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PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification - #546

Merged
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len
Aug 25, 2025
Merged

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification#546
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len

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@rrauch

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This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length during RSA-PSS signature verification.

Should Fix: #361 and similar situations.

Problem

The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification. This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.

This capability was previously available but was removed in PR #294.

Solution

This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit, opt-in feature. A new constructor, VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len, creates a verifier that performs this detection during verification.

  • The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
  • It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable / unknown salt lengths.
  • The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to resist timing attacks.

Commit Structure

This PR consists of three commits:

  1. test: Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
  2. feat: Implements new_with_auto_salt_len and re-introduces the previous detection logic.
  3. fix: Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing attacks.

Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the problem.

rrauch added 3 commits July 30, 2025 12:04
Makes salt_len parameter optional in EMSA-PSS verification, defaulting
to auto-detection by scanning for the 0x01 separator byte. Signing
still requires explicit salt length specification.
Replace variable-time scanning with constant-time implementation.
Eliminates early termination and data-dependent branching that could
leak padding structure via timing side-channels.
@tarcieri
tarcieri merged commit 8b6d423 into RustCrypto:masterAug 25, 2025
11 checks passed
takumi-earth pushed a commit to earthlings-dev/RSA that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2026
…n during verification (RustCrypto#546)
This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length
during RSA-PSS signature verification.
Should Fix: RustCrypto#361 and similar situations.
### Problem
The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification.
This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not
known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.
This capability was previously available but was removed in PR RustCrypto#294.
### Solution
This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit,
opt-in feature. A new constructor,
`VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len`, creates a verifier that performs
this detection during verification.
* The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
* It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable /
unknown salt lengths.
* The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to
resist timing attacks.
### Commit Structure
This PR consists of three commits:
1. **test:** Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
2. **feat:** Implements `new_with_auto_salt_len` and re-introduces the
previous detection logic.
3. **fix:** Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing
attacks.
Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely
that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or
communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to
reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face
the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly
random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the
problem.
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Update from 0.8 to 0.9 broke verification after reading PEM and using Sha256 PSS

2 participants

@rrauch@tarcieri
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PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification by rrauch · Pull Request #546 · RustCrypto/RSA · GitHub
Skip to content

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification - #546

Merged
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len
Aug 25, 2025
Merged

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification#546
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len

Conversation

@rrauch

Copy link
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Contributor

This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length during RSA-PSS signature verification.

Should Fix: #361 and similar situations.

Problem

The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification. This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.

This capability was previously available but was removed in PR #294.

Solution

This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit, opt-in feature. A new constructor, VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len, creates a verifier that performs this detection during verification.

  • The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
  • It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable / unknown salt lengths.
  • The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to resist timing attacks.

Commit Structure

This PR consists of three commits:

  1. test: Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
  2. feat: Implements new_with_auto_salt_len and re-introduces the previous detection logic.
  3. fix: Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing attacks.

Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the problem.

rrauch added 3 commits July 30, 2025 12:04
Makes salt_len parameter optional in EMSA-PSS verification, defaulting
to auto-detection by scanning for the 0x01 separator byte. Signing
still requires explicit salt length specification.
Replace variable-time scanning with constant-time implementation.
Eliminates early termination and data-dependent branching that could
leak padding structure via timing side-channels.
@tarcieri
tarcieri merged commit 8b6d423 into RustCrypto:masterAug 25, 2025
11 checks passed
takumi-earth pushed a commit to earthlings-dev/RSA that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2026
…n during verification (RustCrypto#546)
This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length
during RSA-PSS signature verification.
Should Fix: RustCrypto#361 and similar situations.
### Problem
The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification.
This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not
known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.
This capability was previously available but was removed in PR RustCrypto#294.
### Solution
This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit,
opt-in feature. A new constructor,
`VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len`, creates a verifier that performs
this detection during verification.
* The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
* It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable /
unknown salt lengths.
* The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to
resist timing attacks.
### Commit Structure
This PR consists of three commits:
1. **test:** Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
2. **feat:** Implements `new_with_auto_salt_len` and re-introduces the
previous detection logic.
3. **fix:** Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing
attacks.
Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely
that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or
communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to
reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face
the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly
random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the
problem.
Sign up for freeto join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

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Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Update from 0.8 to 0.9 broke verification after reading PEM and using Sha256 PSS

2 participants

@rrauch@tarcieri
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Force GitHub README to respect dark mode (function() { var style = document.createElement('style'); style.textContent = ' .markdown-body { color-scheme: dark light; } .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; } .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; } .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; } .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; } .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; } .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; } '; document.head.appendChild(style); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + ' PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification by rrauch · Pull Request #546 · RustCrypto/RSA · GitHub
Skip to content

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification - #546

Merged
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len
Aug 25, 2025
Merged

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification#546
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len

Conversation

@rrauch

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length during RSA-PSS signature verification.

Should Fix: #361 and similar situations.

Problem

The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification. This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.

This capability was previously available but was removed in PR #294.

Solution

This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit, opt-in feature. A new constructor, VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len, creates a verifier that performs this detection during verification.

  • The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
  • It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable / unknown salt lengths.
  • The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to resist timing attacks.

Commit Structure

This PR consists of three commits:

  1. test: Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
  2. feat: Implements new_with_auto_salt_len and re-introduces the previous detection logic.
  3. fix: Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing attacks.

Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the problem.

rrauch added 3 commits July 30, 2025 12:04
Makes salt_len parameter optional in EMSA-PSS verification, defaulting
to auto-detection by scanning for the 0x01 separator byte. Signing
still requires explicit salt length specification.
Replace variable-time scanning with constant-time implementation.
Eliminates early termination and data-dependent branching that could
leak padding structure via timing side-channels.
@tarcieri
tarcieri merged commit 8b6d423 into RustCrypto:masterAug 25, 2025
11 checks passed
takumi-earth pushed a commit to earthlings-dev/RSA that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2026
…n during verification (RustCrypto#546)
This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length
during RSA-PSS signature verification.
Should Fix: RustCrypto#361 and similar situations.
### Problem
The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification.
This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not
known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.
This capability was previously available but was removed in PR RustCrypto#294.
### Solution
This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit,
opt-in feature. A new constructor,
`VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len`, creates a verifier that performs
this detection during verification.
* The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
* It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable /
unknown salt lengths.
* The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to
resist timing attacks.
### Commit Structure
This PR consists of three commits:
1. **test:** Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
2. **feat:** Implements `new_with_auto_salt_len` and re-introduces the
previous detection logic.
3. **fix:** Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing
attacks.
Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely
that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or
communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to
reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face
the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly
random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the
problem.
Sign up for freeto join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

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Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Update from 0.8 to 0.9 broke verification after reading PEM and using Sha256 PSS

2 participants

@rrauch@tarcieri
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Skip to content

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification - #546

Merged
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len
Aug 25, 2025
Merged

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification#546
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len

Conversation

@rrauch

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length during RSA-PSS signature verification.

Should Fix: #361 and similar situations.

Problem

The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification. This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.

This capability was previously available but was removed in PR #294.

Solution

This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit, opt-in feature. A new constructor, VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len, creates a verifier that performs this detection during verification.

  • The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
  • It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable / unknown salt lengths.
  • The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to resist timing attacks.

Commit Structure

This PR consists of three commits:

  1. test: Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
  2. feat: Implements new_with_auto_salt_len and re-introduces the previous detection logic.
  3. fix: Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing attacks.

Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the problem.

rrauch added 3 commits July 30, 2025 12:04
Makes salt_len parameter optional in EMSA-PSS verification, defaulting
to auto-detection by scanning for the 0x01 separator byte. Signing
still requires explicit salt length specification.
Replace variable-time scanning with constant-time implementation.
Eliminates early termination and data-dependent branching that could
leak padding structure via timing side-channels.
@tarcieri
tarcieri merged commit 8b6d423 into RustCrypto:masterAug 25, 2025
11 checks passed
takumi-earth pushed a commit to earthlings-dev/RSA that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2026
…n during verification (RustCrypto#546)
This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length
during RSA-PSS signature verification.
Should Fix: RustCrypto#361 and similar situations.
### Problem
The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification.
This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not
known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.
This capability was previously available but was removed in PR RustCrypto#294.
### Solution
This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit,
opt-in feature. A new constructor,
`VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len`, creates a verifier that performs
this detection during verification.
* The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
* It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable /
unknown salt lengths.
* The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to
resist timing attacks.
### Commit Structure
This PR consists of three commits:
1. **test:** Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
2. **feat:** Implements `new_with_auto_salt_len` and re-introduces the
previous detection logic.
3. **fix:** Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing
attacks.
Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely
that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or
communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to
reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face
the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly
random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the
problem.
Sign up for freeto join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

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Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Update from 0.8 to 0.9 broke verification after reading PEM and using Sha256 PSS

2 participants

@rrauch@tarcieri
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page (function() { var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content', 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid', 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign']; function cleanUrl(url) { try { var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin); var changed = false; trackingParams.forEach(function(p) { if (u.searchParams.has(p)) { u.searchParams.delete(p); changed = true; } }); return changed ? u.toString() : url; } catch (e) { return url; } } function cleanLinks() { document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) { var clean = cleanUrl(a.href); if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean; }); } cleanLinks(); var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) { mutations.forEach(function(m) { m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) { if (node.nodeType === 1) { if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks(); node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) { var clean = cleanUrl(a.href); if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean; }); } }); }); }); observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true }); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + ' PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification by rrauch · Pull Request #546 · RustCrypto/RSA · GitHub
Skip to content

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification - #546

Merged
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len
Aug 25, 2025
Merged

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification#546
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len

Conversation

@rrauch

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length during RSA-PSS signature verification.

Should Fix: #361 and similar situations.

Problem

The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification. This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.

This capability was previously available but was removed in PR #294.

Solution

This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit, opt-in feature. A new constructor, VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len, creates a verifier that performs this detection during verification.

  • The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
  • It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable / unknown salt lengths.
  • The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to resist timing attacks.

Commit Structure

This PR consists of three commits:

  1. test: Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
  2. feat: Implements new_with_auto_salt_len and re-introduces the previous detection logic.
  3. fix: Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing attacks.

Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the problem.

rrauch added 3 commits July 30, 2025 12:04
Makes salt_len parameter optional in EMSA-PSS verification, defaulting
to auto-detection by scanning for the 0x01 separator byte. Signing
still requires explicit salt length specification.
Replace variable-time scanning with constant-time implementation.
Eliminates early termination and data-dependent branching that could
leak padding structure via timing side-channels.
@tarcieri
tarcieri merged commit 8b6d423 into RustCrypto:masterAug 25, 2025
11 checks passed
takumi-earth pushed a commit to earthlings-dev/RSA that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2026
…n during verification (RustCrypto#546)
This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length
during RSA-PSS signature verification.
Should Fix: RustCrypto#361 and similar situations.
### Problem
The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification.
This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not
known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.
This capability was previously available but was removed in PR RustCrypto#294.
### Solution
This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit,
opt-in feature. A new constructor,
`VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len`, creates a verifier that performs
this detection during verification.
* The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
* It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable /
unknown salt lengths.
* The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to
resist timing attacks.
### Commit Structure
This PR consists of three commits:
1. **test:** Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
2. **feat:** Implements `new_with_auto_salt_len` and re-introduces the
previous detection logic.
3. **fix:** Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing
attacks.
Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely
that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or
communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to
reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face
the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly
random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the
problem.
Sign up for freeto join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

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Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Update from 0.8 to 0.9 broke verification after reading PEM and using Sha256 PSS

2 participants

@rrauch@tarcieri
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PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification - #546

Merged
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len
Aug 25, 2025
Merged

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification#546
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len

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@rrauch

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This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length during RSA-PSS signature verification.

Should Fix: #361 and similar situations.

Problem

The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification. This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.

This capability was previously available but was removed in PR #294.

Solution

This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit, opt-in feature. A new constructor, VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len, creates a verifier that performs this detection during verification.

  • The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
  • It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable / unknown salt lengths.
  • The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to resist timing attacks.

Commit Structure

This PR consists of three commits:

  1. test: Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
  2. feat: Implements new_with_auto_salt_len and re-introduces the previous detection logic.
  3. fix: Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing attacks.

Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the problem.

rrauch added 3 commits July 30, 2025 12:04
Makes salt_len parameter optional in EMSA-PSS verification, defaulting
to auto-detection by scanning for the 0x01 separator byte. Signing
still requires explicit salt length specification.
Replace variable-time scanning with constant-time implementation.
Eliminates early termination and data-dependent branching that could
leak padding structure via timing side-channels.
@tarcieri
tarcieri merged commit 8b6d423 into RustCrypto:masterAug 25, 2025
11 checks passed
takumi-earth pushed a commit to earthlings-dev/RSA that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2026
…n during verification (RustCrypto#546)
This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length
during RSA-PSS signature verification.
Should Fix: RustCrypto#361 and similar situations.
### Problem
The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification.
This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not
known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.
This capability was previously available but was removed in PR RustCrypto#294.
### Solution
This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit,
opt-in feature. A new constructor,
`VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len`, creates a verifier that performs
this detection during verification.
* The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
* It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable /
unknown salt lengths.
* The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to
resist timing attacks.
### Commit Structure
This PR consists of three commits:
1. **test:** Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
2. **feat:** Implements `new_with_auto_salt_len` and re-introduces the
previous detection logic.
3. **fix:** Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing
attacks.
Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely
that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or
communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to
reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face
the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly
random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the
problem.
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Update from 0.8 to 0.9 broke verification after reading PEM and using Sha256 PSS

2 participants

@rrauch@tarcieri
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content (function() { function unstick() { document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role="banner"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*="position: fixed"], [style*="position:sticky"]').forEach(function(el) { if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') { el.style.position = 'static'; el.style.top = 'auto'; el.style.zIndex = 'auto'; } }); } unstick(); var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick); observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] }); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + ' PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification by rrauch · Pull Request #546 · RustCrypto/RSA · GitHub
Skip to content

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification - #546

Merged
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len
Aug 25, 2025
Merged

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification#546
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len

Conversation

@rrauch

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length during RSA-PSS signature verification.

Should Fix: #361 and similar situations.

Problem

The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification. This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.

This capability was previously available but was removed in PR #294.

Solution

This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit, opt-in feature. A new constructor, VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len, creates a verifier that performs this detection during verification.

  • The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
  • It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable / unknown salt lengths.
  • The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to resist timing attacks.

Commit Structure

This PR consists of three commits:

  1. test: Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
  2. feat: Implements new_with_auto_salt_len and re-introduces the previous detection logic.
  3. fix: Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing attacks.

Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the problem.

rrauch added 3 commits July 30, 2025 12:04
Makes salt_len parameter optional in EMSA-PSS verification, defaulting
to auto-detection by scanning for the 0x01 separator byte. Signing
still requires explicit salt length specification.
Replace variable-time scanning with constant-time implementation.
Eliminates early termination and data-dependent branching that could
leak padding structure via timing side-channels.
@tarcieri
tarcieri merged commit 8b6d423 into RustCrypto:masterAug 25, 2025
11 checks passed
takumi-earth pushed a commit to earthlings-dev/RSA that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2026
…n during verification (RustCrypto#546)
This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length
during RSA-PSS signature verification.
Should Fix: RustCrypto#361 and similar situations.
### Problem
The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification.
This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not
known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.
This capability was previously available but was removed in PR RustCrypto#294.
### Solution
This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit,
opt-in feature. A new constructor,
`VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len`, creates a verifier that performs
this detection during verification.
* The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
* It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable /
unknown salt lengths.
* The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to
resist timing attacks.
### Commit Structure
This PR consists of three commits:
1. **test:** Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
2. **feat:** Implements `new_with_auto_salt_len` and re-introduces the
previous detection logic.
3. **fix:** Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing
attacks.
Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely
that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or
communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to
reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face
the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly
random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the
problem.
Sign up for freeto join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

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Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Update from 0.8 to 0.9 broke verification after reading PEM and using Sha256 PSS

2 participants

@rrauch@tarcieri
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Universal Dark Mode - works on any site (function() { var enabled = true; function applyDarkMode() { if (!enabled) return; // Create style element if it doesn't exist var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style'); if (!style) { style = document.createElement('style'); style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style'; document.head.appendChild(style); } // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video style.textContent = ' /* Invert everything except media */ html { filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important; background: #1a1a2e !important; } /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */ img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*="background-image"] { filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important; } /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */ .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *, [data-theme="light"], [data-theme="light"], .ace_editor, .ace_editor *, .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *, .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *, .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *, .highlight, .highlight *, pre code, pre code * { filter: none !important; } /* Fix common UI elements */ .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover { filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important; background: #2d2d44 !important; border-color: #444 !important; } /* Scrollbars */ ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; } ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; } ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; } /* Selection */ ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; } ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; } '; } function removeDarkMode() { var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style'); if (style) style.remove(); } // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) { if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') { e.preventDefault(); enabled = !enabled; if (enabled) { applyDarkMode(); console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled'); } else { removeDarkMode(); console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled'); } } }); // Apply on load applyDarkMode(); // Re-apply on dynamic content var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) { if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) { applyDarkMode(); } }); observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true }); console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle'); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })(); PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification by rrauch · Pull Request #546 · RustCrypto/RSA · GitHub
Skip to content

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification - #546

Merged
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len
Aug 25, 2025
Merged

PSS: Improve interoperability with optional auto salt length detection during verification#546
tarcieri merged 3 commits into
RustCrypto:masterfrom
rrauch:auto-salt-len

Conversation

@rrauch

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Contributor

This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length during RSA-PSS signature verification.

Should Fix: #361 and similar situations.

Problem

The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification. This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.

This capability was previously available but was removed in PR #294.

Solution

This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit, opt-in feature. A new constructor, VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len, creates a verifier that performs this detection during verification.

  • The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
  • It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable / unknown salt lengths.
  • The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to resist timing attacks.

Commit Structure

This PR consists of three commits:

  1. test: Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
  2. feat: Implements new_with_auto_salt_len and re-introduces the previous detection logic.
  3. fix: Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing attacks.

Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the problem.

rrauch added 3 commits July 30, 2025 12:04
Makes salt_len parameter optional in EMSA-PSS verification, defaulting
to auto-detection by scanning for the 0x01 separator byte. Signing
still requires explicit salt length specification.
Replace variable-time scanning with constant-time implementation.
Eliminates early termination and data-dependent branching that could
leak padding structure via timing side-channels.
@tarcieri
tarcieri merged commit 8b6d423 into RustCrypto:masterAug 25, 2025
11 checks passed
takumi-earth pushed a commit to earthlings-dev/RSA that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2026
…n during verification (RustCrypto#546)
This PR adds an optional method to automatically detect the salt length
during RSA-PSS signature verification.
Should Fix: RustCrypto#361 and similar situations.
### Problem
The crate currently requires a fixed salt length for PSS verification.
This prevents verification of signatures where the salt length is not
known beforehand, a situation not uncommon in interoperability contexts.
This capability was previously available but was removed in PR RustCrypto#294.
### Solution
This change re-introduces salt length auto-detection as an explicit,
opt-in feature. A new constructor,
`VerifyingKey::new_with_auto_salt_len`, creates a verifier that performs
this detection during verification.
* The change is opt-in and does not affect default behavior.
* It improves interoperability by handling signatures with variable /
unknown salt lengths.
* The salt detection logic is implemented in constant(-ish) time to
resist timing attacks.
### Commit Structure
This PR consists of three commits:
1. **test:** Adds a failing unit test to demonstrate the issue.
2. **feat:** Implements `new_with_auto_salt_len` and re-introduces the
previous detection logic.
3. **fix:** Updates the detection logic to be less prone to timing
attacks.
Because salt length auto-detection is OpenSSL's default, it's likely
that many systems were built without a mechanism to enforce or
communicate a fixed salt length. Without this PR, it was impossible to
reliably use this crate in my current project, and I suspect others face
the same blocker. I've lost quite a bit of time dealing with seemingly
random signature verification failures until I realized the crux of the
problem.
Sign up for freeto join this conversation on GitHub. Already have an account? Sign in to comment

Labels

None yet

Projects

None yet

Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

Update from 0.8 to 0.9 broke verification after reading PEM and using Sha256 PSS

2 participants

@rrauch@tarcieri