Add LatentSpaceHookV4 hook on ethereum

[hooklist-generator]

Summary

A token/ETH pool hook that burns a configurable percentage (up to 10%) of token amounts on each swap. Sells (token→ETH) are additionally gated: a designated gatekeeper EOA can block specific addresses from selling (warded mapping) or globally pause all sells (gateSealed flag).

Flags

Flag	Value
beforeInitialize	false
afterInitialize	false
beforeAddLiquidity	false
afterAddLiquidity	false
beforeRemoveLiquidity	false
afterRemoveLiquidity	false
beforeSwap	true
afterSwap	true
beforeDonate	false
afterDonate	false
beforeSwapReturnsDelta	true
afterSwapReturnsDelta	true
afterAddLiquidityReturnsDelta	false
afterRemoveLiquidityReturnsDelta	false

Properties

Property	Value
dynamicFee	false
upgradeable	false
requiresCustomSwapData	false
vanillaSwap	false
swapAccess	allowlist

Warnings

• Submitter did not provide a name. Using AI-derived "LatentSpaceHookV4".
• Submitter did not provide a description. Using AI-generated description.
• Source file is named src_InariaHook.sol but the deployed contract is LatentSpaceHookV4 — the code may have been rebranded or repurposed.
• Hook implements one-sided sell gating: the gatekeeper EOA can block individual addresses (warded mapping) or freeze all sells (gateSealed), while buys are unrestricted — honeypot-style behavior is possible.

Closes #7150

[github-actions]

Review: hooks/ethereum/0x5a8ed93ca6aa5835f4e09ef4a0cb412aa56180cc.json

Flags ✓

Address 0x5a8ed93ca6aa5835f4e09ef4a0cb412aa56180cc — last two bytes 0x80cc = 1000 0000 1100 1100. Lowest 14 bits encode:

Bit	Flag	Address	File
7	beforeSwap	1	true ✓
6	afterSwap	1	true ✓
3	beforeSwapReturnsDelta	1	true ✓
2	afterSwapReturnsDelta	1	true ✓
all others	—	0	false ✓

Confirmed by getHookPermissions() in the verified source.

Properties

• dynamicFee: false ✓ — beforeSwap returns 0 for the fee override; no poolManager.updateDynamicLPFee() call.

• upgradeable: false ✓ — All key addresses (poolManager, authorized, gatekeeper) are immutable; no proxy or delegatecall to mutable address. source_meta.json confirms "proxy": false.

• requiresCustomSwapData: false ✓ — hookData (the bytes calldata parameter) is never read in beforeSwap or afterSwap.

• vanillaSwap: false ✓ — Correct; beforeSwapReturnsDelta and afterSwapReturnsDelta are both true, and the hook actively skims and burns token amounts.

• swapAccess: "allowlist" ✗ — Incorrect. beforeSwap applies two distinct access control mechanisms to sells (!params.zeroForOne):

  1. gateSealed — a boolean flag toggled by the gatekeeper admin (sealGate()/openGate()). This matches the "governance" definition (a boolean flag set by an owner/admin).
  2. warded[tx.origin] — an address-based blocklist managed by the gatekeeper. This matches the "allowlist" definition (checks caller against an address set).

  Since neither "allowlist" nor "governance" alone captures both mechanisms, the correct classification is "other".

Metadata ✓

• name: "LatentSpaceHookV4" matches the verified contract name.
• chainId: 1 is correct for ethereum.
• verifiedSource: true is confirmed.
• description accurately describes the burn mechanism and dual sell-side gating. No audit claims or marketing language.

Required Change

"swapAccess": "other"

[github-actions]

Review: hooks/ethereum/0x5a8ed93ca6aa5835f4e09ef4a0cb412aa56180cc.json

Contract: LatentSpaceHookV4 — verified source confirmed.

Flag Verification

Address low 14 bits: 0x5a8ed93ca6aa5835f4e09ef4a0cb412aa56180cc & 0x3FFF = 0x00CC = 0b00000011001100

Bit	Flag	Address	JSON
7	beforeSwap	1	true ✓
6	afterSwap	1	true ✓
3	beforeSwapReturnsDelta	1	true ✓
2	afterSwapReturnsDelta	1	true ✓
all others	—	0	false ✓

Matches getHookPermissions() in source exactly.

Properties Verification

• dynamicFee: false ✓ — No updateDynamicLPFee() call; beforeSwap returns 0 for the fee slot. The burnFeeBps is a token-burn deduction, not an LP fee override.
• upgradeable: false ✓ — No proxy pattern, no mutable delegatecall target, no SELFDESTRUCT. All critical addresses are immutable.
• requiresCustomSwapData: false ✓ — The hookData parameter is unused in both beforeSwap and afterSwap. Swaps proceed normally without any custom data.
• vanillaSwap: false ✓ — Correctly false; both beforeSwapReturnsDelta and afterSwapReturnsDelta are true, and the hook takes token amounts out of the pool and burns them.
• swapAccess: "other" ✓ — beforeSwap gates sells via two orthogonal mechanisms: a warded blocklist mapping (allowlist-style) and a gateSealed global pause flag (governance-style). Neither alone fully characterizes the access control, so "other" is appropriate.

Metadata Verification

• verifiedSource: true ✓ — confirmed by source_meta.json.
• chainId: 1 ✓ — ethereum mainnet.
• name: "LatentSpaceHookV4" ✓ — matches contractName in Etherscan metadata.
• description ✓ — accurately describes: token burn on swaps (up to 10% via MAX_BURN_FEE_BPS = 1000), sell-side gating by a gatekeeper EOA via the warded mapping and gateSealed flag. No audit claims, safety guarantees, or marketing language.

All fields verified. Approving.

[Ponx]

Bot review verified; bitmask/flags/properties check out. LGTM.