feat(desktop): bounded google calendar event contract and API walk (T12, slice one) by wiggdevin · Pull Request #21 · ZeroSum-Solutions/buzz

wiggdevin · 2026-09-05T20:28:30Z

feat(desktop): bounded google calendar event contract and API walk (T12, slice one)

Summary

This PR lands slice one of T12 (Google Calendar integration): the Rust
contract and data layer only. It adds a google_calendar module to
desktop/src-tauri with:

OAuth authorization contract (T11 dependency) — PKCE, state/nonce
correlation, a loopback callback listener with a bounded total wait,
and a revocation journal with bounded retry.
A fallible compare-and-set mutation seam on the secret store
(SecretStore::mutate_checked), used by the calendar credential
envelope.
A bounded Calendar REST client: capped DTOs (event id, etag, time
zone, page token, id token), a proven-interval walk over paginated
events.list results, transport containments (origin pin, no
redirects, no environment proxy, redacted errors), and a
classify-and-retry failure model.
An events-URL egress-guard inventory update (the repo's existing
relay-egress tripwire) recording the three new /events
URL-construction sites this module adds.

No UI, no Tauri command registration, no render cache. Those are T11
decisions 4, 6 (cache) and 7, and T12a's frontend decisions — all out
of scope for this slice; see Follow-ups.

Fork deviations

Chose the finding's primary resolution (three inventory rows) over its alternative (wire assert_no_key_backup_bytes in single_event_call). Reason cited in code and log: egress_guard.rs:1-24 scopes the guard to relay-bound egress of NIP-49 material, and the Calendar collection built at client.rs:604-607 resolves against www.googleapis.com with a Google bearer token over the Calendar REST API — no Nostr event, no relay, no websocket, so assert_no_key_backup would have nothing to check. The tripwire fired on a textual coincidence: its needle is the literal string '/events', which the Calendar REST collection happens to share with the Nostr relay route. Wiring the guard would also not close W5, whose defect is an unbounded body with no writable-field allowlist (client.rs:472, client.rs:509); an ncryptsec1 substring check bounds neither size nor field set, and the size cap plus allowlist are already scheduled for slice two.
The ticket's stated evals (cargo test google_calendar, just desktop-test) never reach egress_guard::tests, which is why the build round did not see this failure. This round therefore runs the whole lane — cargo test --lib and just desktop-tauri-test — as gates rather than only the ticket filters, and both are recorded above.

Defect checklist

Cap every relay-/user-sourced string at the DTO and test the cap — NOT APPLICABLE to this diff: it changes one test-only const table and adds no DTO field, no parse, no input path. Unchanged from the build round, where every cap named in its finding 10 (MAX_ID_CHARS, MAX_ETAG_CHARS, MAX_TIME_ZONE_CHARS, MAX_PAGE_TOKEN_CHARS, MAX_ID_TOKEN_BYTES) has a test.
Order multi-step writes so every prefix is consistent — NOT APPLICABLE: no write, durable or in-memory, is added or reordered.
Explicit environment for every child process or external server — NOT APPLICABLE: nothing is spawned and no server is started. The change is a compile-time table read by an in-process file scan (read_src_files over CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR).
Every gate bounds the quantity that actually costs — MET, and this is the substance of the fix. The tripwire's costing quantity is the per-file count of /events URL-construction sites paired with the count of guard calls in that file — the unguarded egress site itself, not a proxy such as file-is-on-a-list. The new rows keep that pairing exact at (1,0), (3,0), (1,0) instead of widening the scan, so a second site in client.rs or a fourth in client_tests.rs trips it again.
For every guard, a test that fails when the guard is removed — MET. The guard here is the inventory scan; removing any of the three new rows reproduces the pre-fix FAILED output exactly, and the pairing logic's own falsifiability is proven by inventory_scan_catches_new_site_in_allowlisted_file, inventory_scan_catches_removed_guard_call and inventory_scan_catches_new_unlisted_file, all re-run green.
No swallowed failure — MET. events_inventory_violations collects every violating file and events_url_inventory_is_fully_guarded asserts on the joined list (egress_guard_tests.rs:381-388), so no file is skipped and no drift is downgraded to a warning. The fix adds no error path.

Gates

Tested base OID (origin/zs/main, before this PR's merge commit): 347bfeea5e4f50a4640132d8d750b7d312763d2a

Command	Result
`cargo test google_calendar -- --list \| grep -c ': test'` then `cargo test google_calendar`	67 listed (>= ticket bar of 5); 67 passed, 0 failed
`just desktop-test`	6452 passed, 0 failed
`cargo test --lib` (desktop/src-tauri)	3387 passed, 0 failed
`just fmt-check`	exit 0
`just clippy`	exit 0
`just desktop-check`	exit 0
`just desktop-tauri-fmt-check`	exit 0
`just desktop-tauri-clippy`	exit 0
`just file-size-check`	exit 0
`desktop/src-tauri/Cargo.lock` diff	none — no Rust dependency added, no restore needed
`unwrap()`/`expect()`/`unsafe` scan on production files	none introduced
DCO (`git rev-list origin/zs/main..HEAD` × `git show -s --format=%B`)	all 5 commits carry `Signed-off-by`, all carry `Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1`

Pre-push gate suite (run at push time, full fork lane): push-head-scope, branch-skew, file-size-check, desktop-tauri-checks, rust-tests (12/12 crate suites, 185s) — all passed.

Gemini 3.8 Flash tester

SKIPPED. Worktree google-calendar-test was created and just desktop-install completed. A tester run was launched against a written brief but was still running (no output) when this round had to conclude, so no verdict could be parsed. The worktree was left in place, not removed, so the run can be checked or resumed. git status --porcelain in that worktree showed no changes at the time of this report. Report path: see Follow-ups.

Blind critic

Findings (branch-wide, not all in this PR's diff — see Follow-ups for slice-2 scope):

T11 decision 4 has no code and no test on the branch: no (pubkey, normalized relay URL, channel id) mapping, no opaque mapping id, no call-time tuple revalidation. insert_event/patch_event/delete_event (client.rs:472,509,531) take a bare calendar_id: &str.
T11 decision 6's cache half is absent: no SQLite render cache, no partition/global/row bounds, no oldest-first eviction, no WAL checkpoint, no membership epoch.
T11 decision 7 (refresh on focus, bounded interval, backoff) has no implementation and no test.
T12a decisions 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 have no code: no per-day segments/lanes, no Intl display zone, no CalendarMonth/MonthGrid, no virtualized agenda, no end-of-window state, no roving-focus keyboard path, no labelDayButton/Footer wiring.
The assigned e2e exercise could not run: no calendar view, no e2e mock bridge, no calendar spec exist on the branch.
T12a decision 11's truncated-field rule has no removal test on the path it governs: patch_event never calls CalendarEvent::can_edit_field.
fetch_events discards an already-proven batch on a malformed page (client.rs:388) instead of preserving the proven interval like every other stop path.
No traceability table maps every T11 decision to a named test.

What holds: DTO caps, the proven-interval algebra, the transport containments, and the compare-and-set fences are faithful to the memos, each with a removal-fails test. This branch is slice one only (Rust contract + data layer, no UI/cache/commands) by the ticket's own declared split (mod.rs:8-14); 9 of 22 numbered decisions have no implementing code, three of those inside this slice's own boundary. All gates and evals pass; both fork deviations are visible in the diff and justified.

GPT-5.6 Sol audit

Three review rounds (effort xhigh), converging OPEN with the following state at completion:

Resolved across rounds (verified fixed, confirmed by removal-fails tests):

The .no_proxy() bearer-token containment now has a differential test with origin pinning (base_url private, parsed, matrix-checked).
The compare-and-set seam (SecretStore::mutate_checked) is now exercised through the shipped KeychainEnvelopes::commit, not a reimplementation.
The loopback listener's total-wait guard now bounds the whole connection, not just each read, with a TimedOut test.
The page-cap overshoot half of the event-cap ordering defect is fixed (page truncated to remaining room before extend, with a test).

Still open at completion (all WARN, none reachable on this branch today — see Follow-ups):

reset.rs deletes the whole keychain blob on boot reset, including a google_calendar:<pubkey> envelope — not reachable since nothing on this branch persists an envelope yet.
fetch_events hardcodes refresh_already_forced = false at both call sites, so Terminal(Unauthorized) is unreachable from the retry walk.
A refused mutate_blob_checked call leaves self.cache stale (the adjacent no-op branch refreshes it; the refusal branch doesn't).
The event-cap check still runs before the page_token.is_none() check, so an exact-fit final page with no continuation token is reported truncated although the window was complete.
insert_event/patch_event take a raw, unbounded serde_json::Value with no writable-field allowlist and no body-size cap (W5) — no caller exists yet.
error_reason() returns an uncapped string that is capped for matching but not for the detail field that reaches logs and command errors.
AbandonRevocation names a recovery no transition can perform: an abandoned/terminal journal entry can never be cleared, so JournalFull becomes permanent once eight accumulate.
wait_for_callback returns a bare String (not Redacted) carrying the authorization code, and its state check happens after acceptance rather than during it.
A new test helper (transport_with_proxy_env) mutates process-wide proxy env vars inside a 3408-test parallel binary — a probabilistic flake risk, not yet observed.
calendar_id/event_id/etag are unbounded &str at the client boundary, unlike every other identifier in the module — not reachable, since nothing calls these functions yet.

Full round-by-round detail (including discarded/downgraded findings and reasoning) is in the audit reports linked in Follow-ups.

Follow-ups

Record the T12 backend/UI split in the implementation plan's ticket list, or fold T11 decisions 4, 6 (cache) and 7 back into this slice — today the split is declared only in mod.rs:8-14.
IdTokenSignatureVerifier (oauth.rs:352-366) has no production implementation and no cached JWKS; slice two needs a JWKS-backed verifier.
W5 carried forward: insert_event/patch_event (client.rs:472, 509) take unbounded JSON with no writable-field allowlist and no body size cap — must land before any Tauri command is registered.
T11 decision 9's agent-denial test covers the credential lookup but not "production shell and file tools", and there is no calendar command yet to deny — extend when slice two registers commands.
EventsPage::max_start_lower_bound_ms (dto.rs) is dead code; fetch_events computes its own maximum inline — use it or drop it so the two computations cannot drift.
Sol WARN: reset.rs boot-reset deletes the whole keychain blob, which would erase a Calendar envelope's revocation journal — blocking on slice 2 (calendar disconnect must integrate with sign-out ahead of reset).
Sol WARN: fetch_events passes refresh_already_forced: false at both call sites, making Terminal(Unauthorized) unreachable from the retry walk.
Sol WARN: a refused mutate_blob_checked call leaves the in-process cache stale; the no-op branch refreshes it but the refusal branch doesn't.
Sol WARN: the event-cap check still runs before page_token.is_none(), so an exact-fit final page is reported truncated although complete.
Sol WARN: error_reason()'s uncapped string reaches detail (logs, command errors) even though it's capped for classification matching.
Sol WARN: AbandonRevocation leaves a terminal/abandoned journal entry un-clearable, so JournalFull becomes permanent after eight entries with no way out.
Sol WARN: wait_for_callback returns a bare String instead of Redacted, and its state check runs after acceptance instead of during it.
Sol WARN: transport_with_proxy_env mutates process-wide proxy env vars inside a parallel 3408-test binary — re-exec as a child process instead.
Sol WARN: calendar_id/event_id/etag are unbounded &str at the client boundary — introduce validated newtypes checked at the mapping ingress.
Critic follow-up: exercise the frontend/e2e slice (T12a decisions 3-11) once the calendar view lands — no view, mock bridge, or spec exist yet on this branch.
Critic follow-up: patch_event should take the event plus changed fields and reject a truncated field via CalendarEvent::can_edit_field, with a removal-fails test.
Critic follow-up: fetch_events should return stop!(TruncationReason::Transport, ...) on a malformed page when an earlier page already completed, instead of discarding the proven interval.
Tester note: the Gemini tester run did not complete in this round; worktree google-calendar-test and its report path were left in place for a follow-up run to check or resume.

Reports:

Critic: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-zero-suminc-/a0fab389-7ac7-4f57-88e6-599d452e8e3a/scratchpad/wave4/google-calendar/critic.md
Sol audit rounds: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-zero-suminc-/a0fab389-7ac7-4f57-88e6-599d452e8e3a/scratchpad/wave4/google-calendar/audit.md, audit-delta-2.md, audit-delta-3.md
Tester: /private/tmp/claude-501/-Users-zero-suminc-/a0fab389-7ac7-4f57-88e6-599d452e8e3a/scratchpad/wave4/google-calendar/gemini-report.md

Test plan

🤖 Generated with Claude Code

https://claude.ai/code/session_01E51uwemNnQ6wdrBWU9EhPE

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`mutate_blob` runs a read-modify-write under the interprocess advisory lock with a fresh read inside it, but its mutation cannot refuse. A caller that needs "write this only if the stored state still says X" therefore had to check and then write, which loses the race the check exists for. Add `mutate_checked`, the same operation with a fallible mutation: an `Err` leaves the durable blob and the cache exactly as they were and is returned to the caller, so a predicate can be evaluated on the freshly-read durable state inside the lock. `mutate_blob` now delegates to it, so there is one implementation of the locking, reading and copy-on-write rules. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: wiggdevin <202901685+wiggdevin@users.noreply.github.com>

The credential half of T12, implementing the accepted memo `docs/plans/2026-09-04-calendar-authorization.md`. Nothing here is wired to a command, the webview or the sidebar, and no token reaches either: the module is the contract, the views and the render cache are slice two. * `redact` — the wrapper every credential is held in. It renders as a fixed marker and has no serializer, so a struct holding one cannot be serialized into a UI payload at all; persistence goes through an explicit wire form that is private to `binding`. * `oauth` — PKCE S256, a CSPRNG `state` checked with a constant-time compare, a CSPRNG `nonce` checked inside the ID token, the bounded callback parser, and the exchange conditions (refresh token, ID token, every requested scope) short of which no binding is written. Signature verification is a trait with no implementation here, so no path can produce validated claims without one being supplied (decisions 1 and 2). * `loopback` — the callback listener, bounded on request bytes, connections accepted, per-read time and total wait (decision 1). * `binding` — the stored envelope and five transition-specific compare-and-set predicates, each evaluated on the freshly-read durable state inside the store's lock. Disconnect clears the binding and opens the journal entry in one commit, so no prefix of it leaves a grant unreachable and unrevoked (decisions 2, 5 and 6). The envelope key sits outside the `mcp:` namespace the launcher resolves, which is decision 9's denial seam. * `revocation` — the journal: only HTTP 200 confirms, an entry clears only when the purge and the revocation both confirm, failures back off, and the seven-day ceiling converges on the terminal `revocation_unconfirmed` state rather than retrying forever (decision 5). * `failure` — the three error matrices and their four states, each with an explicit default that fails closed (decision 8). * `interval` — what a batch proves, half-open and never inferred (T12a decision 13). Every predicate has a test that fails when the predicate is deleted, and the concurrent disconnect is a barrier-held race over the shipped transition code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: wiggdevin <202901685+wiggdevin@users.noreply.github.com>

The data half of T12 slice one, implementing `docs/plans/2026-09-04-calendar-view-design.md` where it decides the model and the wire behaviour. Still nothing wired to a command or the webview. * `dto` — the only way API-sourced text enters the fork. Every string is capped here, at the boundary, with one `truncated` flag per field because a truncated field is read-only; the caps also hold a row inside T11 decision 6's 256 KiB bound. An all-day value stays a date in the calendar's zone, never an instant. Editability is `accessRole` narrowed by event type and organizer, and an unrecognized role or type is read-only (decisions 1 and 2). * `client` — the bounded `events.list` walk. Pages, bytes read off the socket, events accumulated and wall-clock time are each capped, a page cut at the byte budget is discarded whole, and the batch carries the interval it proved plus the classified failure that stopped it. The three mutations fence with `If-Match`, carry a client-generated id so a lost create is replayable, and treat a 404 as ambiguous until the calendar is probed (decisions 5, 11, 13). * The shipped transport pins HTTPS, refuses redirects — a followed redirect would replay the bearer token at another host — and never reads proxy settings from the process environment, which a managed agent at operator trust can write. * `mock_server` — a keep-alive mock Google Calendar with two principals on one shared calendar, an ACL-loss switch, paging, `If-Match`, a duplicate-id create and a redirect probe, so the transport, the walk, the caps, the classification and the parser under test are all the shipped ones. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: wiggdevin <202901685+wiggdevin@users.noreply.github.com>

One consolidated fix round on T12 slice one. Every guard the review found undertested now has a test that fails when the guard is deleted, and two guards that bounded the wrong thing were corrected. Transport containment (client.rs). `TransportConfig::base_url` is private and the origin is pinned by parsing, not prefix-matching: a shipped configuration reaches `https://www.googleapis.com/calendar/v3/` and nothing else, so `www.googleapis.com.evil.test`, a non-default port, another API path, an embedded credential and a query on the base are all refused. The `no_proxy()` containment now has a differential test: with every proxy variable pointing at a sentinel listener, a test-only configuration that reads the environment routes there, and the shipped one reaches the loopback mock directly with the sentinel untouched. Deleting `no_proxy()` fails it. Loopback listener (loopback.rs). The wait's deadline is carried into `read_callback`, so each read waits for the shorter of the idle bound and the wait's remainder. Before, the only bound inside a connection was the per-read timeout, which resets on every byte: one local process could hold the flow for hours without ever sending CRLFCRLF. `ListenerError::TimedOut` now has two tests, one with no connection and one with a stalled one; without the fix the second runs 30 s against a 250 ms budget. Compare-and-set seam (secret_store.rs, binding.rs). The candidate builder inside `mutate_checked` is extracted as `checked_candidate` and tested without a keychain, so turning `f(&mut next)?` into a discarded result fails a test on every platform. `KeychainEnvelopes` commits through a `CheckedBlob` seam, and every envelope test now drives that shipped commit over an in-memory blob rather than a reimplementation: swapping the `Refused` and `Store` arms fails seven tests. A backend failure and an unreadable stored envelope each have their own test. Bounds that bounded the wrong quantity. The walk applies the event cap to a page before adding it, so it can no longer return `max_events + page - 1` events, and the proven interval ends at the last kept start rather than the page's. An over-long `recurringEventId` is dropped rather than truncated into a different id. Also bound: the `events.list` query Google is asked for (`singleEvents`, `orderBy=startTime`, `timeMin`, `timeMax`, `maxResults`), the id, etag, zone and page-token caps, the id-token byte cap, and T11 decision 9 driven through the shipped `McpSecretLookup::resolve` with a working control. The mock server no longer `dup`s its socket: a failing `try_clone` near the descriptor limit closed a connection silently, which a client sees as a reset mid-request. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: wiggdevin <202901685+wiggdevin@users.noreply.github.com>

The events-URL tripwire in `egress_guard_tests.rs` scans every `.rs` file under `desktop/src-tauri/src` for `/events` URL construction and fails until each site is paired with an inventory row. The Google Calendar slice adds five such sites — `client.rs:606` (`events_path`), `mock_server.rs:287` and three fixtures in `client_tests.rs` — so `cargo test --lib` (the lane behind `just desktop-tauri-test` and CI's Tauri Rust job) failed `events_url_inventory_is_fully_guarded`. Answer the question the tripwire asks rather than silence it. The Calendar REST collection is not a relay egress boundary: the request goes to `www.googleapis.com` with a Google bearer token and carries no Nostr event, so `assert_no_key_backup` — whose stated scope in `egress_guard.rs` is relay-bound egress of NIP-49 backup material — has nothing to check there. Record that as three rows with zero expected guard calls and the reasoning written beside them, in the file's existing style. The rows still fence the files: a second `/events` site in `client.rs`, or a fourth in `client_tests.rs`, trips the scan and asks again. The existing mutation tests (`inventory_scan_catches_new_site_in_allowlisted_file`, `inventory_scan_catches_removed_guard_call`, `inventory_scan_catches_new_unlisted_file`) already prove the pairing fails when a row or a guard call is removed, so no new mutation test is added. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> Signed-off-by: wiggdevin <202901685+wiggdevin@users.noreply.github.com>

Signed-off-by: wiggdevin <202901685+wiggdevin@users.noreply.github.com>

wiggdevin and others added 6 commits September 5, 2026 11:35

Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/zs/main' into feat/google-calendar

6062afc

Signed-off-by: wiggdevin <202901685+wiggdevin@users.noreply.github.com>

wiggdevin marked this pull request as ready for review September 5, 2026 20:28

wiggdevin enabled auto-merge September 5, 2026 20:28

wiggdevin added this pull request to the merge queue Sep 5, 2026

Merged via the queue into zs/main with commit 0dcb7fe Sep 5, 2026
75 of 76 checks passed

wiggdevin deleted the feat/google-calendar branch September 5, 2026 21:30

This was referenced Sep 5, 2026

fix(desktop): let the proxy sentinel settle before the calendar transport test reads its baseline #24

Merged

feat(acp): park, pause, breaker and replay in the agent harness (T16) #35

Merged

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feat(desktop): bounded google calendar event contract and API walk (T12, slice one) - #21

feat(desktop): bounded google calendar event contract and API walk (T12, slice one)#21
wiggdevin merged 6 commits into
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wiggdevin commented Sep 5, 2026 •

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Summary

Fork deviations

Defect checklist

Gates

Gemini 3.8 Flash tester

Blind critic

GPT-5.6 Sol audit

Follow-ups

Test plan

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wiggdevin commented Sep 5, 2026 •

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