@bounded-systems/cas

Content-addressable storage — the substrate.

The lowest layer in the provenance stack: bytes addressed by their SHA-256 digest. Higher layers (a derivation/provenance graph, content-addressed surface reads) build on this; none owns it. The digest is the same shape in-toto/DSSE statements carry ({ "sha256": "<hex>" }) and the shape OCI image-layout uses for blobs/sha256/<hex>, so a CAS blob is addressable by, and pushable to, those systems without translation.

Install

npm install @bounded-systems/cas

Usage

import{sha256Hex,sha256BareHex}from"@bounded-systems/cas";importtype{Digest,BlobStore}from"@bounded-systems/cas";// Prefixed, branded content address: `sha256:<64 hex>`constid: Digest=sha256Hex("hello");// Bare lowercase hex — the on-the-wire form a content-addressed read holds.constbare: string=sha256BareHex("hello");

The blob-store port

BlobStore is the one capability the substrate exposes — put bytes (and learn their address), get bytes by address, has to ask whether an address is present. Callers depend on the port, never on a concrete store, so the storage can become a wrapped service later (a local on-disk impl now, an OCI-registry backend later) without touching consumers. Addresses are Digests, so the store is the verifier: get can re-hash and reject a corrupt blob.

importtype{BlobStore,Digest}from"@bounded-systems/cas";declareconststore: BlobStore;constaddr: Digest=awaitstore.put(newTextEncoder().encode("payload"));constbytes: Uint8Array=awaitstore.get(addr);constpresent: boolean=awaitstore.has(addr);

Design

• Zero dependencies. Production code touches node:crypto only; the package stands alone in CI. An extractability test enforces outward-only imports and no ambient authority (no shelling out, no process.env).
• Zero-trust addressing. Authority lives in the digest, not in which actor produced the bytes.

License

MIT © Bounded Systems