fix(security): prevent shell expansion in nanoclaw .env heredocs by la14-1 · Pull Request #1031 · OpenRouterLabs/spawn

la14-1 · 2026-02-14T00:09:54Z

Summary

Replace unquoted << EOF heredocs with printf in 33 nanoclaw scripts across all cloud providers to prevent shell expansion of API key values
Fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file() mv command in shared/common.sh
Fix unquoted heredoc in github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config file creation

Problem

All nanoclaw scripts used unquoted heredocs to write the .env file, which causes bash to perform shell expansion before writing. If an API key contains dollar signs, backticks, or backslashes, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution.

Fix

Replace with printf which safely writes the value without shell interpretation. This matches the pattern already used by kamatera, local, and render nanoclaw scripts.

Also quote paths in upload_config_file() mv command to prevent word splitting.

Test plan

All 35 modified scripts pass bash -n syntax check
Full test suite passes (101 pre-existing failures, 0 new failures)
Pattern matches existing safe implementations

Relates to #763 (nanoclaw heredoc medium finding)

-- refactor/security-auditor

… expansion in API keys Unquoted `<< EOF` heredocs in nanoclaw .env file creation cause shell expansion of the API key value. If an API key contains `$`, backticks, or `\`, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution. Replace with `printf '%s'` which safely writes the value without interpretation. Also fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file's mv command and the github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config heredoc. Fixes 34 scripts across all cloud providers. Agent: security-auditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

louisgv

Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED

Findings

[MEDIUM] koyeb/nanoclaw.sh:54 — API key is embedded in single-quoted context inside double-quoted run_server argument. If the key contained single quotes, it could break syntax. Mitigated by koyeb's run_server applying printf '%q' escaping, and OpenRouter API keys being alphanumeric. Old code had the same local-expansion pattern. Acceptable.
[LOW] github-codespaces/openclaw.sh:68 — printf '%s' for MODEL_ID in JSON template. Safe because validate_model_id restricts to ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_:.-]+$.
[LOW] shared/common.sh:2098 — Added single-quote protection around mv arguments in upload_config_file. Developer-controlled paths; improvement over unquoted originals.

Analysis

The PR correctly replaces unquoted heredocs (<< EOF) with printf '%s\n' across 35 files. The old pattern cat > file << EOF ... ${VAR} ... EOF was vulnerable to shell expansion of special characters in API keys ($, backticks, \). The new printf '%s\n' "${VAR}" pattern treats the value as a literal string, preventing unintended expansion. This is a valid and well-executed security hardening.

Tests

bash -n: PASS (all 35 files)
test/run.sh: PASS (79/79)
curl|bash pattern: OK (verified in sample of 6 files)
macOS compat: OK (no echo -e, source <(), ((var++)), or set -u)

-- security/pr-reviewer

la14-1 · 2026-02-14T00:09:54Z

Summary

Replace unquoted << EOF heredocs with printf in 33 nanoclaw scripts across all cloud providers to prevent shell expansion of API key values
Fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file() mv command in shared/common.sh
Fix unquoted heredoc in github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config file creation

Problem

All nanoclaw scripts used unquoted heredocs to write the .env file, which causes bash to perform shell expansion before writing. If an API key contains dollar signs, backticks, or backslashes, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution.

Fix

Replace with printf which safely writes the value without shell interpretation. This matches the pattern already used by kamatera, local, and render nanoclaw scripts.

Also quote paths in upload_config_file() mv command to prevent word splitting.

Test plan

All 35 modified scripts pass bash -n syntax check
Full test suite passes (101 pre-existing failures, 0 new failures)
Pattern matches existing safe implementations

Relates to #763 (nanoclaw heredoc medium finding)

-- refactor/security-auditor

… expansion in API keys Unquoted `<< EOF` heredocs in nanoclaw .env file creation cause shell expansion of the API key value. If an API key contains `$`, backticks, or `\`, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution. Replace with `printf '%s'` which safely writes the value without interpretation. Also fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file's mv command and the github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config heredoc. Fixes 34 scripts across all cloud providers. Agent: security-auditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

louisgv

Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED

Findings

[MEDIUM] koyeb/nanoclaw.sh:54 — API key is embedded in single-quoted context inside double-quoted run_server argument. If the key contained single quotes, it could break syntax. Mitigated by koyeb's run_server applying printf '%q' escaping, and OpenRouter API keys being alphanumeric. Old code had the same local-expansion pattern. Acceptable.
[LOW] github-codespaces/openclaw.sh:68 — printf '%s' for MODEL_ID in JSON template. Safe because validate_model_id restricts to ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_:.-]+$.
[LOW] shared/common.sh:2098 — Added single-quote protection around mv arguments in upload_config_file. Developer-controlled paths; improvement over unquoted originals.

Analysis

The PR correctly replaces unquoted heredocs (<< EOF) with printf '%s\n' across 35 files. The old pattern cat > file << EOF ... ${VAR} ... EOF was vulnerable to shell expansion of special characters in API keys ($, backticks, \). The new printf '%s\n' "${VAR}" pattern treats the value as a literal string, preventing unintended expansion. This is a valid and well-executed security hardening.

Tests

bash -n: PASS (all 35 files)
test/run.sh: PASS (79/79)
curl|bash pattern: OK (verified in sample of 6 files)
macOS compat: OK (no echo -e, source <(), ((var++)), or set -u)

-- security/pr-reviewer

la14-1 · 2026-02-14T00:09:54Z

Summary

Replace unquoted << EOF heredocs with printf in 33 nanoclaw scripts across all cloud providers to prevent shell expansion of API key values
Fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file() mv command in shared/common.sh
Fix unquoted heredoc in github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config file creation

Problem

All nanoclaw scripts used unquoted heredocs to write the .env file, which causes bash to perform shell expansion before writing. If an API key contains dollar signs, backticks, or backslashes, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution.

Fix

Replace with printf which safely writes the value without shell interpretation. This matches the pattern already used by kamatera, local, and render nanoclaw scripts.

Also quote paths in upload_config_file() mv command to prevent word splitting.

Test plan

All 35 modified scripts pass bash -n syntax check
Full test suite passes (101 pre-existing failures, 0 new failures)
Pattern matches existing safe implementations

Relates to #763 (nanoclaw heredoc medium finding)

-- refactor/security-auditor

… expansion in API keys Unquoted `<< EOF` heredocs in nanoclaw .env file creation cause shell expansion of the API key value. If an API key contains `$`, backticks, or `\`, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution. Replace with `printf '%s'` which safely writes the value without interpretation. Also fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file's mv command and the github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config heredoc. Fixes 34 scripts across all cloud providers. Agent: security-auditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

louisgv

Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED

Findings

[MEDIUM] koyeb/nanoclaw.sh:54 — API key is embedded in single-quoted context inside double-quoted run_server argument. If the key contained single quotes, it could break syntax. Mitigated by koyeb's run_server applying printf '%q' escaping, and OpenRouter API keys being alphanumeric. Old code had the same local-expansion pattern. Acceptable.
[LOW] github-codespaces/openclaw.sh:68 — printf '%s' for MODEL_ID in JSON template. Safe because validate_model_id restricts to ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_:.-]+$.
[LOW] shared/common.sh:2098 — Added single-quote protection around mv arguments in upload_config_file. Developer-controlled paths; improvement over unquoted originals.

Analysis

The PR correctly replaces unquoted heredocs (<< EOF) with printf '%s\n' across 35 files. The old pattern cat > file << EOF ... ${VAR} ... EOF was vulnerable to shell expansion of special characters in API keys ($, backticks, \). The new printf '%s\n' "${VAR}" pattern treats the value as a literal string, preventing unintended expansion. This is a valid and well-executed security hardening.

Tests

bash -n: PASS (all 35 files)
test/run.sh: PASS (79/79)
curl|bash pattern: OK (verified in sample of 6 files)
macOS compat: OK (no echo -e, source <(), ((var++)), or set -u)

-- security/pr-reviewer

la14-1 · 2026-02-14T00:09:54Z

Summary

Replace unquoted << EOF heredocs with printf in 33 nanoclaw scripts across all cloud providers to prevent shell expansion of API key values
Fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file() mv command in shared/common.sh
Fix unquoted heredoc in github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config file creation

Problem

All nanoclaw scripts used unquoted heredocs to write the .env file, which causes bash to perform shell expansion before writing. If an API key contains dollar signs, backticks, or backslashes, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution.

Fix

Replace with printf which safely writes the value without shell interpretation. This matches the pattern already used by kamatera, local, and render nanoclaw scripts.

Also quote paths in upload_config_file() mv command to prevent word splitting.

Test plan

All 35 modified scripts pass bash -n syntax check
Full test suite passes (101 pre-existing failures, 0 new failures)
Pattern matches existing safe implementations

Relates to #763 (nanoclaw heredoc medium finding)

-- refactor/security-auditor

… expansion in API keys Unquoted `<< EOF` heredocs in nanoclaw .env file creation cause shell expansion of the API key value. If an API key contains `$`, backticks, or `\`, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution. Replace with `printf '%s'` which safely writes the value without interpretation. Also fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file's mv command and the github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config heredoc. Fixes 34 scripts across all cloud providers. Agent: security-auditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

louisgv

Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED

Findings

[MEDIUM] koyeb/nanoclaw.sh:54 — API key is embedded in single-quoted context inside double-quoted run_server argument. If the key contained single quotes, it could break syntax. Mitigated by koyeb's run_server applying printf '%q' escaping, and OpenRouter API keys being alphanumeric. Old code had the same local-expansion pattern. Acceptable.
[LOW] github-codespaces/openclaw.sh:68 — printf '%s' for MODEL_ID in JSON template. Safe because validate_model_id restricts to ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_:.-]+$.
[LOW] shared/common.sh:2098 — Added single-quote protection around mv arguments in upload_config_file. Developer-controlled paths; improvement over unquoted originals.

Analysis

The PR correctly replaces unquoted heredocs (<< EOF) with printf '%s\n' across 35 files. The old pattern cat > file << EOF ... ${VAR} ... EOF was vulnerable to shell expansion of special characters in API keys ($, backticks, \). The new printf '%s\n' "${VAR}" pattern treats the value as a literal string, preventing unintended expansion. This is a valid and well-executed security hardening.

Tests

bash -n: PASS (all 35 files)
test/run.sh: PASS (79/79)
curl|bash pattern: OK (verified in sample of 6 files)
macOS compat: OK (no echo -e, source <(), ((var++)), or set -u)

-- security/pr-reviewer

la14-1 · 2026-02-14T00:09:54Z

Summary

Replace unquoted << EOF heredocs with printf in 33 nanoclaw scripts across all cloud providers to prevent shell expansion of API key values
Fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file() mv command in shared/common.sh
Fix unquoted heredoc in github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config file creation

Problem

All nanoclaw scripts used unquoted heredocs to write the .env file, which causes bash to perform shell expansion before writing. If an API key contains dollar signs, backticks, or backslashes, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution.

Fix

Replace with printf which safely writes the value without shell interpretation. This matches the pattern already used by kamatera, local, and render nanoclaw scripts.

Also quote paths in upload_config_file() mv command to prevent word splitting.

Test plan

All 35 modified scripts pass bash -n syntax check
Full test suite passes (101 pre-existing failures, 0 new failures)
Pattern matches existing safe implementations

Relates to #763 (nanoclaw heredoc medium finding)

-- refactor/security-auditor

… expansion in API keys Unquoted `<< EOF` heredocs in nanoclaw .env file creation cause shell expansion of the API key value. If an API key contains `$`, backticks, or `\`, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution. Replace with `printf '%s'` which safely writes the value without interpretation. Also fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file's mv command and the github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config heredoc. Fixes 34 scripts across all cloud providers. Agent: security-auditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

louisgv

Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED

Findings

[MEDIUM] koyeb/nanoclaw.sh:54 — API key is embedded in single-quoted context inside double-quoted run_server argument. If the key contained single quotes, it could break syntax. Mitigated by koyeb's run_server applying printf '%q' escaping, and OpenRouter API keys being alphanumeric. Old code had the same local-expansion pattern. Acceptable.
[LOW] github-codespaces/openclaw.sh:68 — printf '%s' for MODEL_ID in JSON template. Safe because validate_model_id restricts to ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_:.-]+$.
[LOW] shared/common.sh:2098 — Added single-quote protection around mv arguments in upload_config_file. Developer-controlled paths; improvement over unquoted originals.

Analysis

The PR correctly replaces unquoted heredocs (<< EOF) with printf '%s\n' across 35 files. The old pattern cat > file << EOF ... ${VAR} ... EOF was vulnerable to shell expansion of special characters in API keys ($, backticks, \). The new printf '%s\n' "${VAR}" pattern treats the value as a literal string, preventing unintended expansion. This is a valid and well-executed security hardening.

Tests

bash -n: PASS (all 35 files)
test/run.sh: PASS (79/79)
curl|bash pattern: OK (verified in sample of 6 files)
macOS compat: OK (no echo -e, source <(), ((var++)), or set -u)

-- security/pr-reviewer

la14-1 · 2026-02-14T00:09:54Z

Summary

Replace unquoted << EOF heredocs with printf in 33 nanoclaw scripts across all cloud providers to prevent shell expansion of API key values
Fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file() mv command in shared/common.sh
Fix unquoted heredoc in github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config file creation

Problem

All nanoclaw scripts used unquoted heredocs to write the .env file, which causes bash to perform shell expansion before writing. If an API key contains dollar signs, backticks, or backslashes, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution.

Fix

Replace with printf which safely writes the value without shell interpretation. This matches the pattern already used by kamatera, local, and render nanoclaw scripts.

Also quote paths in upload_config_file() mv command to prevent word splitting.

Test plan

All 35 modified scripts pass bash -n syntax check
Full test suite passes (101 pre-existing failures, 0 new failures)
Pattern matches existing safe implementations

Relates to #763 (nanoclaw heredoc medium finding)

-- refactor/security-auditor

… expansion in API keys Unquoted `<< EOF` heredocs in nanoclaw .env file creation cause shell expansion of the API key value. If an API key contains `$`, backticks, or `\`, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution. Replace with `printf '%s'` which safely writes the value without interpretation. Also fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file's mv command and the github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config heredoc. Fixes 34 scripts across all cloud providers. Agent: security-auditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

louisgv

Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED

Findings

[MEDIUM] koyeb/nanoclaw.sh:54 — API key is embedded in single-quoted context inside double-quoted run_server argument. If the key contained single quotes, it could break syntax. Mitigated by koyeb's run_server applying printf '%q' escaping, and OpenRouter API keys being alphanumeric. Old code had the same local-expansion pattern. Acceptable.
[LOW] github-codespaces/openclaw.sh:68 — printf '%s' for MODEL_ID in JSON template. Safe because validate_model_id restricts to ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_:.-]+$.
[LOW] shared/common.sh:2098 — Added single-quote protection around mv arguments in upload_config_file. Developer-controlled paths; improvement over unquoted originals.

Analysis

The PR correctly replaces unquoted heredocs (<< EOF) with printf '%s\n' across 35 files. The old pattern cat > file << EOF ... ${VAR} ... EOF was vulnerable to shell expansion of special characters in API keys ($, backticks, \). The new printf '%s\n' "${VAR}" pattern treats the value as a literal string, preventing unintended expansion. This is a valid and well-executed security hardening.

Tests

bash -n: PASS (all 35 files)
test/run.sh: PASS (79/79)
curl|bash pattern: OK (verified in sample of 6 files)
macOS compat: OK (no echo -e, source <(), ((var++)), or set -u)

-- security/pr-reviewer

la14-1 · 2026-02-14T00:09:54Z

Summary

Replace unquoted << EOF heredocs with printf in 33 nanoclaw scripts across all cloud providers to prevent shell expansion of API key values
Fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file() mv command in shared/common.sh
Fix unquoted heredoc in github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config file creation

Problem

All nanoclaw scripts used unquoted heredocs to write the .env file, which causes bash to perform shell expansion before writing. If an API key contains dollar signs, backticks, or backslashes, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution.

Fix

Replace with printf which safely writes the value without shell interpretation. This matches the pattern already used by kamatera, local, and render nanoclaw scripts.

Also quote paths in upload_config_file() mv command to prevent word splitting.

Test plan

All 35 modified scripts pass bash -n syntax check
Full test suite passes (101 pre-existing failures, 0 new failures)
Pattern matches existing safe implementations

Relates to #763 (nanoclaw heredoc medium finding)

-- refactor/security-auditor

… expansion in API keys Unquoted `<< EOF` heredocs in nanoclaw .env file creation cause shell expansion of the API key value. If an API key contains `$`, backticks, or `\`, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution. Replace with `printf '%s'` which safely writes the value without interpretation. Also fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file's mv command and the github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config heredoc. Fixes 34 scripts across all cloud providers. Agent: security-auditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

louisgv

Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED

Findings

[MEDIUM] koyeb/nanoclaw.sh:54 — API key is embedded in single-quoted context inside double-quoted run_server argument. If the key contained single quotes, it could break syntax. Mitigated by koyeb's run_server applying printf '%q' escaping, and OpenRouter API keys being alphanumeric. Old code had the same local-expansion pattern. Acceptable.
[LOW] github-codespaces/openclaw.sh:68 — printf '%s' for MODEL_ID in JSON template. Safe because validate_model_id restricts to ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_:.-]+$.
[LOW] shared/common.sh:2098 — Added single-quote protection around mv arguments in upload_config_file. Developer-controlled paths; improvement over unquoted originals.

Analysis

The PR correctly replaces unquoted heredocs (<< EOF) with printf '%s\n' across 35 files. The old pattern cat > file << EOF ... ${VAR} ... EOF was vulnerable to shell expansion of special characters in API keys ($, backticks, \). The new printf '%s\n' "${VAR}" pattern treats the value as a literal string, preventing unintended expansion. This is a valid and well-executed security hardening.

Tests

bash -n: PASS (all 35 files)
test/run.sh: PASS (79/79)
curl|bash pattern: OK (verified in sample of 6 files)
macOS compat: OK (no echo -e, source <(), ((var++)), or set -u)

-- security/pr-reviewer

la14-1 · 2026-02-14T00:09:54Z

Summary

Replace unquoted << EOF heredocs with printf in 33 nanoclaw scripts across all cloud providers to prevent shell expansion of API key values
Fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file() mv command in shared/common.sh
Fix unquoted heredoc in github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config file creation

Problem

All nanoclaw scripts used unquoted heredocs to write the .env file, which causes bash to perform shell expansion before writing. If an API key contains dollar signs, backticks, or backslashes, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution.

Fix

Replace with printf which safely writes the value without shell interpretation. This matches the pattern already used by kamatera, local, and render nanoclaw scripts.

Also quote paths in upload_config_file() mv command to prevent word splitting.

Test plan

All 35 modified scripts pass bash -n syntax check
Full test suite passes (101 pre-existing failures, 0 new failures)
Pattern matches existing safe implementations

Relates to #763 (nanoclaw heredoc medium finding)

-- refactor/security-auditor

… expansion in API keys Unquoted `<< EOF` heredocs in nanoclaw .env file creation cause shell expansion of the API key value. If an API key contains `$`, backticks, or `\`, the value is silently corrupted or could trigger command execution. Replace with `printf '%s'` which safely writes the value without interpretation. Also fix unquoted variable expansion in upload_config_file's mv command and the github-codespaces/openclaw.sh config heredoc. Fixes 34 scripts across all cloud providers. Agent: security-auditor Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

louisgv

Security Review

Verdict: APPROVED

Findings

[MEDIUM] koyeb/nanoclaw.sh:54 — API key is embedded in single-quoted context inside double-quoted run_server argument. If the key contained single quotes, it could break syntax. Mitigated by koyeb's run_server applying printf '%q' escaping, and OpenRouter API keys being alphanumeric. Old code had the same local-expansion pattern. Acceptable.
[LOW] github-codespaces/openclaw.sh:68 — printf '%s' for MODEL_ID in JSON template. Safe because validate_model_id restricts to ^[a-zA-Z0-9/_:.-]+$.
[LOW] shared/common.sh:2098 — Added single-quote protection around mv arguments in upload_config_file. Developer-controlled paths; improvement over unquoted originals.

Analysis

The PR correctly replaces unquoted heredocs (<< EOF) with printf '%s\n' across 35 files. The old pattern cat > file << EOF ... ${VAR} ... EOF was vulnerable to shell expansion of special characters in API keys ($, backticks, \). The new printf '%s\n' "${VAR}" pattern treats the value as a literal string, preventing unintended expansion. This is a valid and well-executed security hardening.

Tests

bash -n: PASS (all 35 files)
test/run.sh: PASS (79/79)
curl|bash pattern: OK (verified in sample of 6 files)
macOS compat: OK (no echo -e, source <(), ((var++)), or set -u)

-- security/pr-reviewer

la14-1 mentioned this pull request Feb 14, 2026
Security: batch of medium/low findings from scan (Feb 12 2026) #763
Closed

louisgv approved these changes Feb 14, 2026
View reviewed changes

louisgv added the security-approved Security review approved label Feb 14, 2026

louisgv merged commit f586e19 into mainFeb 14, 2026
2 checks passed

louisgv deleted the security/fix-nanoclaw-heredoc-injection branch February 14, 2026 00:41

louisgv mentioned this pull request Feb 14, 2026
[Bug]: What's with this bad test? #1105
Closed

la14-1 mentioned this pull request Feb 17, 2026
security: fix medium/low findings from scan #1395
Merged
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