security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection #2527

Closed
#2532
Closed
security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection#2527
#2532
Labels
safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns

Description

@louisgv
louisgv
opened on Mar 12, 2026

Location

sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh:176

Severity

HIGH - Defense-in-depth violation, potential command injection

Description

The provision_agent function creates a manual .spawnrc file by base64-encoding sensitive data and passing it to a remote SSH command. However, the env_b64 variable is not validated before use, creating a command injection risk if base64 encoding fails or upstream data is corrupted.

Vulnerable Code

local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# env_b64 used directly without validationif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."

Issue

  1. No validation that base64 encoding succeeded
  2. No validation that env_b64 contains only base64-safe characters ([A-Za-z0-9+/=])
  3. If env_b64 is empty or contains shell metacharacters due to corruption, it could be exploited

Attack Vectors

  1. Upstream data corruption: If env_tmp file is corrupted or contains malicious content
  2. Base64 command failure: If base64 silently fails or behaves unexpectedly
  3. Environment variable manipulation: If an attacker can influence OPENROUTER_API_KEY before it's base64-encoded

Impact

  • Remote command execution on provisioned VMs
  • Credential theft (since this code handles API keys)
  • Compromise of E2E test infrastructure

Recommendation

Add validation before use:

local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# VALIDATE env_b64 is non-empty and contains only base64 charactersif [[ -z"${env_b64}" ]] || [[ !"${env_b64}"=~ ^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$ ]];then
log_err "Base64 encoding failed or produced invalid output"return 1
fi# Safe to use nowif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."

Additional hardening:

  • Use -- to prevent env_b64 being interpreted as a flag
  • Consider using heredoc for even better safety

References

  • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command
  • Defense in Depth: Always validate before use in sensitive contexts

Filed automatically by security/shell-scanner

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      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
       blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

      Skip to content
      security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection #2527
      Closed
      #2532
      Closed
      security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection#2527
      #2532
      Labels
      safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
      Description
      @louisgv
      louisgv
      opened on Mar 12, 2026
      Location
      sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh:176
      Severity
      HIGH - Defense-in-depth violation, potential command injection
      Description
      The provision_agent function creates a manual .spawnrc file by base64-encoding sensitive data and passing it to a remote SSH command. However, the env_b64 variable is not validated before use, creating a command injection risk if base64 encoding fails or upstream data is corrupted.
      Vulnerable Code
      local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# env_b64 used directly without validationif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
      Issue
      1. No validation that base64 encoding succeeded
      2. No validation that env_b64 contains only base64-safe characters ([A-Za-z0-9+/=])
      3. If env_b64 is empty or contains shell metacharacters due to corruption, it could be exploited
      Attack Vectors
      1. Upstream data corruption: If env_tmp file is corrupted or contains malicious content
      2. Base64 command failure: If base64 silently fails or behaves unexpectedly
      3. Environment variable manipulation: If an attacker can influence OPENROUTER_API_KEY before it's base64-encoded
      Impact
      • Remote command execution on provisioned VMs
      • Credential theft (since this code handles API keys)
      • Compromise of E2E test infrastructure
      Recommendation
      Add validation before use:
      local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# VALIDATE env_b64 is non-empty and contains only base64 charactersif [[ -z"${env_b64}" ]] || [[ !"${env_b64}"=~ ^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$ ]];then
log_err "Base64 encoding failed or produced invalid output"return 1
fi# Safe to use nowif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
      Additional hardening:
      • Use -- to prevent env_b64 being interpreted as a flag
      • Consider using heredoc for even better safety
      References
      • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command
      • Defense in Depth: Always validate before use in sensitive contexts
      Filed automatically by security/shell-scanner
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      No one assigned
        Labels
        safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

          Skip to content
          security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection #2527
          Closed
          #2532
          Closed
          security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection#2527
          #2532
          Labels
          safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
          Description
          @louisgv
          louisgv
          opened on Mar 12, 2026
          Location
          sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh:176
          Severity
          HIGH - Defense-in-depth violation, potential command injection
          Description
          The provision_agent function creates a manual .spawnrc file by base64-encoding sensitive data and passing it to a remote SSH command. However, the env_b64 variable is not validated before use, creating a command injection risk if base64 encoding fails or upstream data is corrupted.
          Vulnerable Code
          local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# env_b64 used directly without validationif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
          Issue
          1. No validation that base64 encoding succeeded
          2. No validation that env_b64 contains only base64-safe characters ([A-Za-z0-9+/=])
          3. If env_b64 is empty or contains shell metacharacters due to corruption, it could be exploited
          Attack Vectors
          1. Upstream data corruption: If env_tmp file is corrupted or contains malicious content
          2. Base64 command failure: If base64 silently fails or behaves unexpectedly
          3. Environment variable manipulation: If an attacker can influence OPENROUTER_API_KEY before it's base64-encoded
          Impact
          • Remote command execution on provisioned VMs
          • Credential theft (since this code handles API keys)
          • Compromise of E2E test infrastructure
          Recommendation
          Add validation before use:
          local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# VALIDATE env_b64 is non-empty and contains only base64 charactersif [[ -z"${env_b64}" ]] || [[ !"${env_b64}"=~ ^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$ ]];then
log_err "Base64 encoding failed or produced invalid output"return 1
fi# Safe to use nowif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
          Additional hardening:
          • Use -- to prevent env_b64 being interpreted as a flag
          • Consider using heredoc for even better safety
          References
          • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command
          • Defense in Depth: Always validate before use in sensitive contexts
          Filed automatically by security/shell-scanner
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          No one assigned
            Labels
            safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection #2527
              Closed
              #2532
              Closed
              security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection#2527
              #2532
              Labels
              safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
              Description
              @louisgv
              louisgv
              opened on Mar 12, 2026
              Location
              sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh:176
              Severity
              HIGH - Defense-in-depth violation, potential command injection
              Description
              The provision_agent function creates a manual .spawnrc file by base64-encoding sensitive data and passing it to a remote SSH command. However, the env_b64 variable is not validated before use, creating a command injection risk if base64 encoding fails or upstream data is corrupted.
              Vulnerable Code
              local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# env_b64 used directly without validationif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
              Issue
              1. No validation that base64 encoding succeeded
              2. No validation that env_b64 contains only base64-safe characters ([A-Za-z0-9+/=])
              3. If env_b64 is empty or contains shell metacharacters due to corruption, it could be exploited
              Attack Vectors
              1. Upstream data corruption: If env_tmp file is corrupted or contains malicious content
              2. Base64 command failure: If base64 silently fails or behaves unexpectedly
              3. Environment variable manipulation: If an attacker can influence OPENROUTER_API_KEY before it's base64-encoded
              Impact
              • Remote command execution on provisioned VMs
              • Credential theft (since this code handles API keys)
              • Compromise of E2E test infrastructure
              Recommendation
              Add validation before use:
              local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# VALIDATE env_b64 is non-empty and contains only base64 charactersif [[ -z"${env_b64}" ]] || [[ !"${env_b64}"=~ ^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$ ]];then
log_err "Base64 encoding failed or produced invalid output"return 1
fi# Safe to use nowif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
              Additional hardening:
              • Use -- to prevent env_b64 being interpreted as a flag
              • Consider using heredoc for even better safety
              References
              • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command
              • Defense in Depth: Always validate before use in sensitive contexts
              Filed automatically by security/shell-scanner
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              No one assigned
                Labels
                safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                Type
                No type
                Projects
                No projects
                  Milestone
                  No milestone
                  Relationships
                  None yet
                  Development
                  No branches or pull requests
                  Issue actions
                  
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

                  Skip to content
                  security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection #2527
                  Closed
                  #2532
                  Closed
                  security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection#2527
                  #2532
                  Labels
                  safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                  Description
                  @louisgv
                  louisgv
                  opened on Mar 12, 2026
                  Location
                  sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh:176
                  Severity
                  HIGH - Defense-in-depth violation, potential command injection
                  Description
                  The provision_agent function creates a manual .spawnrc file by base64-encoding sensitive data and passing it to a remote SSH command. However, the env_b64 variable is not validated before use, creating a command injection risk if base64 encoding fails or upstream data is corrupted.
                  Vulnerable Code
                  local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# env_b64 used directly without validationif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
                  Issue
                  1. No validation that base64 encoding succeeded
                  2. No validation that env_b64 contains only base64-safe characters ([A-Za-z0-9+/=])
                  3. If env_b64 is empty or contains shell metacharacters due to corruption, it could be exploited
                  Attack Vectors
                  1. Upstream data corruption: If env_tmp file is corrupted or contains malicious content
                  2. Base64 command failure: If base64 silently fails or behaves unexpectedly
                  3. Environment variable manipulation: If an attacker can influence OPENROUTER_API_KEY before it's base64-encoded
                  Impact
                  • Remote command execution on provisioned VMs
                  • Credential theft (since this code handles API keys)
                  • Compromise of E2E test infrastructure
                  Recommendation
                  Add validation before use:
                  local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# VALIDATE env_b64 is non-empty and contains only base64 charactersif [[ -z"${env_b64}" ]] || [[ !"${env_b64}"=~ ^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$ ]];then
log_err "Base64 encoding failed or produced invalid output"return 1
fi# Safe to use nowif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
                  Additional hardening:
                  • Use -- to prevent env_b64 being interpreted as a flag
                  • Consider using heredoc for even better safety
                  References
                  • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command
                  • Defense in Depth: Always validate before use in sensitive contexts
                  Filed automatically by security/shell-scanner
                  Metadata
                  Metadata
                  Assignees
                  No one assigned
                    Labels
                    safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                    Type
                    No type
                    Projects
                    No projects
                      Milestone
                      No milestone
                      Relationships
                      None yet
                      Development
                      No branches or pull requests
                      Issue actions
                      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                      Skip to content
                      security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection #2527
                      Closed
                      #2532
                      Closed
                      security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection#2527
                      #2532
                      Labels
                      safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                      Description
                      @louisgv
                      louisgv
                      opened on Mar 12, 2026
                      Location
                      sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh:176
                      Severity
                      HIGH - Defense-in-depth violation, potential command injection
                      Description
                      The provision_agent function creates a manual .spawnrc file by base64-encoding sensitive data and passing it to a remote SSH command. However, the env_b64 variable is not validated before use, creating a command injection risk if base64 encoding fails or upstream data is corrupted.
                      Vulnerable Code
                      local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# env_b64 used directly without validationif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
                      Issue
                      1. No validation that base64 encoding succeeded
                      2. No validation that env_b64 contains only base64-safe characters ([A-Za-z0-9+/=])
                      3. If env_b64 is empty or contains shell metacharacters due to corruption, it could be exploited
                      Attack Vectors
                      1. Upstream data corruption: If env_tmp file is corrupted or contains malicious content
                      2. Base64 command failure: If base64 silently fails or behaves unexpectedly
                      3. Environment variable manipulation: If an attacker can influence OPENROUTER_API_KEY before it's base64-encoded
                      Impact
                      • Remote command execution on provisioned VMs
                      • Credential theft (since this code handles API keys)
                      • Compromise of E2E test infrastructure
                      Recommendation
                      Add validation before use:
                      local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# VALIDATE env_b64 is non-empty and contains only base64 charactersif [[ -z"${env_b64}" ]] || [[ !"${env_b64}"=~ ^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$ ]];then
log_err "Base64 encoding failed or produced invalid output"return 1
fi# Safe to use nowif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
                      Additional hardening:
                      • Use -- to prevent env_b64 being interpreted as a flag
                      • Consider using heredoc for even better safety
                      References
                      • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command
                      • Defense in Depth: Always validate before use in sensitive contexts
                      Filed automatically by security/shell-scanner
                      Metadata
                      Metadata
                      Assignees
                      No one assigned
                        Labels
                        safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                        Type
                        No type
                        Projects
                        No projects
                          Milestone
                          No milestone
                          Relationships
                          None yet
                          Development
                          No branches or pull requests
                          Issue actions
                          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                          Skip to content
                          security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection #2527
                          Closed
                          #2532
                          Closed
                          security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection#2527
                          #2532
                          Labels
                          safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                          Description
                          @louisgv
                          louisgv
                          opened on Mar 12, 2026
                          Location
                          sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh:176
                          Severity
                          HIGH - Defense-in-depth violation, potential command injection
                          Description
                          The provision_agent function creates a manual .spawnrc file by base64-encoding sensitive data and passing it to a remote SSH command. However, the env_b64 variable is not validated before use, creating a command injection risk if base64 encoding fails or upstream data is corrupted.
                          Vulnerable Code
                          local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# env_b64 used directly without validationif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
                          Issue
                          1. No validation that base64 encoding succeeded
                          2. No validation that env_b64 contains only base64-safe characters ([A-Za-z0-9+/=])
                          3. If env_b64 is empty or contains shell metacharacters due to corruption, it could be exploited
                          Attack Vectors
                          1. Upstream data corruption: If env_tmp file is corrupted or contains malicious content
                          2. Base64 command failure: If base64 silently fails or behaves unexpectedly
                          3. Environment variable manipulation: If an attacker can influence OPENROUTER_API_KEY before it's base64-encoded
                          Impact
                          • Remote command execution on provisioned VMs
                          • Credential theft (since this code handles API keys)
                          • Compromise of E2E test infrastructure
                          Recommendation
                          Add validation before use:
                          local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# VALIDATE env_b64 is non-empty and contains only base64 charactersif [[ -z"${env_b64}" ]] || [[ !"${env_b64}"=~ ^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$ ]];then
log_err "Base64 encoding failed or produced invalid output"return 1
fi# Safe to use nowif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
                          Additional hardening:
                          • Use -- to prevent env_b64 being interpreted as a flag
                          • Consider using heredoc for even better safety
                          References
                          • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command
                          • Defense in Depth: Always validate before use in sensitive contexts
                          Filed automatically by security/shell-scanner
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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                              security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection #2527
                              Closed
                              #2532
                              Closed
                              security: [provision.sh] Unvalidated base64 value in SSH command allows potential command injection#2527
                              #2532
                              Labels
                              safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                              Description
                              @louisgv
                              louisgv
                              opened on Mar 12, 2026
                              Location
                              sh/e2e/lib/provision.sh:176
                              Severity
                              HIGH - Defense-in-depth violation, potential command injection
                              Description
                              The provision_agent function creates a manual .spawnrc file by base64-encoding sensitive data and passing it to a remote SSH command. However, the env_b64 variable is not validated before use, creating a command injection risk if base64 encoding fails or upstream data is corrupted.
                              Vulnerable Code
                              local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# env_b64 used directly without validationif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
                              Issue
                              1. No validation that base64 encoding succeeded
                              2. No validation that env_b64 contains only base64-safe characters ([A-Za-z0-9+/=])
                              3. If env_b64 is empty or contains shell metacharacters due to corruption, it could be exploited
                              Attack Vectors
                              1. Upstream data corruption: If env_tmp file is corrupted or contains malicious content
                              2. Base64 command failure: If base64 silently fails or behaves unexpectedly
                              3. Environment variable manipulation: If an attacker can influence OPENROUTER_API_KEY before it's base64-encoded
                              Impact
                              • Remote command execution on provisioned VMs
                              • Credential theft (since this code handles API keys)
                              • Compromise of E2E test infrastructure
                              Recommendation
                              Add validation before use:
                              local env_b64
env_b64=$(base64 <"${env_tmp}"| tr -d '\n')
rm -f "${env_tmp}"# VALIDATE env_b64 is non-empty and contains only base64 charactersif [[ -z"${env_b64}" ]] || [[ !"${env_b64}"=~ ^[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$ ]];then
log_err "Base64 encoding failed or produced invalid output"return 1
fi# Safe to use nowif cloud_exec "${app_name}""printf '%s' \"${env_b64}\" | base64 -d > ~/.spawnrc && ..."
                              Additional hardening:
                              • Use -- to prevent env_b64 being interpreted as a flag
                              • Consider using heredoc for even better safety
                              References
                              • CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command
                              • Defense in Depth: Always validate before use in sensitive contexts
                              Filed automatically by security/shell-scanner
                              Metadata
                              Metadata
                              Assignees
                              No one assigned
                                Labels
                                safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                                Type
                                No type
                                Projects
                                No projects
                                  Milestone
                                  No milestone
                                  Relationships
                                  None yet
                                  Development
                                  No branches or pull requests
                                  Issue actions