Security: dcadolph/cipher

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

cipher protects secret files at rest with envelope encryption backed by SOPS. This document covers the supported versions, the disclosure process, the threat model, and key handling guidance.

Supported Versions

Pre-1.0, only the most recent tagged release is supported. Older tags receive no fixes or backports.

VersionStatus
Latest tagActive.
Older tagsUnsupported.

Reporting a Vulnerability

Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories.

Include:

  • Affected version or commit hash.
  • A short reproduction.
  • Observed impact and any known mitigation.

Acknowledgment target is 72 hours. A coordinated disclosure window is agreed once the report is confirmed. Public disclosure happens after a fix is released, or 90 days from the report, whichever comes first.

Do not open public issues for security reports.

Threat Model

What cipher protects

AssetProtection
File contents on diskEncrypted with a per-file data key wrapped by every configured backend.
File contents on a networkInert ciphertext when paired with HTTPS or other transport security.
Recipient changesAdd or remove without re-encrypting the payload. The wrapped data key changes, the bulk payload does not.
Plaintext during editMaterialized only in a private 0700 temp directory in a 0600 file, removed best-effort when the editor exits.

What cipher does NOT protect

AssetReason
Plaintext in memory after decryptionOnce Decode returns, plaintext lives in the caller's process. Memory hygiene is the caller's responsibility.
Decrypted temp files after a crashcipher edit removes the temp dir best-effort. A hard crash leaves the temp file until the OS cleans /tmp.
Logged plaintextIf the caller logs decrypted contents, cipher cannot help. Use json:"-" on secret struct fields and zap encoders that redact.
Compromised backend identityAnyone holding SOPS_AGE_KEY, a valid KMS principal, or a Vault token can decrypt every file encrypted to that recipient. Rotate after compromise.
Side channelsNo constant-time guarantees. Pair with a cloud KMS where a hardware root of trust matters.
Compromised dependenciescipher depends on SOPS, age, and cloud SDKs. A vulnerability in any of those reaches cipher.
The host OS, Go runtime, or filesystemOutside cipher's perimeter.

Trust boundaries

BoundaryTrusted sideUntrusted side
KMS API callThe calling process with valid credentials.The network in between, assumed HTTPS.
Encrypted fileAnyone with read access can copy it.Without recipient credentials, plaintext stays inaccessible.
Editor subprocessThe user's text editor binary.Other processes on the host that can read /tmp while the editor is open.
Pre-commit hookThe repo's working tree on a developer machine.Any shell or editor path that bypasses the hook.

Key Handling Guidance

  • Generate age identities with age.GenerateIdentity or age-keygen. Never derive an age secret from a passphrase or any deterministic input.
  • Store the age secret string with 0600 permissions and load it through SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE, or fetch it from a secret manager at startup.
  • Prefer cloud KMS in production where IAM and audit logging are first class.
  • Rotate the per-file data key with cipher rotate after every recipient removal, after personnel changes, and on a periodic schedule.
  • Never commit an age secret, a KMS access key, or a Vault token. Install cipher precommit to block plaintext leaks at commit time.
  • Treat --allow-orphan as a one-way door. It removes the last recipient and the file becomes undecryptable.

Known Limitations

LimitationWorkaround
Plaintext lifetime in memory is not bounded.Zero buffers in the caller after use.
Temp file cleanup is best-effort.Run cipher edit on a host with tmpfs for /tmp.
Recipient identifiers passed via flags are visible to ps.Acceptable. Recipient strings are public-key material, not secret.
Logging redaction is the caller's responsibility.Use the patterns documented in logger godoc.

Cryptographic Choices

cipher does not implement cryptography. It composes:

  • SOPS for envelope encryption and key-group rules.
  • age for X25519 plus ChaCha20-Poly1305.
  • AWS, GCP, Azure, and Vault SDKs for managed-key envelope wrapping.

Algorithm parameters follow the defaults of each backend. Propose algorithm upgrades through the regular issue tracker, not this disclosure path.

Changes to This Policy

Track this file in git. Material changes get a SECURITY.md commit and a corresponding entry in the release notes for that tag.

There aren't any published security advisories

, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: dcadolph/cipher
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
cipher protects secret files at rest with envelope encryption backed by SOPS. This document covers the supported versions, the disclosure process, the threat model, and key handling guidance.
Supported Versions
Pre-1.0, only the most recent tagged release is supported. Older tags receive no fixes or backports.
VersionStatus
Latest tagActive.
Older tagsUnsupported.
Reporting a Vulnerability
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories.
Include:
  • Affected version or commit hash.
  • A short reproduction.
  • Observed impact and any known mitigation.
Acknowledgment target is 72 hours. A coordinated disclosure window is agreed once the report is confirmed. Public disclosure happens after a fix is released, or 90 days from the report, whichever comes first.
Do not open public issues for security reports.
Threat Model
What cipher protects
AssetProtection
File contents on diskEncrypted with a per-file data key wrapped by every configured backend.
File contents on a networkInert ciphertext when paired with HTTPS or other transport security.
Recipient changesAdd or remove without re-encrypting the payload. The wrapped data key changes, the bulk payload does not.
Plaintext during editMaterialized only in a private 0700 temp directory in a 0600 file, removed best-effort when the editor exits.
What cipher does NOT protect
AssetReason
Plaintext in memory after decryptionOnce Decode returns, plaintext lives in the caller's process. Memory hygiene is the caller's responsibility.
Decrypted temp files after a crashcipher edit removes the temp dir best-effort. A hard crash leaves the temp file until the OS cleans /tmp.
Logged plaintextIf the caller logs decrypted contents, cipher cannot help. Use json:"-" on secret struct fields and zap encoders that redact.
Compromised backend identityAnyone holding SOPS_AGE_KEY, a valid KMS principal, or a Vault token can decrypt every file encrypted to that recipient. Rotate after compromise.
Side channelsNo constant-time guarantees. Pair with a cloud KMS where a hardware root of trust matters.
Compromised dependenciescipher depends on SOPS, age, and cloud SDKs. A vulnerability in any of those reaches cipher.
The host OS, Go runtime, or filesystemOutside cipher's perimeter.
Trust boundaries
BoundaryTrusted sideUntrusted side
KMS API callThe calling process with valid credentials.The network in between, assumed HTTPS.
Encrypted fileAnyone with read access can copy it.Without recipient credentials, plaintext stays inaccessible.
Editor subprocessThe user's text editor binary.Other processes on the host that can read /tmp while the editor is open.
Pre-commit hookThe repo's working tree on a developer machine.Any shell or editor path that bypasses the hook.
Key Handling Guidance
  • Generate age identities with age.GenerateIdentity or age-keygen. Never derive an age secret from a passphrase or any deterministic input.
  • Store the age secret string with 0600 permissions and load it through SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE, or fetch it from a secret manager at startup.
  • Prefer cloud KMS in production where IAM and audit logging are first class.
  • Rotate the per-file data key with cipher rotate after every recipient removal, after personnel changes, and on a periodic schedule.
  • Never commit an age secret, a KMS access key, or a Vault token. Install cipher precommit to block plaintext leaks at commit time.
  • Treat --allow-orphan as a one-way door. It removes the last recipient and the file becomes undecryptable.
Known Limitations
LimitationWorkaround
Plaintext lifetime in memory is not bounded.Zero buffers in the caller after use.
Temp file cleanup is best-effort.Run cipher edit on a host with tmpfs for /tmp.
Recipient identifiers passed via flags are visible to ps.Acceptable. Recipient strings are public-key material, not secret.
Logging redaction is the caller's responsibility.Use the patterns documented in logger godoc.
Cryptographic Choices
cipher does not implement cryptography. It composes:
  • SOPS for envelope encryption and key-group rules.
  • age for X25519 plus ChaCha20-Poly1305.
  • AWS, GCP, Azure, and Vault SDKs for managed-key envelope wrapping.
Algorithm parameters follow the defaults of each backend. Propose algorithm upgrades through the regular issue tracker, not this disclosure path.
Changes to This Policy
Track this file in git. Material changes get a SECURITY.md commit and a corresponding entry in the release notes for that tag.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: dcadolph/cipher
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
cipher protects secret files at rest with envelope encryption backed by SOPS. This document covers the supported versions, the disclosure process, the threat model, and key handling guidance.
Supported Versions
Pre-1.0, only the most recent tagged release is supported. Older tags receive no fixes or backports.
VersionStatus
Latest tagActive.
Older tagsUnsupported.
Reporting a Vulnerability
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories.
Include:
  • Affected version or commit hash.
  • A short reproduction.
  • Observed impact and any known mitigation.
Acknowledgment target is 72 hours. A coordinated disclosure window is agreed once the report is confirmed. Public disclosure happens after a fix is released, or 90 days from the report, whichever comes first.
Do not open public issues for security reports.
Threat Model
What cipher protects
AssetProtection
File contents on diskEncrypted with a per-file data key wrapped by every configured backend.
File contents on a networkInert ciphertext when paired with HTTPS or other transport security.
Recipient changesAdd or remove without re-encrypting the payload. The wrapped data key changes, the bulk payload does not.
Plaintext during editMaterialized only in a private 0700 temp directory in a 0600 file, removed best-effort when the editor exits.
What cipher does NOT protect
AssetReason
Plaintext in memory after decryptionOnce Decode returns, plaintext lives in the caller's process. Memory hygiene is the caller's responsibility.
Decrypted temp files after a crashcipher edit removes the temp dir best-effort. A hard crash leaves the temp file until the OS cleans /tmp.
Logged plaintextIf the caller logs decrypted contents, cipher cannot help. Use json:"-" on secret struct fields and zap encoders that redact.
Compromised backend identityAnyone holding SOPS_AGE_KEY, a valid KMS principal, or a Vault token can decrypt every file encrypted to that recipient. Rotate after compromise.
Side channelsNo constant-time guarantees. Pair with a cloud KMS where a hardware root of trust matters.
Compromised dependenciescipher depends on SOPS, age, and cloud SDKs. A vulnerability in any of those reaches cipher.
The host OS, Go runtime, or filesystemOutside cipher's perimeter.
Trust boundaries
BoundaryTrusted sideUntrusted side
KMS API callThe calling process with valid credentials.The network in between, assumed HTTPS.
Encrypted fileAnyone with read access can copy it.Without recipient credentials, plaintext stays inaccessible.
Editor subprocessThe user's text editor binary.Other processes on the host that can read /tmp while the editor is open.
Pre-commit hookThe repo's working tree on a developer machine.Any shell or editor path that bypasses the hook.
Key Handling Guidance
  • Generate age identities with age.GenerateIdentity or age-keygen. Never derive an age secret from a passphrase or any deterministic input.
  • Store the age secret string with 0600 permissions and load it through SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE, or fetch it from a secret manager at startup.
  • Prefer cloud KMS in production where IAM and audit logging are first class.
  • Rotate the per-file data key with cipher rotate after every recipient removal, after personnel changes, and on a periodic schedule.
  • Never commit an age secret, a KMS access key, or a Vault token. Install cipher precommit to block plaintext leaks at commit time.
  • Treat --allow-orphan as a one-way door. It removes the last recipient and the file becomes undecryptable.
Known Limitations
LimitationWorkaround
Plaintext lifetime in memory is not bounded.Zero buffers in the caller after use.
Temp file cleanup is best-effort.Run cipher edit on a host with tmpfs for /tmp.
Recipient identifiers passed via flags are visible to ps.Acceptable. Recipient strings are public-key material, not secret.
Logging redaction is the caller's responsibility.Use the patterns documented in logger godoc.
Cryptographic Choices
cipher does not implement cryptography. It composes:
  • SOPS for envelope encryption and key-group rules.
  • age for X25519 plus ChaCha20-Poly1305.
  • AWS, GCP, Azure, and Vault SDKs for managed-key envelope wrapping.
Algorithm parameters follow the defaults of each backend. Propose algorithm upgrades through the regular issue tracker, not this disclosure path.
Changes to This Policy
Track this file in git. Material changes get a SECURITY.md commit and a corresponding entry in the release notes for that tag.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: dcadolph/cipher
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
cipher protects secret files at rest with envelope encryption backed by SOPS. This document covers the supported versions, the disclosure process, the threat model, and key handling guidance.
Supported Versions
Pre-1.0, only the most recent tagged release is supported. Older tags receive no fixes or backports.
VersionStatus
Latest tagActive.
Older tagsUnsupported.
Reporting a Vulnerability
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories.
Include:
  • Affected version or commit hash.
  • A short reproduction.
  • Observed impact and any known mitigation.
Acknowledgment target is 72 hours. A coordinated disclosure window is agreed once the report is confirmed. Public disclosure happens after a fix is released, or 90 days from the report, whichever comes first.
Do not open public issues for security reports.
Threat Model
What cipher protects
AssetProtection
File contents on diskEncrypted with a per-file data key wrapped by every configured backend.
File contents on a networkInert ciphertext when paired with HTTPS or other transport security.
Recipient changesAdd or remove without re-encrypting the payload. The wrapped data key changes, the bulk payload does not.
Plaintext during editMaterialized only in a private 0700 temp directory in a 0600 file, removed best-effort when the editor exits.
What cipher does NOT protect
AssetReason
Plaintext in memory after decryptionOnce Decode returns, plaintext lives in the caller's process. Memory hygiene is the caller's responsibility.
Decrypted temp files after a crashcipher edit removes the temp dir best-effort. A hard crash leaves the temp file until the OS cleans /tmp.
Logged plaintextIf the caller logs decrypted contents, cipher cannot help. Use json:"-" on secret struct fields and zap encoders that redact.
Compromised backend identityAnyone holding SOPS_AGE_KEY, a valid KMS principal, or a Vault token can decrypt every file encrypted to that recipient. Rotate after compromise.
Side channelsNo constant-time guarantees. Pair with a cloud KMS where a hardware root of trust matters.
Compromised dependenciescipher depends on SOPS, age, and cloud SDKs. A vulnerability in any of those reaches cipher.
The host OS, Go runtime, or filesystemOutside cipher's perimeter.
Trust boundaries
BoundaryTrusted sideUntrusted side
KMS API callThe calling process with valid credentials.The network in between, assumed HTTPS.
Encrypted fileAnyone with read access can copy it.Without recipient credentials, plaintext stays inaccessible.
Editor subprocessThe user's text editor binary.Other processes on the host that can read /tmp while the editor is open.
Pre-commit hookThe repo's working tree on a developer machine.Any shell or editor path that bypasses the hook.
Key Handling Guidance
  • Generate age identities with age.GenerateIdentity or age-keygen. Never derive an age secret from a passphrase or any deterministic input.
  • Store the age secret string with 0600 permissions and load it through SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE, or fetch it from a secret manager at startup.
  • Prefer cloud KMS in production where IAM and audit logging are first class.
  • Rotate the per-file data key with cipher rotate after every recipient removal, after personnel changes, and on a periodic schedule.
  • Never commit an age secret, a KMS access key, or a Vault token. Install cipher precommit to block plaintext leaks at commit time.
  • Treat --allow-orphan as a one-way door. It removes the last recipient and the file becomes undecryptable.
Known Limitations
LimitationWorkaround
Plaintext lifetime in memory is not bounded.Zero buffers in the caller after use.
Temp file cleanup is best-effort.Run cipher edit on a host with tmpfs for /tmp.
Recipient identifiers passed via flags are visible to ps.Acceptable. Recipient strings are public-key material, not secret.
Logging redaction is the caller's responsibility.Use the patterns documented in logger godoc.
Cryptographic Choices
cipher does not implement cryptography. It composes:
  • SOPS for envelope encryption and key-group rules.
  • age for X25519 plus ChaCha20-Poly1305.
  • AWS, GCP, Azure, and Vault SDKs for managed-key envelope wrapping.
Algorithm parameters follow the defaults of each backend. Propose algorithm upgrades through the regular issue tracker, not this disclosure path.
Changes to This Policy
Track this file in git. Material changes get a SECURITY.md commit and a corresponding entry in the release notes for that tag.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
Security: dcadolph/cipher
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
cipher protects secret files at rest with envelope encryption backed by SOPS. This document covers the supported versions, the disclosure process, the threat model, and key handling guidance.
Supported Versions
Pre-1.0, only the most recent tagged release is supported. Older tags receive no fixes or backports.
VersionStatus
Latest tagActive.
Older tagsUnsupported.
Reporting a Vulnerability
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories.
Include:
  • Affected version or commit hash.
  • A short reproduction.
  • Observed impact and any known mitigation.
Acknowledgment target is 72 hours. A coordinated disclosure window is agreed once the report is confirmed. Public disclosure happens after a fix is released, or 90 days from the report, whichever comes first.
Do not open public issues for security reports.
Threat Model
What cipher protects
AssetProtection
File contents on diskEncrypted with a per-file data key wrapped by every configured backend.
File contents on a networkInert ciphertext when paired with HTTPS or other transport security.
Recipient changesAdd or remove without re-encrypting the payload. The wrapped data key changes, the bulk payload does not.
Plaintext during editMaterialized only in a private 0700 temp directory in a 0600 file, removed best-effort when the editor exits.
What cipher does NOT protect
AssetReason
Plaintext in memory after decryptionOnce Decode returns, plaintext lives in the caller's process. Memory hygiene is the caller's responsibility.
Decrypted temp files after a crashcipher edit removes the temp dir best-effort. A hard crash leaves the temp file until the OS cleans /tmp.
Logged plaintextIf the caller logs decrypted contents, cipher cannot help. Use json:"-" on secret struct fields and zap encoders that redact.
Compromised backend identityAnyone holding SOPS_AGE_KEY, a valid KMS principal, or a Vault token can decrypt every file encrypted to that recipient. Rotate after compromise.
Side channelsNo constant-time guarantees. Pair with a cloud KMS where a hardware root of trust matters.
Compromised dependenciescipher depends on SOPS, age, and cloud SDKs. A vulnerability in any of those reaches cipher.
The host OS, Go runtime, or filesystemOutside cipher's perimeter.
Trust boundaries
BoundaryTrusted sideUntrusted side
KMS API callThe calling process with valid credentials.The network in between, assumed HTTPS.
Encrypted fileAnyone with read access can copy it.Without recipient credentials, plaintext stays inaccessible.
Editor subprocessThe user's text editor binary.Other processes on the host that can read /tmp while the editor is open.
Pre-commit hookThe repo's working tree on a developer machine.Any shell or editor path that bypasses the hook.
Key Handling Guidance
  • Generate age identities with age.GenerateIdentity or age-keygen. Never derive an age secret from a passphrase or any deterministic input.
  • Store the age secret string with 0600 permissions and load it through SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE, or fetch it from a secret manager at startup.
  • Prefer cloud KMS in production where IAM and audit logging are first class.
  • Rotate the per-file data key with cipher rotate after every recipient removal, after personnel changes, and on a periodic schedule.
  • Never commit an age secret, a KMS access key, or a Vault token. Install cipher precommit to block plaintext leaks at commit time.
  • Treat --allow-orphan as a one-way door. It removes the last recipient and the file becomes undecryptable.
Known Limitations
LimitationWorkaround
Plaintext lifetime in memory is not bounded.Zero buffers in the caller after use.
Temp file cleanup is best-effort.Run cipher edit on a host with tmpfs for /tmp.
Recipient identifiers passed via flags are visible to ps.Acceptable. Recipient strings are public-key material, not secret.
Logging redaction is the caller's responsibility.Use the patterns documented in logger godoc.
Cryptographic Choices
cipher does not implement cryptography. It composes:
  • SOPS for envelope encryption and key-group rules.
  • age for X25519 plus ChaCha20-Poly1305.
  • AWS, GCP, Azure, and Vault SDKs for managed-key envelope wrapping.
Algorithm parameters follow the defaults of each backend. Propose algorithm upgrades through the regular issue tracker, not this disclosure path.
Changes to This Policy
Track this file in git. Material changes get a SECURITY.md commit and a corresponding entry in the release notes for that tag.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: dcadolph/cipher
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
cipher protects secret files at rest with envelope encryption backed by SOPS. This document covers the supported versions, the disclosure process, the threat model, and key handling guidance.
Supported Versions
Pre-1.0, only the most recent tagged release is supported. Older tags receive no fixes or backports.
VersionStatus
Latest tagActive.
Older tagsUnsupported.
Reporting a Vulnerability
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories.
Include:
  • Affected version or commit hash.
  • A short reproduction.
  • Observed impact and any known mitigation.
Acknowledgment target is 72 hours. A coordinated disclosure window is agreed once the report is confirmed. Public disclosure happens after a fix is released, or 90 days from the report, whichever comes first.
Do not open public issues for security reports.
Threat Model
What cipher protects
AssetProtection
File contents on diskEncrypted with a per-file data key wrapped by every configured backend.
File contents on a networkInert ciphertext when paired with HTTPS or other transport security.
Recipient changesAdd or remove without re-encrypting the payload. The wrapped data key changes, the bulk payload does not.
Plaintext during editMaterialized only in a private 0700 temp directory in a 0600 file, removed best-effort when the editor exits.
What cipher does NOT protect
AssetReason
Plaintext in memory after decryptionOnce Decode returns, plaintext lives in the caller's process. Memory hygiene is the caller's responsibility.
Decrypted temp files after a crashcipher edit removes the temp dir best-effort. A hard crash leaves the temp file until the OS cleans /tmp.
Logged plaintextIf the caller logs decrypted contents, cipher cannot help. Use json:"-" on secret struct fields and zap encoders that redact.
Compromised backend identityAnyone holding SOPS_AGE_KEY, a valid KMS principal, or a Vault token can decrypt every file encrypted to that recipient. Rotate after compromise.
Side channelsNo constant-time guarantees. Pair with a cloud KMS where a hardware root of trust matters.
Compromised dependenciescipher depends on SOPS, age, and cloud SDKs. A vulnerability in any of those reaches cipher.
The host OS, Go runtime, or filesystemOutside cipher's perimeter.
Trust boundaries
BoundaryTrusted sideUntrusted side
KMS API callThe calling process with valid credentials.The network in between, assumed HTTPS.
Encrypted fileAnyone with read access can copy it.Without recipient credentials, plaintext stays inaccessible.
Editor subprocessThe user's text editor binary.Other processes on the host that can read /tmp while the editor is open.
Pre-commit hookThe repo's working tree on a developer machine.Any shell or editor path that bypasses the hook.
Key Handling Guidance
  • Generate age identities with age.GenerateIdentity or age-keygen. Never derive an age secret from a passphrase or any deterministic input.
  • Store the age secret string with 0600 permissions and load it through SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE, or fetch it from a secret manager at startup.
  • Prefer cloud KMS in production where IAM and audit logging are first class.
  • Rotate the per-file data key with cipher rotate after every recipient removal, after personnel changes, and on a periodic schedule.
  • Never commit an age secret, a KMS access key, or a Vault token. Install cipher precommit to block plaintext leaks at commit time.
  • Treat --allow-orphan as a one-way door. It removes the last recipient and the file becomes undecryptable.
Known Limitations
LimitationWorkaround
Plaintext lifetime in memory is not bounded.Zero buffers in the caller after use.
Temp file cleanup is best-effort.Run cipher edit on a host with tmpfs for /tmp.
Recipient identifiers passed via flags are visible to ps.Acceptable. Recipient strings are public-key material, not secret.
Logging redaction is the caller's responsibility.Use the patterns documented in logger godoc.
Cryptographic Choices
cipher does not implement cryptography. It composes:
  • SOPS for envelope encryption and key-group rules.
  • age for X25519 plus ChaCha20-Poly1305.
  • AWS, GCP, Azure, and Vault SDKs for managed-key envelope wrapping.
Algorithm parameters follow the defaults of each backend. Propose algorithm upgrades through the regular issue tracker, not this disclosure path.
Changes to This Policy
Track this file in git. Material changes get a SECURITY.md commit and a corresponding entry in the release notes for that tag.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
Security: dcadolph/cipher
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
cipher protects secret files at rest with envelope encryption backed by SOPS. This document covers the supported versions, the disclosure process, the threat model, and key handling guidance.
Supported Versions
Pre-1.0, only the most recent tagged release is supported. Older tags receive no fixes or backports.
VersionStatus
Latest tagActive.
Older tagsUnsupported.
Reporting a Vulnerability
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories.
Include:
  • Affected version or commit hash.
  • A short reproduction.
  • Observed impact and any known mitigation.
Acknowledgment target is 72 hours. A coordinated disclosure window is agreed once the report is confirmed. Public disclosure happens after a fix is released, or 90 days from the report, whichever comes first.
Do not open public issues for security reports.
Threat Model
What cipher protects
AssetProtection
File contents on diskEncrypted with a per-file data key wrapped by every configured backend.
File contents on a networkInert ciphertext when paired with HTTPS or other transport security.
Recipient changesAdd or remove without re-encrypting the payload. The wrapped data key changes, the bulk payload does not.
Plaintext during editMaterialized only in a private 0700 temp directory in a 0600 file, removed best-effort when the editor exits.
What cipher does NOT protect
AssetReason
Plaintext in memory after decryptionOnce Decode returns, plaintext lives in the caller's process. Memory hygiene is the caller's responsibility.
Decrypted temp files after a crashcipher edit removes the temp dir best-effort. A hard crash leaves the temp file until the OS cleans /tmp.
Logged plaintextIf the caller logs decrypted contents, cipher cannot help. Use json:"-" on secret struct fields and zap encoders that redact.
Compromised backend identityAnyone holding SOPS_AGE_KEY, a valid KMS principal, or a Vault token can decrypt every file encrypted to that recipient. Rotate after compromise.
Side channelsNo constant-time guarantees. Pair with a cloud KMS where a hardware root of trust matters.
Compromised dependenciescipher depends on SOPS, age, and cloud SDKs. A vulnerability in any of those reaches cipher.
The host OS, Go runtime, or filesystemOutside cipher's perimeter.
Trust boundaries
BoundaryTrusted sideUntrusted side
KMS API callThe calling process with valid credentials.The network in between, assumed HTTPS.
Encrypted fileAnyone with read access can copy it.Without recipient credentials, plaintext stays inaccessible.
Editor subprocessThe user's text editor binary.Other processes on the host that can read /tmp while the editor is open.
Pre-commit hookThe repo's working tree on a developer machine.Any shell or editor path that bypasses the hook.
Key Handling Guidance
  • Generate age identities with age.GenerateIdentity or age-keygen. Never derive an age secret from a passphrase or any deterministic input.
  • Store the age secret string with 0600 permissions and load it through SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE, or fetch it from a secret manager at startup.
  • Prefer cloud KMS in production where IAM and audit logging are first class.
  • Rotate the per-file data key with cipher rotate after every recipient removal, after personnel changes, and on a periodic schedule.
  • Never commit an age secret, a KMS access key, or a Vault token. Install cipher precommit to block plaintext leaks at commit time.
  • Treat --allow-orphan as a one-way door. It removes the last recipient and the file becomes undecryptable.
Known Limitations
LimitationWorkaround
Plaintext lifetime in memory is not bounded.Zero buffers in the caller after use.
Temp file cleanup is best-effort.Run cipher edit on a host with tmpfs for /tmp.
Recipient identifiers passed via flags are visible to ps.Acceptable. Recipient strings are public-key material, not secret.
Logging redaction is the caller's responsibility.Use the patterns documented in logger godoc.
Cryptographic Choices
cipher does not implement cryptography. It composes:
  • SOPS for envelope encryption and key-group rules.
  • age for X25519 plus ChaCha20-Poly1305.
  • AWS, GCP, Azure, and Vault SDKs for managed-key envelope wrapping.
Algorithm parameters follow the defaults of each backend. Propose algorithm upgrades through the regular issue tracker, not this disclosure path.
Changes to This Policy
Track this file in git. Material changes get a SECURITY.md commit and a corresponding entry in the release notes for that tag.
 There aren't any published security advisories


, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

Skip to content
Security: dcadolph/cipher
Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy
cipher protects secret files at rest with envelope encryption backed by SOPS. This document covers the supported versions, the disclosure process, the threat model, and key handling guidance.
Supported Versions
Pre-1.0, only the most recent tagged release is supported. Older tags receive no fixes or backports.
VersionStatus
Latest tagActive.
Older tagsUnsupported.
Reporting a Vulnerability
Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories.
Include:
  • Affected version or commit hash.
  • A short reproduction.
  • Observed impact and any known mitigation.
Acknowledgment target is 72 hours. A coordinated disclosure window is agreed once the report is confirmed. Public disclosure happens after a fix is released, or 90 days from the report, whichever comes first.
Do not open public issues for security reports.
Threat Model
What cipher protects
AssetProtection
File contents on diskEncrypted with a per-file data key wrapped by every configured backend.
File contents on a networkInert ciphertext when paired with HTTPS or other transport security.
Recipient changesAdd or remove without re-encrypting the payload. The wrapped data key changes, the bulk payload does not.
Plaintext during editMaterialized only in a private 0700 temp directory in a 0600 file, removed best-effort when the editor exits.
What cipher does NOT protect
AssetReason
Plaintext in memory after decryptionOnce Decode returns, plaintext lives in the caller's process. Memory hygiene is the caller's responsibility.
Decrypted temp files after a crashcipher edit removes the temp dir best-effort. A hard crash leaves the temp file until the OS cleans /tmp.
Logged plaintextIf the caller logs decrypted contents, cipher cannot help. Use json:"-" on secret struct fields and zap encoders that redact.
Compromised backend identityAnyone holding SOPS_AGE_KEY, a valid KMS principal, or a Vault token can decrypt every file encrypted to that recipient. Rotate after compromise.
Side channelsNo constant-time guarantees. Pair with a cloud KMS where a hardware root of trust matters.
Compromised dependenciescipher depends on SOPS, age, and cloud SDKs. A vulnerability in any of those reaches cipher.
The host OS, Go runtime, or filesystemOutside cipher's perimeter.
Trust boundaries
BoundaryTrusted sideUntrusted side
KMS API callThe calling process with valid credentials.The network in between, assumed HTTPS.
Encrypted fileAnyone with read access can copy it.Without recipient credentials, plaintext stays inaccessible.
Editor subprocessThe user's text editor binary.Other processes on the host that can read /tmp while the editor is open.
Pre-commit hookThe repo's working tree on a developer machine.Any shell or editor path that bypasses the hook.
Key Handling Guidance
  • Generate age identities with age.GenerateIdentity or age-keygen. Never derive an age secret from a passphrase or any deterministic input.
  • Store the age secret string with 0600 permissions and load it through SOPS_AGE_KEY_FILE, or fetch it from a secret manager at startup.
  • Prefer cloud KMS in production where IAM and audit logging are first class.
  • Rotate the per-file data key with cipher rotate after every recipient removal, after personnel changes, and on a periodic schedule.
  • Never commit an age secret, a KMS access key, or a Vault token. Install cipher precommit to block plaintext leaks at commit time.
  • Treat --allow-orphan as a one-way door. It removes the last recipient and the file becomes undecryptable.
Known Limitations
LimitationWorkaround
Plaintext lifetime in memory is not bounded.Zero buffers in the caller after use.
Temp file cleanup is best-effort.Run cipher edit on a host with tmpfs for /tmp.
Recipient identifiers passed via flags are visible to ps.Acceptable. Recipient strings are public-key material, not secret.
Logging redaction is the caller's responsibility.Use the patterns documented in logger godoc.
Cryptographic Choices
cipher does not implement cryptography. It composes:
  • SOPS for envelope encryption and key-group rules.
  • age for X25519 plus ChaCha20-Poly1305.
  • AWS, GCP, Azure, and Vault SDKs for managed-key envelope wrapping.
Algorithm parameters follow the defaults of each backend. Propose algorithm upgrades through the regular issue tracker, not this disclosure path.
Changes to This Policy
Track this file in git. Material changes get a SECURITY.md commit and a corresponding entry in the release notes for that tag.
 There aren't any published security advisories