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security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS #451

Closed
#482
Closed
security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS#451
#482
Assignees
nic-6443
Labels
P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability

Description

@juzhiyuan
juzhiyuan
opened on May 29, 2026

Summary

Proxy metrics currently use the raw request path as the endpoint label before authentication. Unauthenticated callers can create unbounded time series through unique passthrough paths.

Source

  • Imported from Codex Security scan results shared in Slock #Dev:bc985f48 (chatgpt.com.har).
  • This issue groups findings with the same engineering boundary to avoid fragmented fixes.
  • Triage priority: P1.

Covered scanner findings

Expected fix direction

  • Normalize metric endpoint labels to a fixed route template such as /passthrough/:provider/*rest before recording.
  • Avoid recording high-cardinality labels derived from unauthenticated raw paths.
  • Verify zero-value gauge series are removed or bounded if the metrics backend retains label sets.
  • Add a regression test that many unique unauthenticated passthrough paths produce bounded metric series.

Definition of done

  • Fix is covered by regression tests for the affected mode/provider/endpoint.
  • The fix is applied at the shared boundary where possible, not only at one provider call site.
  • Security behavior is documented in code comments or docs where operator expectations change.

Metadata

Metadata

Assignees

Labels

P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability

Type

No type

Projects

No projects

    Milestone

    No milestone

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    None yet

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    No branches or pull requests

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    , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Add copy buttons to all 
     blocks
(function() {
function addCopyButtons() {
document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {
if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;
codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');
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btn.textContent = 'Copy';
btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';
btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };
btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };
btn.onclick = function() {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {
btn.textContent = 'Copied!';
setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);
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codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';
codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);
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observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
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}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
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(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS · Issue #451 · api7/aisix · GitHub
    Skip to content
    security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS #451
    Closed
    #482
    Closed
    security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS#451
    #482
    Assignees
    nic-6443
    Labels
    P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
    Description
    @juzhiyuan
    juzhiyuan
    opened on May 29, 2026
    Summary
    Proxy metrics currently use the raw request path as the endpoint label before authentication. Unauthenticated callers can create unbounded time series through unique passthrough paths.
    Source
    • Imported from Codex Security scan results shared in Slock #Dev:bc985f48 (chatgpt.com.har).
    • This issue groups findings with the same engineering boundary to avoid fragmented fixes.
    • Triage priority: P1.
    Covered scanner findings
    Expected fix direction
    •  Normalize metric endpoint labels to a fixed route template such as /passthrough/:provider/*rest before recording.
    •  Avoid recording high-cardinality labels derived from unauthenticated raw paths.
    •  Verify zero-value gauge series are removed or bounded if the metrics backend retains label sets.
    •  Add a regression test that many unique unauthenticated passthrough paths produce bounded metric series.
    Definition of done
    •  Fix is covered by regression tests for the affected mode/provider/endpoint.
    •  The fix is applied at the shared boundary where possible, not only at one provider call site.
    •  Security behavior is documented in code comments or docs where operator expectations change.
    Metadata
    Metadata
    Assignees
    Labels
    P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
    Type
    No type
    Projects
    No projects
      Milestone
      No milestone
      Relationships
      None yet
      Development
      No branches or pull requests
      Issue actions
      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode
(function() {
var style = document.createElement('style');
style.textContent = '
.markdown-body {
color-scheme: dark light;
}
.markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }
.markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }
.markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }
.markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }
.markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }
.markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }
';
document.head.appendChild(style);
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS · Issue #451 · api7/aisix · GitHub
      Skip to content
      security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS #451
      Closed
      #482
      Closed
      security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS#451
      #482
      Assignees
      nic-6443
      Labels
      P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
      Description
      @juzhiyuan
      juzhiyuan
      opened on May 29, 2026
      Summary
      Proxy metrics currently use the raw request path as the endpoint label before authentication. Unauthenticated callers can create unbounded time series through unique passthrough paths.
      Source
      • Imported from Codex Security scan results shared in Slock #Dev:bc985f48 (chatgpt.com.har).
      • This issue groups findings with the same engineering boundary to avoid fragmented fixes.
      • Triage priority: P1.
      Covered scanner findings
      Expected fix direction
      •  Normalize metric endpoint labels to a fixed route template such as /passthrough/:provider/*rest before recording.
      •  Avoid recording high-cardinality labels derived from unauthenticated raw paths.
      •  Verify zero-value gauge series are removed or bounded if the metrics backend retains label sets.
      •  Add a regression test that many unique unauthenticated passthrough paths produce bounded metric series.
      Definition of done
      •  Fix is covered by regression tests for the affected mode/provider/endpoint.
      •  The fix is applied at the shared boundary where possible, not only at one provider call site.
      •  Security behavior is documented in code comments or docs where operator expectations change.
      Metadata
      Metadata
      Assignees
      Labels
      P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
      Type
      No type
      Projects
      No projects
        Milestone
        No milestone
        Relationships
        None yet
        Development
        No branches or pull requests
        Issue actions
        
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer
(function() {
var ref = document.referrer;
var terms = [];
if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {
var url = new URL(ref);
var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');
if (q) {
terms = q.split(/\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });
}
}
if (terms.length === 0) return;
var style = document.createElement('style');
style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';
document.head.appendChild(style);
function highlight(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node
var text = node.textContent;
var found = false;
terms.forEach(function(term) {
var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\') + ')', 'gi');
if (regex.test(text)) {
found = true;
var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();
var parts = text.split(regex);
parts.forEach(function(part, i) {
if (i % 2 === 0) {
frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));
} else {
var span = document.createElement('span');
span.className = 'userscript-highlight';
span.textContent = part;
frag.appendChild(span);
}
});
node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);
}
});
} else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element
var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];
if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {
Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);
}
}
}
highlight(document.body);
// Re-highlight on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
mutations.forEach(function(m) {
m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);
});
});
});
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS · Issue #451 · api7/aisix · GitHub
        Skip to content
        security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS #451
        Closed
        #482
        Closed
        security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS#451
        #482
        Assignees
        nic-6443
        Labels
        P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
        Description
        @juzhiyuan
        juzhiyuan
        opened on May 29, 2026
        Summary
        Proxy metrics currently use the raw request path as the endpoint label before authentication. Unauthenticated callers can create unbounded time series through unique passthrough paths.
        Source
        • Imported from Codex Security scan results shared in Slock #Dev:bc985f48 (chatgpt.com.har).
        • This issue groups findings with the same engineering boundary to avoid fragmented fixes.
        • Triage priority: P1.
        Covered scanner findings
        Expected fix direction
        •  Normalize metric endpoint labels to a fixed route template such as /passthrough/:provider/*rest before recording.
        •  Avoid recording high-cardinality labels derived from unauthenticated raw paths.
        •  Verify zero-value gauge series are removed or bounded if the metrics backend retains label sets.
        •  Add a regression test that many unique unauthenticated passthrough paths produce bounded metric series.
        Definition of done
        •  Fix is covered by regression tests for the affected mode/provider/endpoint.
        •  The fix is applied at the shared boundary where possible, not only at one provider call site.
        •  Security behavior is documented in code comments or docs where operator expectations change.
        Metadata
        Metadata
        Assignees
        Labels
        P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
        Type
        No type
        Projects
        No projects
          Milestone
          No milestone
          Relationships
          None yet
          Development
          No branches or pull requests
          Issue actions
          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page
(function() {
var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',
'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',
'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];
function cleanUrl(url) {
try {
var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);
var changed = false;
trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {
if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {
u.searchParams.delete(p);
changed = true;
}
});
return changed ? u.toString() : url;
} catch (e) {
return url;
}
}
function cleanLinks() {
document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {
var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);
if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;
});
}
cleanLinks();
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
mutations.forEach(function(m) {
m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 1) {
if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();
node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {
var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);
if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;
});
}
});
});
});
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS · Issue #451 · api7/aisix · GitHub
          Skip to content
          security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS #451
          Closed
          #482
          Closed
          security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS#451
          #482
          Assignees
          nic-6443
          Labels
          P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
          Description
          @juzhiyuan
          juzhiyuan
          opened on May 29, 2026
          Summary
          Proxy metrics currently use the raw request path as the endpoint label before authentication. Unauthenticated callers can create unbounded time series through unique passthrough paths.
          Source
          • Imported from Codex Security scan results shared in Slock #Dev:bc985f48 (chatgpt.com.har).
          • This issue groups findings with the same engineering boundary to avoid fragmented fixes.
          • Triage priority: P1.
          Covered scanner findings
          Expected fix direction
          •  Normalize metric endpoint labels to a fixed route template such as /passthrough/:provider/*rest before recording.
          •  Avoid recording high-cardinality labels derived from unauthenticated raw paths.
          •  Verify zero-value gauge series are removed or bounded if the metrics backend retains label sets.
          •  Add a regression test that many unique unauthenticated passthrough paths produce bounded metric series.
          Definition of done
          •  Fix is covered by regression tests for the affected mode/provider/endpoint.
          •  The fix is applied at the shared boundary where possible, not only at one provider call site.
          •  Security behavior is documented in code comments or docs where operator expectations change.
          Metadata
          Metadata
          Assignees
          Labels
          P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
          Type
          No type
          Projects
          No projects
            Milestone
            No milestone
            Relationships
            None yet
            Development
            No branches or pull requests
            Issue actions
            
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube
(function() {
function tryTheater() {
var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label="Theater mode"], ytd-player #player button[title="Theater mode"]');
if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {
btn.click();
}
}
// Try immediately
tryTheater();
// Try after navigation (SPA)
var lastUrl = location.href;
setInterval(function() {
if (location.href !== lastUrl) {
lastUrl = location.href;
setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);
}
}, 1000);
// Also try on player load
var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS · Issue #451 · api7/aisix · GitHub
            Skip to content
            security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS #451
            Closed
            #482
            Closed
            security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS#451
            #482
            Assignees
            nic-6443
            Labels
            P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
            Description
            @juzhiyuan
            juzhiyuan
            opened on May 29, 2026
            Summary
            Proxy metrics currently use the raw request path as the endpoint label before authentication. Unauthenticated callers can create unbounded time series through unique passthrough paths.
            Source
            • Imported from Codex Security scan results shared in Slock #Dev:bc985f48 (chatgpt.com.har).
            • This issue groups findings with the same engineering boundary to avoid fragmented fixes.
            • Triage priority: P1.
            Covered scanner findings
            Expected fix direction
            •  Normalize metric endpoint labels to a fixed route template such as /passthrough/:provider/*rest before recording.
            •  Avoid recording high-cardinality labels derived from unauthenticated raw paths.
            •  Verify zero-value gauge series are removed or bounded if the metrics backend retains label sets.
            •  Add a regression test that many unique unauthenticated passthrough paths produce bounded metric series.
            Definition of done
            •  Fix is covered by regression tests for the affected mode/provider/endpoint.
            •  The fix is applied at the shared boundary where possible, not only at one provider call site.
            •  Security behavior is documented in code comments or docs where operator expectations change.
            Metadata
            Metadata
            Assignees
            Labels
            P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
            Type
            No type
            Projects
            No projects
              Milestone
              No milestone
              Relationships
              None yet
              Development
              No branches or pull requests
              Issue actions
              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content
(function() {
function unstick() {
document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role="banner"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*="position: fixed"], [style*="position:sticky"]').forEach(function(el) {
if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {
el.style.position = 'static';
el.style.top = 'auto';
el.style.zIndex = 'auto';
}
});
}
unstick();
var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS · Issue #451 · api7/aisix · GitHub
              Skip to content
              security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS #451
              Closed
              #482
              Closed
              security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS#451
              #482
              Assignees
              nic-6443
              Labels
              P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
              Description
              @juzhiyuan
              juzhiyuan
              opened on May 29, 2026
              Summary
              Proxy metrics currently use the raw request path as the endpoint label before authentication. Unauthenticated callers can create unbounded time series through unique passthrough paths.
              Source
              • Imported from Codex Security scan results shared in Slock #Dev:bc985f48 (chatgpt.com.har).
              • This issue groups findings with the same engineering boundary to avoid fragmented fixes.
              • Triage priority: P1.
              Covered scanner findings
              Expected fix direction
              •  Normalize metric endpoint labels to a fixed route template such as /passthrough/:provider/*rest before recording.
              •  Avoid recording high-cardinality labels derived from unauthenticated raw paths.
              •  Verify zero-value gauge series are removed or bounded if the metrics backend retains label sets.
              •  Add a regression test that many unique unauthenticated passthrough paths produce bounded metric series.
              Definition of done
              •  Fix is covered by regression tests for the affected mode/provider/endpoint.
              •  The fix is applied at the shared boundary where possible, not only at one provider call site.
              •  Security behavior is documented in code comments or docs where operator expectations change.
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              Labels
              P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
              Type
              No type
              Projects
              No projects
                Milestone
                No milestone
                Relationships
                None yet
                Development
                No branches or pull requests
                Issue actions
                
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site
(function() {
var enabled = true;
function applyDarkMode() {
if (!enabled) return;
// Create style element if it doesn't exist
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (!style) {
style = document.createElement('style');
style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';
document.head.appendChild(style);
}
// Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video
style.textContent = '
/* Invert everything except media */
html {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #1a1a2e !important;
}
/* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */
img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*="background-image"] {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
}
/* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */
.no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,
[data-theme="light"], [data-theme="light"],
.ace_editor, .ace_editor *,
.CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,
.monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,
.markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,
.highlight, .highlight *,
pre code, pre code * {
filter: none !important;
}
/* Fix common UI elements */
.modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #2d2d44 !important;
border-color: #444 !important;
}
/* Scrollbars */
::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }
/* Selection */
::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
';
}
function removeDarkMode() {
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (style) style.remove();
}
// Toggle with Alt+Shift+D
document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {
if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {
e.preventDefault();
enabled = !enabled;
if (enabled) {
applyDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');
} else {
removeDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');
}
}
});
// Apply on load
applyDarkMode();
// Re-apply on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {
applyDarkMode();
}
});
observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();
security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS · Issue #451 · api7/aisix · GitHub
                Skip to content
                security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS #451
                Closed
                #482
                Closed
                security: prevent unauthenticated metric-label cardinality DoS#451
                #482
                Assignees
                nic-6443
                Labels
                P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
                Description
                @juzhiyuan
                juzhiyuan
                opened on May 29, 2026
                Summary
                Proxy metrics currently use the raw request path as the endpoint label before authentication. Unauthenticated callers can create unbounded time series through unique passthrough paths.
                Source
                • Imported from Codex Security scan results shared in Slock #Dev:bc985f48 (chatgpt.com.har).
                • This issue groups findings with the same engineering boundary to avoid fragmented fixes.
                • Triage priority: P1.
                Covered scanner findings
                Expected fix direction
                •  Normalize metric endpoint labels to a fixed route template such as /passthrough/:provider/*rest before recording.
                •  Avoid recording high-cardinality labels derived from unauthenticated raw paths.
                •  Verify zero-value gauge series are removed or bounded if the metrics backend retains label sets.
                •  Add a regression test that many unique unauthenticated passthrough paths produce bounded metric series.
                Definition of done
                •  Fix is covered by regression tests for the affected mode/provider/endpoint.
                •  The fix is applied at the shared boundary where possible, not only at one provider call site.
                •  Security behavior is documented in code comments or docs where operator expectations change.
                Metadata
                Metadata
                Assignees
                Labels
                P1High-value differentiatorbugSomething isn't workingvulnerability
                Type
                No type
                Projects
                No projects
                  Milestone
                  No milestone
                  Relationships
                  None yet
                  Development
                  No branches or pull requests
                  Issue actions