fix(opencode): resolve symlinks to directories in project picker

[frizikk]

Fixes#10365

Summary

Symlinked directories weren't visible in the project picker because entry.isDirectory() returns false for symlinks.

Changes

Added symlink detection with parallel target resolution:

constisDir=entry.isDirectory()||(entry.isSymbolicLink()&&awaitFilesystem.isDir(fullPath))

• Uses existing Filesystem.isDir() (Bun API)
• stat() only for symlinks (short-circuit)
• Parallel processing via Promise.all()

Files

File	Change
packages/opencode/src/file/index.ts	Symlink handling in File.list() and home scan
packages/opencode/test/file/symlink.test.ts	5 tests (new)
packages/opencode/test/util/filesystem.test.ts	1 test

Verification

ln -s /tmp/real-dir ~/Projects/symlink-dir
bun dev # symlink-dir visible in picker
bun test test/file/symlink.test.ts # 5 pass

[github-actions]

The following comment was made by an LLM, it may be inaccurate:

Based on my search, I found one potentially related PR:

Related PR:

• fix(security): prevent path traversal via symlinks in File.read and File.list #8727 - fix(security): prevent path traversal via symlinks in File.read and File.list

This PR also deals with symlink handling in the File.list() function. While your current PR (10366) focuses on making symlinked directories visible in the project picker, PR #8727 addresses security concerns with symlinks in file operations. These may have overlapping changes in the same file (packages/opencode/src/file/index.ts), so it's worth reviewing to ensure compatibility.

[frizikk]

Security Consideration

I'm aware of #8313 and the related PR #8727 addressing path traversal via symlinks.
This PR does not introduce security vulnerabilities:

1. No changes to containment checks - The Instance.containsPath(resolved) check (line 355) remains untouched and executes before any symlink handling.
2. Metadata only - Our change only determines if a symlink points to a directory for display purposes (type: "directory" vs type: "file"). It does not read file contents or bypass access controls.
3. Symlink escape still blocked - If a symlink inside the project points outside (e.g., evil-link -> /etc), any attempt to File.list("evil-link") will fail at the containsPath() check.
4. Orthogonal to fix(security): prevent path traversal via symlinks in File.read and File.list #8727 - PR fix(security): prevent path traversal via symlinks in File.read and File.list #8727 adds realpath() validation before access. Our change operates after containment is verified, only affecting how entries are classified in listings.
   The existing path-traversal tests in test/file/path-traversal.test.ts continue to pass.

[github-actions]

Closing this pull request because it has had no updates for more than 60 days. If you plan to continue working on it, feel free to reopen or open a new PR.