Security: RodCor/kimetsu.dev

Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy

Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's security advisory flow for this repository. Do not include real credentials or sensitive user data in an issue, pull request, or test fixture.

Agent gateway threat model

agents.kimetsu.dev is deliberately capability-poor:

  • It supports public, read-only discovery over GET and HEAD.
  • Its only POST route is the credential-free Sidequest A2A guidance endpoint. That endpoint returns deterministic text, performs no writes or tool calls, and never logs, echoes, fetches, or forwards caller message content.
  • It rejects requests carrying Authorization, Cookie, or Proxy-Authorization.
  • It rejects query strings everywhere and request bodies outside the bounded A2A route.
  • It fetches only a fixed allowlist of public Sidequest Commons JSON documents.
  • It constructs upstream requests from scratch, so caller headers never cross the trust boundary.
  • It validates response type and size before returning an upstream document.
  • It exposes no secrets, bindings, mutation APIs, tool execution, or arbitrary fetch capability.

These constraints are product requirements, not optional hardening.

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: RodCor/kimetsu.dev
Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's security advisory flow for
this repository. Do not include real credentials or sensitive user data in an
issue, pull request, or test fixture.
Agent gateway threat model
agents.kimetsu.dev is deliberately capability-poor:
  • It supports public, read-only discovery over GET and HEAD.
  • Its only POST route is the credential-free Sidequest A2A guidance endpoint.
That endpoint returns deterministic text, performs no writes or tool calls,
and never logs, echoes, fetches, or forwards caller message content.
  • It rejects requests carrying Authorization, Cookie, or Proxy-Authorization.
  • It rejects query strings everywhere and request bodies outside the bounded A2A route.
  • It fetches only a fixed allowlist of public Sidequest Commons JSON documents.
  • It constructs upstream requests from scratch, so caller headers never cross
the trust boundary.
  • It validates response type and size before returning an upstream document.
  • It exposes no secrets, bindings, mutation APIs, tool execution, or arbitrary
fetch capability.
These constraints are product requirements, not optional hardening.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: RodCor/kimetsu.dev
Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's security advisory flow for
this repository. Do not include real credentials or sensitive user data in an
issue, pull request, or test fixture.
Agent gateway threat model
agents.kimetsu.dev is deliberately capability-poor:
  • It supports public, read-only discovery over GET and HEAD.
  • Its only POST route is the credential-free Sidequest A2A guidance endpoint.
That endpoint returns deterministic text, performs no writes or tool calls,
and never logs, echoes, fetches, or forwards caller message content.
  • It rejects requests carrying Authorization, Cookie, or Proxy-Authorization.
  • It rejects query strings everywhere and request bodies outside the bounded A2A route.
  • It fetches only a fixed allowlist of public Sidequest Commons JSON documents.
  • It constructs upstream requests from scratch, so caller headers never cross
the trust boundary.
  • It validates response type and size before returning an upstream document.
  • It exposes no secrets, bindings, mutation APIs, tool execution, or arbitrary
fetch capability.
These constraints are product requirements, not optional hardening.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: RodCor/kimetsu.dev
Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's security advisory flow for
this repository. Do not include real credentials or sensitive user data in an
issue, pull request, or test fixture.
Agent gateway threat model
agents.kimetsu.dev is deliberately capability-poor:
  • It supports public, read-only discovery over GET and HEAD.
  • Its only POST route is the credential-free Sidequest A2A guidance endpoint.
That endpoint returns deterministic text, performs no writes or tool calls,
and never logs, echoes, fetches, or forwards caller message content.
  • It rejects requests carrying Authorization, Cookie, or Proxy-Authorization.
  • It rejects query strings everywhere and request bodies outside the bounded A2A route.
  • It fetches only a fixed allowlist of public Sidequest Commons JSON documents.
  • It constructs upstream requests from scratch, so caller headers never cross
the trust boundary.
  • It validates response type and size before returning an upstream document.
  • It exposes no secrets, bindings, mutation APIs, tool execution, or arbitrary
fetch capability.
These constraints are product requirements, not optional hardening.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: RodCor/kimetsu.dev
Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's security advisory flow for
this repository. Do not include real credentials or sensitive user data in an
issue, pull request, or test fixture.
Agent gateway threat model
agents.kimetsu.dev is deliberately capability-poor:
  • It supports public, read-only discovery over GET and HEAD.
  • Its only POST route is the credential-free Sidequest A2A guidance endpoint.
That endpoint returns deterministic text, performs no writes or tool calls,
and never logs, echoes, fetches, or forwards caller message content.
  • It rejects requests carrying Authorization, Cookie, or Proxy-Authorization.
  • It rejects query strings everywhere and request bodies outside the bounded A2A route.
  • It fetches only a fixed allowlist of public Sidequest Commons JSON documents.
  • It constructs upstream requests from scratch, so caller headers never cross
the trust boundary.
  • It validates response type and size before returning an upstream document.
  • It exposes no secrets, bindings, mutation APIs, tool execution, or arbitrary
fetch capability.
These constraints are product requirements, not optional hardening.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: RodCor/kimetsu.dev
Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's security advisory flow for
this repository. Do not include real credentials or sensitive user data in an
issue, pull request, or test fixture.
Agent gateway threat model
agents.kimetsu.dev is deliberately capability-poor:
  • It supports public, read-only discovery over GET and HEAD.
  • Its only POST route is the credential-free Sidequest A2A guidance endpoint.
That endpoint returns deterministic text, performs no writes or tool calls,
and never logs, echoes, fetches, or forwards caller message content.
  • It rejects requests carrying Authorization, Cookie, or Proxy-Authorization.
  • It rejects query strings everywhere and request bodies outside the bounded A2A route.
  • It fetches only a fixed allowlist of public Sidequest Commons JSON documents.
  • It constructs upstream requests from scratch, so caller headers never cross
the trust boundary.
  • It validates response type and size before returning an upstream document.
  • It exposes no secrets, bindings, mutation APIs, tool execution, or arbitrary
fetch capability.
These constraints are product requirements, not optional hardening.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: RodCor/kimetsu.dev
Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's security advisory flow for
this repository. Do not include real credentials or sensitive user data in an
issue, pull request, or test fixture.
Agent gateway threat model
agents.kimetsu.dev is deliberately capability-poor:
  • It supports public, read-only discovery over GET and HEAD.
  • Its only POST route is the credential-free Sidequest A2A guidance endpoint.
That endpoint returns deterministic text, performs no writes or tool calls,
and never logs, echoes, fetches, or forwards caller message content.
  • It rejects requests carrying Authorization, Cookie, or Proxy-Authorization.
  • It rejects query strings everywhere and request bodies outside the bounded A2A route.
  • It fetches only a fixed allowlist of public Sidequest Commons JSON documents.
  • It constructs upstream requests from scratch, so caller headers never cross
the trust boundary.
  • It validates response type and size before returning an upstream document.
  • It exposes no secrets, bindings, mutation APIs, tool execution, or arbitrary
fetch capability.
These constraints are product requirements, not optional hardening.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

Skip to content
Security: RodCor/kimetsu.dev
Security

SECURITY.md

Security policy
Report vulnerabilities privately through GitHub's security advisory flow for
this repository. Do not include real credentials or sensitive user data in an
issue, pull request, or test fixture.
Agent gateway threat model
agents.kimetsu.dev is deliberately capability-poor:
  • It supports public, read-only discovery over GET and HEAD.
  • Its only POST route is the credential-free Sidequest A2A guidance endpoint.
That endpoint returns deterministic text, performs no writes or tool calls,
and never logs, echoes, fetches, or forwards caller message content.
  • It rejects requests carrying Authorization, Cookie, or Proxy-Authorization.
  • It rejects query strings everywhere and request bodies outside the bounded A2A route.
  • It fetches only a fixed allowlist of public Sidequest Commons JSON documents.
  • It constructs upstream requests from scratch, so caller headers never cross
the trust boundary.
  • It validates response type and size before returning an upstream document.
  • It exposes no secrets, bindings, mutation APIs, tool execution, or arbitrary
fetch capability.
These constraints are product requirements, not optional hardening.
 There aren't any published security advisories