Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands #736

Closed
Closed
Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands#736
Labels
in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns

Description

@louisgv
louisgv
opened on Feb 12, 2026

Security Finding

Severity: HIGH
Category: Command injection via API key interpolation

Description

Multiple agent scripts pass OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly into run_server command strings without proper escaping. If an API key contains shell metacharacters (e.g., $(cmd), backticks, ; cmd, etc.), they would be interpreted by the remote shell.

Affected files (non-exhaustive — pattern appears in ~12+ files):

FileLinePattern
latitude/continue.sh35-36run_server "$IP" "printf '%s\n' 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> /root/.bashrc"
daytona/continue.sh32-33run_server "printf 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> ~/.bashrc"
scaleway/continue.sh37-38Same pattern with ${OPENROUTER_API_KEY} in double-quoted string
e2b/continue.sh36-37Same pattern
modal/continue.sh35-36Same pattern
upcloud/continue.sh34-35Same pattern
github-codespaces/continue.sh41-42Same pattern
kamatera/nanoclaw.sh43run_server "$IP" "printf 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' > ~/nanoclaw/.env"

Root Cause

The API key is interpolated into a double-quoted string that forms a shell command. The run_server function typically executes this via SSH, meaning the string is parsed by the remote shell. While OpenRouter API keys are normally alphanumeric, any key with special characters would be executed as shell commands.

Remediation

Use the generic_inject_env_vars pattern from shared/common.sh which writes env vars to a temp file with chmod 600, uploads it, and sources it — avoiding shell interpolation entirely. The existing inject_env_vars and inject_env_vars_fly functions in shared/common.sh already do this safely.

For scripts that must use inline commands, use printf '%s' with the key passed as a separate argument rather than interpolated into the format string.

Found by

Automated security scan (spawn security team)

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      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
       blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

      Skip to content
      Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands #736
      Closed
      Closed
      Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands#736
      Labels
      in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
      Description
      @louisgv
      louisgv
      opened on Feb 12, 2026
      Security Finding
      Severity: HIGH
      Category: Command injection via API key interpolation
      Description
      Multiple agent scripts pass OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly into run_server command strings without proper escaping. If an API key contains shell metacharacters (e.g., $(cmd), backticks, ; cmd, etc.), they would be interpreted by the remote shell.
      Affected files (non-exhaustive — pattern appears in ~12+ files):
      FileLinePattern
      latitude/continue.sh35-36run_server "$IP" "printf '%s\n' 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> /root/.bashrc"
      daytona/continue.sh32-33run_server "printf 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> ~/.bashrc"
      scaleway/continue.sh37-38Same pattern with ${OPENROUTER_API_KEY} in double-quoted string
      e2b/continue.sh36-37Same pattern
      modal/continue.sh35-36Same pattern
      upcloud/continue.sh34-35Same pattern
      github-codespaces/continue.sh41-42Same pattern
      kamatera/nanoclaw.sh43run_server "$IP" "printf 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' > ~/nanoclaw/.env"
      Root Cause
      The API key is interpolated into a double-quoted string that forms a shell command. The run_server function typically executes this via SSH, meaning the string is parsed by the remote shell. While OpenRouter API keys are normally alphanumeric, any key with special characters would be executed as shell commands.
      Remediation
      Use the generic_inject_env_vars pattern from shared/common.sh which writes env vars to a temp file with chmod 600, uploads it, and sources it — avoiding shell interpolation entirely. The existing inject_env_vars and inject_env_vars_fly functions in shared/common.sh already do this safely.
      For scripts that must use inline commands, use printf '%s' with the key passed as a separate argument rather than interpolated into the format string.
      Found by
      Automated security scan (spawn security team)
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      No one assigned
        Labels
        in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

          Skip to content
          Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands #736
          Closed
          Closed
          Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands#736
          Labels
          in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
          Description
          @louisgv
          louisgv
          opened on Feb 12, 2026
          Security Finding
          Severity: HIGH
          Category: Command injection via API key interpolation
          Description
          Multiple agent scripts pass OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly into run_server command strings without proper escaping. If an API key contains shell metacharacters (e.g., $(cmd), backticks, ; cmd, etc.), they would be interpreted by the remote shell.
          Affected files (non-exhaustive — pattern appears in ~12+ files):
          FileLinePattern
          latitude/continue.sh35-36run_server "$IP" "printf '%s\n' 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> /root/.bashrc"
          daytona/continue.sh32-33run_server "printf 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> ~/.bashrc"
          scaleway/continue.sh37-38Same pattern with ${OPENROUTER_API_KEY} in double-quoted string
          e2b/continue.sh36-37Same pattern
          modal/continue.sh35-36Same pattern
          upcloud/continue.sh34-35Same pattern
          github-codespaces/continue.sh41-42Same pattern
          kamatera/nanoclaw.sh43run_server "$IP" "printf 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' > ~/nanoclaw/.env"
          Root Cause
          The API key is interpolated into a double-quoted string that forms a shell command. The run_server function typically executes this via SSH, meaning the string is parsed by the remote shell. While OpenRouter API keys are normally alphanumeric, any key with special characters would be executed as shell commands.
          Remediation
          Use the generic_inject_env_vars pattern from shared/common.sh which writes env vars to a temp file with chmod 600, uploads it, and sources it — avoiding shell interpolation entirely. The existing inject_env_vars and inject_env_vars_fly functions in shared/common.sh already do this safely.
          For scripts that must use inline commands, use printf '%s' with the key passed as a separate argument rather than interpolated into the format string.
          Found by
          Automated security scan (spawn security team)
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          No one assigned
            Labels
            in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands #736
              Closed
              Closed
              Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands#736
              Labels
              in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
              Description
              @louisgv
              louisgv
              opened on Feb 12, 2026
              Security Finding
              Severity: HIGH
              Category: Command injection via API key interpolation
              Description
              Multiple agent scripts pass OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly into run_server command strings without proper escaping. If an API key contains shell metacharacters (e.g., $(cmd), backticks, ; cmd, etc.), they would be interpreted by the remote shell.
              Affected files (non-exhaustive — pattern appears in ~12+ files):
              FileLinePattern
              latitude/continue.sh35-36run_server "$IP" "printf '%s\n' 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> /root/.bashrc"
              daytona/continue.sh32-33run_server "printf 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> ~/.bashrc"
              scaleway/continue.sh37-38Same pattern with ${OPENROUTER_API_KEY} in double-quoted string
              e2b/continue.sh36-37Same pattern
              modal/continue.sh35-36Same pattern
              upcloud/continue.sh34-35Same pattern
              github-codespaces/continue.sh41-42Same pattern
              kamatera/nanoclaw.sh43run_server "$IP" "printf 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' > ~/nanoclaw/.env"
              Root Cause
              The API key is interpolated into a double-quoted string that forms a shell command. The run_server function typically executes this via SSH, meaning the string is parsed by the remote shell. While OpenRouter API keys are normally alphanumeric, any key with special characters would be executed as shell commands.
              Remediation
              Use the generic_inject_env_vars pattern from shared/common.sh which writes env vars to a temp file with chmod 600, uploads it, and sources it — avoiding shell interpolation entirely. The existing inject_env_vars and inject_env_vars_fly functions in shared/common.sh already do this safely.
              For scripts that must use inline commands, use printf '%s' with the key passed as a separate argument rather than interpolated into the format string.
              Found by
              Automated security scan (spawn security team)
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              No one assigned
                Labels
                in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                Type
                No type
                Projects
                No projects
                  Milestone
                  No milestone
                  Relationships
                  None yet
                  Development
                  No branches or pull requests
                  Issue actions
                  
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

                  Skip to content
                  Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands #736
                  Closed
                  Closed
                  Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands#736
                  Labels
                  in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                  Description
                  @louisgv
                  louisgv
                  opened on Feb 12, 2026
                  Security Finding
                  Severity: HIGH
                  Category: Command injection via API key interpolation
                  Description
                  Multiple agent scripts pass OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly into run_server command strings without proper escaping. If an API key contains shell metacharacters (e.g., $(cmd), backticks, ; cmd, etc.), they would be interpreted by the remote shell.
                  Affected files (non-exhaustive — pattern appears in ~12+ files):
                  FileLinePattern
                  latitude/continue.sh35-36run_server "$IP" "printf '%s\n' 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> /root/.bashrc"
                  daytona/continue.sh32-33run_server "printf 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> ~/.bashrc"
                  scaleway/continue.sh37-38Same pattern with ${OPENROUTER_API_KEY} in double-quoted string
                  e2b/continue.sh36-37Same pattern
                  modal/continue.sh35-36Same pattern
                  upcloud/continue.sh34-35Same pattern
                  github-codespaces/continue.sh41-42Same pattern
                  kamatera/nanoclaw.sh43run_server "$IP" "printf 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' > ~/nanoclaw/.env"
                  Root Cause
                  The API key is interpolated into a double-quoted string that forms a shell command. The run_server function typically executes this via SSH, meaning the string is parsed by the remote shell. While OpenRouter API keys are normally alphanumeric, any key with special characters would be executed as shell commands.
                  Remediation
                  Use the generic_inject_env_vars pattern from shared/common.sh which writes env vars to a temp file with chmod 600, uploads it, and sources it — avoiding shell interpolation entirely. The existing inject_env_vars and inject_env_vars_fly functions in shared/common.sh already do this safely.
                  For scripts that must use inline commands, use printf '%s' with the key passed as a separate argument rather than interpolated into the format string.
                  Found by
                  Automated security scan (spawn security team)
                  Metadata
                  Metadata
                  Assignees
                  No one assigned
                    Labels
                    in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                    Type
                    No type
                    Projects
                    No projects
                      Milestone
                      No milestone
                      Relationships
                      None yet
                      Development
                      No branches or pull requests
                      Issue actions
                      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                      Skip to content
                      Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands #736
                      Closed
                      Closed
                      Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands#736
                      Labels
                      in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                      Description
                      @louisgv
                      louisgv
                      opened on Feb 12, 2026
                      Security Finding
                      Severity: HIGH
                      Category: Command injection via API key interpolation
                      Description
                      Multiple agent scripts pass OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly into run_server command strings without proper escaping. If an API key contains shell metacharacters (e.g., $(cmd), backticks, ; cmd, etc.), they would be interpreted by the remote shell.
                      Affected files (non-exhaustive — pattern appears in ~12+ files):
                      FileLinePattern
                      latitude/continue.sh35-36run_server "$IP" "printf '%s\n' 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> /root/.bashrc"
                      daytona/continue.sh32-33run_server "printf 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> ~/.bashrc"
                      scaleway/continue.sh37-38Same pattern with ${OPENROUTER_API_KEY} in double-quoted string
                      e2b/continue.sh36-37Same pattern
                      modal/continue.sh35-36Same pattern
                      upcloud/continue.sh34-35Same pattern
                      github-codespaces/continue.sh41-42Same pattern
                      kamatera/nanoclaw.sh43run_server "$IP" "printf 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' > ~/nanoclaw/.env"
                      Root Cause
                      The API key is interpolated into a double-quoted string that forms a shell command. The run_server function typically executes this via SSH, meaning the string is parsed by the remote shell. While OpenRouter API keys are normally alphanumeric, any key with special characters would be executed as shell commands.
                      Remediation
                      Use the generic_inject_env_vars pattern from shared/common.sh which writes env vars to a temp file with chmod 600, uploads it, and sources it — avoiding shell interpolation entirely. The existing inject_env_vars and inject_env_vars_fly functions in shared/common.sh already do this safely.
                      For scripts that must use inline commands, use printf '%s' with the key passed as a separate argument rather than interpolated into the format string.
                      Found by
                      Automated security scan (spawn security team)
                      Metadata
                      Metadata
                      Assignees
                      No one assigned
                        Labels
                        in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                        Type
                        No type
                        Projects
                        No projects
                          Milestone
                          No milestone
                          Relationships
                          None yet
                          Development
                          No branches or pull requests
                          Issue actions
                          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                          Skip to content
                          Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands #736
                          Closed
                          Closed
                          Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands#736
                          Labels
                          in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                          Description
                          @louisgv
                          louisgv
                          opened on Feb 12, 2026
                          Security Finding
                          Severity: HIGH
                          Category: Command injection via API key interpolation
                          Description
                          Multiple agent scripts pass OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly into run_server command strings without proper escaping. If an API key contains shell metacharacters (e.g., $(cmd), backticks, ; cmd, etc.), they would be interpreted by the remote shell.
                          Affected files (non-exhaustive — pattern appears in ~12+ files):
                          FileLinePattern
                          latitude/continue.sh35-36run_server "$IP" "printf '%s\n' 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> /root/.bashrc"
                          daytona/continue.sh32-33run_server "printf 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> ~/.bashrc"
                          scaleway/continue.sh37-38Same pattern with ${OPENROUTER_API_KEY} in double-quoted string
                          e2b/continue.sh36-37Same pattern
                          modal/continue.sh35-36Same pattern
                          upcloud/continue.sh34-35Same pattern
                          github-codespaces/continue.sh41-42Same pattern
                          kamatera/nanoclaw.sh43run_server "$IP" "printf 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' > ~/nanoclaw/.env"
                          Root Cause
                          The API key is interpolated into a double-quoted string that forms a shell command. The run_server function typically executes this via SSH, meaning the string is parsed by the remote shell. While OpenRouter API keys are normally alphanumeric, any key with special characters would be executed as shell commands.
                          Remediation
                          Use the generic_inject_env_vars pattern from shared/common.sh which writes env vars to a temp file with chmod 600, uploads it, and sources it — avoiding shell interpolation entirely. The existing inject_env_vars and inject_env_vars_fly functions in shared/common.sh already do this safely.
                          For scripts that must use inline commands, use printf '%s' with the key passed as a separate argument rather than interpolated into the format string.
                          Found by
                          Automated security scan (spawn security team)
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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                              Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands #736
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                              Closed
                              Security: API key injection via unquoted interpolation in run_server commands#736
                              Labels
                              in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                              Description
                              @louisgv
                              louisgv
                              opened on Feb 12, 2026
                              Security Finding
                              Severity: HIGH
                              Category: Command injection via API key interpolation
                              Description
                              Multiple agent scripts pass OPENROUTER_API_KEY directly into run_server command strings without proper escaping. If an API key contains shell metacharacters (e.g., $(cmd), backticks, ; cmd, etc.), they would be interpreted by the remote shell.
                              Affected files (non-exhaustive — pattern appears in ~12+ files):
                              FileLinePattern
                              latitude/continue.sh35-36run_server "$IP" "printf '%s\n' 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> /root/.bashrc"
                              daytona/continue.sh32-33run_server "printf 'export OPENROUTER_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' >> ~/.bashrc"
                              scaleway/continue.sh37-38Same pattern with ${OPENROUTER_API_KEY} in double-quoted string
                              e2b/continue.sh36-37Same pattern
                              modal/continue.sh35-36Same pattern
                              upcloud/continue.sh34-35Same pattern
                              github-codespaces/continue.sh41-42Same pattern
                              kamatera/nanoclaw.sh43run_server "$IP" "printf 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=%s\n' '${OPENROUTER_API_KEY}' > ~/nanoclaw/.env"
                              Root Cause
                              The API key is interpolated into a double-quoted string that forms a shell command. The run_server function typically executes this via SSH, meaning the string is parsed by the remote shell. While OpenRouter API keys are normally alphanumeric, any key with special characters would be executed as shell commands.
                              Remediation
                              Use the generic_inject_env_vars pattern from shared/common.sh which writes env vars to a temp file with chmod 600, uploads it, and sources it — avoiding shell interpolation entirely. The existing inject_env_vars and inject_env_vars_fly functions in shared/common.sh already do this safely.
                              For scripts that must use inline commands, use printf '%s' with the key passed as a separate argument rather than interpolated into the format string.
                              Found by
                              Automated security scan (spawn security team)
                              Metadata
                              Metadata
                              Assignees
                              No one assigned
                                Labels
                                in-progressIssue is being actively worked onsafe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concerns
                                Type
                                No type
                                Projects
                                No projects
                                  Milestone
                                  No milestone
                                  Relationships
                                  None yet
                                  Development
                                  No branches or pull requests
                                  Issue actions