Security: MartinOnami/TurboFiles

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories ("Report a vulnerability") or by emailing security@gowp.com. Do not open a public issue for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days.

Security model

TurboFiles handles credentials and remote file access, so security is a first-class concern.

Credentials & secrets

  • Passwords and key passphrases are stored in the OS keychain (keyring crate): macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service.
  • Secrets are never written to the SQLite database, to logs, or to disk in plain text, and are never returned to the frontend.
  • Error messages are constructed to avoid leaking secret material.

Transport

  • SFTP runs over SSH; host-key handling follows the ssh2/libssh2 defaults.
  • FTPS uses explicit TLS via native-tls. Plain FTP is unencrypted - the UI surfaces the protocol clearly so users make an informed choice.

Application sandboxing

  • The Tauri Content-Security-Policy restricts the webview to 'self' (see src-tauri/tauri.conf.json and index.html).
  • The frontend can only call the explicitly allow-listed Tauri commands; there is no arbitrary shell or filesystem bridge exposed to the webview.
  • Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/main.json) scope plugin permissions to the minimum required.

Supply chain

  • cargo audit and npm audit run in CI (and weekly) - see .github/workflows/security.yml.
  • CodeQL static analysis runs on every push/PR.
  • Dependabot keeps npm, cargo, and GitHub Actions dependencies patched.

Build integrity

  • Release binaries are built in CI and support code signing / notarization (macOS) and Tauri's updater signing keys (secrets configured in repo settings).

Supported versions

During the 0.x series, only the latest minor release receives security fixes.

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: MartinOnami/TurboFiles
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories
("Report a vulnerability") or by emailing security@gowp.com. Do not open a
public issue for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days.
Security model
TurboFiles handles credentials and remote file access, so security is a first-class
concern.
Credentials & secrets
  • Passwords and key passphrases are stored in the OS keychain (keyring
crate): macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service.
  • Secrets are never written to the SQLite database, to logs, or to disk in
plain text, and are never returned to the frontend.
  • Error messages are constructed to avoid leaking secret material.
Transport
  • SFTP runs over SSH; host-key handling follows the ssh2/libssh2 defaults.
  • FTPS uses explicit TLS via native-tls. Plain FTP is unencrypted - the UI
surfaces the protocol clearly so users make an informed choice.
Application sandboxing
  • The Tauri Content-Security-Policy restricts the webview to 'self'
(see src-tauri/tauri.conf.json and index.html).
  • The frontend can only call the explicitly allow-listed Tauri commands; there is
no arbitrary shell or filesystem bridge exposed to the webview.
  • Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/main.json) scope plugin
permissions to the minimum required.
Supply chain
  • cargo audit and npm audit run in CI (and weekly) - see
.github/workflows/security.yml.
  • CodeQL static analysis runs on every push/PR.
  • Dependabot keeps npm, cargo, and GitHub Actions dependencies patched.
Build integrity
  • Release binaries are built in CI and support code signing / notarization
(macOS) and Tauri's updater signing keys (secrets configured in repo settings).
Supported versions
During the 0.x series, only the latest minor release receives security fixes.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: MartinOnami/TurboFiles
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories
("Report a vulnerability") or by emailing security@gowp.com. Do not open a
public issue for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days.
Security model
TurboFiles handles credentials and remote file access, so security is a first-class
concern.
Credentials & secrets
  • Passwords and key passphrases are stored in the OS keychain (keyring
crate): macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service.
  • Secrets are never written to the SQLite database, to logs, or to disk in
plain text, and are never returned to the frontend.
  • Error messages are constructed to avoid leaking secret material.
Transport
  • SFTP runs over SSH; host-key handling follows the ssh2/libssh2 defaults.
  • FTPS uses explicit TLS via native-tls. Plain FTP is unencrypted - the UI
surfaces the protocol clearly so users make an informed choice.
Application sandboxing
  • The Tauri Content-Security-Policy restricts the webview to 'self'
(see src-tauri/tauri.conf.json and index.html).
  • The frontend can only call the explicitly allow-listed Tauri commands; there is
no arbitrary shell or filesystem bridge exposed to the webview.
  • Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/main.json) scope plugin
permissions to the minimum required.
Supply chain
  • cargo audit and npm audit run in CI (and weekly) - see
.github/workflows/security.yml.
  • CodeQL static analysis runs on every push/PR.
  • Dependabot keeps npm, cargo, and GitHub Actions dependencies patched.
Build integrity
  • Release binaries are built in CI and support code signing / notarization
(macOS) and Tauri's updater signing keys (secrets configured in repo settings).
Supported versions
During the 0.x series, only the latest minor release receives security fixes.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: MartinOnami/TurboFiles
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories
("Report a vulnerability") or by emailing security@gowp.com. Do not open a
public issue for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days.
Security model
TurboFiles handles credentials and remote file access, so security is a first-class
concern.
Credentials & secrets
  • Passwords and key passphrases are stored in the OS keychain (keyring
crate): macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service.
  • Secrets are never written to the SQLite database, to logs, or to disk in
plain text, and are never returned to the frontend.
  • Error messages are constructed to avoid leaking secret material.
Transport
  • SFTP runs over SSH; host-key handling follows the ssh2/libssh2 defaults.
  • FTPS uses explicit TLS via native-tls. Plain FTP is unencrypted - the UI
surfaces the protocol clearly so users make an informed choice.
Application sandboxing
  • The Tauri Content-Security-Policy restricts the webview to 'self'
(see src-tauri/tauri.conf.json and index.html).
  • The frontend can only call the explicitly allow-listed Tauri commands; there is
no arbitrary shell or filesystem bridge exposed to the webview.
  • Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/main.json) scope plugin
permissions to the minimum required.
Supply chain
  • cargo audit and npm audit run in CI (and weekly) - see
.github/workflows/security.yml.
  • CodeQL static analysis runs on every push/PR.
  • Dependabot keeps npm, cargo, and GitHub Actions dependencies patched.
Build integrity
  • Release binaries are built in CI and support code signing / notarization
(macOS) and Tauri's updater signing keys (secrets configured in repo settings).
Supported versions
During the 0.x series, only the latest minor release receives security fixes.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: MartinOnami/TurboFiles
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories
("Report a vulnerability") or by emailing security@gowp.com. Do not open a
public issue for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days.
Security model
TurboFiles handles credentials and remote file access, so security is a first-class
concern.
Credentials & secrets
  • Passwords and key passphrases are stored in the OS keychain (keyring
crate): macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service.
  • Secrets are never written to the SQLite database, to logs, or to disk in
plain text, and are never returned to the frontend.
  • Error messages are constructed to avoid leaking secret material.
Transport
  • SFTP runs over SSH; host-key handling follows the ssh2/libssh2 defaults.
  • FTPS uses explicit TLS via native-tls. Plain FTP is unencrypted - the UI
surfaces the protocol clearly so users make an informed choice.
Application sandboxing
  • The Tauri Content-Security-Policy restricts the webview to 'self'
(see src-tauri/tauri.conf.json and index.html).
  • The frontend can only call the explicitly allow-listed Tauri commands; there is
no arbitrary shell or filesystem bridge exposed to the webview.
  • Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/main.json) scope plugin
permissions to the minimum required.
Supply chain
  • cargo audit and npm audit run in CI (and weekly) - see
.github/workflows/security.yml.
  • CodeQL static analysis runs on every push/PR.
  • Dependabot keeps npm, cargo, and GitHub Actions dependencies patched.
Build integrity
  • Release binaries are built in CI and support code signing / notarization
(macOS) and Tauri's updater signing keys (secrets configured in repo settings).
Supported versions
During the 0.x series, only the latest minor release receives security fixes.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: MartinOnami/TurboFiles
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories
("Report a vulnerability") or by emailing security@gowp.com. Do not open a
public issue for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days.
Security model
TurboFiles handles credentials and remote file access, so security is a first-class
concern.
Credentials & secrets
  • Passwords and key passphrases are stored in the OS keychain (keyring
crate): macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service.
  • Secrets are never written to the SQLite database, to logs, or to disk in
plain text, and are never returned to the frontend.
  • Error messages are constructed to avoid leaking secret material.
Transport
  • SFTP runs over SSH; host-key handling follows the ssh2/libssh2 defaults.
  • FTPS uses explicit TLS via native-tls. Plain FTP is unencrypted - the UI
surfaces the protocol clearly so users make an informed choice.
Application sandboxing
  • The Tauri Content-Security-Policy restricts the webview to 'self'
(see src-tauri/tauri.conf.json and index.html).
  • The frontend can only call the explicitly allow-listed Tauri commands; there is
no arbitrary shell or filesystem bridge exposed to the webview.
  • Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/main.json) scope plugin
permissions to the minimum required.
Supply chain
  • cargo audit and npm audit run in CI (and weekly) - see
.github/workflows/security.yml.
  • CodeQL static analysis runs on every push/PR.
  • Dependabot keeps npm, cargo, and GitHub Actions dependencies patched.
Build integrity
  • Release binaries are built in CI and support code signing / notarization
(macOS) and Tauri's updater signing keys (secrets configured in repo settings).
Supported versions
During the 0.x series, only the latest minor release receives security fixes.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: MartinOnami/TurboFiles
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories
("Report a vulnerability") or by emailing security@gowp.com. Do not open a
public issue for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days.
Security model
TurboFiles handles credentials and remote file access, so security is a first-class
concern.
Credentials & secrets
  • Passwords and key passphrases are stored in the OS keychain (keyring
crate): macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service.
  • Secrets are never written to the SQLite database, to logs, or to disk in
plain text, and are never returned to the frontend.
  • Error messages are constructed to avoid leaking secret material.
Transport
  • SFTP runs over SSH; host-key handling follows the ssh2/libssh2 defaults.
  • FTPS uses explicit TLS via native-tls. Plain FTP is unencrypted - the UI
surfaces the protocol clearly so users make an informed choice.
Application sandboxing
  • The Tauri Content-Security-Policy restricts the webview to 'self'
(see src-tauri/tauri.conf.json and index.html).
  • The frontend can only call the explicitly allow-listed Tauri commands; there is
no arbitrary shell or filesystem bridge exposed to the webview.
  • Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/main.json) scope plugin
permissions to the minimum required.
Supply chain
  • cargo audit and npm audit run in CI (and weekly) - see
.github/workflows/security.yml.
  • CodeQL static analysis runs on every push/PR.
  • Dependabot keeps npm, cargo, and GitHub Actions dependencies patched.
Build integrity
  • Release binaries are built in CI and support code signing / notarization
(macOS) and Tauri's updater signing keys (secrets configured in repo settings).
Supported versions
During the 0.x series, only the latest minor release receives security fixes.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

Skip to content
Security: MartinOnami/TurboFiles
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report security issues privately via GitHub Security Advisories
("Report a vulnerability") or by emailing security@gowp.com. Do not open a
public issue for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days.
Security model
TurboFiles handles credentials and remote file access, so security is a first-class
concern.
Credentials & secrets
  • Passwords and key passphrases are stored in the OS keychain (keyring
crate): macOS Keychain, Windows Credential Manager, Linux Secret Service.
  • Secrets are never written to the SQLite database, to logs, or to disk in
plain text, and are never returned to the frontend.
  • Error messages are constructed to avoid leaking secret material.
Transport
  • SFTP runs over SSH; host-key handling follows the ssh2/libssh2 defaults.
  • FTPS uses explicit TLS via native-tls. Plain FTP is unencrypted - the UI
surfaces the protocol clearly so users make an informed choice.
Application sandboxing
  • The Tauri Content-Security-Policy restricts the webview to 'self'
(see src-tauri/tauri.conf.json and index.html).
  • The frontend can only call the explicitly allow-listed Tauri commands; there is
no arbitrary shell or filesystem bridge exposed to the webview.
  • Tauri capabilities (src-tauri/capabilities/main.json) scope plugin
permissions to the minimum required.
Supply chain
  • cargo audit and npm audit run in CI (and weekly) - see
.github/workflows/security.yml.
  • CodeQL static analysis runs on every push/PR.
  • Dependabot keeps npm, cargo, and GitHub Actions dependencies patched.
Build integrity
  • Release binaries are built in CI and support code signing / notarization
(macOS) and Tauri's updater signing keys (secrets configured in repo settings).
Supported versions
During the 0.x series, only the latest minor release receives security fixes.
 There aren't any published security advisories