list():
print(app.id, app.name, app.public_key, app.sandbox)

A secret key sees exactly its own app — listing siblings would widen a single leaked key into team-wide reconnaissance. The model carries no secret material.

Verifying webhooks

doDomain signs every delivery Stripe-style:

x-dodomain-signature: t=<unix millis>,v1=<hex sha256 hmac>
x-dodomain-event: connection.verified
x-dodomain-delivery-id: whd_…

Verify against the raw request body, before any JSON parsing — re-serializing a parsed body changes the bytes and the signature will not match.

importjsonimportosfromdodomainimportverify_webhook@app.post("/webhooks/dodomain")asyncdefhandle(request):
raw=awaitrequest.body()
signature=request.headers.get("x-dodomain-signature", "")
ifnotverify_webhook(os.environ["DODOMAIN_WEBHOOK_SECRET"], raw, signature):
returnResponse(status_code=400)
event=json.loads(raw)
...

verify_webhook(secret, body, header, tolerance_ms=300_000, now_ms=None) -> bool

• body may be str or bytes; secret too.
• The replay window is five minutes by default.
• It never raises. A wrong secret, a tampered body, a stale timestamp, a malformed or missing v1, and outright garbage are all just False — an attacker cannot turn a crafted header into a 500 inside your handler.
• Comparison is constant-time.

The delivered body

{
"id": "whd_…",
"type": "connection.verified",
"occurredAt": "2026-08-17T10:00:00.000Z",
"data": { "sessionId": "cs_…", "connectionId": "conn_…" },
"event": "connection.verified"
}

Read type. Dedupe on id — it is stable across retries and is the same value as the x-dodomain-delivery-id header, so you can dedupe before parsing the body at all. event is a deprecated alias of type, byte-identical to it, kept only so receivers written before the 2026-08-06 envelope cutover keep parsing; do not write new code against it.

data always carries sessionId as your correlation handle, and every payload that announces a connection also carries connectionId — the id connections.get / reverify / disconnect are keyed by.

Event types: connection.verified, connection.failed, connection.disconnected, session.completed, session.abandoned. A receiver that does not recognise a type must ignore it — the vocabulary grows additively.

No typed event parser ships, on purpose. Both the event vocabulary and the payload fields grow additively, so a strict parser would reject a delivery the day the API adds a type — exactly the failure a webhook receiver must not have. verify_webhook checks the HMAC and nothing else, which is what makes it safe across every additive change.

Error handling

Every failure is a subclass of DoDomainError. Nothing raw — not a JSONDecodeError from a proxy's HTML 502, not an httpx timeout — escapes.

fromdodomainimportDoDomainAPIError, NotFoundError, RateLimitErrortry:
client.connections.reverify("conn_123")
exceptNotFoundError:
... # unknown id, or one you do not ownexceptRateLimitErrorasexc:
print(exc.reason, exc.retry_after)
exceptDoDomainAPIErrorasexc:
print(exc.code, exc.status_code, exc.message, exc.details)

API error code	Exception	Status
unauthorized	AuthenticationError	401
forbidden	PermissionError_	403
not_found	NotFoundError	404
expired	ExpiredError	410
invalid_request	InvalidRequestError	400
quota_exceeded	QuotaExceededError	402
not_configured	NotConfiguredError	503
conflict	ConflictError	409
rate_limited	RateLimitError	429
internal	InternalServerError	500
(anything else)	DoDomainAPIError	as sent

Plus, outside the HTTP layer: DoDomainConfigError (bad constructor options), DoDomainConnectionError (no response was ever received), and InvalidResponseError (a 2xx body that does not match the contract).

exc.message is frequently None. The API drops the message field on most thrown errors, so do not build your user-facing string from it. str(exc) synthesizes a useful one for you:

doDomain API error: POST /api/v1/sessions returned HTTP 402 (quota_exceeded)

An InvalidRequestError raised by the SDK's own input validation carries status_code == 0: no request was sent.

Rate limits

The plan cap starts at 60 requests/minute, in fixed 60-second windows. A 429 carries Retry-After, and — importantly — two different meanings:

exceptRateLimitErrorasexc:
ifexc.reason=="recently_checked":
# This ONE connection was DNS-checked inside its 10-minute cooldown.# Nothing global is throttled. Do NOT retry — show "checked recently,# try again in a few minutes". A backoff loop here only burns your plan# quota against the other limiter.show_cooldown_notice(exc.retry_after)
else: # reason == "request_rate"# You are calling too fast. exc.limit is the per-minute cap.back_off(exc.retry_after)

The SDK already does the right thing for you: it retries request_rate (honouring Retry-After) and raises recently_checked immediately.

client.last_rate_limit holds a snapshot of the most recent response's rate-limit headers. The API emits only Retry-After today, so the IETF draft-11 RateLimit-* fields are None; they are read opportunistically so the SDK already reports them the day the API adopts them.

Client options

client=DoDomain(
secret_key="dd_sk_…",
base_url="https://app.dodomain.io", # the only origin that serves /api/v1timeout=30.0,
max_retries=2,
http_client=None, # bring your own httpx.Client
)

• Retries apply to GET and DELETE only, on 429/5xx/transport errors, with exponential backoff and full jitter (base 0.5s, cap 8s). A Retry-After above 60 seconds is raised rather than slept through.
• POST is never retried. The API has no server-side idempotency, so a replayed POST /v1/sessions would mint a second session and burn a second unit of plan quota. sessions.verify and connections.disconnectare idempotent server-side, so retrying those yourself is safe.
• idempotency_key is accepted on every write method and forwarded as Idempotency-Key. The API does not currently honour it; the plumbing is there so the eventual server-side landing is a non-event. client.new_idempotency_key() mints one.
• Both clients are context managers (with / async with) and expose .close(). An injected http_client is never closed by the SDK.

Development

python -m venv .venv &&source .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
ruff check .&& ruff format --check .&& ty check
pytest tests --ignore=tests/e2e --cov=dodomain --cov-fail-under=90

The unit suite mocks the wire with respx and asserts on the actual request — URL, method, headers, JSON body — as well as the parsed return value, so it tests the protocol rather than the mock.

tests/fixtures/webhook_vectors.json is generated by the TypeScriptsignWebhook in the doDomain monorepo (packages/core/src/webhook.ts), executed directly with node --experimental-strip-types. It is the guard against the Python and TypeScript verifiers drifting apart.

tests/e2e/ runs against production and skips loudly without DODOMAIN_SECRET_KEY:

DODOMAIN_SECRET_KEY="dd_sk_…" pytest tests/e2e -v

This SDK is hand-written, not generated. doDomain does publish an OpenAPI 3.1 document — https://dodomain.io/docs/openapi.json, generated from the same zod schemas the route handlers validate with — and it is the right thing to check this SDK's shapes against, but the hand-written surface is deliberate: the naming, the sync/async twins, the local validation and the docstrings that explain why an endpoint behaves the way it does are the product here, and none of them survive a generator.

License

MIT © 2026 Devino Solutions Inc.