Security: DragonOS-Community/gvisor

Security

SECURITY.md

Security and Vulnerability Reporting

Sensitive security-related questions, comments, and reports should be sent to the gvisor-security mailing list. You should receive a prompt response, typically within 48 hours.

Security issue taxonomy

We distinguish the following type of issues, listed from most to least severe:

  • Issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary:
    • Container escapes: Issues that allow arbitrary code to run on the host machine.
      • gVisor's purpose is to prevent these.
    • Data exfiltration from the host: Issues that allow reading arbitrary files or file metadata from the host (other than those intended to be visible to the sandbox).
    • Sandbox-to-sandbox lateral movement: Issues that allow arbitrary code execution in a different sandbox on the same host.
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect the host kernel (i.e. trigger a host kernel panic).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect other sandboxes on the same host.
      • This excludes things like causing CPU starvation when a sandbox is running without resource constraints.
  • Issues that remain confined to a single sandbox:
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are triggerable remotely (e.g. by sending a specially-crafted network packet).
    • Privilege escalation within the sandbox (e.g. being able to do what in-sandbox root would be able to do from an in-sandbox non-root user).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are triggerable from user code running in that sandbox.
    • Data integrity issues relative to Linux behavior.
      • gVisor aims to be bug-for-bug compatible with Linux. While most compatibility issues are not security issues, it is conceivable that some compatibility issues may manifest as persistent data corruption; for example, differences in I/O syscall implementations may cause a database program to end up storing invalid data.

While all of the above are security issues, we generally only assign CVEs for issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary. Since gVisor is a container security platform, its main security focus is on preventing a user workload from "getting out of the box", relative to issues that remain within the proverbial box. Therefore, security issues that remain contained to a single sandbox are not considered critical and are not given CVE numbers by default. If you would still like to get a CVE number issued, you may report it to BugHunter.

Security list access

Policies for security list access, vulnerability embargo, and vulnerability disclosure are outlined in the governance policy.

There aren't any published security advisories

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btn.textContent = 'Copy';
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btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };
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})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: DragonOS-Community/gvisor
Security

SECURITY.md

Security and Vulnerability Reporting
Sensitive security-related questions, comments, and reports should be sent to
the gvisor-security mailing list. You should receive a
prompt response, typically within 48 hours.
Security issue taxonomy
We distinguish the following type of issues, listed from most to least severe:
  • Issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary:

    • Container escapes: Issues that allow arbitrary code to run on the
host machine.

      • gVisor's purpose is to prevent these.
    • Data exfiltration from the host: Issues that allow reading arbitrary
files or file metadata from the host (other than those intended to be
visible to the sandbox).
    • Sandbox-to-sandbox lateral movement: Issues that allow arbitrary
code execution in a different sandbox on the same host.
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect the host kernel (i.e.
trigger a host kernel panic).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect other sandboxes on the same
host.

      • This excludes things like causing CPU starvation when a sandbox is
running without resource constraints.
  • Issues that remain confined to a single sandbox:

    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable remotely (e.g. by sending a specially-crafted network
packet).
    • Privilege escalation within the sandbox (e.g. being able to do what
in-sandbox root would be able to do from an in-sandbox non-root
user).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable from user code running in that sandbox.
    • Data integrity issues relative to Linux behavior.

      • gVisor aims to be bug-for-bug compatible with Linux. While most
compatibility issues are not security issues, it is conceivable that
some compatibility issues may manifest as persistent data
corruption; for example, differences in I/O syscall implementations
may cause a database program to end up storing invalid data.
While all of the above are security issues, we generally only assign CVEs for
issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary. Since gVisor is a container security
platform, its main security focus is on preventing a user workload from "getting
out of the box", relative to issues that remain within the proverbial box.
Therefore, security issues that remain contained to a single sandbox are not
considered critical and are not given CVE numbers by default. If you would still
like to get a CVE number issued, you may report it to
BugHunter.
Security list access
Policies for security list access, vulnerability embargo, and vulnerability
disclosure are outlined in the governance policy.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode
(function() {
var style = document.createElement('style');
style.textContent = '
.markdown-body {
color-scheme: dark light;
}
.markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }
.markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }
.markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }
.markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }
.markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }
.markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }
';
document.head.appendChild(style);
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: DragonOS-Community/gvisor
Security

SECURITY.md

Security and Vulnerability Reporting
Sensitive security-related questions, comments, and reports should be sent to
the gvisor-security mailing list. You should receive a
prompt response, typically within 48 hours.
Security issue taxonomy
We distinguish the following type of issues, listed from most to least severe:
  • Issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary:

    • Container escapes: Issues that allow arbitrary code to run on the
host machine.

      • gVisor's purpose is to prevent these.
    • Data exfiltration from the host: Issues that allow reading arbitrary
files or file metadata from the host (other than those intended to be
visible to the sandbox).
    • Sandbox-to-sandbox lateral movement: Issues that allow arbitrary
code execution in a different sandbox on the same host.
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect the host kernel (i.e.
trigger a host kernel panic).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect other sandboxes on the same
host.

      • This excludes things like causing CPU starvation when a sandbox is
running without resource constraints.
  • Issues that remain confined to a single sandbox:

    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable remotely (e.g. by sending a specially-crafted network
packet).
    • Privilege escalation within the sandbox (e.g. being able to do what
in-sandbox root would be able to do from an in-sandbox non-root
user).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable from user code running in that sandbox.
    • Data integrity issues relative to Linux behavior.

      • gVisor aims to be bug-for-bug compatible with Linux. While most
compatibility issues are not security issues, it is conceivable that
some compatibility issues may manifest as persistent data
corruption; for example, differences in I/O syscall implementations
may cause a database program to end up storing invalid data.
While all of the above are security issues, we generally only assign CVEs for
issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary. Since gVisor is a container security
platform, its main security focus is on preventing a user workload from "getting
out of the box", relative to issues that remain within the proverbial box.
Therefore, security issues that remain contained to a single sandbox are not
considered critical and are not given CVE numbers by default. If you would still
like to get a CVE number issued, you may report it to
BugHunter.
Security list access
Policies for security list access, vulnerability embargo, and vulnerability
disclosure are outlined in the governance policy.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer
(function() {
var ref = document.referrer;
var terms = [];
if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {
var url = new URL(ref);
var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');
if (q) {
terms = q.split(/\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });
}
}
if (terms.length === 0) return;
var style = document.createElement('style');
style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';
document.head.appendChild(style);
function highlight(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node
var text = node.textContent;
var found = false;
terms.forEach(function(term) {
var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\') + ')', 'gi');
if (regex.test(text)) {
found = true;
var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();
var parts = text.split(regex);
parts.forEach(function(part, i) {
if (i % 2 === 0) {
frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));
} else {
var span = document.createElement('span');
span.className = 'userscript-highlight';
span.textContent = part;
frag.appendChild(span);
}
});
node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);
}
});
} else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element
var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];
if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {
Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);
}
}
}
highlight(document.body);
// Re-highlight on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
mutations.forEach(function(m) {
m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);
});
});
});
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: DragonOS-Community/gvisor
Security

SECURITY.md

Security and Vulnerability Reporting
Sensitive security-related questions, comments, and reports should be sent to
the gvisor-security mailing list. You should receive a
prompt response, typically within 48 hours.
Security issue taxonomy
We distinguish the following type of issues, listed from most to least severe:
  • Issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary:

    • Container escapes: Issues that allow arbitrary code to run on the
host machine.

      • gVisor's purpose is to prevent these.
    • Data exfiltration from the host: Issues that allow reading arbitrary
files or file metadata from the host (other than those intended to be
visible to the sandbox).
    • Sandbox-to-sandbox lateral movement: Issues that allow arbitrary
code execution in a different sandbox on the same host.
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect the host kernel (i.e.
trigger a host kernel panic).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect other sandboxes on the same
host.

      • This excludes things like causing CPU starvation when a sandbox is
running without resource constraints.
  • Issues that remain confined to a single sandbox:

    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable remotely (e.g. by sending a specially-crafted network
packet).
    • Privilege escalation within the sandbox (e.g. being able to do what
in-sandbox root would be able to do from an in-sandbox non-root
user).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable from user code running in that sandbox.
    • Data integrity issues relative to Linux behavior.

      • gVisor aims to be bug-for-bug compatible with Linux. While most
compatibility issues are not security issues, it is conceivable that
some compatibility issues may manifest as persistent data
corruption; for example, differences in I/O syscall implementations
may cause a database program to end up storing invalid data.
While all of the above are security issues, we generally only assign CVEs for
issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary. Since gVisor is a container security
platform, its main security focus is on preventing a user workload from "getting
out of the box", relative to issues that remain within the proverbial box.
Therefore, security issues that remain contained to a single sandbox are not
considered critical and are not given CVE numbers by default. If you would still
like to get a CVE number issued, you may report it to
BugHunter.
Security list access
Policies for security list access, vulnerability embargo, and vulnerability
disclosure are outlined in the governance policy.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page
(function() {
var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',
'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',
'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];
function cleanUrl(url) {
try {
var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);
var changed = false;
trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {
if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {
u.searchParams.delete(p);
changed = true;
}
});
return changed ? u.toString() : url;
} catch (e) {
return url;
}
}
function cleanLinks() {
document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {
var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);
if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;
});
}
cleanLinks();
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
mutations.forEach(function(m) {
m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 1) {
if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();
node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {
var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);
if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;
});
}
});
});
});
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: DragonOS-Community/gvisor
Security

SECURITY.md

Security and Vulnerability Reporting
Sensitive security-related questions, comments, and reports should be sent to
the gvisor-security mailing list. You should receive a
prompt response, typically within 48 hours.
Security issue taxonomy
We distinguish the following type of issues, listed from most to least severe:
  • Issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary:

    • Container escapes: Issues that allow arbitrary code to run on the
host machine.

      • gVisor's purpose is to prevent these.
    • Data exfiltration from the host: Issues that allow reading arbitrary
files or file metadata from the host (other than those intended to be
visible to the sandbox).
    • Sandbox-to-sandbox lateral movement: Issues that allow arbitrary
code execution in a different sandbox on the same host.
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect the host kernel (i.e.
trigger a host kernel panic).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect other sandboxes on the same
host.

      • This excludes things like causing CPU starvation when a sandbox is
running without resource constraints.
  • Issues that remain confined to a single sandbox:

    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable remotely (e.g. by sending a specially-crafted network
packet).
    • Privilege escalation within the sandbox (e.g. being able to do what
in-sandbox root would be able to do from an in-sandbox non-root
user).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable from user code running in that sandbox.
    • Data integrity issues relative to Linux behavior.

      • gVisor aims to be bug-for-bug compatible with Linux. While most
compatibility issues are not security issues, it is conceivable that
some compatibility issues may manifest as persistent data
corruption; for example, differences in I/O syscall implementations
may cause a database program to end up storing invalid data.
While all of the above are security issues, we generally only assign CVEs for
issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary. Since gVisor is a container security
platform, its main security focus is on preventing a user workload from "getting
out of the box", relative to issues that remain within the proverbial box.
Therefore, security issues that remain contained to a single sandbox are not
considered critical and are not given CVE numbers by default. If you would still
like to get a CVE number issued, you may report it to
BugHunter.
Security list access
Policies for security list access, vulnerability embargo, and vulnerability
disclosure are outlined in the governance policy.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube
(function() {
function tryTheater() {
var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label="Theater mode"], ytd-player #player button[title="Theater mode"]');
if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {
btn.click();
}
}
// Try immediately
tryTheater();
// Try after navigation (SPA)
var lastUrl = location.href;
setInterval(function() {
if (location.href !== lastUrl) {
lastUrl = location.href;
setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);
}
}, 1000);
// Also try on player load
var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: DragonOS-Community/gvisor
Security

SECURITY.md

Security and Vulnerability Reporting
Sensitive security-related questions, comments, and reports should be sent to
the gvisor-security mailing list. You should receive a
prompt response, typically within 48 hours.
Security issue taxonomy
We distinguish the following type of issues, listed from most to least severe:
  • Issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary:

    • Container escapes: Issues that allow arbitrary code to run on the
host machine.

      • gVisor's purpose is to prevent these.
    • Data exfiltration from the host: Issues that allow reading arbitrary
files or file metadata from the host (other than those intended to be
visible to the sandbox).
    • Sandbox-to-sandbox lateral movement: Issues that allow arbitrary
code execution in a different sandbox on the same host.
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect the host kernel (i.e.
trigger a host kernel panic).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect other sandboxes on the same
host.

      • This excludes things like causing CPU starvation when a sandbox is
running without resource constraints.
  • Issues that remain confined to a single sandbox:

    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable remotely (e.g. by sending a specially-crafted network
packet).
    • Privilege escalation within the sandbox (e.g. being able to do what
in-sandbox root would be able to do from an in-sandbox non-root
user).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable from user code running in that sandbox.
    • Data integrity issues relative to Linux behavior.

      • gVisor aims to be bug-for-bug compatible with Linux. While most
compatibility issues are not security issues, it is conceivable that
some compatibility issues may manifest as persistent data
corruption; for example, differences in I/O syscall implementations
may cause a database program to end up storing invalid data.
While all of the above are security issues, we generally only assign CVEs for
issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary. Since gVisor is a container security
platform, its main security focus is on preventing a user workload from "getting
out of the box", relative to issues that remain within the proverbial box.
Therefore, security issues that remain contained to a single sandbox are not
considered critical and are not given CVE numbers by default. If you would still
like to get a CVE number issued, you may report it to
BugHunter.
Security list access
Policies for security list access, vulnerability embargo, and vulnerability
disclosure are outlined in the governance policy.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content
(function() {
function unstick() {
document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role="banner"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*="position: fixed"], [style*="position:sticky"]').forEach(function(el) {
if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {
el.style.position = 'static';
el.style.top = 'auto';
el.style.zIndex = 'auto';
}
});
}
unstick();
var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: DragonOS-Community/gvisor
Security

SECURITY.md

Security and Vulnerability Reporting
Sensitive security-related questions, comments, and reports should be sent to
the gvisor-security mailing list. You should receive a
prompt response, typically within 48 hours.
Security issue taxonomy
We distinguish the following type of issues, listed from most to least severe:
  • Issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary:

    • Container escapes: Issues that allow arbitrary code to run on the
host machine.

      • gVisor's purpose is to prevent these.
    • Data exfiltration from the host: Issues that allow reading arbitrary
files or file metadata from the host (other than those intended to be
visible to the sandbox).
    • Sandbox-to-sandbox lateral movement: Issues that allow arbitrary
code execution in a different sandbox on the same host.
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect the host kernel (i.e.
trigger a host kernel panic).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect other sandboxes on the same
host.

      • This excludes things like causing CPU starvation when a sandbox is
running without resource constraints.
  • Issues that remain confined to a single sandbox:

    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable remotely (e.g. by sending a specially-crafted network
packet).
    • Privilege escalation within the sandbox (e.g. being able to do what
in-sandbox root would be able to do from an in-sandbox non-root
user).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable from user code running in that sandbox.
    • Data integrity issues relative to Linux behavior.

      • gVisor aims to be bug-for-bug compatible with Linux. While most
compatibility issues are not security issues, it is conceivable that
some compatibility issues may manifest as persistent data
corruption; for example, differences in I/O syscall implementations
may cause a database program to end up storing invalid data.
While all of the above are security issues, we generally only assign CVEs for
issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary. Since gVisor is a container security
platform, its main security focus is on preventing a user workload from "getting
out of the box", relative to issues that remain within the proverbial box.
Therefore, security issues that remain contained to a single sandbox are not
considered critical and are not given CVE numbers by default. If you would still
like to get a CVE number issued, you may report it to
BugHunter.
Security list access
Policies for security list access, vulnerability embargo, and vulnerability
disclosure are outlined in the governance policy.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site
(function() {
var enabled = true;
function applyDarkMode() {
if (!enabled) return;
// Create style element if it doesn't exist
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (!style) {
style = document.createElement('style');
style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';
document.head.appendChild(style);
}
// Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video
style.textContent = '
/* Invert everything except media */
html {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #1a1a2e !important;
}
/* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */
img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*="background-image"] {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
}
/* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */
.no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,
[data-theme="light"], [data-theme="light"],
.ace_editor, .ace_editor *,
.CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,
.monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,
.markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,
.highlight, .highlight *,
pre code, pre code * {
filter: none !important;
}
/* Fix common UI elements */
.modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #2d2d44 !important;
border-color: #444 !important;
}
/* Scrollbars */
::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }
/* Selection */
::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
';
}
function removeDarkMode() {
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (style) style.remove();
}
// Toggle with Alt+Shift+D
document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {
if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {
e.preventDefault();
enabled = !enabled;
if (enabled) {
applyDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');
} else {
removeDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');
}
}
});
// Apply on load
applyDarkMode();
// Re-apply on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {
applyDarkMode();
}
});
observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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Security: DragonOS-Community/gvisor
Security

SECURITY.md

Security and Vulnerability Reporting
Sensitive security-related questions, comments, and reports should be sent to
the gvisor-security mailing list. You should receive a
prompt response, typically within 48 hours.
Security issue taxonomy
We distinguish the following type of issues, listed from most to least severe:
  • Issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary:

    • Container escapes: Issues that allow arbitrary code to run on the
host machine.

      • gVisor's purpose is to prevent these.
    • Data exfiltration from the host: Issues that allow reading arbitrary
files or file metadata from the host (other than those intended to be
visible to the sandbox).
    • Sandbox-to-sandbox lateral movement: Issues that allow arbitrary
code execution in a different sandbox on the same host.
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect the host kernel (i.e.
trigger a host kernel panic).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect other sandboxes on the same
host.

      • This excludes things like causing CPU starvation when a sandbox is
running without resource constraints.
  • Issues that remain confined to a single sandbox:

    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable remotely (e.g. by sending a specially-crafted network
packet).
    • Privilege escalation within the sandbox (e.g. being able to do what
in-sandbox root would be able to do from an in-sandbox non-root
user).
    • Denial-of-service attacks that affect a single sandbox and are
triggerable from user code running in that sandbox.
    • Data integrity issues relative to Linux behavior.

      • gVisor aims to be bug-for-bug compatible with Linux. While most
compatibility issues are not security issues, it is conceivable that
some compatibility issues may manifest as persistent data
corruption; for example, differences in I/O syscall implementations
may cause a database program to end up storing invalid data.
While all of the above are security issues, we generally only assign CVEs for
issues that go beyond the sandbox boundary. Since gVisor is a container security
platform, its main security focus is on preventing a user workload from "getting
out of the box", relative to issues that remain within the proverbial box.
Therefore, security issues that remain contained to a single sandbox are not
considered critical and are not given CVE numbers by default. If you would still
like to get a CVE number issued, you may report it to
BugHunter.
Security list access
Policies for security list access, vulnerability embargo, and vulnerability
disclosure are outlined in the governance policy.
 There aren't any published security advisories