Security: baanish/agent-render

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

agent-render treats artifact payloads as untrusted input. The default static viewer keeps artifact contents in the URL fragment so the host does not receive the payload during the initial page request, but shared links can still appear in browser history, copied URLs, screenshots, logs from browser extensions, or any client-side telemetry added by a deployer.

Supported Versions

Security fixes are accepted for the current main branch and the latest tagged release.

VersionSupported
0.1.xYes

Reporting a Vulnerability

Please report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting:

https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/security/advisories/new

If private reporting is unavailable, open a minimal public issue that describes the affected surface without including exploit payloads or private artifact data:

https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/issues/new

Useful reports include:

  • The affected renderer, codec, or payload path.
  • A small sanitized reproduction payload or link.
  • The expected impact, such as script execution, payload disclosure, denial of service, or unsafe parsing.
  • Browser and deployment details when the behavior depends on runtime environment.

Security Boundaries

  • The static fragment-based viewer is zero-retention by host design, not a general-purpose secret manager.
  • The optional self-hosted UUID mode stores payloads server-side and must be protected according to the deployment operator's needs.
  • Markdown rendering must remain sanitized; raw HTML support requires explicit security review before shipping.
  • Renderer and codec changes should fail clearly on malformed or oversized payloads before mounting expensive UI paths when possible.

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: baanish/agent-render
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
agent-render treats artifact payloads as untrusted input. The default static viewer keeps artifact contents in the URL fragment so the host does not receive the payload during the initial page request, but shared links can still appear in browser history, copied URLs, screenshots, logs from browser extensions, or any client-side telemetry added by a deployer.
Supported Versions
Security fixes are accepted for the current main branch and the latest tagged release.
VersionSupported
0.1.xYes
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/security/advisories/new
If private reporting is unavailable, open a minimal public issue that describes the affected surface without including exploit payloads or private artifact data:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/issues/new
Useful reports include:
  • The affected renderer, codec, or payload path.
  • A small sanitized reproduction payload or link.
  • The expected impact, such as script execution, payload disclosure, denial of service, or unsafe parsing.
  • Browser and deployment details when the behavior depends on runtime environment.
Security Boundaries
  • The static fragment-based viewer is zero-retention by host design, not a general-purpose secret manager.
  • The optional self-hosted UUID mode stores payloads server-side and must be protected according to the deployment operator's needs.
  • Markdown rendering must remain sanitized; raw HTML support requires explicit security review before shipping.
  • Renderer and codec changes should fail clearly on malformed or oversized payloads before mounting expensive UI paths when possible.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: baanish/agent-render
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
agent-render treats artifact payloads as untrusted input. The default static viewer keeps artifact contents in the URL fragment so the host does not receive the payload during the initial page request, but shared links can still appear in browser history, copied URLs, screenshots, logs from browser extensions, or any client-side telemetry added by a deployer.
Supported Versions
Security fixes are accepted for the current main branch and the latest tagged release.
VersionSupported
0.1.xYes
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/security/advisories/new
If private reporting is unavailable, open a minimal public issue that describes the affected surface without including exploit payloads or private artifact data:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/issues/new
Useful reports include:
  • The affected renderer, codec, or payload path.
  • A small sanitized reproduction payload or link.
  • The expected impact, such as script execution, payload disclosure, denial of service, or unsafe parsing.
  • Browser and deployment details when the behavior depends on runtime environment.
Security Boundaries
  • The static fragment-based viewer is zero-retention by host design, not a general-purpose secret manager.
  • The optional self-hosted UUID mode stores payloads server-side and must be protected according to the deployment operator's needs.
  • Markdown rendering must remain sanitized; raw HTML support requires explicit security review before shipping.
  • Renderer and codec changes should fail clearly on malformed or oversized payloads before mounting expensive UI paths when possible.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: baanish/agent-render
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
agent-render treats artifact payloads as untrusted input. The default static viewer keeps artifact contents in the URL fragment so the host does not receive the payload during the initial page request, but shared links can still appear in browser history, copied URLs, screenshots, logs from browser extensions, or any client-side telemetry added by a deployer.
Supported Versions
Security fixes are accepted for the current main branch and the latest tagged release.
VersionSupported
0.1.xYes
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/security/advisories/new
If private reporting is unavailable, open a minimal public issue that describes the affected surface without including exploit payloads or private artifact data:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/issues/new
Useful reports include:
  • The affected renderer, codec, or payload path.
  • A small sanitized reproduction payload or link.
  • The expected impact, such as script execution, payload disclosure, denial of service, or unsafe parsing.
  • Browser and deployment details when the behavior depends on runtime environment.
Security Boundaries
  • The static fragment-based viewer is zero-retention by host design, not a general-purpose secret manager.
  • The optional self-hosted UUID mode stores payloads server-side and must be protected according to the deployment operator's needs.
  • Markdown rendering must remain sanitized; raw HTML support requires explicit security review before shipping.
  • Renderer and codec changes should fail clearly on malformed or oversized payloads before mounting expensive UI paths when possible.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: baanish/agent-render
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
agent-render treats artifact payloads as untrusted input. The default static viewer keeps artifact contents in the URL fragment so the host does not receive the payload during the initial page request, but shared links can still appear in browser history, copied URLs, screenshots, logs from browser extensions, or any client-side telemetry added by a deployer.
Supported Versions
Security fixes are accepted for the current main branch and the latest tagged release.
VersionSupported
0.1.xYes
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/security/advisories/new
If private reporting is unavailable, open a minimal public issue that describes the affected surface without including exploit payloads or private artifact data:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/issues/new
Useful reports include:
  • The affected renderer, codec, or payload path.
  • A small sanitized reproduction payload or link.
  • The expected impact, such as script execution, payload disclosure, denial of service, or unsafe parsing.
  • Browser and deployment details when the behavior depends on runtime environment.
Security Boundaries
  • The static fragment-based viewer is zero-retention by host design, not a general-purpose secret manager.
  • The optional self-hosted UUID mode stores payloads server-side and must be protected according to the deployment operator's needs.
  • Markdown rendering must remain sanitized; raw HTML support requires explicit security review before shipping.
  • Renderer and codec changes should fail clearly on malformed or oversized payloads before mounting expensive UI paths when possible.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: baanish/agent-render
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
agent-render treats artifact payloads as untrusted input. The default static viewer keeps artifact contents in the URL fragment so the host does not receive the payload during the initial page request, but shared links can still appear in browser history, copied URLs, screenshots, logs from browser extensions, or any client-side telemetry added by a deployer.
Supported Versions
Security fixes are accepted for the current main branch and the latest tagged release.
VersionSupported
0.1.xYes
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/security/advisories/new
If private reporting is unavailable, open a minimal public issue that describes the affected surface without including exploit payloads or private artifact data:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/issues/new
Useful reports include:
  • The affected renderer, codec, or payload path.
  • A small sanitized reproduction payload or link.
  • The expected impact, such as script execution, payload disclosure, denial of service, or unsafe parsing.
  • Browser and deployment details when the behavior depends on runtime environment.
Security Boundaries
  • The static fragment-based viewer is zero-retention by host design, not a general-purpose secret manager.
  • The optional self-hosted UUID mode stores payloads server-side and must be protected according to the deployment operator's needs.
  • Markdown rendering must remain sanitized; raw HTML support requires explicit security review before shipping.
  • Renderer and codec changes should fail clearly on malformed or oversized payloads before mounting expensive UI paths when possible.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: baanish/agent-render
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
agent-render treats artifact payloads as untrusted input. The default static viewer keeps artifact contents in the URL fragment so the host does not receive the payload during the initial page request, but shared links can still appear in browser history, copied URLs, screenshots, logs from browser extensions, or any client-side telemetry added by a deployer.
Supported Versions
Security fixes are accepted for the current main branch and the latest tagged release.
VersionSupported
0.1.xYes
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/security/advisories/new
If private reporting is unavailable, open a minimal public issue that describes the affected surface without including exploit payloads or private artifact data:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/issues/new
Useful reports include:
  • The affected renderer, codec, or payload path.
  • A small sanitized reproduction payload or link.
  • The expected impact, such as script execution, payload disclosure, denial of service, or unsafe parsing.
  • Browser and deployment details when the behavior depends on runtime environment.
Security Boundaries
  • The static fragment-based viewer is zero-retention by host design, not a general-purpose secret manager.
  • The optional self-hosted UUID mode stores payloads server-side and must be protected according to the deployment operator's needs.
  • Markdown rendering must remain sanitized; raw HTML support requires explicit security review before shipping.
  • Renderer and codec changes should fail clearly on malformed or oversized payloads before mounting expensive UI paths when possible.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

Skip to content
Security: baanish/agent-render
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
agent-render treats artifact payloads as untrusted input. The default static viewer keeps artifact contents in the URL fragment so the host does not receive the payload during the initial page request, but shared links can still appear in browser history, copied URLs, screenshots, logs from browser extensions, or any client-side telemetry added by a deployer.
Supported Versions
Security fixes are accepted for the current main branch and the latest tagged release.
VersionSupported
0.1.xYes
Reporting a Vulnerability
Please report suspected vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/security/advisories/new
If private reporting is unavailable, open a minimal public issue that describes the affected surface without including exploit payloads or private artifact data:
https://github.com/baanish/agent-render/issues/new
Useful reports include:
  • The affected renderer, codec, or payload path.
  • A small sanitized reproduction payload or link.
  • The expected impact, such as script execution, payload disclosure, denial of service, or unsafe parsing.
  • Browser and deployment details when the behavior depends on runtime environment.
Security Boundaries
  • The static fragment-based viewer is zero-retention by host design, not a general-purpose secret manager.
  • The optional self-hosted UUID mode stores payloads server-side and must be protected according to the deployment operator's needs.
  • Markdown rendering must remain sanitized; raw HTML support requires explicit security review before shipping.
  • Renderer and codec changes should fail clearly on malformed or oversized payloads before mounting expensive UI paths when possible.
 There aren't any published security advisories