feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents #794

Closed
#882
Closed
feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents#794
#882
Assignees
coodos

Description

@coodos
coodos
opened on Feb 9, 2026

Summary

Implement secondary trust signals:

  • Photo binding (Veriff-only) signed/attested by Remote CA
  • Friend attestation bindings with mandatory countersign by the subject

Photo binding (Veriff-only)

  • Created only during Veriff flows
  • Remote CA signs attestation tying face evidence reference/hash to subject eName
  • Stored in encrypted binding-doc sector

Friend binding

  • Subject requests friend signature from share ePassport modal
  • Friend signs assertion tying claimed detail(s) to subject eName
  • Subject countersigns for validity

Mermaid — photo binding creation

sequenceDiagram
participant Veriff
participant App
participant CA as Remote CA
participant Vault as eVault
Veriff -->> App: Face evidence ref or hash
App ->> CA: Request PHOTO binding attestation (eName, evidenceRef)
CA -->> App: PhotoBindingDoc (CA-signed)
App ->> Vault: Store PhotoBindingDoc
Loading

Mermaid — friend binding sequence

sequenceDiagram
actor Subject
actor Friend
participant AppS as Subject App
participant AppF as Friend App
participant VaultS as Subject eVault
participant VaultF as Friend eVault
Subject ->> AppS: Create friend-binding request
AppS -->> Friend: Share request link or payload
Friend ->> AppF: Open request
AppF ->> VaultF: Sign FRIEND binding doc
VaultF -->> AppF: FriendBindingDoc
AppF -->> Subject: Send FriendBindingDoc
Subject ->> AppS: Review friend binding
AppS ->> VaultS: Counter-sign FriendBindingDoc
VaultS -->> AppS: CountersignedFriendBindingDoc
AppS ->> VaultS: Store CountersignedFriendBindingDoc
Loading

Acceptance criteria

  • Photo binding documents are created only via Veriff flows.
  • Remote CA signs/attests photo binding tying evidence to subject eName.
  • Users can request friend signatures via share ePassport modal.
  • Friend binding documents must be countersigned by the subject to be valid.
  • Non-countersigned friend bindings are ignored by verification and UI trust scoring.

Metadata

Metadata

Assignees

Labels

No labels
No labels

Type

No type

Projects

No projects

    Milestone

    No milestone

    Relationships

    None yet

    Development

    No branches or pull requests

    Issue actions

    , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
     blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

    Skip to content
    feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents #794
    Closed
    #882
    Closed
    feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents#794
    #882
    Assignees
    coodos
    Description
    @coodos
    coodos
    opened on Feb 9, 2026
    Summary
    Implement secondary trust signals:
    • Photo binding (Veriff-only) signed/attested by Remote CA
    • Friend attestation bindings with mandatory countersign by the subject
    Photo binding (Veriff-only)
    • Created only during Veriff flows
    • Remote CA signs attestation tying face evidence reference/hash to subject eName
    • Stored in encrypted binding-doc sector
    Friend binding
    • Subject requests friend signature from share ePassport modal
    • Friend signs assertion tying claimed detail(s) to subject eName
    • Subject countersigns for validity
    Mermaid — photo binding creation
    sequenceDiagram
participant Veriff
participant App
participant CA as Remote CA
participant Vault as eVault
Veriff -->> App: Face evidence ref or hash
App ->> CA: Request PHOTO binding attestation (eName, evidenceRef)
CA -->> App: PhotoBindingDoc (CA-signed)
App ->> Vault: Store PhotoBindingDoc

    Loading
    Mermaid — friend binding sequence
    sequenceDiagram
actor Subject
actor Friend
participant AppS as Subject App
participant AppF as Friend App
participant VaultS as Subject eVault
participant VaultF as Friend eVault
Subject ->> AppS: Create friend-binding request
AppS -->> Friend: Share request link or payload
Friend ->> AppF: Open request
AppF ->> VaultF: Sign FRIEND binding doc
VaultF -->> AppF: FriendBindingDoc
AppF -->> Subject: Send FriendBindingDoc
Subject ->> AppS: Review friend binding
AppS ->> VaultS: Counter-sign FriendBindingDoc
VaultS -->> AppS: CountersignedFriendBindingDoc
AppS ->> VaultS: Store CountersignedFriendBindingDoc

    Loading
    Acceptance criteria
    •  Photo binding documents are created only via Veriff flows.
    •  Remote CA signs/attests photo binding tying evidence to subject eName.
    •  Users can request friend signatures via share ePassport modal.
    •  Friend binding documents must be countersigned by the subject to be valid.
    •  Non-countersigned friend bindings are ignored by verification and UI trust scoring.
    Metadata
    Metadata
    Assignees
    Labels
    No labels
    No labels
    Type
    No type
    Projects
    No projects
      Milestone
      No milestone
      Relationships
      None yet
      Development
      No branches or pull requests
      Issue actions
      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

      Skip to content
      feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents #794
      Closed
      #882
      Closed
      feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents#794
      #882
      Assignees
      coodos
      Description
      @coodos
      coodos
      opened on Feb 9, 2026
      Summary
      Implement secondary trust signals:
      • Photo binding (Veriff-only) signed/attested by Remote CA
      • Friend attestation bindings with mandatory countersign by the subject
      Photo binding (Veriff-only)
      • Created only during Veriff flows
      • Remote CA signs attestation tying face evidence reference/hash to subject eName
      • Stored in encrypted binding-doc sector
      Friend binding
      • Subject requests friend signature from share ePassport modal
      • Friend signs assertion tying claimed detail(s) to subject eName
      • Subject countersigns for validity
      Mermaid — photo binding creation
      sequenceDiagram
participant Veriff
participant App
participant CA as Remote CA
participant Vault as eVault
Veriff -->> App: Face evidence ref or hash
App ->> CA: Request PHOTO binding attestation (eName, evidenceRef)
CA -->> App: PhotoBindingDoc (CA-signed)
App ->> Vault: Store PhotoBindingDoc

      Loading
      Mermaid — friend binding sequence
      sequenceDiagram
actor Subject
actor Friend
participant AppS as Subject App
participant AppF as Friend App
participant VaultS as Subject eVault
participant VaultF as Friend eVault
Subject ->> AppS: Create friend-binding request
AppS -->> Friend: Share request link or payload
Friend ->> AppF: Open request
AppF ->> VaultF: Sign FRIEND binding doc
VaultF -->> AppF: FriendBindingDoc
AppF -->> Subject: Send FriendBindingDoc
Subject ->> AppS: Review friend binding
AppS ->> VaultS: Counter-sign FriendBindingDoc
VaultS -->> AppS: CountersignedFriendBindingDoc
AppS ->> VaultS: Store CountersignedFriendBindingDoc

      Loading
      Acceptance criteria
      •  Photo binding documents are created only via Veriff flows.
      •  Remote CA signs/attests photo binding tying evidence to subject eName.
      •  Users can request friend signatures via share ePassport modal.
      •  Friend binding documents must be countersigned by the subject to be valid.
      •  Non-countersigned friend bindings are ignored by verification and UI trust scoring.
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      Labels
      No labels
      No labels
      Type
      No type
      Projects
      No projects
        Milestone
        No milestone
        Relationships
        None yet
        Development
        No branches or pull requests
        Issue actions
        
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

        Skip to content
        feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents #794
        Closed
        #882
        Closed
        feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents#794
        #882
        Assignees
        coodos
        Description
        @coodos
        coodos
        opened on Feb 9, 2026
        Summary
        Implement secondary trust signals:
        • Photo binding (Veriff-only) signed/attested by Remote CA
        • Friend attestation bindings with mandatory countersign by the subject
        Photo binding (Veriff-only)
        • Created only during Veriff flows
        • Remote CA signs attestation tying face evidence reference/hash to subject eName
        • Stored in encrypted binding-doc sector
        Friend binding
        • Subject requests friend signature from share ePassport modal
        • Friend signs assertion tying claimed detail(s) to subject eName
        • Subject countersigns for validity
        Mermaid — photo binding creation
        sequenceDiagram
participant Veriff
participant App
participant CA as Remote CA
participant Vault as eVault
Veriff -->> App: Face evidence ref or hash
App ->> CA: Request PHOTO binding attestation (eName, evidenceRef)
CA -->> App: PhotoBindingDoc (CA-signed)
App ->> Vault: Store PhotoBindingDoc

        Loading
        Mermaid — friend binding sequence
        sequenceDiagram
actor Subject
actor Friend
participant AppS as Subject App
participant AppF as Friend App
participant VaultS as Subject eVault
participant VaultF as Friend eVault
Subject ->> AppS: Create friend-binding request
AppS -->> Friend: Share request link or payload
Friend ->> AppF: Open request
AppF ->> VaultF: Sign FRIEND binding doc
VaultF -->> AppF: FriendBindingDoc
AppF -->> Subject: Send FriendBindingDoc
Subject ->> AppS: Review friend binding
AppS ->> VaultS: Counter-sign FriendBindingDoc
VaultS -->> AppS: CountersignedFriendBindingDoc
AppS ->> VaultS: Store CountersignedFriendBindingDoc

        Loading
        Acceptance criteria
        •  Photo binding documents are created only via Veriff flows.
        •  Remote CA signs/attests photo binding tying evidence to subject eName.
        •  Users can request friend signatures via share ePassport modal.
        •  Friend binding documents must be countersigned by the subject to be valid.
        •  Non-countersigned friend bindings are ignored by verification and UI trust scoring.
        Metadata
        Metadata
        Assignees
        Labels
        No labels
        No labels
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

          Skip to content
          feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents #794
          Closed
          #882
          Closed
          feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents#794
          #882
          Assignees
          coodos
          Description
          @coodos
          coodos
          opened on Feb 9, 2026
          Summary
          Implement secondary trust signals:
          • Photo binding (Veriff-only) signed/attested by Remote CA
          • Friend attestation bindings with mandatory countersign by the subject
          Photo binding (Veriff-only)
          • Created only during Veriff flows
          • Remote CA signs attestation tying face evidence reference/hash to subject eName
          • Stored in encrypted binding-doc sector
          Friend binding
          • Subject requests friend signature from share ePassport modal
          • Friend signs assertion tying claimed detail(s) to subject eName
          • Subject countersigns for validity
          Mermaid — photo binding creation
          sequenceDiagram
participant Veriff
participant App
participant CA as Remote CA
participant Vault as eVault
Veriff -->> App: Face evidence ref or hash
App ->> CA: Request PHOTO binding attestation (eName, evidenceRef)
CA -->> App: PhotoBindingDoc (CA-signed)
App ->> Vault: Store PhotoBindingDoc

          Loading
          Mermaid — friend binding sequence
          sequenceDiagram
actor Subject
actor Friend
participant AppS as Subject App
participant AppF as Friend App
participant VaultS as Subject eVault
participant VaultF as Friend eVault
Subject ->> AppS: Create friend-binding request
AppS -->> Friend: Share request link or payload
Friend ->> AppF: Open request
AppF ->> VaultF: Sign FRIEND binding doc
VaultF -->> AppF: FriendBindingDoc
AppF -->> Subject: Send FriendBindingDoc
Subject ->> AppS: Review friend binding
AppS ->> VaultS: Counter-sign FriendBindingDoc
VaultS -->> AppS: CountersignedFriendBindingDoc
AppS ->> VaultS: Store CountersignedFriendBindingDoc

          Loading
          Acceptance criteria
          •  Photo binding documents are created only via Veriff flows.
          •  Remote CA signs/attests photo binding tying evidence to subject eName.
          •  Users can request friend signatures via share ePassport modal.
          •  Friend binding documents must be countersigned by the subject to be valid.
          •  Non-countersigned friend bindings are ignored by verification and UI trust scoring.
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          Labels
          No labels
          No labels
          Type
          No type
          Projects
          No projects
            Milestone
            No milestone
            Relationships
            None yet
            Development
            No branches or pull requests
            Issue actions
            
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

            Skip to content
            feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents #794
            Closed
            #882
            Closed
            feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents#794
            #882
            Assignees
            coodos
            Description
            @coodos
            coodos
            opened on Feb 9, 2026
            Summary
            Implement secondary trust signals:
            • Photo binding (Veriff-only) signed/attested by Remote CA
            • Friend attestation bindings with mandatory countersign by the subject
            Photo binding (Veriff-only)
            • Created only during Veriff flows
            • Remote CA signs attestation tying face evidence reference/hash to subject eName
            • Stored in encrypted binding-doc sector
            Friend binding
            • Subject requests friend signature from share ePassport modal
            • Friend signs assertion tying claimed detail(s) to subject eName
            • Subject countersigns for validity
            Mermaid — photo binding creation
            sequenceDiagram
participant Veriff
participant App
participant CA as Remote CA
participant Vault as eVault
Veriff -->> App: Face evidence ref or hash
App ->> CA: Request PHOTO binding attestation (eName, evidenceRef)
CA -->> App: PhotoBindingDoc (CA-signed)
App ->> Vault: Store PhotoBindingDoc

            Loading
            Mermaid — friend binding sequence
            sequenceDiagram
actor Subject
actor Friend
participant AppS as Subject App
participant AppF as Friend App
participant VaultS as Subject eVault
participant VaultF as Friend eVault
Subject ->> AppS: Create friend-binding request
AppS -->> Friend: Share request link or payload
Friend ->> AppF: Open request
AppF ->> VaultF: Sign FRIEND binding doc
VaultF -->> AppF: FriendBindingDoc
AppF -->> Subject: Send FriendBindingDoc
Subject ->> AppS: Review friend binding
AppS ->> VaultS: Counter-sign FriendBindingDoc
VaultS -->> AppS: CountersignedFriendBindingDoc
AppS ->> VaultS: Store CountersignedFriendBindingDoc

            Loading
            Acceptance criteria
            •  Photo binding documents are created only via Veriff flows.
            •  Remote CA signs/attests photo binding tying evidence to subject eName.
            •  Users can request friend signatures via share ePassport modal.
            •  Friend binding documents must be countersigned by the subject to be valid.
            •  Non-countersigned friend bindings are ignored by verification and UI trust scoring.
            Metadata
            Metadata
            Assignees
            Labels
            No labels
            No labels
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents #794
              Closed
              #882
              Closed
              feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents#794
              #882
              Assignees
              coodos
              Description
              @coodos
              coodos
              opened on Feb 9, 2026
              Summary
              Implement secondary trust signals:
              • Photo binding (Veriff-only) signed/attested by Remote CA
              • Friend attestation bindings with mandatory countersign by the subject
              Photo binding (Veriff-only)
              • Created only during Veriff flows
              • Remote CA signs attestation tying face evidence reference/hash to subject eName
              • Stored in encrypted binding-doc sector
              Friend binding
              • Subject requests friend signature from share ePassport modal
              • Friend signs assertion tying claimed detail(s) to subject eName
              • Subject countersigns for validity
              Mermaid — photo binding creation
              sequenceDiagram
participant Veriff
participant App
participant CA as Remote CA
participant Vault as eVault
Veriff -->> App: Face evidence ref or hash
App ->> CA: Request PHOTO binding attestation (eName, evidenceRef)
CA -->> App: PhotoBindingDoc (CA-signed)
App ->> Vault: Store PhotoBindingDoc

              Loading
              Mermaid — friend binding sequence
              sequenceDiagram
actor Subject
actor Friend
participant AppS as Subject App
participant AppF as Friend App
participant VaultS as Subject eVault
participant VaultF as Friend eVault
Subject ->> AppS: Create friend-binding request
AppS -->> Friend: Share request link or payload
Friend ->> AppF: Open request
AppF ->> VaultF: Sign FRIEND binding doc
VaultF -->> AppF: FriendBindingDoc
AppF -->> Subject: Send FriendBindingDoc
Subject ->> AppS: Review friend binding
AppS ->> VaultS: Counter-sign FriendBindingDoc
VaultS -->> AppS: CountersignedFriendBindingDoc
AppS ->> VaultS: Store CountersignedFriendBindingDoc

              Loading
              Acceptance criteria
              •  Photo binding documents are created only via Veriff flows.
              •  Remote CA signs/attests photo binding tying evidence to subject eName.
              •  Users can request friend signatures via share ePassport modal.
              •  Friend binding documents must be countersigned by the subject to be valid.
              •  Non-countersigned friend bindings are ignored by verification and UI trust scoring.
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              Labels
              No labels
              No labels
              Type
              No type
              Projects
              No projects
                Milestone
                No milestone
                Relationships
                None yet
                Development
                No branches or pull requests
                Issue actions
                
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

                Skip to content
                feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents #794
                Closed
                #882
                Closed
                feat: (core) Photo and Friend binding documents#794
                #882
                Assignees
                coodos
                Description
                @coodos
                coodos
                opened on Feb 9, 2026
                Summary
                Implement secondary trust signals:
                • Photo binding (Veriff-only) signed/attested by Remote CA
                • Friend attestation bindings with mandatory countersign by the subject
                Photo binding (Veriff-only)
                • Created only during Veriff flows
                • Remote CA signs attestation tying face evidence reference/hash to subject eName
                • Stored in encrypted binding-doc sector
                Friend binding
                • Subject requests friend signature from share ePassport modal
                • Friend signs assertion tying claimed detail(s) to subject eName
                • Subject countersigns for validity
                Mermaid — photo binding creation
                sequenceDiagram
participant Veriff
participant App
participant CA as Remote CA
participant Vault as eVault
Veriff -->> App: Face evidence ref or hash
App ->> CA: Request PHOTO binding attestation (eName, evidenceRef)
CA -->> App: PhotoBindingDoc (CA-signed)
App ->> Vault: Store PhotoBindingDoc

                Loading
                Mermaid — friend binding sequence
                sequenceDiagram
actor Subject
actor Friend
participant AppS as Subject App
participant AppF as Friend App
participant VaultS as Subject eVault
participant VaultF as Friend eVault
Subject ->> AppS: Create friend-binding request
AppS -->> Friend: Share request link or payload
Friend ->> AppF: Open request
AppF ->> VaultF: Sign FRIEND binding doc
VaultF -->> AppF: FriendBindingDoc
AppF -->> Subject: Send FriendBindingDoc
Subject ->> AppS: Review friend binding
AppS ->> VaultS: Counter-sign FriendBindingDoc
VaultS -->> AppS: CountersignedFriendBindingDoc
AppS ->> VaultS: Store CountersignedFriendBindingDoc

                Loading
                Acceptance criteria
                •  Photo binding documents are created only via Veriff flows.
                •  Remote CA signs/attests photo binding tying evidence to subject eName.
                •  Users can request friend signatures via share ePassport modal.
                •  Friend binding documents must be countersigned by the subject to be valid.
                •  Non-countersigned friend bindings are ignored by verification and UI trust scoring.
                Metadata
                Metadata
                Assignees
                Labels
                No labels
                No labels
                Type
                No type
                Projects
                No projects
                  Milestone
                  No milestone
                  Relationships
                  None yet
                  Development
                  No branches or pull requests
                  Issue actions