| Version | Supported | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1.7.1 | ✅ Current stable | AISS-1 + AISS-2, VRS, TSI, A2C, Vigil, TrustGate, 9 bridges |
| 1.7.x | ✅ Security patches only | |
| 1.6.x | ✅ Security patches only | |
| 1.5.x | Upgrade recommended | |
| < 1.5 | ❌ Not supported |
PiQrypt handles cryptographic identities and audit chains for autonomous AI agents. Any vulnerability in these areas has potential legal and operational impact for our users.
Email:security@piqrypt.comSubject:[SECURITY] Vulnerability ReportPGP: Available on request at security@piqrypt.com
Include in your report:
- Affected version and component (aiss, rfc3161, key_store, chain, vigil, trustgate…)
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- Suggested fix if any
Please do NOT:
- Open a public GitHub issue before coordinated disclosure
- Disclose publicly before a fix is available
- Test against third-party production systems
| Stage | Target |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgement | 48 hours |
| Initial assessment | 5 business days |
| Fix or workaround | 15 business days |
| Public disclosure | After fix + 30 days |
| Component | Algorithm | Standard | Quantum-resistant |
|---|---|---|---|
| Agent signatures (AISS-1, default) | Ed25519 | RFC 8032 | ❌ |
| Agent signatures (AISS-2, Pro+) | Dilithium3 | NIST FIPS 204 | ✅ |
| Key encryption at rest | AES-256-GCM | NIST FIPS 197 | — |
| Key derivation | scrypt N=2¹⁷ | RFC 7914 | — |
| Hash chain | SHA-256 | NIST FIPS 180-4 | — |
| Trusted timestamps | RFC 3161 | IETF | — |
| JSON canonicalization | RFC 8785 | IETF | — |
| Licence JWT | Ed25519 | RFC 8032 | — |
Note on post-quantum: AISS-1 (Free/Pro default) uses Ed25519 which is not quantum-resistant. AISS-2 (Pro+,
pip install piqrypt[post-quantum]) adds Dilithium3 for post-quantum signatures.
- Post-event log modification or deletion
- Identity repudiation between agents (Ed25519 / Dilithium3 signatures)
- Timeline alteration when TSA RFC 3161 timestamps are used
- Behavioural anomalies: concentration, entropy drop, synchronisation, silence break
- Unsupervised critical agent actions (TrustGate — Pro+)
- Compromised private keys — if the host is compromised before stamping, all bets are off
- Malicious logic executing before the event is stamped
- Fully compromised host environments
- Vulnerabilities in underlying libraries (PyNaCl, cryptography)
- Network attacks against TSA servers (graceful degradation applies)
| Tier | Storage | Protection |
|---|---|---|
| Free | private.key.json plaintext | OS file permissions only |
| Pro+ | private.key.enc encrypted | AES-256-GCM + scrypt N=2¹⁷ (~128 MB RAM/attempt) |
| Enterprise | HSM integration available | Contact sales@piqrypt.com |
CRITICAL: Never commit private.key.json or private.key.enc to version control.
The provided .gitignore excludes all key files — verify before every push.
| Limitation | Impact | Planned fix |
|---|---|---|
verify_tsa_token() checks DER structure only — does not verify TSA signature (CMS/PKCS7) | A forged token could pass as "verified" | v1.8.4 — full CMS verification |
| JSON flat-file event storage — not designed for >100k events/agent | High-frequency agents (>10 events/s) will degrade | v2.0 — PostgreSQL backend |
Vigil/TrustGate use static VIGIL_TOKEN/TRUSTGATE_TOKEN env var | No per-user auth | v1.8.4 — OIDC/SSO |
license.py HMAC validation (Free) is client-side | Motivated developer can bypass | By design for Free tier — Pro+ uses Ed25519 JWT |
- Free tier: HMAC local token — offline, no server calls, bypassable by a motivated developer. Acceptable for a free tier — no payment data at risk.
- Pro+ tiers: Ed25519 JWT signed by PiQrypt's private key (never leaves
api.piqrypt.com). Verification is 100% offline using the embedded public key. Cannot be forged without the private key. - Network calls: Only at renewal time (monthly/annual). Zero heartbeat, zero telemetry, zero data about your agents leaves your infrastructure.
We appreciate responsible security research. Researchers who report valid vulnerabilities will be credited in our changelog (with permission).
Contact:security@piqrypt.com
PiQrypt Inc. e-Soleau primary deposit: DSO2026006483 — 19 February 2026 e-Soleau addendum: DSO2026009143 — 12 March 2026
Intellectual Property Notice
Core protocol concepts described in this document were deposited via e-Soleau with the French National Institute of Industrial Property (INPI):
Primary deposit: DSO2026006483 — 19 February 2026 Addendum: DSO2026009143 — 12 March 2026
PCP (Proof of Continuity Protocol) is an open protocol specification. It may be implemented independently by any compliant system. PiQrypt is the reference implementation.
© 2026 PiQrypt — contact@piqrypt.com