Security: Command injection risk in codesandbox upload_file #989

Description

@louisgv

Security Finding

Severity: CRITICAL
File: codesandbox/lib/common.sh:211
Category: Command injection

Description

The upload_file function uses printf '%q' to escape the remote_path, but then still passes it to run_server which wraps it in a command. The escaped path becomes part of a base64 decode pipeline: base64 -d > ${escaped_path}. While printf '%q' adds quotes, the underlying run_server passes commands via environment variables to Node.js SDK, then the SDK runs them in a shell. If the remote_path contains crafted sequences, it could still bypass the escaping.

Example vulnerable flow:

upload_file "./config.json""$(cat /etc/passwd)"

Even with input validation blocking quotes/backticks/dollar signs, the command construction pattern is fragile. The remote_path validation at lines 199-202 blocks some attack vectors but doesn't guarantee safety.

Remediation

Use a two-stage approach:

  1. Validate the path strictly (only alphanumeric, /, -, _)
  2. Pass it via a separate env var instead of inline substitution
  3. Or use the SDK's file write API if available instead of shell redirection

Example fix:

upload_file() {
local local_path="${1}"local remote_path="${2}"# Strict validation: only safe charactersif [[ \!"${remote_path}"=~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$ ]];then
log_error "Invalid remote path (must be alphanumeric with /-._): $remote_path"return 1
filocal content
content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}"2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")# Pass path via env var to prevent injection
_CSB_REMOTE_PATH="${remote_path}" _CSB_CONTENT="${content}" _csb_sdk_eval " const fs = require('fs'); const path = process.env._CSB_REMOTE_PATH; const content = Buffer.from(process.env._CSB_CONTENT, 'base64'); fs.writeFileSync(path, content);"
}

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      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
       blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
      }
      } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
      })();
      (function(){
      try {
      var __m = "github.com";
      var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
      
      Skip to content

      Security: Command injection risk in codesandbox upload_file #989

      Description

      @louisgv

      Security Finding

      Severity: CRITICAL
      File: codesandbox/lib/common.sh:211
      Category: Command injection

      Description

      The upload_file function uses printf '%q' to escape the remote_path, but then still passes it to run_server which wraps it in a command. The escaped path becomes part of a base64 decode pipeline: base64 -d > ${escaped_path}. While printf '%q' adds quotes, the underlying run_server passes commands via environment variables to Node.js SDK, then the SDK runs them in a shell. If the remote_path contains crafted sequences, it could still bypass the escaping.

      Example vulnerable flow:

      upload_file "./config.json""$(cat /etc/passwd)"

      Even with input validation blocking quotes/backticks/dollar signs, the command construction pattern is fragile. The remote_path validation at lines 199-202 blocks some attack vectors but doesn't guarantee safety.

      Remediation

      Use a two-stage approach:

      1. Validate the path strictly (only alphanumeric, /, -, _)
      2. Pass it via a separate env var instead of inline substitution
      3. Or use the SDK's file write API if available instead of shell redirection

      Example fix:

      upload_file() {
      local local_path="${1}"local remote_path="${2}"# Strict validation: only safe charactersif [[ \!"${remote_path}"=~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$ ]];then
      log_error "Invalid remote path (must be alphanumeric with /-._): $remote_path"return 1
      filocal content
      content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}"2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")# Pass path via env var to prevent injection
      _CSB_REMOTE_PATH="${remote_path}" _CSB_CONTENT="${content}" _csb_sdk_eval " const fs = require('fs'); const path = process.env._CSB_REMOTE_PATH; const content = Buffer.from(process.env._CSB_CONTENT, 'base64'); fs.writeFileSync(path, content);"
      }

      Found by

      -- security/shell-scanner

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        safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team

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          , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
          Skip to content

          Security: Command injection risk in codesandbox upload_file #989

          Description

          @louisgv

          Security Finding

          Severity: CRITICAL
          File: codesandbox/lib/common.sh:211
          Category: Command injection

          Description

          The upload_file function uses printf '%q' to escape the remote_path, but then still passes it to run_server which wraps it in a command. The escaped path becomes part of a base64 decode pipeline: base64 -d > ${escaped_path}. While printf '%q' adds quotes, the underlying run_server passes commands via environment variables to Node.js SDK, then the SDK runs them in a shell. If the remote_path contains crafted sequences, it could still bypass the escaping.

          Example vulnerable flow:

          upload_file "./config.json""$(cat /etc/passwd)"

          Even with input validation blocking quotes/backticks/dollar signs, the command construction pattern is fragile. The remote_path validation at lines 199-202 blocks some attack vectors but doesn't guarantee safety.

          Remediation

          Use a two-stage approach:

          1. Validate the path strictly (only alphanumeric, /, -, _)
          2. Pass it via a separate env var instead of inline substitution
          3. Or use the SDK's file write API if available instead of shell redirection

          Example fix:

          upload_file() {
          local local_path="${1}"local remote_path="${2}"# Strict validation: only safe charactersif [[ \!"${remote_path}"=~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$ ]];then
          log_error "Invalid remote path (must be alphanumeric with /-._): $remote_path"return 1
          filocal content
          content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}"2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")# Pass path via env var to prevent injection
          _CSB_REMOTE_PATH="${remote_path}" _CSB_CONTENT="${content}" _csb_sdk_eval " const fs = require('fs'); const path = process.env._CSB_REMOTE_PATH; const content = Buffer.from(process.env._CSB_CONTENT, 'base64'); fs.writeFileSync(path, content);"
          }

          Found by

          -- security/shell-scanner

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            safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team

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              , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
              Skip to content

              Security: Command injection risk in codesandbox upload_file #989

              Description

              @louisgv

              Security Finding

              Severity: CRITICAL
              File: codesandbox/lib/common.sh:211
              Category: Command injection

              Description

              The upload_file function uses printf '%q' to escape the remote_path, but then still passes it to run_server which wraps it in a command. The escaped path becomes part of a base64 decode pipeline: base64 -d > ${escaped_path}. While printf '%q' adds quotes, the underlying run_server passes commands via environment variables to Node.js SDK, then the SDK runs them in a shell. If the remote_path contains crafted sequences, it could still bypass the escaping.

              Example vulnerable flow:

              upload_file "./config.json""$(cat /etc/passwd)"

              Even with input validation blocking quotes/backticks/dollar signs, the command construction pattern is fragile. The remote_path validation at lines 199-202 blocks some attack vectors but doesn't guarantee safety.

              Remediation

              Use a two-stage approach:

              1. Validate the path strictly (only alphanumeric, /, -, _)
              2. Pass it via a separate env var instead of inline substitution
              3. Or use the SDK's file write API if available instead of shell redirection

              Example fix:

              upload_file() {
              local local_path="${1}"local remote_path="${2}"# Strict validation: only safe charactersif [[ \!"${remote_path}"=~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$ ]];then
              log_error "Invalid remote path (must be alphanumeric with /-._): $remote_path"return 1
              filocal content
              content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}"2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")# Pass path via env var to prevent injection
              _CSB_REMOTE_PATH="${remote_path}" _CSB_CONTENT="${content}" _csb_sdk_eval " const fs = require('fs'); const path = process.env._CSB_REMOTE_PATH; const content = Buffer.from(process.env._CSB_CONTENT, 'base64'); fs.writeFileSync(path, content);"
              }

              Found by

              -- security/shell-scanner

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                safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team

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                  , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
                  Skip to content

                  Security: Command injection risk in codesandbox upload_file #989

                  Description

                  @louisgv

                  Security Finding

                  Severity: CRITICAL
                  File: codesandbox/lib/common.sh:211
                  Category: Command injection

                  Description

                  The upload_file function uses printf '%q' to escape the remote_path, but then still passes it to run_server which wraps it in a command. The escaped path becomes part of a base64 decode pipeline: base64 -d > ${escaped_path}. While printf '%q' adds quotes, the underlying run_server passes commands via environment variables to Node.js SDK, then the SDK runs them in a shell. If the remote_path contains crafted sequences, it could still bypass the escaping.

                  Example vulnerable flow:

                  upload_file "./config.json""$(cat /etc/passwd)"

                  Even with input validation blocking quotes/backticks/dollar signs, the command construction pattern is fragile. The remote_path validation at lines 199-202 blocks some attack vectors but doesn't guarantee safety.

                  Remediation

                  Use a two-stage approach:

                  1. Validate the path strictly (only alphanumeric, /, -, _)
                  2. Pass it via a separate env var instead of inline substitution
                  3. Or use the SDK's file write API if available instead of shell redirection

                  Example fix:

                  upload_file() {
                  local local_path="${1}"local remote_path="${2}"# Strict validation: only safe charactersif [[ \!"${remote_path}"=~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$ ]];then
                  log_error "Invalid remote path (must be alphanumeric with /-._): $remote_path"return 1
                  filocal content
                  content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}"2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")# Pass path via env var to prevent injection
                  _CSB_REMOTE_PATH="${remote_path}" _CSB_CONTENT="${content}" _csb_sdk_eval " const fs = require('fs'); const path = process.env._CSB_REMOTE_PATH; const content = Buffer.from(process.env._CSB_CONTENT, 'base64'); fs.writeFileSync(path, content);"
                  }

                  Found by

                  -- security/shell-scanner

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                    Labels

                    safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team

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                      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
                      Skip to content

                      Security: Command injection risk in codesandbox upload_file #989

                      Description

                      @louisgv

                      Security Finding

                      Severity: CRITICAL
                      File: codesandbox/lib/common.sh:211
                      Category: Command injection

                      Description

                      The upload_file function uses printf '%q' to escape the remote_path, but then still passes it to run_server which wraps it in a command. The escaped path becomes part of a base64 decode pipeline: base64 -d > ${escaped_path}. While printf '%q' adds quotes, the underlying run_server passes commands via environment variables to Node.js SDK, then the SDK runs them in a shell. If the remote_path contains crafted sequences, it could still bypass the escaping.

                      Example vulnerable flow:

                      upload_file "./config.json""$(cat /etc/passwd)"

                      Even with input validation blocking quotes/backticks/dollar signs, the command construction pattern is fragile. The remote_path validation at lines 199-202 blocks some attack vectors but doesn't guarantee safety.

                      Remediation

                      Use a two-stage approach:

                      1. Validate the path strictly (only alphanumeric, /, -, _)
                      2. Pass it via a separate env var instead of inline substitution
                      3. Or use the SDK's file write API if available instead of shell redirection

                      Example fix:

                      upload_file() {
                      local local_path="${1}"local remote_path="${2}"# Strict validation: only safe charactersif [[ \!"${remote_path}"=~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$ ]];then
                      log_error "Invalid remote path (must be alphanumeric with /-._): $remote_path"return 1
                      filocal content
                      content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}"2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")# Pass path via env var to prevent injection
                      _CSB_REMOTE_PATH="${remote_path}" _CSB_CONTENT="${content}" _csb_sdk_eval " const fs = require('fs'); const path = process.env._CSB_REMOTE_PATH; const content = Buffer.from(process.env._CSB_CONTENT, 'base64'); fs.writeFileSync(path, content);"
                      }

                      Found by

                      -- security/shell-scanner

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                        Labels

                        safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team

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                        No projects

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                          No milestone

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                          , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
                          Skip to content

                          Security: Command injection risk in codesandbox upload_file #989

                          Description

                          @louisgv

                          Security Finding

                          Severity: CRITICAL
                          File: codesandbox/lib/common.sh:211
                          Category: Command injection

                          Description

                          The upload_file function uses printf '%q' to escape the remote_path, but then still passes it to run_server which wraps it in a command. The escaped path becomes part of a base64 decode pipeline: base64 -d > ${escaped_path}. While printf '%q' adds quotes, the underlying run_server passes commands via environment variables to Node.js SDK, then the SDK runs them in a shell. If the remote_path contains crafted sequences, it could still bypass the escaping.

                          Example vulnerable flow:

                          upload_file "./config.json""$(cat /etc/passwd)"

                          Even with input validation blocking quotes/backticks/dollar signs, the command construction pattern is fragile. The remote_path validation at lines 199-202 blocks some attack vectors but doesn't guarantee safety.

                          Remediation

                          Use a two-stage approach:

                          1. Validate the path strictly (only alphanumeric, /, -, _)
                          2. Pass it via a separate env var instead of inline substitution
                          3. Or use the SDK's file write API if available instead of shell redirection

                          Example fix:

                          upload_file() {
                          local local_path="${1}"local remote_path="${2}"# Strict validation: only safe charactersif [[ \!"${remote_path}"=~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$ ]];then
                          log_error "Invalid remote path (must be alphanumeric with /-._): $remote_path"return 1
                          filocal content
                          content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}"2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")# Pass path via env var to prevent injection
                          _CSB_REMOTE_PATH="${remote_path}" _CSB_CONTENT="${content}" _csb_sdk_eval " const fs = require('fs'); const path = process.env._CSB_REMOTE_PATH; const content = Buffer.from(process.env._CSB_CONTENT, 'base64'); fs.writeFileSync(path, content);"
                          }

                          Found by

                          -- security/shell-scanner

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                            safe-to-workSecurity triage: safe for automated processingsecuritySecurity vulnerabilities and concernsunder-reviewIssue is being reviewed by the team

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                            No projects

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                              , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
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                              Security: Command injection risk in codesandbox upload_file #989

                              Description

                              @louisgv

                              Security Finding

                              Severity: CRITICAL
                              File: codesandbox/lib/common.sh:211
                              Category: Command injection

                              Description

                              The upload_file function uses printf '%q' to escape the remote_path, but then still passes it to run_server which wraps it in a command. The escaped path becomes part of a base64 decode pipeline: base64 -d > ${escaped_path}. While printf '%q' adds quotes, the underlying run_server passes commands via environment variables to Node.js SDK, then the SDK runs them in a shell. If the remote_path contains crafted sequences, it could still bypass the escaping.

                              Example vulnerable flow:

                              upload_file "./config.json""$(cat /etc/passwd)"

                              Even with input validation blocking quotes/backticks/dollar signs, the command construction pattern is fragile. The remote_path validation at lines 199-202 blocks some attack vectors but doesn't guarantee safety.

                              Remediation

                              Use a two-stage approach:

                              1. Validate the path strictly (only alphanumeric, /, -, _)
                              2. Pass it via a separate env var instead of inline substitution
                              3. Or use the SDK's file write API if available instead of shell redirection

                              Example fix:

                              upload_file() {
                              local local_path="${1}"local remote_path="${2}"# Strict validation: only safe charactersif [[ \!"${remote_path}"=~ ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_.-]+$ ]];then
                              log_error "Invalid remote path (must be alphanumeric with /-._): $remote_path"return 1
                              filocal content
                              content=$(base64 -w0 "${local_path}"2>/dev/null || base64 "${local_path}")# Pass path via env var to prevent injection
                              _CSB_REMOTE_PATH="${remote_path}" _CSB_CONTENT="${content}" _csb_sdk_eval " const fs = require('fs'); const path = process.env._CSB_REMOTE_PATH; const content = Buffer.from(process.env._CSB_CONTENT, 'base64'); fs.writeFileSync(path, content);"
                              }

                              Found by

                              -- security/shell-scanner

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