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Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description #520

Closed
#525
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Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description#520
#525
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AndresL230
Labels
P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S

Description

@AndresL230
AndresL230
opened on Aug 3, 2026

Problem

Two free-text user-input columns are stored in plaintext:

feedback.commentTEXT-- plaintextfeedback.topicTEXT-- plaintextissue_reports.topicTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintextissue_reports.descriptionTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintext

Neither routes/feedback.py nor the issue-report write path imports services.encryption — verified by grepping every file that references the module.

Why it matters

These are unbounded free-text boxes shown to users at the moment something has gone wrong. In practice people paste whatever is on screen: error messages containing IDs, chat excerpts, assignment text, occasionally their own contact details. messages.content and notes.body — the other two places students type prose — are both encrypted. These two are the same class of input with none of the protection.

issue_reports.screenshot_urls points into the issues-media-files bucket, which was made private in #231, so the images are already protected. The description sitting beside them is not.

Proposed fix

encrypt_if_present at write, decrypt_if_present at read, matching notes_service.py.

Check first — this is the thing that makes it non-trivial:

  • The admin surfaces that list feedback and issue reports must decrypt before render, or they will show ciphertext. Check routes/admin.py for every read of these tables.
  • Confirm nothing filters or searches on comment / description in SQL. If admin search over feedback text exists, encryption removes it and that trade needs a decision.
  • feedback.selected_options (JSONB) is a fixed enum set, not free text — leave it queryable.

Backfill existing rows via db/backfill_encryption.py.

Acceptance

  • feedback.comment, feedback.topic, issue_reports.topic, issue_reports.description encrypted at write
  • Every admin read path decrypts; no ciphertext reaches any UI
  • Confirmed no SQL filter/search depends on these columns (or the loss is explicitly accepted)
  • Backfill extended and run (staging → prod)
  • Raw-SQL round-trip tests per column
  • CLAUDE.md + Canopy sapling-infrastructure encrypted-columns table updated

Parent: see the encryption-coverage epic. Verified against origin/main on 2026-08-02.

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P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S

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Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description · Issue #520 · SaplingLearn/Sapling · GitHub
    Skip to content
    Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description #520
    Closed
    #525
    Closed
    Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description#520
    #525
    Assignees
    AndresL230
    Labels
    P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
    Description
    @AndresL230
    AndresL230
    opened on Aug 3, 2026
    Problem
    Two free-text user-input columns are stored in plaintext:
    feedback.commentTEXT-- plaintextfeedback.topicTEXT-- plaintextissue_reports.topicTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintextissue_reports.descriptionTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintext
    Neither routes/feedback.py nor the issue-report write path imports services.encryption — verified by grepping every file that references the module.
    Why it matters
    These are unbounded free-text boxes shown to users at the moment something has gone wrong. In practice people paste whatever is on screen: error messages containing IDs, chat excerpts, assignment text, occasionally their own contact details. messages.content and notes.body — the other two places students type prose — are both encrypted. These two are the same class of input with none of the protection.
    issue_reports.screenshot_urls points into the issues-media-files bucket, which was made private in #231, so the images are already protected. The description sitting beside them is not.
    Proposed fix
    encrypt_if_present at write, decrypt_if_present at read, matching notes_service.py.
    Check first — this is the thing that makes it non-trivial:
    • The admin surfaces that list feedback and issue reports must decrypt before render, or they will show ciphertext. Check routes/admin.py for every read of these tables.
    • Confirm nothing filters or searches on comment / description in SQL. If admin search over feedback text exists, encryption removes it and that trade needs a decision.
    • feedback.selected_options (JSONB) is a fixed enum set, not free text — leave it queryable.
    Backfill existing rows via db/backfill_encryption.py.
    Acceptance
    • feedback.comment, feedback.topic, issue_reports.topic, issue_reports.description encrypted at write
    •  Every admin read path decrypts; no ciphertext reaches any UI
    •  Confirmed no SQL filter/search depends on these columns (or the loss is explicitly accepted)
    •  Backfill extended and run (staging → prod)
    •  Raw-SQL round-trip tests per column
    • CLAUDE.md + Canopy sapling-infrastructure encrypted-columns table updated
    Parent: see the encryption-coverage epic. Verified against origin/main on 2026-08-02.
    Metadata
    Metadata
    Assignees
    Labels
    P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
    Type
    No type
    Projects
    No projects
      Milestone
      No milestone
      Relationships
      None yet
      Development
      No branches or pull requests
      Issue actions
      
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Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description · Issue #520 · SaplingLearn/Sapling · GitHub
      Skip to content
      Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description #520
      Closed
      #525
      Closed
      Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description#520
      #525
      Assignees
      AndresL230
      Labels
      P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
      Description
      @AndresL230
      AndresL230
      opened on Aug 3, 2026
      Problem
      Two free-text user-input columns are stored in plaintext:
      feedback.commentTEXT-- plaintextfeedback.topicTEXT-- plaintextissue_reports.topicTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintextissue_reports.descriptionTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintext
      Neither routes/feedback.py nor the issue-report write path imports services.encryption — verified by grepping every file that references the module.
      Why it matters
      These are unbounded free-text boxes shown to users at the moment something has gone wrong. In practice people paste whatever is on screen: error messages containing IDs, chat excerpts, assignment text, occasionally their own contact details. messages.content and notes.body — the other two places students type prose — are both encrypted. These two are the same class of input with none of the protection.
      issue_reports.screenshot_urls points into the issues-media-files bucket, which was made private in #231, so the images are already protected. The description sitting beside them is not.
      Proposed fix
      encrypt_if_present at write, decrypt_if_present at read, matching notes_service.py.
      Check first — this is the thing that makes it non-trivial:
      • The admin surfaces that list feedback and issue reports must decrypt before render, or they will show ciphertext. Check routes/admin.py for every read of these tables.
      • Confirm nothing filters or searches on comment / description in SQL. If admin search over feedback text exists, encryption removes it and that trade needs a decision.
      • feedback.selected_options (JSONB) is a fixed enum set, not free text — leave it queryable.
      Backfill existing rows via db/backfill_encryption.py.
      Acceptance
      • feedback.comment, feedback.topic, issue_reports.topic, issue_reports.description encrypted at write
      •  Every admin read path decrypts; no ciphertext reaches any UI
      •  Confirmed no SQL filter/search depends on these columns (or the loss is explicitly accepted)
      •  Backfill extended and run (staging → prod)
      •  Raw-SQL round-trip tests per column
      • CLAUDE.md + Canopy sapling-infrastructure encrypted-columns table updated
      Parent: see the encryption-coverage epic. Verified against origin/main on 2026-08-02.
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      Labels
      P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
      Type
      No type
      Projects
      No projects
        Milestone
        No milestone
        Relationships
        None yet
        Development
        No branches or pull requests
        Issue actions
        
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try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description · Issue #520 · SaplingLearn/Sapling · GitHub
        Skip to content
        Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description #520
        Closed
        #525
        Closed
        Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description#520
        #525
        Assignees
        AndresL230
        Labels
        P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
        Description
        @AndresL230
        AndresL230
        opened on Aug 3, 2026
        Problem
        Two free-text user-input columns are stored in plaintext:
        feedback.commentTEXT-- plaintextfeedback.topicTEXT-- plaintextissue_reports.topicTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintextissue_reports.descriptionTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintext
        Neither routes/feedback.py nor the issue-report write path imports services.encryption — verified by grepping every file that references the module.
        Why it matters
        These are unbounded free-text boxes shown to users at the moment something has gone wrong. In practice people paste whatever is on screen: error messages containing IDs, chat excerpts, assignment text, occasionally their own contact details. messages.content and notes.body — the other two places students type prose — are both encrypted. These two are the same class of input with none of the protection.
        issue_reports.screenshot_urls points into the issues-media-files bucket, which was made private in #231, so the images are already protected. The description sitting beside them is not.
        Proposed fix
        encrypt_if_present at write, decrypt_if_present at read, matching notes_service.py.
        Check first — this is the thing that makes it non-trivial:
        • The admin surfaces that list feedback and issue reports must decrypt before render, or they will show ciphertext. Check routes/admin.py for every read of these tables.
        • Confirm nothing filters or searches on comment / description in SQL. If admin search over feedback text exists, encryption removes it and that trade needs a decision.
        • feedback.selected_options (JSONB) is a fixed enum set, not free text — leave it queryable.
        Backfill existing rows via db/backfill_encryption.py.
        Acceptance
        • feedback.comment, feedback.topic, issue_reports.topic, issue_reports.description encrypted at write
        •  Every admin read path decrypts; no ciphertext reaches any UI
        •  Confirmed no SQL filter/search depends on these columns (or the loss is explicitly accepted)
        •  Backfill extended and run (staging → prod)
        •  Raw-SQL round-trip tests per column
        • CLAUDE.md + Canopy sapling-infrastructure encrypted-columns table updated
        Parent: see the encryption-coverage epic. Verified against origin/main on 2026-08-02.
        Metadata
        Metadata
        Assignees
        Labels
        P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
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var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description · Issue #520 · SaplingLearn/Sapling · GitHub
          Skip to content
          Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description #520
          Closed
          #525
          Closed
          Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description#520
          #525
          Assignees
          AndresL230
          Labels
          P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
          Description
          @AndresL230
          AndresL230
          opened on Aug 3, 2026
          Problem
          Two free-text user-input columns are stored in plaintext:
          feedback.commentTEXT-- plaintextfeedback.topicTEXT-- plaintextissue_reports.topicTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintextissue_reports.descriptionTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintext
          Neither routes/feedback.py nor the issue-report write path imports services.encryption — verified by grepping every file that references the module.
          Why it matters
          These are unbounded free-text boxes shown to users at the moment something has gone wrong. In practice people paste whatever is on screen: error messages containing IDs, chat excerpts, assignment text, occasionally their own contact details. messages.content and notes.body — the other two places students type prose — are both encrypted. These two are the same class of input with none of the protection.
          issue_reports.screenshot_urls points into the issues-media-files bucket, which was made private in #231, so the images are already protected. The description sitting beside them is not.
          Proposed fix
          encrypt_if_present at write, decrypt_if_present at read, matching notes_service.py.
          Check first — this is the thing that makes it non-trivial:
          • The admin surfaces that list feedback and issue reports must decrypt before render, or they will show ciphertext. Check routes/admin.py for every read of these tables.
          • Confirm nothing filters or searches on comment / description in SQL. If admin search over feedback text exists, encryption removes it and that trade needs a decision.
          • feedback.selected_options (JSONB) is a fixed enum set, not free text — leave it queryable.
          Backfill existing rows via db/backfill_encryption.py.
          Acceptance
          • feedback.comment, feedback.topic, issue_reports.topic, issue_reports.description encrypted at write
          •  Every admin read path decrypts; no ciphertext reaches any UI
          •  Confirmed no SQL filter/search depends on these columns (or the loss is explicitly accepted)
          •  Backfill extended and run (staging → prod)
          •  Raw-SQL round-trip tests per column
          • CLAUDE.md + Canopy sapling-infrastructure encrypted-columns table updated
          Parent: see the encryption-coverage epic. Verified against origin/main on 2026-08-02.
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          Labels
          P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
          Type
          No type
          Projects
          No projects
            Milestone
            No milestone
            Relationships
            None yet
            Development
            No branches or pull requests
            Issue actions
            
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube
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(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description · Issue #520 · SaplingLearn/Sapling · GitHub
            Skip to content
            Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description #520
            Closed
            #525
            Closed
            Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description#520
            #525
            Assignees
            AndresL230
            Labels
            P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
            Description
            @AndresL230
            AndresL230
            opened on Aug 3, 2026
            Problem
            Two free-text user-input columns are stored in plaintext:
            feedback.commentTEXT-- plaintextfeedback.topicTEXT-- plaintextissue_reports.topicTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintextissue_reports.descriptionTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintext
            Neither routes/feedback.py nor the issue-report write path imports services.encryption — verified by grepping every file that references the module.
            Why it matters
            These are unbounded free-text boxes shown to users at the moment something has gone wrong. In practice people paste whatever is on screen: error messages containing IDs, chat excerpts, assignment text, occasionally their own contact details. messages.content and notes.body — the other two places students type prose — are both encrypted. These two are the same class of input with none of the protection.
            issue_reports.screenshot_urls points into the issues-media-files bucket, which was made private in #231, so the images are already protected. The description sitting beside them is not.
            Proposed fix
            encrypt_if_present at write, decrypt_if_present at read, matching notes_service.py.
            Check first — this is the thing that makes it non-trivial:
            • The admin surfaces that list feedback and issue reports must decrypt before render, or they will show ciphertext. Check routes/admin.py for every read of these tables.
            • Confirm nothing filters or searches on comment / description in SQL. If admin search over feedback text exists, encryption removes it and that trade needs a decision.
            • feedback.selected_options (JSONB) is a fixed enum set, not free text — leave it queryable.
            Backfill existing rows via db/backfill_encryption.py.
            Acceptance
            • feedback.comment, feedback.topic, issue_reports.topic, issue_reports.description encrypted at write
            •  Every admin read path decrypts; no ciphertext reaches any UI
            •  Confirmed no SQL filter/search depends on these columns (or the loss is explicitly accepted)
            •  Backfill extended and run (staging → prod)
            •  Raw-SQL round-trip tests per column
            • CLAUDE.md + Canopy sapling-infrastructure encrypted-columns table updated
            Parent: see the encryption-coverage epic. Verified against origin/main on 2026-08-02.
            Metadata
            Metadata
            Assignees
            Labels
            P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content
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(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description · Issue #520 · SaplingLearn/Sapling · GitHub
              Skip to content
              Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description #520
              Closed
              #525
              Closed
              Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description#520
              #525
              Assignees
              AndresL230
              Labels
              P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
              Description
              @AndresL230
              AndresL230
              opened on Aug 3, 2026
              Problem
              Two free-text user-input columns are stored in plaintext:
              feedback.commentTEXT-- plaintextfeedback.topicTEXT-- plaintextissue_reports.topicTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintextissue_reports.descriptionTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintext
              Neither routes/feedback.py nor the issue-report write path imports services.encryption — verified by grepping every file that references the module.
              Why it matters
              These are unbounded free-text boxes shown to users at the moment something has gone wrong. In practice people paste whatever is on screen: error messages containing IDs, chat excerpts, assignment text, occasionally their own contact details. messages.content and notes.body — the other two places students type prose — are both encrypted. These two are the same class of input with none of the protection.
              issue_reports.screenshot_urls points into the issues-media-files bucket, which was made private in #231, so the images are already protected. The description sitting beside them is not.
              Proposed fix
              encrypt_if_present at write, decrypt_if_present at read, matching notes_service.py.
              Check first — this is the thing that makes it non-trivial:
              • The admin surfaces that list feedback and issue reports must decrypt before render, or they will show ciphertext. Check routes/admin.py for every read of these tables.
              • Confirm nothing filters or searches on comment / description in SQL. If admin search over feedback text exists, encryption removes it and that trade needs a decision.
              • feedback.selected_options (JSONB) is a fixed enum set, not free text — leave it queryable.
              Backfill existing rows via db/backfill_encryption.py.
              Acceptance
              • feedback.comment, feedback.topic, issue_reports.topic, issue_reports.description encrypted at write
              •  Every admin read path decrypts; no ciphertext reaches any UI
              •  Confirmed no SQL filter/search depends on these columns (or the loss is explicitly accepted)
              •  Backfill extended and run (staging → prod)
              •  Raw-SQL round-trip tests per column
              • CLAUDE.md + Canopy sapling-infrastructure encrypted-columns table updated
              Parent: see the encryption-coverage epic. Verified against origin/main on 2026-08-02.
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site
(function() {
var enabled = true;
function applyDarkMode() {
if (!enabled) return;
// Create style element if it doesn't exist
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (!style) {
style = document.createElement('style');
style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';
document.head.appendChild(style);
}
// Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video
style.textContent = '
/* Invert everything except media */
html {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #1a1a2e !important;
}
/* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */
img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*="background-image"] {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
}
/* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */
.no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,
[data-theme="light"], [data-theme="light"],
.ace_editor, .ace_editor *,
.CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,
.monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,
.markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,
.highlight, .highlight *,
pre code, pre code * {
filter: none !important;
}
/* Fix common UI elements */
.modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #2d2d44 !important;
border-color: #444 !important;
}
/* Scrollbars */
::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }
/* Selection */
::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
';
}
function removeDarkMode() {
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (style) style.remove();
}
// Toggle with Alt+Shift+D
document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {
if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {
e.preventDefault();
enabled = !enabled;
if (enabled) {
applyDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');
} else {
removeDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');
}
}
});
// Apply on load
applyDarkMode();
// Re-apply on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {
applyDarkMode();
}
});
observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();
Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description · Issue #520 · SaplingLearn/Sapling · GitHub
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                Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description #520
                Closed
                #525
                Closed
                Free-text user input stored in plaintext: feedback.comment and issue_reports.description#520
                #525
                Assignees
                AndresL230
                Labels
                P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
                Description
                @AndresL230
                AndresL230
                opened on Aug 3, 2026
                Problem
                Two free-text user-input columns are stored in plaintext:
                feedback.commentTEXT-- plaintextfeedback.topicTEXT-- plaintextissue_reports.topicTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintextissue_reports.descriptionTEXTNOT NULL-- plaintext
                Neither routes/feedback.py nor the issue-report write path imports services.encryption — verified by grepping every file that references the module.
                Why it matters
                These are unbounded free-text boxes shown to users at the moment something has gone wrong. In practice people paste whatever is on screen: error messages containing IDs, chat excerpts, assignment text, occasionally their own contact details. messages.content and notes.body — the other two places students type prose — are both encrypted. These two are the same class of input with none of the protection.
                issue_reports.screenshot_urls points into the issues-media-files bucket, which was made private in #231, so the images are already protected. The description sitting beside them is not.
                Proposed fix
                encrypt_if_present at write, decrypt_if_present at read, matching notes_service.py.
                Check first — this is the thing that makes it non-trivial:
                • The admin surfaces that list feedback and issue reports must decrypt before render, or they will show ciphertext. Check routes/admin.py for every read of these tables.
                • Confirm nothing filters or searches on comment / description in SQL. If admin search over feedback text exists, encryption removes it and that trade needs a decision.
                • feedback.selected_options (JSONB) is a fixed enum set, not free text — leave it queryable.
                Backfill existing rows via db/backfill_encryption.py.
                Acceptance
                • feedback.comment, feedback.topic, issue_reports.topic, issue_reports.description encrypted at write
                •  Every admin read path decrypts; no ciphertext reaches any UI
                •  Confirmed no SQL filter/search depends on these columns (or the loss is explicitly accepted)
                •  Backfill extended and run (staging → prod)
                •  Raw-SQL round-trip tests per column
                • CLAUDE.md + Canopy sapling-infrastructure encrypted-columns table updated
                Parent: see the encryption-coverage epic. Verified against origin/main on 2026-08-02.
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                P2Medium prioritybackendBackend / APIsecuritySecurity / data exposuresize-S
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