🔒 Fix command injection vulnerability in stdlib process.spawn - #40
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Co-authored-by: Tcode-Motion <188012755+Tcode-Motion@users.noreply.github.com>
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🎯 What: Fixed a critical command injection vulnerability in the
⚠️ Risk: The
std.process.spawnfunction within thetechscript_stdlibcrate.process.spawnfunction was executing user-provided command strings by passing them directly to the Windows shell (cmd /C <command>). This allowed attackers to execute arbitrary, unconstrained OS commands via shell meta-characters (like&,|,;), completely bypassing language-level security boundaries.🛡️ Solution: Modified
process.spawnto securely parse the user-provided command string into its component program and arguments using theshlexcrate. These arguments are now passed directly tostd::process::Command::new(), completely circumventing the shell and neutralizing injection vectors. Added a comprehensive test suite to verify correct parsing and security behavior.PR created automatically by Jules for task 6640346681076279577 started by @Tcode-Motion