[Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing #3361

Open
#3362
Open
[Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing#3361
#3362
Labels
bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team

Description

@la14-1
la14-1
opened on Apr 25, 2026

Context

Follow-up from the security review of #3360 (--repo / spawn.mdapi_key steps). Finding: MEDIUM — deferred shell injection.

The primitive

packages/cli/src/shared/spawn-md.ts:394:

awaitrunner.runServer(`mkdir -p /etc/spawn && printf 'export %s="%s"\\n' '${escapedName}' "\" >> /etc/spawn/secrets && chmod 600 /etc/spawn/secrets`,);

The user-supplied api_key value is base64-encoded locally, then decoded back on the VM inside a printf format that writes export NAME="VALUE" to /etc/spawn/secrets. The file is then sourced from ~/.bashrc.

If the pasted value contains " or a newline, the written file becomes sourceable-but-broken:

# user pastes: foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar
# file ends up: export NAME="foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar"
# next login: ls /etc runs

Impact

  • Self-inflicted: user types their own value, so no external attacker surface today
  • But: becomes a trust-transfer vector if a template's description/guide_url tells the user "paste this exact string" — then the malicious string lands in a shell-sourceable file and executes on next login
  • Class: deferred code execution, not prompt/input validation

Fix options

  1. Keep values base64-encoded at rest and decode at source-time via a wrapper. Removes the whole class — quotes, newlines, $, backticks all pass through opaquely.

    # /etc/spawn/secrets.b64 — not shell-sourceable, written format:
NAME=BASE64VALUE
# ~/.bashrc instead sources a loader:while IFS='='read -r k v;doexport"$k=$(base64 -d <<<"$v")";done< /etc/spawn/secrets.b64

  2. Dotenv-style loader with a parser that does not re-interpret quotes. Still has to handle = / CRLF / line continuation carefully.

  3. (weakest) Sanitize the value before writing — strip or escape ", \\, $, backtick, and newline. Fragile; likelier to leave a hole than close one.

Option 1 is simplest and eliminates the class. Also: the b64 file can keep chmod 600 unchanged.

Related

Filed from Slack by SPA

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try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

      Skip to content
      [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing #3361
      Open
      #3362
      Open
      [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing#3361
      #3362
      Labels
      bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
      Description
      @la14-1
      la14-1
      opened on Apr 25, 2026
      Context
      Follow-up from the security review of #3360 (--repo / spawn.mdapi_key steps). Finding: MEDIUM — deferred shell injection.
      The primitive
      packages/cli/src/shared/spawn-md.ts:394:
      awaitrunner.runServer(`mkdir -p /etc/spawn && printf 'export %s="%s"\\n' '${escapedName}' "\" >> /etc/spawn/secrets && chmod 600 /etc/spawn/secrets`,);
      The user-supplied api_key value is base64-encoded locally, then decoded back on the VM inside a printf format that writes export NAME="VALUE" to /etc/spawn/secrets. The file is then sourced from ~/.bashrc.
      If the pasted value contains " or a newline, the written file becomes sourceable-but-broken:
      # user pastes: foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar
# file ends up: export NAME="foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar"
# next login: ls /etc runs

      Impact
      • Self-inflicted: user types their own value, so no external attacker surface today
      • But: becomes a trust-transfer vector if a template's description/guide_url tells the user "paste this exact string" — then the malicious string lands in a shell-sourceable file and executes on next login
      • Class: deferred code execution, not prompt/input validation
      Fix options
      1. Keep values base64-encoded at rest and decode at source-time via a wrapper. Removes the whole class — quotes, newlines, $, backticks all pass through opaquely.
        # /etc/spawn/secrets.b64 — not shell-sourceable, written format:
NAME=BASE64VALUE
# ~/.bashrc instead sources a loader:while IFS='='read -r k v;doexport"$k=$(base64 -d <<<"$v")";done< /etc/spawn/secrets.b64
      2. Dotenv-style loader with a parser that does not re-interpret quotes. Still has to handle = / CRLF / line continuation carefully.
      3. (weakest) Sanitize the value before writing — strip or escape ", \\, $, backtick, and newline. Fragile; likelier to leave a hole than close one.
      Option 1 is simplest and eliminates the class. Also: the b64 file can keep chmod 600 unchanged.
      Related
      Filed from Slack by SPA
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var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

          Skip to content
          [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing #3361
          Open
          #3362
          Open
          [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing#3361
          #3362
          Labels
          bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
          Description
          @la14-1
          la14-1
          opened on Apr 25, 2026
          Context
          Follow-up from the security review of #3360 (--repo / spawn.mdapi_key steps). Finding: MEDIUM — deferred shell injection.
          The primitive
          packages/cli/src/shared/spawn-md.ts:394:
          awaitrunner.runServer(`mkdir -p /etc/spawn && printf 'export %s="%s"\\n' '${escapedName}' "\" >> /etc/spawn/secrets && chmod 600 /etc/spawn/secrets`,);
          The user-supplied api_key value is base64-encoded locally, then decoded back on the VM inside a printf format that writes export NAME="VALUE" to /etc/spawn/secrets. The file is then sourced from ~/.bashrc.
          If the pasted value contains " or a newline, the written file becomes sourceable-but-broken:
          # user pastes: foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar
# file ends up: export NAME="foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar"
# next login: ls /etc runs

          Impact
          • Self-inflicted: user types their own value, so no external attacker surface today
          • But: becomes a trust-transfer vector if a template's description/guide_url tells the user "paste this exact string" — then the malicious string lands in a shell-sourceable file and executes on next login
          • Class: deferred code execution, not prompt/input validation
          Fix options
          1. Keep values base64-encoded at rest and decode at source-time via a wrapper. Removes the whole class — quotes, newlines, $, backticks all pass through opaquely.
            # /etc/spawn/secrets.b64 — not shell-sourceable, written format:
NAME=BASE64VALUE
# ~/.bashrc instead sources a loader:while IFS='='read -r k v;doexport"$k=$(base64 -d <<<"$v")";done< /etc/spawn/secrets.b64
          2. Dotenv-style loader with a parser that does not re-interpret quotes. Still has to handle = / CRLF / line continuation carefully.
          3. (weakest) Sanitize the value before writing — strip or escape ", \\, $, backtick, and newline. Fragile; likelier to leave a hole than close one.
          Option 1 is simplest and eliminates the class. Also: the b64 file can keep chmod 600 unchanged.
          Related
          Filed from Slack by SPA
          Metadata
          Metadata
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          No one assigned
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(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing #3361
              Open
              #3362
              Open
              [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing#3361
              #3362
              Labels
              bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
              Description
              @la14-1
              la14-1
              opened on Apr 25, 2026
              Context
              Follow-up from the security review of #3360 (--repo / spawn.mdapi_key steps). Finding: MEDIUM — deferred shell injection.
              The primitive
              packages/cli/src/shared/spawn-md.ts:394:
              awaitrunner.runServer(`mkdir -p /etc/spawn && printf 'export %s="%s"\\n' '${escapedName}' "\" >> /etc/spawn/secrets && chmod 600 /etc/spawn/secrets`,);
              The user-supplied api_key value is base64-encoded locally, then decoded back on the VM inside a printf format that writes export NAME="VALUE" to /etc/spawn/secrets. The file is then sourced from ~/.bashrc.
              If the pasted value contains " or a newline, the written file becomes sourceable-but-broken:
              # user pastes: foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar
# file ends up: export NAME="foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar"
# next login: ls /etc runs

              Impact
              • Self-inflicted: user types their own value, so no external attacker surface today
              • But: becomes a trust-transfer vector if a template's description/guide_url tells the user "paste this exact string" — then the malicious string lands in a shell-sourceable file and executes on next login
              • Class: deferred code execution, not prompt/input validation
              Fix options
              1. Keep values base64-encoded at rest and decode at source-time via a wrapper. Removes the whole class — quotes, newlines, $, backticks all pass through opaquely.
                # /etc/spawn/secrets.b64 — not shell-sourceable, written format:
NAME=BASE64VALUE
# ~/.bashrc instead sources a loader:while IFS='='read -r k v;doexport"$k=$(base64 -d <<<"$v")";done< /etc/spawn/secrets.b64
              2. Dotenv-style loader with a parser that does not re-interpret quotes. Still has to handle = / CRLF / line continuation carefully.
              3. (weakest) Sanitize the value before writing — strip or escape ", \\, $, backtick, and newline. Fragile; likelier to leave a hole than close one.
              Option 1 is simplest and eliminates the class. Also: the b64 file can keep chmod 600 unchanged.
              Related
              Filed from Slack by SPA
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              No one assigned
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                bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
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                  None yet
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                  No branches or pull requests
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})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

                  Skip to content
                  [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing #3361
                  Open
                  #3362
                  Open
                  [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing#3361
                  #3362
                  Labels
                  bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                  Description
                  @la14-1
                  la14-1
                  opened on Apr 25, 2026
                  Context
                  Follow-up from the security review of #3360 (--repo / spawn.mdapi_key steps). Finding: MEDIUM — deferred shell injection.
                  The primitive
                  packages/cli/src/shared/spawn-md.ts:394:
                  awaitrunner.runServer(`mkdir -p /etc/spawn && printf 'export %s="%s"\\n' '${escapedName}' "\" >> /etc/spawn/secrets && chmod 600 /etc/spawn/secrets`,);
                  The user-supplied api_key value is base64-encoded locally, then decoded back on the VM inside a printf format that writes export NAME="VALUE" to /etc/spawn/secrets. The file is then sourced from ~/.bashrc.
                  If the pasted value contains " or a newline, the written file becomes sourceable-but-broken:
                  # user pastes: foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar
# file ends up: export NAME="foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar"
# next login: ls /etc runs

                  Impact
                  • Self-inflicted: user types their own value, so no external attacker surface today
                  • But: becomes a trust-transfer vector if a template's description/guide_url tells the user "paste this exact string" — then the malicious string lands in a shell-sourceable file and executes on next login
                  • Class: deferred code execution, not prompt/input validation
                  Fix options
                  1. Keep values base64-encoded at rest and decode at source-time via a wrapper. Removes the whole class — quotes, newlines, $, backticks all pass through opaquely.
                    # /etc/spawn/secrets.b64 — not shell-sourceable, written format:
NAME=BASE64VALUE
# ~/.bashrc instead sources a loader:while IFS='='read -r k v;doexport"$k=$(base64 -d <<<"$v")";done< /etc/spawn/secrets.b64
                  2. Dotenv-style loader with a parser that does not re-interpret quotes. Still has to handle = / CRLF / line continuation carefully.
                  3. (weakest) Sanitize the value before writing — strip or escape ", \\, $, backtick, and newline. Fragile; likelier to leave a hole than close one.
                  Option 1 is simplest and eliminates the class. Also: the b64 file can keep chmod 600 unchanged.
                  Related
                  Filed from Slack by SPA
                  Metadata
                  Metadata
                  Assignees
                  No one assigned
                    Labels
                    bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                    Type
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                      Relationships
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                      No branches or pull requests
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
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})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                      Skip to content
                      [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing #3361
                      Open
                      #3362
                      Open
                      [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing#3361
                      #3362
                      Labels
                      bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                      Description
                      @la14-1
                      la14-1
                      opened on Apr 25, 2026
                      Context
                      Follow-up from the security review of #3360 (--repo / spawn.mdapi_key steps). Finding: MEDIUM — deferred shell injection.
                      The primitive
                      packages/cli/src/shared/spawn-md.ts:394:
                      awaitrunner.runServer(`mkdir -p /etc/spawn && printf 'export %s="%s"\\n' '${escapedName}' "\" >> /etc/spawn/secrets && chmod 600 /etc/spawn/secrets`,);
                      The user-supplied api_key value is base64-encoded locally, then decoded back on the VM inside a printf format that writes export NAME="VALUE" to /etc/spawn/secrets. The file is then sourced from ~/.bashrc.
                      If the pasted value contains " or a newline, the written file becomes sourceable-but-broken:
                      # user pastes: foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar
# file ends up: export NAME="foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar"
# next login: ls /etc runs

                      Impact
                      • Self-inflicted: user types their own value, so no external attacker surface today
                      • But: becomes a trust-transfer vector if a template's description/guide_url tells the user "paste this exact string" — then the malicious string lands in a shell-sourceable file and executes on next login
                      • Class: deferred code execution, not prompt/input validation
                      Fix options
                      1. Keep values base64-encoded at rest and decode at source-time via a wrapper. Removes the whole class — quotes, newlines, $, backticks all pass through opaquely.
                        # /etc/spawn/secrets.b64 — not shell-sourceable, written format:
NAME=BASE64VALUE
# ~/.bashrc instead sources a loader:while IFS='='read -r k v;doexport"$k=$(base64 -d <<<"$v")";done< /etc/spawn/secrets.b64
                      2. Dotenv-style loader with a parser that does not re-interpret quotes. Still has to handle = / CRLF / line continuation carefully.
                      3. (weakest) Sanitize the value before writing — strip or escape ", \\, $, backtick, and newline. Fragile; likelier to leave a hole than close one.
                      Option 1 is simplest and eliminates the class. Also: the b64 file can keep chmod 600 unchanged.
                      Related
                      Filed from Slack by SPA
                      Metadata
                      Metadata
                      Assignees
                      No one assigned
                        Labels
                        bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                        Type
                        No type
                        Projects
                        No projects
                          Milestone
                          No milestone
                          Relationships
                          None yet
                          Development
                          No branches or pull requests
                          Issue actions
                          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
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observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });
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} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                          Skip to content
                          [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing #3361
                          Open
                          #3362
                          Open
                          [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing#3361
                          #3362
                          Labels
                          bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                          Description
                          @la14-1
                          la14-1
                          opened on Apr 25, 2026
                          Context
                          Follow-up from the security review of #3360 (--repo / spawn.mdapi_key steps). Finding: MEDIUM — deferred shell injection.
                          The primitive
                          packages/cli/src/shared/spawn-md.ts:394:
                          awaitrunner.runServer(`mkdir -p /etc/spawn && printf 'export %s="%s"\\n' '${escapedName}' "\" >> /etc/spawn/secrets && chmod 600 /etc/spawn/secrets`,);
                          The user-supplied api_key value is base64-encoded locally, then decoded back on the VM inside a printf format that writes export NAME="VALUE" to /etc/spawn/secrets. The file is then sourced from ~/.bashrc.
                          If the pasted value contains " or a newline, the written file becomes sourceable-but-broken:
                          # user pastes: foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar
# file ends up: export NAME="foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar"
# next login: ls /etc runs

                          Impact
                          • Self-inflicted: user types their own value, so no external attacker surface today
                          • But: becomes a trust-transfer vector if a template's description/guide_url tells the user "paste this exact string" — then the malicious string lands in a shell-sourceable file and executes on next login
                          • Class: deferred code execution, not prompt/input validation
                          Fix options
                          1. Keep values base64-encoded at rest and decode at source-time via a wrapper. Removes the whole class — quotes, newlines, $, backticks all pass through opaquely.
                            # /etc/spawn/secrets.b64 — not shell-sourceable, written format:
NAME=BASE64VALUE
# ~/.bashrc instead sources a loader:while IFS='='read -r k v;doexport"$k=$(base64 -d <<<"$v")";done< /etc/spawn/secrets.b64
                          2. Dotenv-style loader with a parser that does not re-interpret quotes. Still has to handle = / CRLF / line continuation carefully.
                          3. (weakest) Sanitize the value before writing — strip or escape ", \\, $, backtick, and newline. Fragile; likelier to leave a hole than close one.
                          Option 1 is simplest and eliminates the class. Also: the b64 file can keep chmod 600 unchanged.
                          Related
                          Filed from Slack by SPA
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if (!enabled) return;
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style = document.createElement('style');
style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';
document.head.appendChild(style);
}
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/* Invert everything except media */
html {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #1a1a2e !important;
}
/* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */
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filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
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pre code, pre code * {
filter: none !important;
}
/* Fix common UI elements */
.modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #2d2d44 !important;
border-color: #444 !important;
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::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }
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::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
';
}
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var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (style) style.remove();
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if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {
applyDarkMode();
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})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
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                              [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing #3361
                              Open
                              #3362
                              Open
                              [Bug]: /etc/spawn/secrets is shell-sourced — escape user-supplied api_key values or stop sourcing#3361
                              #3362
                              Labels
                              bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                              Description
                              @la14-1
                              la14-1
                              opened on Apr 25, 2026
                              Context
                              Follow-up from the security review of #3360 (--repo / spawn.mdapi_key steps). Finding: MEDIUM — deferred shell injection.
                              The primitive
                              packages/cli/src/shared/spawn-md.ts:394:
                              awaitrunner.runServer(`mkdir -p /etc/spawn && printf 'export %s="%s"\\n' '${escapedName}' "\" >> /etc/spawn/secrets && chmod 600 /etc/spawn/secrets`,);
                              The user-supplied api_key value is base64-encoded locally, then decoded back on the VM inside a printf format that writes export NAME="VALUE" to /etc/spawn/secrets. The file is then sourced from ~/.bashrc.
                              If the pasted value contains " or a newline, the written file becomes sourceable-but-broken:
                              # user pastes: foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar
# file ends up: export NAME="foo"; ls /etc; echo "bar"
# next login: ls /etc runs

                              Impact
                              • Self-inflicted: user types their own value, so no external attacker surface today
                              • But: becomes a trust-transfer vector if a template's description/guide_url tells the user "paste this exact string" — then the malicious string lands in a shell-sourceable file and executes on next login
                              • Class: deferred code execution, not prompt/input validation
                              Fix options
                              1. Keep values base64-encoded at rest and decode at source-time via a wrapper. Removes the whole class — quotes, newlines, $, backticks all pass through opaquely.
                                # /etc/spawn/secrets.b64 — not shell-sourceable, written format:
NAME=BASE64VALUE
# ~/.bashrc instead sources a loader:while IFS='='read -r k v;doexport"$k=$(base64 -d <<<"$v")";done< /etc/spawn/secrets.b64
                              2. Dotenv-style loader with a parser that does not re-interpret quotes. Still has to handle = / CRLF / line continuation carefully.
                              3. (weakest) Sanitize the value before writing — strip or escape ", \\, $, backtick, and newline. Fragile; likelier to leave a hole than close one.
                              Option 1 is simplest and eliminates the class. Also: the b64 file can keep chmod 600 unchanged.
                              Related
                              Filed from Slack by SPA
                              Metadata
                              Metadata
                              Assignees
                              No one assigned
                                Labels
                                bugSomething isn't workingin-progressIssue is being actively worked onsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team
                                Type
                                No type
                                Projects
                                No projects
                                  Milestone
                                  No milestone
                                  Relationships
                                  None yet
                                  Development
                                  No branches or pull requests
                                  Issue actions