ci: harden GitHub Actions against supply chain attacks by rodrigopavezi · Pull Request #1722 · RequestNetwork/requestNetwork

rodrigopavezi · 2026-05-14T10:57:44Z

Implements all GitHub Actions hardening from RequestNetwork/private-issues#282.

Changes

All third-party actions pinned to immutable commit SHAs — including github/codeql-action/upload-sarif which runs with security-events: write
Top-level permissions: contents: read added to workflows that lacked it (security workflows already had correct permission blocks)
StepSecurity Harden Runner added to every job (egress-policy: audit)
SocketDev Firewall Free added to tron-smart-contracts install steps (sfw yarn install --frozen-lockfile)

Next steps after merge

Monitor Harden Runner audit logs for ~1 week, then promote egress-policy: audit → block with the actual allowlist

- Pin all third-party actions to immutable commit SHAs - Add top-level permissions: contents: read to all workflows - Add StepSecurity Harden Runner (egress-policy: audit) to every job - Add SocketDev/action (firewall-free) + sfw install wrapper to tron-smart-contracts jobs - Pin github/codeql-action/upload-sarif to SHA (runs with security-events: write) ClosesRequestNetwork/private-issues#282

greptile-apps · 2026-05-14T11:00:17Z

Greptile Summary

This PR hardens seven GitHub Actions workflows against supply chain attacks by pinning all third-party actions to immutable commit SHAs, adding StepSecurity Harden Runner to every job, applying the SocketDev firewall to package install steps, and migrating github-script inline context interpolation to environment variables (fixing a script injection vector).

All direct action references (actions/checkout, actions/setup-node, actions/cache, actions/upload-artifact, actions/github-script, github/codeql-action/upload-sarif, step-security/harden-runner, SocketDev/action, kentaro-m/auto-assign-action) are now pinned to full commit SHAs.
permissions: contents: read was added to auto-project.yml, pr-comments.yml, reopen-issue-if-prs-open.yml, and tron-smart-contracts.yml; issues: write was added to security-echidna.yml so nightly failure issues can be created.
Three workflows (pr-comments.yml, auto-project.yml, reopen-issue-if-prs-open.yml) still call first-party reusable workflows via a mutable @main ref and forward PATs/tokens to them — this remains the open supply chain gap after this PR.

Confidence Score: 4/5

Safe to merge for most jobs, but three workflows still forward PATs/tokens to externally-owned reusable workflows referenced by a mutable branch tag.

The bulk of the hardening is solid — direct action pins, Harden Runner, SocketDev firewall, and the script-injection fixes are all correct. The remaining gap is that pr-comments.yml (a pull_request_target workflow forwarding GH_PAT_AUTO_COMMENTS), auto-project.yml (forwarding PROJECT_TOKEN), and reopen-issue-if-prs-open.yml (forwarding REOPEN_ISSUES_TOKEN) all call external reusable workflows via @main — exactly the attack vector this PR set out to eliminate.

pr-comments.yml needs the most attention due to its pull_request_target trigger combined with the unpinned external workflow and forwarded PAT. auto-project.yml and reopen-issue-if-prs-open.yml share the same pattern with their respective tokens.

Security Review

Mutable reusable workflow refs with forwarded secrets (pr-comments.yml, auto-project.yml, reopen-issue-if-prs-open.yml): all three call external RequestNetwork/* reusable workflows pinned to @main rather than a commit SHA. pr-comments.yml is the most exposed — it uses pull_request_target (runs with base-repo write access even for fork PRs) and forwards GH_PAT_AUTO_COMMENTS to the unpinned workflow. A compromise of those repos' main branches would give an attacker the token and PR write access.

Important Files Changed

Filename	Overview
.github/workflows/pr-comments.yml	Adds top-level permissions block, but the reusable workflow call to `RequestNetwork/auto-comments@main` remains unpinned; highest-risk file due to `pull_request_target` + forwarded PAT.
.github/workflows/auto-project.yml	Adds `permissions: contents: read`; reusable workflow call to `RequestNetwork/.github@main` with `PROJECT_TOKEN` is still mutable.
.github/workflows/reopen-issue-if-prs-open.yml	Adds `permissions: contents: read`; reusable workflow call to `RequestNetwork/.github@main` with `REOPEN_ISSUES_TOKEN` remains pinned to a mutable branch.
.github/workflows/auto_assign_pr.yml	Harden Runner added and `kentaro-m/auto-assign-action` pinned to commit SHA; permissions block was already present.
.github/workflows/security-echidna.yml	All actions pinned to commit SHAs, Harden Runner added, `issues: write` permission added, github-script steps migrated from inline context interpolation to env vars.
.github/workflows/security-slither.yml	All actions pinned to commit SHAs including `codeql-action/upload-sarif`, Harden Runner added, github-script steps migrated to env vars; `security-events: write` was already present.
.github/workflows/tron-smart-contracts.yml	All actions pinned, Harden Runner added to all three jobs, SocketDev firewall applied to install steps, top-level `permissions: contents: read` added.

Comments Outside Diff (1)

.github/workflows/pr-comments.yml, line 14-19 (link)
Reusable workflow still referenced via mutable @main tag
This workflow uses pull_request_target (giving it write access to the base repo, even for fork PRs) and passes GH_PAT_AUTO_COMMENTS to an external reusable workflow pinned only at @main. If RequestNetwork/auto-comments main branch is ever compromised, malicious workflow code runs with PR write access and the PAT. The same pattern exists in auto-project.yml (calls RequestNetwork/.github@main with PROJECT_TOKEN) and reopen-issue-if-prs-open.yml (same repo with REOPEN_ISSUES_TOKEN). All three need to be pinned to a commit SHA instead of @main to close the gap this PR aims to address.

_{Reviews (4): Last reviewed commit: "fix(ci): address PR review comments on s..." | Re-trigger Greptile}

github-actions · 2026-05-14T11:01:05Z

✅ Slither Security Analysis

Status: Passed

Findings Summary

Severity	Count	Status
✅ High	0	Pass
🟡 Medium	2	Review Recommended
🔵 Low	0	Info
ℹ️ Informational	1	Info

⚠️Please review the findings in the Security tab or download the artifacts.

📄 Full report available in workflow artifacts.
🔍 View detailed findings in the Security tab.

github-actions · 2026-05-14T11:03:26Z

✅ Echidna Fuzzing Results

Mode: ci (50000 test sequences)
Status: All Properties Passed

Property Test Results

Status	Count
✅ Passed	16
❌ Failed	0
Total	16
Pass Rate	100.0%

📄 Full report and corpus available in workflow artifacts.

ℹ️ About Echidna Fuzzing

Echidna is a property-based fuzzer that generates random sequences of transactions
to test invariants (properties that should always hold true).

Properties tested:

Fee calculation bounds
Access control enforcement
Amount constraints
No duplicate payments
Zero address validation
Integer overflow protection

The nightly failure-alert step calls github.rest.issues.create() to notify the team when Echidna properties fail. Without issues: write the call silently returns a 403 and the alert is never created.

github-actions · 2026-05-14T11:18:42Z

✅ Slither Security Analysis

Status: Passed

Findings Summary

Severity	Count	Status
✅ High	0	Pass
🟡 Medium	2	Review Recommended
🔵 Low	0	Info
ℹ️ Informational	1	Info

⚠️Please review the findings in the Security tab or download the artifacts.

📄 Full report available in workflow artifacts.
🔍 View detailed findings in the Security tab.

github-actions · 2026-05-14T11:21:09Z

✅ Echidna Fuzzing Results

Mode: ci (50000 test sequences)
Status: All Properties Passed

Property Test Results

Status	Count
✅ Passed	16
❌ Failed	0
Total	16
Pass Rate	100.0%

📄 Full report and corpus available in workflow artifacts.

ℹ️ About Echidna Fuzzing

Echidna is a property-based fuzzer that generates random sequences of transactions
to test invariants (properties that should always hold true).

Properties tested:

Fee calculation bounds
Access control enforcement
Amount constraints
No duplicate payments
Zero address validation
Integer overflow protection

The previous CircleCI failures on this PR were caused by the RequestNetwork CircleCI org dropping to the Free plan, which caps Docker resource classes at large. The repo's .circleci/config.yml declares xlarge for build/test jobs (deliberate; see #1703), so every build failed with resource-class-not-in-plan. Org was upgraded to Performance; this empty commit re-triggers the pipeline. No source changes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

github-actions · 2026-05-15T19:54:01Z

✅ Slither Security Analysis

Status: Passed

Findings Summary

Severity	Count	Status
✅ High	0	Pass
🟡 Medium	2	Review Recommended
🔵 Low	0	Info
ℹ️ Informational	1	Info

⚠️Please review the findings in the Security tab or download the artifacts.

📄 Full report available in workflow artifacts.
🔍 View detailed findings in the Security tab.

github-actions · 2026-05-15T19:56:31Z

✅ Echidna Fuzzing Results

Mode: ci (50000 test sequences)
Status: All Properties Passed

Property Test Results

Status	Count
✅ Passed	16
❌ Failed	0
Total	16
Pass Rate	100.0%

📄 Full report and corpus available in workflow artifacts.

ℹ️ About Echidna Fuzzing

Echidna is a property-based fuzzer that generates random sequences of transactions
to test invariants (properties that should always hold true).

Properties tested:

Fee calculation bounds
Access control enforcement
Amount constraints
No duplicate payments
Zero address validation
Integer overflow protection

MantisClone

Approved 👍 pending comment resolution 🚧

Mostly clean; one bug and one scope gap to address before merge.

🔴 Must-fix before merge

github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@5e316336… does not exist in github/codeql-action. Verified three ways: 422 on direct commit lookup, no ref points at it, not in the tag list. The step is if: always() && hashFiles(...) != '' and Slither emits a SARIF every run, so it fails the SARIF upload (and the Slither job) on every contract PR. This is also the exact action #282 called out as highest priority.

Fix: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@9e0d7b8d25671d64c341c19c0152d693099fb5ba # v4.35.5.

🟡 Scope gap

security-echidna.yml and security-slither.yml both run yarn install --frozen-lockfile unprotected by Socket Firewall. #282 task 4 said Socket on the install step across CI workflows; the PR only wraps the three Tron install steps. Either add sfw to the two security workflows or call out the rationale in the description.

🔵 Nice-to-have before merge

Bump # v2 / # v4 / # v7 comments to exact-version (e.g. # v2.11.1, # v4.4.0) so the next reviewer can verify by eye. The floating major tags have already moved past several of the pinned SHAs.
Lift the dedicated fix(ci): add issues: write… commit subject into the PR description so the permission expansion is documented in the body, not just in git log.

📋 UAT

PR is missing a UAT procedure. Suggested shape:

After merge, push any contract change to master to trigger Slither, Echidna, and the three Tron jobs.
Verify each job has Harden Runner as step 1 and (Tron only) sfw yarn install --frozen-lockfile.
Open https://app.stepsecurity.io and confirm the audit-mode log shows an egress list on each run.
Confirm the Slither SARIF upload to the Security tab succeeds (this is the failure mode of the must-fix above).

📌 Follow-ups (separate issues, not blockers)

Fresh-eyes pass surfaced things outside this PR's scope. Happy to file these as private-issues if you want:

Add Slither Static Analysis, Echidna Property-Based Fuzzing, and the three Tron checks to master's required status checks. Currently only CircleCI gates merge.
Enable sha_pinning_required: true at the repo or org level so the pinning policy is regression-proof.
Pin actions/github-script@v6 inside RequestNetwork/auto-comments/.github/workflows/pr-auto-comments.yml. That reusable workflow runs under pull_request_target with GH_PAT_AUTO_COMMENTS, so the supply-chain threat model leaks one hop in.
Pin the three first-party @main reusable workflows (auto-project.yml, pr-comments.yml, reopen-issue-if-prs-open.yml) to SHAs or document accepting the residual risk.
Add .github/CODEOWNERS requiring security-team review on .github/workflows/**.
Add .github/dependabot.yml. The push to this branch surfaced 166 vulns on master (4 critical / 82 high) which is a related theme.
Set dismiss_stale_reviews: true on master branch protection.

- Fix invalid codeql-action/upload-sarif SHA (5e316336 -> 9e0d7b8d, v4.35.5) - Add Socket.dev Firewall to security-slither and security-echidna yarn install steps - Gate tronbox global install through sfw by swapping step order in tron-smart-contracts - Use env: + process.env pattern in github-script steps to eliminate ${{ }} script injection

github-actions · 2026-05-22T14:26:09Z

✅ Slither Security Analysis

Status: Passed

Findings Summary

Severity	Count	Status
✅ High	0	Pass
🟡 Medium	2	Review Recommended
🔵 Low	0	Info
ℹ️ Informational	1	Info

⚠️Please review the findings in the Security tab or download the artifacts.

📄 Full report available in workflow artifacts.
🔍 View detailed findings in the Security tab.

github-actions · 2026-05-22T14:28:00Z

✅ Echidna Fuzzing Results

Mode: ci (50000 test sequences)
Status: All Properties Passed

Property Test Results

Status	Count
✅ Passed	16
❌ Failed	0
Total	16
Pass Rate	100.0%

📄 Full report and corpus available in workflow artifacts.

ℹ️ About Echidna Fuzzing

Echidna is a property-based fuzzer that generates random sequences of transactions
to test invariants (properties that should always hold true).

Properties tested:

Fee calculation bounds
Access control enforcement
Amount constraints
No duplicate payments
Zero address validation
Integer overflow protection

rodrigopavezi · 2026-05-22T14:36:39Z

Merge activity

May 22, 2:36 PM UTC: A user started a stack merge that includes this pull request via Graphite.
May 22, 2:36 PM UTC: @rodrigopavezi merged this pull request with Graphite.

rodrigopavezi self-assigned this May 14, 2026

fix(ci): add issues: write permission to security-echidna workflow
a8e46ba
The nightly failure-alert step calls github.rest.issues.create() to notify the team when Echidna properties fail. Without issues: write the call silently returns a 403 and the alert is never created.

rodrigopavezi requested review from MantisClone, aimen74 and bassgeta May 18, 2026 09:36

MantisClone approved these changes May 18, 2026
View reviewed changes

Comment thread.github/workflows/security-slither.yml Outdated
Comment thread.github/workflows/security-echidna.yml
Comment thread.github/workflows/security-slither.yml
Comment thread.github/workflows/tron-smart-contracts.yml Outdated
Comment thread.github/workflows/security-echidna.yml

rodrigopavezi merged commit 2d9d248 into masterMay 22, 2026
15 checks passed

rodrigopavezi deleted the feat/ci-supply-chain-hardening branch May 22, 2026 14:36

rodrigopavezi mentioned this pull request May 25, 2026
chore: publish 0.63.0 #1726
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Greptile Summary

Confidence Score: 4/5

Security Review

Important Files Changed

Comments Outside Diff (1)

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github-actionsBot commented May 14, 2026

✅ Slither Security Analysis

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✅ Echidna Fuzzing Results

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✅ Slither Security Analysis

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✅ Echidna Fuzzing Results

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🔴 Must-fix before merge

🟡 Scope gap

🔵 Nice-to-have before merge

📋 UAT

📌 Follow-ups (separate issues, not blockers)

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github-actionsBot commented May 22, 2026

✅ Slither Security Analysis

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github-actionsBot commented May 22, 2026

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