Security: ZHINFINITY/ReadInfinity

Security

Report a vulnerability

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Scope and threat model

Read∞ is an offline-first ebook reader for Android and desktop platforms. It processes user-selected ebook and dictionary files, stores reading metadata locally, and provides native filesystem access only through the application’s scoped platform integrations. Core reading does not require an account, cloud library, remote synchronization, telemetry, or a backend service.

The primary security boundary is the user’s device. Book and dictionary files are untrusted input and may be malformed or intentionally hostile. The application also includes native components, third-party parsing and rendering libraries, WebView content, build dependencies, and platform filesystem integrations.

Protected assets

AssetProtection goal
User-selected ebook and dictionary filesPrevent unintended modification, deletion, disclosure, or execution outside the reader’s supported content model
Reading progress, annotations, notes, covers, and preferencesKeep local metadata private and consistent
Selected-folder permissions and pathsUse only the folders the user grants or selects
Native bridge and filesystem operationsLimit platform actions to explicit application capabilities and validated inputs
Release signing materialKeep private signing keys and passwords outside the repository and CI logs
Dependencies and build outputsDetect tampering and known vulnerabilities before release

Important mitigations

Untrusted book content

Book files are treated as untrusted content. Rendering is isolated through the application’s WebView and reader boundaries, and the application does not treat ebook markup as native application code. Parser, renderer, archive, and content-security issues should be reported even when they require a specially crafted local file.

Local filesystem access

Native file access is initiated by an explicit user-selected folder, file picker, or operating-system open-with action. Read∞ records source paths and local metadata; it does not need to copy user books into a remote service. A report involving path traversal, unintended folder access, destructive file operations, or access outside a granted scope is security-sensitive.

Offline data handling

The offline application does not depend on login or cloud synchronization for its core library. Reports should still cover accidental network transmission, unexpected remote requests, exposed local metadata, unsafe URL handling, or a path that allows untrusted book content to reach privileged native operations.

Native and WebView boundaries

Native commands and Android integrations are reviewed as privileged boundaries. Reports involving arbitrary command execution, unsafe IPC, WebView escape, exported activities, permission escalation, or bypasses of user-selected-folder restrictions should include a minimal reproduction whenever possible.

Dependency and release security

JavaScript and Rust dependencies are pinned through the repository lockfiles. Release APKs are built in GitHub Actions, signed with repository secrets, and verified for package identity, signature, and ABI contents before publication. Signing passwords and private key material must never be committed or printed in logs.

Out of scope

The following are generally outside the project’s direct control unless the application introduces a specific unsafe interaction with them:

  • Vulnerabilities in an unmodified operating system, Android WebView, browser, or device firmware.
  • Physical access attacks against an unlocked device.
  • Malicious files opened by a user when no application boundary is bypassed.
  • Availability or security incidents in unrelated third-party services.
  • Feature requests or ordinary bugs without a confidentiality, integrity, privilege, or code-execution impact.

Supported versions

Security fixes are prioritized for the latest public release series.

VersionSupported
1.0.xYes
Older versionsBest effort only; update to the latest release when possible

Reporting a vulnerability

Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue or discussion for security-sensitive details. Use GitHub’s private vulnerability reporting for this repository, or contact the repository maintainer privately through the ZHINFINITY GitHub profile.

Include the affected version, platform and ABI where relevant, a clear security impact, reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept, and any suggested mitigation. Please redact personal files, private paths, signing material, and unrelated sensitive information.

We aim to acknowledge reports within three business days. We may request additional reproduction details or validation. Please keep vulnerability details private until a fix and disclosure plan have been agreed with the maintainer.

Incident response

For a confirmed vulnerability, maintainers will triage severity and affected versions, develop and test a mitigation, publish a patched release when appropriate, and document the resolution in the repository or release notes. Disclosure timing will be coordinated with the reporter whenever practical.

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

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Security: ZHINFINITY/ReadInfinity
Security
Report a vulnerability

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Scope and threat model
Read∞ is an offline-first ebook reader for Android and desktop platforms. It processes user-selected ebook and dictionary files, stores reading metadata locally, and provides native filesystem access only through the application’s scoped platform integrations. Core reading does not require an account, cloud library, remote synchronization, telemetry, or a backend service.
The primary security boundary is the user’s device. Book and dictionary files are untrusted input and may be malformed or intentionally hostile. The application also includes native components, third-party parsing and rendering libraries, WebView content, build dependencies, and platform filesystem integrations.
Protected assets
AssetProtection goal
User-selected ebook and dictionary filesPrevent unintended modification, deletion, disclosure, or execution outside the reader’s supported content model
Reading progress, annotations, notes, covers, and preferencesKeep local metadata private and consistent
Selected-folder permissions and pathsUse only the folders the user grants or selects
Native bridge and filesystem operationsLimit platform actions to explicit application capabilities and validated inputs
Release signing materialKeep private signing keys and passwords outside the repository and CI logs
Dependencies and build outputsDetect tampering and known vulnerabilities before release
Important mitigations
Untrusted book content
Book files are treated as untrusted content. Rendering is isolated through the application’s WebView and reader boundaries, and the application does not treat ebook markup as native application code. Parser, renderer, archive, and content-security issues should be reported even when they require a specially crafted local file.
Local filesystem access
Native file access is initiated by an explicit user-selected folder, file picker, or operating-system open-with action. Read∞ records source paths and local metadata; it does not need to copy user books into a remote service. A report involving path traversal, unintended folder access, destructive file operations, or access outside a granted scope is security-sensitive.
Offline data handling
The offline application does not depend on login or cloud synchronization for its core library. Reports should still cover accidental network transmission, unexpected remote requests, exposed local metadata, unsafe URL handling, or a path that allows untrusted book content to reach privileged native operations.
Native and WebView boundaries
Native commands and Android integrations are reviewed as privileged boundaries. Reports involving arbitrary command execution, unsafe IPC, WebView escape, exported activities, permission escalation, or bypasses of user-selected-folder restrictions should include a minimal reproduction whenever possible.
Dependency and release security
JavaScript and Rust dependencies are pinned through the repository lockfiles. Release APKs are built in GitHub Actions, signed with repository secrets, and verified for package identity, signature, and ABI contents before publication. Signing passwords and private key material must never be committed or printed in logs.
Out of scope
The following are generally outside the project’s direct control unless the application introduces a specific unsafe interaction with them:
  • Vulnerabilities in an unmodified operating system, Android WebView, browser, or device firmware.
  • Physical access attacks against an unlocked device.
  • Malicious files opened by a user when no application boundary is bypassed.
  • Availability or security incidents in unrelated third-party services.
  • Feature requests or ordinary bugs without a confidentiality, integrity, privilege, or code-execution impact.
Supported versions
Security fixes are prioritized for the latest public release series.
VersionSupported
1.0.xYes
Older versionsBest effort only; update to the latest release when possible
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue or discussion for security-sensitive details. Use GitHub’s private vulnerability reporting for this repository, or contact the repository maintainer privately through the ZHINFINITY GitHub profile.
Include the affected version, platform and ABI where relevant, a clear security impact, reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept, and any suggested mitigation. Please redact personal files, private paths, signing material, and unrelated sensitive information.
We aim to acknowledge reports within three business days. We may request additional reproduction details or validation. Please keep vulnerability details private until a fix and disclosure plan have been agreed with the maintainer.
Incident response
For a confirmed vulnerability, maintainers will triage severity and affected versions, develop and test a mitigation, publish a patched release when appropriate, and document the resolution in the repository or release notes. Disclosure timing will be coordinated with the reporter whenever practical.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: ZHINFINITY/ReadInfinity
Security
Report a vulnerability

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Scope and threat model
Read∞ is an offline-first ebook reader for Android and desktop platforms. It processes user-selected ebook and dictionary files, stores reading metadata locally, and provides native filesystem access only through the application’s scoped platform integrations. Core reading does not require an account, cloud library, remote synchronization, telemetry, or a backend service.
The primary security boundary is the user’s device. Book and dictionary files are untrusted input and may be malformed or intentionally hostile. The application also includes native components, third-party parsing and rendering libraries, WebView content, build dependencies, and platform filesystem integrations.
Protected assets
AssetProtection goal
User-selected ebook and dictionary filesPrevent unintended modification, deletion, disclosure, or execution outside the reader’s supported content model
Reading progress, annotations, notes, covers, and preferencesKeep local metadata private and consistent
Selected-folder permissions and pathsUse only the folders the user grants or selects
Native bridge and filesystem operationsLimit platform actions to explicit application capabilities and validated inputs
Release signing materialKeep private signing keys and passwords outside the repository and CI logs
Dependencies and build outputsDetect tampering and known vulnerabilities before release
Important mitigations
Untrusted book content
Book files are treated as untrusted content. Rendering is isolated through the application’s WebView and reader boundaries, and the application does not treat ebook markup as native application code. Parser, renderer, archive, and content-security issues should be reported even when they require a specially crafted local file.
Local filesystem access
Native file access is initiated by an explicit user-selected folder, file picker, or operating-system open-with action. Read∞ records source paths and local metadata; it does not need to copy user books into a remote service. A report involving path traversal, unintended folder access, destructive file operations, or access outside a granted scope is security-sensitive.
Offline data handling
The offline application does not depend on login or cloud synchronization for its core library. Reports should still cover accidental network transmission, unexpected remote requests, exposed local metadata, unsafe URL handling, or a path that allows untrusted book content to reach privileged native operations.
Native and WebView boundaries
Native commands and Android integrations are reviewed as privileged boundaries. Reports involving arbitrary command execution, unsafe IPC, WebView escape, exported activities, permission escalation, or bypasses of user-selected-folder restrictions should include a minimal reproduction whenever possible.
Dependency and release security
JavaScript and Rust dependencies are pinned through the repository lockfiles. Release APKs are built in GitHub Actions, signed with repository secrets, and verified for package identity, signature, and ABI contents before publication. Signing passwords and private key material must never be committed or printed in logs.
Out of scope
The following are generally outside the project’s direct control unless the application introduces a specific unsafe interaction with them:
  • Vulnerabilities in an unmodified operating system, Android WebView, browser, or device firmware.
  • Physical access attacks against an unlocked device.
  • Malicious files opened by a user when no application boundary is bypassed.
  • Availability or security incidents in unrelated third-party services.
  • Feature requests or ordinary bugs without a confidentiality, integrity, privilege, or code-execution impact.
Supported versions
Security fixes are prioritized for the latest public release series.
VersionSupported
1.0.xYes
Older versionsBest effort only; update to the latest release when possible
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue or discussion for security-sensitive details. Use GitHub’s private vulnerability reporting for this repository, or contact the repository maintainer privately through the ZHINFINITY GitHub profile.
Include the affected version, platform and ABI where relevant, a clear security impact, reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept, and any suggested mitigation. Please redact personal files, private paths, signing material, and unrelated sensitive information.
We aim to acknowledge reports within three business days. We may request additional reproduction details or validation. Please keep vulnerability details private until a fix and disclosure plan have been agreed with the maintainer.
Incident response
For a confirmed vulnerability, maintainers will triage severity and affected versions, develop and test a mitigation, publish a patched release when appropriate, and document the resolution in the repository or release notes. Disclosure timing will be coordinated with the reporter whenever practical.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: ZHINFINITY/ReadInfinity
Security
Report a vulnerability

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Scope and threat model
Read∞ is an offline-first ebook reader for Android and desktop platforms. It processes user-selected ebook and dictionary files, stores reading metadata locally, and provides native filesystem access only through the application’s scoped platform integrations. Core reading does not require an account, cloud library, remote synchronization, telemetry, or a backend service.
The primary security boundary is the user’s device. Book and dictionary files are untrusted input and may be malformed or intentionally hostile. The application also includes native components, third-party parsing and rendering libraries, WebView content, build dependencies, and platform filesystem integrations.
Protected assets
AssetProtection goal
User-selected ebook and dictionary filesPrevent unintended modification, deletion, disclosure, or execution outside the reader’s supported content model
Reading progress, annotations, notes, covers, and preferencesKeep local metadata private and consistent
Selected-folder permissions and pathsUse only the folders the user grants or selects
Native bridge and filesystem operationsLimit platform actions to explicit application capabilities and validated inputs
Release signing materialKeep private signing keys and passwords outside the repository and CI logs
Dependencies and build outputsDetect tampering and known vulnerabilities before release
Important mitigations
Untrusted book content
Book files are treated as untrusted content. Rendering is isolated through the application’s WebView and reader boundaries, and the application does not treat ebook markup as native application code. Parser, renderer, archive, and content-security issues should be reported even when they require a specially crafted local file.
Local filesystem access
Native file access is initiated by an explicit user-selected folder, file picker, or operating-system open-with action. Read∞ records source paths and local metadata; it does not need to copy user books into a remote service. A report involving path traversal, unintended folder access, destructive file operations, or access outside a granted scope is security-sensitive.
Offline data handling
The offline application does not depend on login or cloud synchronization for its core library. Reports should still cover accidental network transmission, unexpected remote requests, exposed local metadata, unsafe URL handling, or a path that allows untrusted book content to reach privileged native operations.
Native and WebView boundaries
Native commands and Android integrations are reviewed as privileged boundaries. Reports involving arbitrary command execution, unsafe IPC, WebView escape, exported activities, permission escalation, or bypasses of user-selected-folder restrictions should include a minimal reproduction whenever possible.
Dependency and release security
JavaScript and Rust dependencies are pinned through the repository lockfiles. Release APKs are built in GitHub Actions, signed with repository secrets, and verified for package identity, signature, and ABI contents before publication. Signing passwords and private key material must never be committed or printed in logs.
Out of scope
The following are generally outside the project’s direct control unless the application introduces a specific unsafe interaction with them:
  • Vulnerabilities in an unmodified operating system, Android WebView, browser, or device firmware.
  • Physical access attacks against an unlocked device.
  • Malicious files opened by a user when no application boundary is bypassed.
  • Availability or security incidents in unrelated third-party services.
  • Feature requests or ordinary bugs without a confidentiality, integrity, privilege, or code-execution impact.
Supported versions
Security fixes are prioritized for the latest public release series.
VersionSupported
1.0.xYes
Older versionsBest effort only; update to the latest release when possible
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue or discussion for security-sensitive details. Use GitHub’s private vulnerability reporting for this repository, or contact the repository maintainer privately through the ZHINFINITY GitHub profile.
Include the affected version, platform and ABI where relevant, a clear security impact, reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept, and any suggested mitigation. Please redact personal files, private paths, signing material, and unrelated sensitive information.
We aim to acknowledge reports within three business days. We may request additional reproduction details or validation. Please keep vulnerability details private until a fix and disclosure plan have been agreed with the maintainer.
Incident response
For a confirmed vulnerability, maintainers will triage severity and affected versions, develop and test a mitigation, publish a patched release when appropriate, and document the resolution in the repository or release notes. Disclosure timing will be coordinated with the reporter whenever practical.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: ZHINFINITY/ReadInfinity
Security
Report a vulnerability

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Scope and threat model
Read∞ is an offline-first ebook reader for Android and desktop platforms. It processes user-selected ebook and dictionary files, stores reading metadata locally, and provides native filesystem access only through the application’s scoped platform integrations. Core reading does not require an account, cloud library, remote synchronization, telemetry, or a backend service.
The primary security boundary is the user’s device. Book and dictionary files are untrusted input and may be malformed or intentionally hostile. The application also includes native components, third-party parsing and rendering libraries, WebView content, build dependencies, and platform filesystem integrations.
Protected assets
AssetProtection goal
User-selected ebook and dictionary filesPrevent unintended modification, deletion, disclosure, or execution outside the reader’s supported content model
Reading progress, annotations, notes, covers, and preferencesKeep local metadata private and consistent
Selected-folder permissions and pathsUse only the folders the user grants or selects
Native bridge and filesystem operationsLimit platform actions to explicit application capabilities and validated inputs
Release signing materialKeep private signing keys and passwords outside the repository and CI logs
Dependencies and build outputsDetect tampering and known vulnerabilities before release
Important mitigations
Untrusted book content
Book files are treated as untrusted content. Rendering is isolated through the application’s WebView and reader boundaries, and the application does not treat ebook markup as native application code. Parser, renderer, archive, and content-security issues should be reported even when they require a specially crafted local file.
Local filesystem access
Native file access is initiated by an explicit user-selected folder, file picker, or operating-system open-with action. Read∞ records source paths and local metadata; it does not need to copy user books into a remote service. A report involving path traversal, unintended folder access, destructive file operations, or access outside a granted scope is security-sensitive.
Offline data handling
The offline application does not depend on login or cloud synchronization for its core library. Reports should still cover accidental network transmission, unexpected remote requests, exposed local metadata, unsafe URL handling, or a path that allows untrusted book content to reach privileged native operations.
Native and WebView boundaries
Native commands and Android integrations are reviewed as privileged boundaries. Reports involving arbitrary command execution, unsafe IPC, WebView escape, exported activities, permission escalation, or bypasses of user-selected-folder restrictions should include a minimal reproduction whenever possible.
Dependency and release security
JavaScript and Rust dependencies are pinned through the repository lockfiles. Release APKs are built in GitHub Actions, signed with repository secrets, and verified for package identity, signature, and ABI contents before publication. Signing passwords and private key material must never be committed or printed in logs.
Out of scope
The following are generally outside the project’s direct control unless the application introduces a specific unsafe interaction with them:
  • Vulnerabilities in an unmodified operating system, Android WebView, browser, or device firmware.
  • Physical access attacks against an unlocked device.
  • Malicious files opened by a user when no application boundary is bypassed.
  • Availability or security incidents in unrelated third-party services.
  • Feature requests or ordinary bugs without a confidentiality, integrity, privilege, or code-execution impact.
Supported versions
Security fixes are prioritized for the latest public release series.
VersionSupported
1.0.xYes
Older versionsBest effort only; update to the latest release when possible
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue or discussion for security-sensitive details. Use GitHub’s private vulnerability reporting for this repository, or contact the repository maintainer privately through the ZHINFINITY GitHub profile.
Include the affected version, platform and ABI where relevant, a clear security impact, reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept, and any suggested mitigation. Please redact personal files, private paths, signing material, and unrelated sensitive information.
We aim to acknowledge reports within three business days. We may request additional reproduction details or validation. Please keep vulnerability details private until a fix and disclosure plan have been agreed with the maintainer.
Incident response
For a confirmed vulnerability, maintainers will triage severity and affected versions, develop and test a mitigation, publish a patched release when appropriate, and document the resolution in the repository or release notes. Disclosure timing will be coordinated with the reporter whenever practical.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: ZHINFINITY/ReadInfinity
Security
Report a vulnerability

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Scope and threat model
Read∞ is an offline-first ebook reader for Android and desktop platforms. It processes user-selected ebook and dictionary files, stores reading metadata locally, and provides native filesystem access only through the application’s scoped platform integrations. Core reading does not require an account, cloud library, remote synchronization, telemetry, or a backend service.
The primary security boundary is the user’s device. Book and dictionary files are untrusted input and may be malformed or intentionally hostile. The application also includes native components, third-party parsing and rendering libraries, WebView content, build dependencies, and platform filesystem integrations.
Protected assets
AssetProtection goal
User-selected ebook and dictionary filesPrevent unintended modification, deletion, disclosure, or execution outside the reader’s supported content model
Reading progress, annotations, notes, covers, and preferencesKeep local metadata private and consistent
Selected-folder permissions and pathsUse only the folders the user grants or selects
Native bridge and filesystem operationsLimit platform actions to explicit application capabilities and validated inputs
Release signing materialKeep private signing keys and passwords outside the repository and CI logs
Dependencies and build outputsDetect tampering and known vulnerabilities before release
Important mitigations
Untrusted book content
Book files are treated as untrusted content. Rendering is isolated through the application’s WebView and reader boundaries, and the application does not treat ebook markup as native application code. Parser, renderer, archive, and content-security issues should be reported even when they require a specially crafted local file.
Local filesystem access
Native file access is initiated by an explicit user-selected folder, file picker, or operating-system open-with action. Read∞ records source paths and local metadata; it does not need to copy user books into a remote service. A report involving path traversal, unintended folder access, destructive file operations, or access outside a granted scope is security-sensitive.
Offline data handling
The offline application does not depend on login or cloud synchronization for its core library. Reports should still cover accidental network transmission, unexpected remote requests, exposed local metadata, unsafe URL handling, or a path that allows untrusted book content to reach privileged native operations.
Native and WebView boundaries
Native commands and Android integrations are reviewed as privileged boundaries. Reports involving arbitrary command execution, unsafe IPC, WebView escape, exported activities, permission escalation, or bypasses of user-selected-folder restrictions should include a minimal reproduction whenever possible.
Dependency and release security
JavaScript and Rust dependencies are pinned through the repository lockfiles. Release APKs are built in GitHub Actions, signed with repository secrets, and verified for package identity, signature, and ABI contents before publication. Signing passwords and private key material must never be committed or printed in logs.
Out of scope
The following are generally outside the project’s direct control unless the application introduces a specific unsafe interaction with them:
  • Vulnerabilities in an unmodified operating system, Android WebView, browser, or device firmware.
  • Physical access attacks against an unlocked device.
  • Malicious files opened by a user when no application boundary is bypassed.
  • Availability or security incidents in unrelated third-party services.
  • Feature requests or ordinary bugs without a confidentiality, integrity, privilege, or code-execution impact.
Supported versions
Security fixes are prioritized for the latest public release series.
VersionSupported
1.0.xYes
Older versionsBest effort only; update to the latest release when possible
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue or discussion for security-sensitive details. Use GitHub’s private vulnerability reporting for this repository, or contact the repository maintainer privately through the ZHINFINITY GitHub profile.
Include the affected version, platform and ABI where relevant, a clear security impact, reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept, and any suggested mitigation. Please redact personal files, private paths, signing material, and unrelated sensitive information.
We aim to acknowledge reports within three business days. We may request additional reproduction details or validation. Please keep vulnerability details private until a fix and disclosure plan have been agreed with the maintainer.
Incident response
For a confirmed vulnerability, maintainers will triage severity and affected versions, develop and test a mitigation, publish a patched release when appropriate, and document the resolution in the repository or release notes. Disclosure timing will be coordinated with the reporter whenever practical.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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Security: ZHINFINITY/ReadInfinity
Security
Report a vulnerability

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Scope and threat model
Read∞ is an offline-first ebook reader for Android and desktop platforms. It processes user-selected ebook and dictionary files, stores reading metadata locally, and provides native filesystem access only through the application’s scoped platform integrations. Core reading does not require an account, cloud library, remote synchronization, telemetry, or a backend service.
The primary security boundary is the user’s device. Book and dictionary files are untrusted input and may be malformed or intentionally hostile. The application also includes native components, third-party parsing and rendering libraries, WebView content, build dependencies, and platform filesystem integrations.
Protected assets
AssetProtection goal
User-selected ebook and dictionary filesPrevent unintended modification, deletion, disclosure, or execution outside the reader’s supported content model
Reading progress, annotations, notes, covers, and preferencesKeep local metadata private and consistent
Selected-folder permissions and pathsUse only the folders the user grants or selects
Native bridge and filesystem operationsLimit platform actions to explicit application capabilities and validated inputs
Release signing materialKeep private signing keys and passwords outside the repository and CI logs
Dependencies and build outputsDetect tampering and known vulnerabilities before release
Important mitigations
Untrusted book content
Book files are treated as untrusted content. Rendering is isolated through the application’s WebView and reader boundaries, and the application does not treat ebook markup as native application code. Parser, renderer, archive, and content-security issues should be reported even when they require a specially crafted local file.
Local filesystem access
Native file access is initiated by an explicit user-selected folder, file picker, or operating-system open-with action. Read∞ records source paths and local metadata; it does not need to copy user books into a remote service. A report involving path traversal, unintended folder access, destructive file operations, or access outside a granted scope is security-sensitive.
Offline data handling
The offline application does not depend on login or cloud synchronization for its core library. Reports should still cover accidental network transmission, unexpected remote requests, exposed local metadata, unsafe URL handling, or a path that allows untrusted book content to reach privileged native operations.
Native and WebView boundaries
Native commands and Android integrations are reviewed as privileged boundaries. Reports involving arbitrary command execution, unsafe IPC, WebView escape, exported activities, permission escalation, or bypasses of user-selected-folder restrictions should include a minimal reproduction whenever possible.
Dependency and release security
JavaScript and Rust dependencies are pinned through the repository lockfiles. Release APKs are built in GitHub Actions, signed with repository secrets, and verified for package identity, signature, and ABI contents before publication. Signing passwords and private key material must never be committed or printed in logs.
Out of scope
The following are generally outside the project’s direct control unless the application introduces a specific unsafe interaction with them:
  • Vulnerabilities in an unmodified operating system, Android WebView, browser, or device firmware.
  • Physical access attacks against an unlocked device.
  • Malicious files opened by a user when no application boundary is bypassed.
  • Availability or security incidents in unrelated third-party services.
  • Feature requests or ordinary bugs without a confidentiality, integrity, privilege, or code-execution impact.
Supported versions
Security fixes are prioritized for the latest public release series.
VersionSupported
1.0.xYes
Older versionsBest effort only; update to the latest release when possible
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue or discussion for security-sensitive details. Use GitHub’s private vulnerability reporting for this repository, or contact the repository maintainer privately through the ZHINFINITY GitHub profile.
Include the affected version, platform and ABI where relevant, a clear security impact, reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept, and any suggested mitigation. Please redact personal files, private paths, signing material, and unrelated sensitive information.
We aim to acknowledge reports within three business days. We may request additional reproduction details or validation. Please keep vulnerability details private until a fix and disclosure plan have been agreed with the maintainer.
Incident response
For a confirmed vulnerability, maintainers will triage severity and affected versions, develop and test a mitigation, publish a patched release when appropriate, and document the resolution in the repository or release notes. Disclosure timing will be coordinated with the reporter whenever practical.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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Security: ZHINFINITY/ReadInfinity
Security
Report a vulnerability

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
Scope and threat model
Read∞ is an offline-first ebook reader for Android and desktop platforms. It processes user-selected ebook and dictionary files, stores reading metadata locally, and provides native filesystem access only through the application’s scoped platform integrations. Core reading does not require an account, cloud library, remote synchronization, telemetry, or a backend service.
The primary security boundary is the user’s device. Book and dictionary files are untrusted input and may be malformed or intentionally hostile. The application also includes native components, third-party parsing and rendering libraries, WebView content, build dependencies, and platform filesystem integrations.
Protected assets
AssetProtection goal
User-selected ebook and dictionary filesPrevent unintended modification, deletion, disclosure, or execution outside the reader’s supported content model
Reading progress, annotations, notes, covers, and preferencesKeep local metadata private and consistent
Selected-folder permissions and pathsUse only the folders the user grants or selects
Native bridge and filesystem operationsLimit platform actions to explicit application capabilities and validated inputs
Release signing materialKeep private signing keys and passwords outside the repository and CI logs
Dependencies and build outputsDetect tampering and known vulnerabilities before release
Important mitigations
Untrusted book content
Book files are treated as untrusted content. Rendering is isolated through the application’s WebView and reader boundaries, and the application does not treat ebook markup as native application code. Parser, renderer, archive, and content-security issues should be reported even when they require a specially crafted local file.
Local filesystem access
Native file access is initiated by an explicit user-selected folder, file picker, or operating-system open-with action. Read∞ records source paths and local metadata; it does not need to copy user books into a remote service. A report involving path traversal, unintended folder access, destructive file operations, or access outside a granted scope is security-sensitive.
Offline data handling
The offline application does not depend on login or cloud synchronization for its core library. Reports should still cover accidental network transmission, unexpected remote requests, exposed local metadata, unsafe URL handling, or a path that allows untrusted book content to reach privileged native operations.
Native and WebView boundaries
Native commands and Android integrations are reviewed as privileged boundaries. Reports involving arbitrary command execution, unsafe IPC, WebView escape, exported activities, permission escalation, or bypasses of user-selected-folder restrictions should include a minimal reproduction whenever possible.
Dependency and release security
JavaScript and Rust dependencies are pinned through the repository lockfiles. Release APKs are built in GitHub Actions, signed with repository secrets, and verified for package identity, signature, and ABI contents before publication. Signing passwords and private key material must never be committed or printed in logs.
Out of scope
The following are generally outside the project’s direct control unless the application introduces a specific unsafe interaction with them:
  • Vulnerabilities in an unmodified operating system, Android WebView, browser, or device firmware.
  • Physical access attacks against an unlocked device.
  • Malicious files opened by a user when no application boundary is bypassed.
  • Availability or security incidents in unrelated third-party services.
  • Feature requests or ordinary bugs without a confidentiality, integrity, privilege, or code-execution impact.
Supported versions
Security fixes are prioritized for the latest public release series.
VersionSupported
1.0.xYes
Older versionsBest effort only; update to the latest release when possible
Reporting a vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities privately. Do not open a public issue or discussion for security-sensitive details. Use GitHub’s private vulnerability reporting for this repository, or contact the repository maintainer privately through the ZHINFINITY GitHub profile.
Include the affected version, platform and ABI where relevant, a clear security impact, reproduction steps or a minimal proof of concept, and any suggested mitigation. Please redact personal files, private paths, signing material, and unrelated sensitive information.
We aim to acknowledge reports within three business days. We may request additional reproduction details or validation. Please keep vulnerability details private until a fix and disclosure plan have been agreed with the maintainer.
Incident response
For a confirmed vulnerability, maintainers will triage severity and affected versions, develop and test a mitigation, publish a patched release when appropriate, and document the resolution in the repository or release notes. Disclosure timing will be coordinated with the reporter whenever practical.
 There aren't any published security advisories