clerk_active_context cookie is not partition-aware (non-deterministic session-cookie write gate in CHIPS/partitioned cross-origin iframes) #8921

Description

@jacekradko

Summary

The clerk_active_context cookie is the one auth cookie in clerk-js that is not partition-aware. In a partitioned / blocked-third-party-cookie context (Chrome CHIPS), it becomes unreadable inside a cross-origin iframe, which silently degrades the cross-tab/cross-context arbitration that gates the session-cookie write.

Details

createActiveContextCookie() sets only SameSite=None, with no Partitioned attribute and no usePartitionedCookies plumbing:

// packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/activeContext.tsconstattributes={secure: getSecureAttribute('None')};

By contrast, the session cookie (and __client_uat / dev-browser cookies) compute a Partitioned attribute when partitioned cookies are enabled or when running in a cross-origin iframe:

// packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/session.tsconstisPartitioned=options.usePartitionedCookies();constsameSite=isPartitioned||inCrossOriginIframe()||requiresSameSiteNone() ? 'None' : 'Lax';constpartitioned=isPartitioned&&secure;

AuthCookieService.updateSessionCookie() gates the cookie write on document.hasFocus() OR isCurrentContextActive(), and isCurrentContextActive() reads clerk_active_context. In a partitioned cross-origin iframe the session cookie lives in the partitioned jar while clerk_active_context does not, so:

  • the active-context read returns undefined and isCurrentContextActive() falls back to true (which happens to unblock the write today), or
  • in configurations where the cookie is readable-but-mismatched, the gate falls closed and drops writes.

Either way the multi-context arbitration the gate is meant to provide does not behave the same inside a partitioned iframe as it does in a first-party tab. The behavior is config-dependent rather than deterministic.

Impact

Today this is mostly latent because the absent-cookie branch falls open. But it makes the session-cookie write-gate non-deterministic in partitioned/CHIPS embedded contexts, and it is a latent correctness hazard for the multi-tab/multi-context active-organization logic when an app runs inside a cross-origin iframe.

Suggested fix

Make clerk_active_context partition-aware: thread the same partitioned-attribute computation used by session.ts (set Partitioned when usePartitionedCookies() / inCrossOriginIframe()) so it is written and read in the same partition as the session cookie. Note the browser treats partitioned and non-partitioned cookies of the same name as distinct, so a migration/cleanup of the old unpartitioned cookie is also needed.

Context

Found while fixing the embedded-iframe session-refresh bug (a Clerk app in a cross-origin iframe returning 401s after tab re-activation). That fix adds a visibilitychange refresh trigger and lets a visible cross-origin iframe write the cookie; this partitioned-attribute defect was deliberately left out of scope for that change and filed separately.

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      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
       blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
      }
      } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
      })();
      (function(){
      try {
      var __m = "github.com";
      var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
      
      Skip to content

      clerk_active_context cookie is not partition-aware (non-deterministic session-cookie write gate in CHIPS/partitioned cross-origin iframes) #8921

      Description

      @jacekradko

      Summary

      The clerk_active_context cookie is the one auth cookie in clerk-js that is not partition-aware. In a partitioned / blocked-third-party-cookie context (Chrome CHIPS), it becomes unreadable inside a cross-origin iframe, which silently degrades the cross-tab/cross-context arbitration that gates the session-cookie write.

      Details

      createActiveContextCookie() sets only SameSite=None, with no Partitioned attribute and no usePartitionedCookies plumbing:

      // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/activeContext.tsconstattributes={secure: getSecureAttribute('None')};

      By contrast, the session cookie (and __client_uat / dev-browser cookies) compute a Partitioned attribute when partitioned cookies are enabled or when running in a cross-origin iframe:

      // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/session.tsconstisPartitioned=options.usePartitionedCookies();constsameSite=isPartitioned||inCrossOriginIframe()||requiresSameSiteNone() ? 'None' : 'Lax';constpartitioned=isPartitioned&&secure;

      AuthCookieService.updateSessionCookie() gates the cookie write on document.hasFocus() OR isCurrentContextActive(), and isCurrentContextActive() reads clerk_active_context. In a partitioned cross-origin iframe the session cookie lives in the partitioned jar while clerk_active_context does not, so:

      • the active-context read returns undefined and isCurrentContextActive() falls back to true (which happens to unblock the write today), or
      • in configurations where the cookie is readable-but-mismatched, the gate falls closed and drops writes.

      Either way the multi-context arbitration the gate is meant to provide does not behave the same inside a partitioned iframe as it does in a first-party tab. The behavior is config-dependent rather than deterministic.

      Impact

      Today this is mostly latent because the absent-cookie branch falls open. But it makes the session-cookie write-gate non-deterministic in partitioned/CHIPS embedded contexts, and it is a latent correctness hazard for the multi-tab/multi-context active-organization logic when an app runs inside a cross-origin iframe.

      Suggested fix

      Make clerk_active_context partition-aware: thread the same partitioned-attribute computation used by session.ts (set Partitioned when usePartitionedCookies() / inCrossOriginIframe()) so it is written and read in the same partition as the session cookie. Note the browser treats partitioned and non-partitioned cookies of the same name as distinct, so a migration/cleanup of the old unpartitioned cookie is also needed.

      Context

      Found while fixing the embedded-iframe session-refresh bug (a Clerk app in a cross-origin iframe returning 401s after tab re-activation). That fix adds a visibilitychange refresh trigger and lets a visible cross-origin iframe write the cookie; this partitioned-attribute defect was deliberately left out of scope for that change and filed separately.

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          , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
          Skip to content

          clerk_active_context cookie is not partition-aware (non-deterministic session-cookie write gate in CHIPS/partitioned cross-origin iframes) #8921

          Description

          @jacekradko

          Summary

          The clerk_active_context cookie is the one auth cookie in clerk-js that is not partition-aware. In a partitioned / blocked-third-party-cookie context (Chrome CHIPS), it becomes unreadable inside a cross-origin iframe, which silently degrades the cross-tab/cross-context arbitration that gates the session-cookie write.

          Details

          createActiveContextCookie() sets only SameSite=None, with no Partitioned attribute and no usePartitionedCookies plumbing:

          // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/activeContext.tsconstattributes={secure: getSecureAttribute('None')};

          By contrast, the session cookie (and __client_uat / dev-browser cookies) compute a Partitioned attribute when partitioned cookies are enabled or when running in a cross-origin iframe:

          // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/session.tsconstisPartitioned=options.usePartitionedCookies();constsameSite=isPartitioned||inCrossOriginIframe()||requiresSameSiteNone() ? 'None' : 'Lax';constpartitioned=isPartitioned&&secure;

          AuthCookieService.updateSessionCookie() gates the cookie write on document.hasFocus() OR isCurrentContextActive(), and isCurrentContextActive() reads clerk_active_context. In a partitioned cross-origin iframe the session cookie lives in the partitioned jar while clerk_active_context does not, so:

          • the active-context read returns undefined and isCurrentContextActive() falls back to true (which happens to unblock the write today), or
          • in configurations where the cookie is readable-but-mismatched, the gate falls closed and drops writes.

          Either way the multi-context arbitration the gate is meant to provide does not behave the same inside a partitioned iframe as it does in a first-party tab. The behavior is config-dependent rather than deterministic.

          Impact

          Today this is mostly latent because the absent-cookie branch falls open. But it makes the session-cookie write-gate non-deterministic in partitioned/CHIPS embedded contexts, and it is a latent correctness hazard for the multi-tab/multi-context active-organization logic when an app runs inside a cross-origin iframe.

          Suggested fix

          Make clerk_active_context partition-aware: thread the same partitioned-attribute computation used by session.ts (set Partitioned when usePartitionedCookies() / inCrossOriginIframe()) so it is written and read in the same partition as the session cookie. Note the browser treats partitioned and non-partitioned cookies of the same name as distinct, so a migration/cleanup of the old unpartitioned cookie is also needed.

          Context

          Found while fixing the embedded-iframe session-refresh bug (a Clerk app in a cross-origin iframe returning 401s after tab re-activation). That fix adds a visibilitychange refresh trigger and lets a visible cross-origin iframe write the cookie; this partitioned-attribute defect was deliberately left out of scope for that change and filed separately.

          Metadata

          Metadata

          Assignees

          No one assigned

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              No milestone

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              None yet

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              No branches or pull requests

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              , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
              Skip to content

              clerk_active_context cookie is not partition-aware (non-deterministic session-cookie write gate in CHIPS/partitioned cross-origin iframes) #8921

              Description

              @jacekradko

              Summary

              The clerk_active_context cookie is the one auth cookie in clerk-js that is not partition-aware. In a partitioned / blocked-third-party-cookie context (Chrome CHIPS), it becomes unreadable inside a cross-origin iframe, which silently degrades the cross-tab/cross-context arbitration that gates the session-cookie write.

              Details

              createActiveContextCookie() sets only SameSite=None, with no Partitioned attribute and no usePartitionedCookies plumbing:

              // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/activeContext.tsconstattributes={secure: getSecureAttribute('None')};

              By contrast, the session cookie (and __client_uat / dev-browser cookies) compute a Partitioned attribute when partitioned cookies are enabled or when running in a cross-origin iframe:

              // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/session.tsconstisPartitioned=options.usePartitionedCookies();constsameSite=isPartitioned||inCrossOriginIframe()||requiresSameSiteNone() ? 'None' : 'Lax';constpartitioned=isPartitioned&&secure;

              AuthCookieService.updateSessionCookie() gates the cookie write on document.hasFocus() OR isCurrentContextActive(), and isCurrentContextActive() reads clerk_active_context. In a partitioned cross-origin iframe the session cookie lives in the partitioned jar while clerk_active_context does not, so:

              • the active-context read returns undefined and isCurrentContextActive() falls back to true (which happens to unblock the write today), or
              • in configurations where the cookie is readable-but-mismatched, the gate falls closed and drops writes.

              Either way the multi-context arbitration the gate is meant to provide does not behave the same inside a partitioned iframe as it does in a first-party tab. The behavior is config-dependent rather than deterministic.

              Impact

              Today this is mostly latent because the absent-cookie branch falls open. But it makes the session-cookie write-gate non-deterministic in partitioned/CHIPS embedded contexts, and it is a latent correctness hazard for the multi-tab/multi-context active-organization logic when an app runs inside a cross-origin iframe.

              Suggested fix

              Make clerk_active_context partition-aware: thread the same partitioned-attribute computation used by session.ts (set Partitioned when usePartitionedCookies() / inCrossOriginIframe()) so it is written and read in the same partition as the session cookie. Note the browser treats partitioned and non-partitioned cookies of the same name as distinct, so a migration/cleanup of the old unpartitioned cookie is also needed.

              Context

              Found while fixing the embedded-iframe session-refresh bug (a Clerk app in a cross-origin iframe returning 401s after tab re-activation). That fix adds a visibilitychange refresh trigger and lets a visible cross-origin iframe write the cookie; this partitioned-attribute defect was deliberately left out of scope for that change and filed separately.

              Metadata

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              Assignees

              No one assigned

                Labels

                Type

                No type

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                No projects

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                  No milestone

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                  None yet

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                  , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
                  Skip to content

                  clerk_active_context cookie is not partition-aware (non-deterministic session-cookie write gate in CHIPS/partitioned cross-origin iframes) #8921

                  Description

                  @jacekradko

                  Summary

                  The clerk_active_context cookie is the one auth cookie in clerk-js that is not partition-aware. In a partitioned / blocked-third-party-cookie context (Chrome CHIPS), it becomes unreadable inside a cross-origin iframe, which silently degrades the cross-tab/cross-context arbitration that gates the session-cookie write.

                  Details

                  createActiveContextCookie() sets only SameSite=None, with no Partitioned attribute and no usePartitionedCookies plumbing:

                  // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/activeContext.tsconstattributes={secure: getSecureAttribute('None')};

                  By contrast, the session cookie (and __client_uat / dev-browser cookies) compute a Partitioned attribute when partitioned cookies are enabled or when running in a cross-origin iframe:

                  // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/session.tsconstisPartitioned=options.usePartitionedCookies();constsameSite=isPartitioned||inCrossOriginIframe()||requiresSameSiteNone() ? 'None' : 'Lax';constpartitioned=isPartitioned&&secure;

                  AuthCookieService.updateSessionCookie() gates the cookie write on document.hasFocus() OR isCurrentContextActive(), and isCurrentContextActive() reads clerk_active_context. In a partitioned cross-origin iframe the session cookie lives in the partitioned jar while clerk_active_context does not, so:

                  • the active-context read returns undefined and isCurrentContextActive() falls back to true (which happens to unblock the write today), or
                  • in configurations where the cookie is readable-but-mismatched, the gate falls closed and drops writes.

                  Either way the multi-context arbitration the gate is meant to provide does not behave the same inside a partitioned iframe as it does in a first-party tab. The behavior is config-dependent rather than deterministic.

                  Impact

                  Today this is mostly latent because the absent-cookie branch falls open. But it makes the session-cookie write-gate non-deterministic in partitioned/CHIPS embedded contexts, and it is a latent correctness hazard for the multi-tab/multi-context active-organization logic when an app runs inside a cross-origin iframe.

                  Suggested fix

                  Make clerk_active_context partition-aware: thread the same partitioned-attribute computation used by session.ts (set Partitioned when usePartitionedCookies() / inCrossOriginIframe()) so it is written and read in the same partition as the session cookie. Note the browser treats partitioned and non-partitioned cookies of the same name as distinct, so a migration/cleanup of the old unpartitioned cookie is also needed.

                  Context

                  Found while fixing the embedded-iframe session-refresh bug (a Clerk app in a cross-origin iframe returning 401s after tab re-activation). That fix adds a visibilitychange refresh trigger and lets a visible cross-origin iframe write the cookie; this partitioned-attribute defect was deliberately left out of scope for that change and filed separately.

                  Metadata

                  Metadata

                  Assignees

                  No one assigned

                    Labels

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                    No type

                    Projects

                    No projects

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                      No milestone

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                      None yet

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                      No branches or pull requests

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                      , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
                      Skip to content

                      clerk_active_context cookie is not partition-aware (non-deterministic session-cookie write gate in CHIPS/partitioned cross-origin iframes) #8921

                      Description

                      @jacekradko

                      Summary

                      The clerk_active_context cookie is the one auth cookie in clerk-js that is not partition-aware. In a partitioned / blocked-third-party-cookie context (Chrome CHIPS), it becomes unreadable inside a cross-origin iframe, which silently degrades the cross-tab/cross-context arbitration that gates the session-cookie write.

                      Details

                      createActiveContextCookie() sets only SameSite=None, with no Partitioned attribute and no usePartitionedCookies plumbing:

                      // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/activeContext.tsconstattributes={secure: getSecureAttribute('None')};

                      By contrast, the session cookie (and __client_uat / dev-browser cookies) compute a Partitioned attribute when partitioned cookies are enabled or when running in a cross-origin iframe:

                      // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/session.tsconstisPartitioned=options.usePartitionedCookies();constsameSite=isPartitioned||inCrossOriginIframe()||requiresSameSiteNone() ? 'None' : 'Lax';constpartitioned=isPartitioned&&secure;

                      AuthCookieService.updateSessionCookie() gates the cookie write on document.hasFocus() OR isCurrentContextActive(), and isCurrentContextActive() reads clerk_active_context. In a partitioned cross-origin iframe the session cookie lives in the partitioned jar while clerk_active_context does not, so:

                      • the active-context read returns undefined and isCurrentContextActive() falls back to true (which happens to unblock the write today), or
                      • in configurations where the cookie is readable-but-mismatched, the gate falls closed and drops writes.

                      Either way the multi-context arbitration the gate is meant to provide does not behave the same inside a partitioned iframe as it does in a first-party tab. The behavior is config-dependent rather than deterministic.

                      Impact

                      Today this is mostly latent because the absent-cookie branch falls open. But it makes the session-cookie write-gate non-deterministic in partitioned/CHIPS embedded contexts, and it is a latent correctness hazard for the multi-tab/multi-context active-organization logic when an app runs inside a cross-origin iframe.

                      Suggested fix

                      Make clerk_active_context partition-aware: thread the same partitioned-attribute computation used by session.ts (set Partitioned when usePartitionedCookies() / inCrossOriginIframe()) so it is written and read in the same partition as the session cookie. Note the browser treats partitioned and non-partitioned cookies of the same name as distinct, so a migration/cleanup of the old unpartitioned cookie is also needed.

                      Context

                      Found while fixing the embedded-iframe session-refresh bug (a Clerk app in a cross-origin iframe returning 401s after tab re-activation). That fix adds a visibilitychange refresh trigger and lets a visible cross-origin iframe write the cookie; this partitioned-attribute defect was deliberately left out of scope for that change and filed separately.

                      Metadata

                      Metadata

                      Assignees

                      No one assigned

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                        No type

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                        No projects

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                          No milestone

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                          None yet

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                          , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
                          Skip to content

                          clerk_active_context cookie is not partition-aware (non-deterministic session-cookie write gate in CHIPS/partitioned cross-origin iframes) #8921

                          Description

                          @jacekradko

                          Summary

                          The clerk_active_context cookie is the one auth cookie in clerk-js that is not partition-aware. In a partitioned / blocked-third-party-cookie context (Chrome CHIPS), it becomes unreadable inside a cross-origin iframe, which silently degrades the cross-tab/cross-context arbitration that gates the session-cookie write.

                          Details

                          createActiveContextCookie() sets only SameSite=None, with no Partitioned attribute and no usePartitionedCookies plumbing:

                          // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/activeContext.tsconstattributes={secure: getSecureAttribute('None')};

                          By contrast, the session cookie (and __client_uat / dev-browser cookies) compute a Partitioned attribute when partitioned cookies are enabled or when running in a cross-origin iframe:

                          // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/session.tsconstisPartitioned=options.usePartitionedCookies();constsameSite=isPartitioned||inCrossOriginIframe()||requiresSameSiteNone() ? 'None' : 'Lax';constpartitioned=isPartitioned&&secure;

                          AuthCookieService.updateSessionCookie() gates the cookie write on document.hasFocus() OR isCurrentContextActive(), and isCurrentContextActive() reads clerk_active_context. In a partitioned cross-origin iframe the session cookie lives in the partitioned jar while clerk_active_context does not, so:

                          • the active-context read returns undefined and isCurrentContextActive() falls back to true (which happens to unblock the write today), or
                          • in configurations where the cookie is readable-but-mismatched, the gate falls closed and drops writes.

                          Either way the multi-context arbitration the gate is meant to provide does not behave the same inside a partitioned iframe as it does in a first-party tab. The behavior is config-dependent rather than deterministic.

                          Impact

                          Today this is mostly latent because the absent-cookie branch falls open. But it makes the session-cookie write-gate non-deterministic in partitioned/CHIPS embedded contexts, and it is a latent correctness hazard for the multi-tab/multi-context active-organization logic when an app runs inside a cross-origin iframe.

                          Suggested fix

                          Make clerk_active_context partition-aware: thread the same partitioned-attribute computation used by session.ts (set Partitioned when usePartitionedCookies() / inCrossOriginIframe()) so it is written and read in the same partition as the session cookie. Note the browser treats partitioned and non-partitioned cookies of the same name as distinct, so a migration/cleanup of the old unpartitioned cookie is also needed.

                          Context

                          Found while fixing the embedded-iframe session-refresh bug (a Clerk app in a cross-origin iframe returning 401s after tab re-activation). That fix adds a visibilitychange refresh trigger and lets a visible cross-origin iframe write the cookie; this partitioned-attribute defect was deliberately left out of scope for that change and filed separately.

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                              , 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
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                              clerk_active_context cookie is not partition-aware (non-deterministic session-cookie write gate in CHIPS/partitioned cross-origin iframes) #8921

                              Description

                              @jacekradko

                              Summary

                              The clerk_active_context cookie is the one auth cookie in clerk-js that is not partition-aware. In a partitioned / blocked-third-party-cookie context (Chrome CHIPS), it becomes unreadable inside a cross-origin iframe, which silently degrades the cross-tab/cross-context arbitration that gates the session-cookie write.

                              Details

                              createActiveContextCookie() sets only SameSite=None, with no Partitioned attribute and no usePartitionedCookies plumbing:

                              // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/activeContext.tsconstattributes={secure: getSecureAttribute('None')};

                              By contrast, the session cookie (and __client_uat / dev-browser cookies) compute a Partitioned attribute when partitioned cookies are enabled or when running in a cross-origin iframe:

                              // packages/clerk-js/src/core/auth/cookies/session.tsconstisPartitioned=options.usePartitionedCookies();constsameSite=isPartitioned||inCrossOriginIframe()||requiresSameSiteNone() ? 'None' : 'Lax';constpartitioned=isPartitioned&&secure;

                              AuthCookieService.updateSessionCookie() gates the cookie write on document.hasFocus() OR isCurrentContextActive(), and isCurrentContextActive() reads clerk_active_context. In a partitioned cross-origin iframe the session cookie lives in the partitioned jar while clerk_active_context does not, so:

                              • the active-context read returns undefined and isCurrentContextActive() falls back to true (which happens to unblock the write today), or
                              • in configurations where the cookie is readable-but-mismatched, the gate falls closed and drops writes.

                              Either way the multi-context arbitration the gate is meant to provide does not behave the same inside a partitioned iframe as it does in a first-party tab. The behavior is config-dependent rather than deterministic.

                              Impact

                              Today this is mostly latent because the absent-cookie branch falls open. But it makes the session-cookie write-gate non-deterministic in partitioned/CHIPS embedded contexts, and it is a latent correctness hazard for the multi-tab/multi-context active-organization logic when an app runs inside a cross-origin iframe.

                              Suggested fix

                              Make clerk_active_context partition-aware: thread the same partitioned-attribute computation used by session.ts (set Partitioned when usePartitionedCookies() / inCrossOriginIframe()) so it is written and read in the same partition as the session cookie. Note the browser treats partitioned and non-partitioned cookies of the same name as distinct, so a migration/cleanup of the old unpartitioned cookie is also needed.

                              Context

                              Found while fixing the embedded-iframe session-refresh bug (a Clerk app in a cross-origin iframe returning 401s after tab re-activation). That fix adds a visibilitychange refresh trigger and lets a visible cross-origin iframe write the cookie; this partitioned-attribute defect was deliberately left out of scope for that change and filed separately.

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