A purple-team RNG analysis toolkit. Point it at a stream of "random" values from software or an embedded/OT device and it will tell you whether that randomness is predictable, prove it by recovering the generator's internal state and predicting future and past outputs, then tell you exactly what the code should have used instead.
DETECT -> EXPLOIT -> REMEDIATE (blue -> red -> blue)
$ deadpoint predict tokens.txt --fmt hex --width 32 --forward 5 --backward 3forward (5): [3387135577, 2892245552, 2493570821, 1340861552, 807034130]backward (3): [2912693742, 3815118128, 1202786163]
$ deadpoint report tokens.txt --fmt hex --width 32 --forward 3 --backward 0====================================================================== DEADPOINT — RNG ANALYSIS REPORT======================================================================Risk rating : CRITICALSamples analysed : 700 (32-bit words)-- DETECT ------------------------------------------------------------Verdict : WEAKSuspected family : MT19937Confidence : 0.99Statistical tests: 5/5 passed (looks_random=True)-- EXPLOIT -----------------------------------------------------------State recovered : True (method: untemper + linear recurrence)Predictions verified on holdout: TrueNext outputs : 3387135577, 2892245552, 2493570821-- REMEDIATE ---------------------------------------------------------[CRITICAL] Weak generator in use (MT19937) fix: Replace the generator with secrets / os.urandom for any security-relevant value (tokens, keys, nonces, IDs).Non-cryptographic PRNGs (Mersenne Twister / MT19937, LCGs, xorshift) are still routinely used where unpredictability actually matters: session tokens, password reset tokens, "random" device IDs, challenge nonces, key generation on embedded gear. These generators are built for statistical quality and speed, not unpredictability — their state is fully recoverable from observed output (CWE-338, CWE-330, CWE-337). deadpoint demonstrates that, and then points you at the fix.
| Capability | randcrack | deadpoint |
|---|---|---|
MT19937 from 624 clean getrandbits(32) | ✅ | ✅ |
| Partial / truncated outputs via an SMT (Z3) model | ❌ | ✅ random(), getrandbits(k<32), randint/randrange |
Rejection sampling (randint/randrange) handled exactly | ❌ | ✅ via seed recovery + real-generator replay |
Higher-level call modelling (random(), randint, …) | ❌ | ✅ |
| Backward prediction (rewind prior outputs) | ❌ | ✅ |
Multi-family: LCG, Java Random + Math.random, PHP mt_rand, V8 Math.random | ❌ | ✅ |
| Seed recovery (small / Unix-time seeds) by replay | ❌ | ✅ |
| Detect + remediate stages, risk-rated report | ❌ | ✅ |
| Capture on-ramps (pcap, live endpoint) + optional Rust core | ❌ | ✅ |
| Embedded/OT randomness-audit framing | ❌ | ✅ |
The Z3 partial-output solver is the headline: instead of needing 624 full 32-bit words, deadpoint builds a symbolic model of the MT19937 recurrence and tempering and solves for the state from whatever bits each call actually reveals.
pip install deadpoint # core (z3-solver, numpy)
pip install "deadpoint[remediate]"# + cryptography for the secure AEAD helpersfromdeadpointimportingest, analyze, MT19937Cracker, hardenstream=ingest("tokens.txt", fmt="hex", width=32)
report=analyze(stream) # -> DetectReportreport.verdict# Verdict.WEAKreport.suspected# PRNGType.MT19937cr=MT19937Cracker(call="getrandbits", nbits=32)
cr.feed(stream.values)
cr.recover() # untemper + state recoverycr.predict(10) # next 10 outputscr.rewind(5) # 5 PRIOR outputs# partial-output example: values came from random.randint(0, 999)# randint/randrange use rejection sampling; deadpoint recovers a small/time seed# and replays the REAL generator, so rejection is handled exactly.cr=MT19937Cracker(call="randint", lo=0, hi=999)
cr.feed(observed_ints)
ifcr.recover(): # exact via seed replay, or best-effort state solvecr.predict(3)
fixes=harden(report) # -> RemediateReport (mappings + patches)deadpoint analyze tokens.txt --fmt hex --width 32
deadpoint predict outputs.txt --call randint --lo 0 --hi 999 --forward 5
deadpoint recover tokens.txt --fmt hex
deadpoint harden app.py --snippet app.py
deadpoint report device_dump.hex --fmt hex --out audit.txtreport runs the full pipeline and prints a risk-rated, plain-text audit
(CRITICAL when state is recovered and predictions verify on a holdout); add
--json anywhere for machine-readable output.
- Clean path. Each
getrandbits(32)output is untempered back to its raw state word (the four tempering ops are bijections). 624 consecutive words clone the generator; the global output recurrenceW[k+624] = W[k+397] ^ twist(W[k], W[k+1])gives exact forward prediction, and inverting the twist recovers prior outputs (all but the single oldest per block — MT discards 31 bits each twist). - Partial path. A Z3 model of the recurrence + tempering is constrained by
the bits each call exposes (
random()→ 27+26 bits from two words;getrandbits(k)→ top k bits;randint/randrange→ reduced togetrandbits, best-effort becauserandbelowrejection-samples), and solved for the initial state. Every recovery is confirmed against a holdout the solver never saw, so a reported success is a proven one — and an unrecoverable case (e.g. a rejection landed in the window) returns cleanly instead of lying. - Seeds. Small integer and Unix-time seeds are recovered by bounded brute
force and confirmed by replay. For call-modelled streams this runs first
(it's fast and exact): because it replays CPython's own generator, it handles
randint/randrangerejection sampling — the "subtle case" — exactly, which the symbolic path only approximates.
Beyond CPython's random, deadpoint recovers three more real-world generators:
JavaScript / V8
Math.random(xorshift128+). A 128-bit state recovered from ~4 observed doubles via a small Z3 model, then exact forward prediction. Handles V8's 64-value cache reversal (xorshift.v8_unbatch).fromdeadpoint.exploitimportxorshiftcr=xorshift.V8Cracker(); cr.feed_and_recover(observed_doubles) cr.predict(5) # next Math.random() values
Java
Math.random/Random.nextDouble(48-bit LCG). Recovers the state from a single double by brute-forcing 2²² low bits, then predicts.fromdeadpoint.exploitimportlcgst=lcg.recover_java_from_double(observed_double) lcg.java_double_predict(st, 5)
PHP
mt_rand(MT19937 mode). PHP output istemper(word) >> 1— bit-for-bit CPythongetrandbits(31)— so rawmt_rand()feeds straight into the Z3 solver. Includes a faithful engine, seed recovery, and range unscaling. (The legacyMT_RAND_PHPreload variant is intentionally out of scope.)fromdeadpoint.exploitimportphpcr=php.recover(raw_mt_rand_outputs) # cr.predict(n) -> future mt_rand()
Beyond files/stdin, deadpoint can pull a value stream straight from a capture or a running service (both feed the same detect/exploit pipeline):
fromdeadpoint.pcapimportextract_stream, offset_extractorfromdeadpoint.webimportsample_endpoint, regex_extractor# Modbus transaction IDs at a fixed offset in each packet of a capturestream=extract_stream("cap.pcap", offset_extractor(offset=2, nbytes=2), width=16)
# session tokens sampled live from an endpoint (fetch is injectable for testing)stream=sample_endpoint("https://app.test/login", 700,
regex_extractor(r'"session":"([0-9a-f]+)"'), width=32)pip install deadpoint is pure Python — the published wheel contains no
compiled code and has no Rust dependency. The native accelerator is strictly
opt-in.
A Rust + PyO3 crate in native/ provides a compiled deadpoint_native module
(untempering + clean state solve). To use it, build it yourself:
pip install maturin
cd native && maturin develop --releasedeadpoint then imports it automatically and falls back to pure Python when it's
absent — identical results either way, just faster. Check which path is
active with python -c "from deadpoint.exploit import untemper as u; import importlib; print(importlib.import_module('deadpoint.exploit.untemper').NATIVE)".
See native/README.md.
Run the same pipeline on a weak stream and a secrets stream side by side:
deadpoint demo --count 700WEAK — random | STRONG — secrets
verdict : WEAK | verdict : STRONG
suspected : MT19937 | suspected : CSPRNG
EXPLOIT : state recovered, verified=True | EXPLOIT : not recoverable
One stream leaks its future; the other gives deadpoint nothing. That difference
is secrets / os.urandom.
A Textual dashboard renders the whole pipeline live — detect verdict, exploit status, a forward/backward prediction table, and remediation — over any stream. It's an opt-in extra (a thin read-only view over the library; the core has no Textual dependency):
pip install "deadpoint[tui]"
deadpoint tui tokens.txt --fmt hex --width 32q quits, r re-runs. For anything scriptable, prefer the CLI/library — the TUI
is for interactive exploration.
docs/usage.md— full CLI/library reference, formats, minimum sample counts.docs/case-study-ot-pairing-code.md— predicting an embedded device's "random" pairing code.docs/case-study-session-token-prediction.md— predicting web session tokens.
- N1. deadpoint does not implement a new random number generator.
- N2. deadpoint implements no cryptographic primitive by hand. The
remediation helpers wrap vetted libraries (
secrets,cryptography's AEAD) and nothing else. "Don't roll your own crypto" is enforced in code — seedeadpoint/remediate/secure_helpers.py, where every function's docstring states which vetted library it wraps. - The tool breaks weak RNGs and recommends vetted ones — the exact inverse of rolling your own.
- Precise about families: glibc
rand()is an additive-feedback generator, not a simple LCG, and is out of scope; the clean LCG targets are JavaRandomand textbook full-output LCGs.
deadpoint is an auditing / defensive-research tool for systems you own or are
authorized to test. Every example here is self-assessment or authorized
pentesting. Use it to prove a weakness so you can fix it — then fix it with
secrets / os.urandom.
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest -m "not slow"# fast suite
pytest # includes the heavier Z3 random() recoveryCorrectness is checkable against ground truth: property-based tests seed a known
random.Random, run recovery, and assert predictions exactly match the
reference generator's future and past outputs.
MIT — see LICENSE.
