HADOOP-19868: ci: add comments from security review of new actions

.github/workflows/build_and_test.yml

@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
 
 name: "Build"
 
+# Security: write privileges are safe since this is triggered
+# only by `push` (implying user has write access).
 on:
   push:
     branches:

.github/workflows/notify_test_workflow.yml

@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@
 
 name: "PR update"
 
+# Security: `pull_request_target` events can be risky, but we:
+# 1. Only grant write access for checks (a.k.a. check runs).
+# 2. We are careful with untrusted inputs (i.e. don't use user-supplied
+#    variables in ways vulnerable to shell injection, etc.)
+# 3. We don't check out the fork's head ref.
 on:
   pull_request_target:
     types: [opened, reopened, synchronize]

.github/workflows/tmpl_build_and_test.yml

@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ on:
           Candidates: "build-only".
         default: '[ "build-only" ]'
 
+# Default to minimal permissions for workflow.
 permissions:
   packages: read
 
@@ -78,6 +79,9 @@ jobs:
     steps:
       - name: Set up Outputs
         id: variables
+        # Security: passing inputs.{os, branch} through workflow (above) inputs removes
+        # ability to do shell injection below.
+        # See: https://securitylab.github.com/resources/github-actions-untrusted-input/
         run: |
           # Convert to lowercase to meet Docker repo name requirement
           REPO_OWNER=$(echo "${{ github.repository_owner }}" | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')
@@ -86,6 +90,23 @@ jobs:
     name: Build Image ${{ inputs.os }}-${{ inputs.branch }}
     runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
     needs: [ precondition ]
+    # Security: this does not leak write access for our image repository to
+    # forked repos.
+    #
+    # We have `packages: write` permissions for our GITHUB_TOKEN below. However:
+    #
+    # - For `pull_request`, GitHub downgrades GITHUB_TOKEN permissions to
+    #   read-only.
+    # - For `push` triggers on a fork, the GITHUB_TOKEN retains write
+    #   permissions, but the `push` is happening in the context of the fork, not
+    #   the upstream repo.
+    # - `pull_request_target` events (not used here) use the base repo's
+    #   default branch. This prevents an attacker from adding code in a pull
+    #   request which prints / leaks secrets, etc.. Also the GITHUB_TOKEN we
+    #   use to grant access to writing to the image repo. is scoped to the
+    #   repository it runs on. Even if a fork were to gain access to a
+    #   GITHUB_TOKEN with write privileges, it doesn't grant access for other
+    #   repositories to write.
     permissions:
       packages: write
     outputs:

.github/workflows/update_build_status.yml

@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ on:
   schedule:
     - cron: "*/15 * * * *"
 
+# Security: privileged (can write) workflow is only triggered via schedule,
+# so issues associated with forks do not apply.
 jobs:
   update:
     name: "Update Build Status"