[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux - #96838

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wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Jan 16, 2024
Merged

[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux#96838
wfurt merged 3 commits into
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rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0

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@rzikmrzikm commented Jan 11, 2024•
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Backport of PR #96792, PR #96448, PR #90200 and PR #96972.

Fixes#96770, #96659 and #89907

Description

Regression: No, .NET 6 didn't have OCSP staple feature.
Customer: Internal partner team - blocking migration from Windows to Linux.

OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) stapling is an optimization where instead of clients individually retrieving revocation status of the server certificate, server will fetch the OCSP response itself and send it to clients during connection handshake. The authenticity of the response is assured by a digital signature.

First bug in .NET 7.0+ ... An invalid response can get cached and the server would fail to refresh it. The server would then keep sending the old, cached and potentially malformed OCSP response. This bug is triggered when either:

Second bug in .NET 7.0+ ... Validation of OCSP response always fails when the method of "delegated signing" is used (delegated signing means that the OCSP response is signed by a special certificate delegated by the server certificate issuer).

  • Note that validation when receiving OCSP response on client-side is not affected by this bug and is extensively tested, only the server part is affected by the bug.
  • Server validating the OCSP response before sending it out is only to play nice and not send invalid OCSP responses out. This bug DOES NOT create security vulnerability because clients are expected to independently validate the OCSP response themselves.
    Fixed in main by PR Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Response #96792

The two issues mentioned above may lead to following undesired behaviors:

  • Server caches an invalid OCSP staple (e.g. error page due to OCSP server outage), and keeps sending it out.
  • Server stops refreshing the OCSP staple and keeps sending the old one even after its validity expired.
  • Server sends out OCSP staple which it does not consider valid

Customer Impact

Android clients cannot connect to .NET 7+ servers affected by this bug because the OCSP information may get outdated (and not refreshed) and Android 9+'s application default security restrictions don't allow HTTP connections by default.

Regression

No, sending OCSP staples from .NET servers is a new feature in .NET 7.

Testing

Locally reproduced affected scenario and extensively tested manually.

Customer validated private 7.0 bits.

There is extensive existing test coverage on client-side OCSP usage/validation. Missing E2E server-side automated test coverage is planned for upcoming weeks.

Risk

Small to medium. Code touched by this PR is not used in other code paths than OCSP, so only "Sending OCSP staples from a server" scenario is affected.

rzikmand others added 2 commits January 11, 2024 14:20
@rzikm@bartonjs
Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Resp…
df4171f
…onse (dotnet#96792)
* Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when validating OCSP_Response
* Code review feedback
* More code review feedback
* Update src/libraries/System.Net.Security/src/System/Net/Security/SslStreamCertificateContext.Linux.cs
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
* Fix compilation
* Always include root certificate
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
@rzikm
Recover from failed OCSP download. (dotnet#96448)
174b8c0
* Recover from failed OCSP check.
* Add 5s back-off after failed OCSP querry
@ghostghost assigned rzikmJan 11, 2024
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Issue Details

Description

Customer Impact

Regression

Testing

Risk

Package authoring signed off?

IMPORTANT: If this change touches code that ships in a NuGet package, please make certain that you have added any necessary package authoring and gotten it explicitly reviewed.

Author:rzikm
Assignees:rzikm
Labels:

area-System.Net.Security

Milestone:-

@rzikmrzikm added this to the 8.0.x milestone Jan 11, 2024
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@carlossanlop

carlossanlop commented Jan 12, 2024

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I see this is still a draft. Friendly reminder that Tuesday January 16th 4pm is the Code Complete deadline for the February Release. If all requirements are met, please merge your PR before that date and time to ensure this fix gets included in that Release. Otherwise it will have to wait until March.

@rzikm
rzikm marked this pull request as ready for review January 15, 2024 08:27
@rzikm
rzikm requested a review from bartonjsJanuary 15, 2024 08:28
@karelzkarelz added Servicing-consider Issue for next servicing release review Servicing-approved Approved for servicing release os-linux Linux OS (any supported distro) and removed Servicing-consider Issue for next servicing release review labels Jan 15, 2024
@karelz

karelz commented Jan 16, 2024

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Approved by Tactics (@SteveMCarroll) on 1/15 via email - label updated to Servicing-approved.

@rzikmrzikm mentioned this pull request Jan 16, 2024
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@karelz@rzikm can we get a sign-off for this PR as well?

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rzikm requested a review from wfurtJanuary 16, 2024 19:25
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LGTM

@carlossanlopcarlossanlop mentioned this pull request Jan 16, 2024
Merged
@rzikm@wfurt
Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch (dotnet#96972)
cabb320
* Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch
* Code review feedback
@wfurt
wfurt merged commit 85c2772 into dotnet:release/8.0-stagingJan 16, 2024
@github-actionsgithub-actionsBot locked and limited conversation to collaborators Feb 16, 2024
@karelzkarelz modified the milestones: 8.0.x, 8.0.2Jun 25, 2024
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@rzikm@carlossanlop@karelz@bartonjs@wfurt
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
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}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

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[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux - #96838
Merged
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Jan 16, 2024
Merged
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux#96838
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
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@rzikm
@rzikmrzikm
commented
Jan 11, 2024•

edited by wfurt

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Backport of PR #96792, PR #96448, PR #90200 and PR #96972.
Fixes#96770, #96659 and #89907
Description
Regression: No, .NET 6 didn't have OCSP staple feature.

Customer: Internal partner team - blocking migration from Windows to Linux.
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) stapling is an optimization where instead of clients individually retrieving revocation status of the server certificate, server will fetch the OCSP response itself and send it to clients during connection handshake. The authenticity of the response is assured by a digital signature.
First bug in .NET 7.0+ ... An invalid response can get cached and the server would fail to refresh it. The server would then keep sending the old, cached and potentially malformed OCSP response. This bug is triggered when either:
Second bug in .NET 7.0+ ... Validation of OCSP response always fails when the method of "delegated signing" is used (delegated signing means that the OCSP response is signed by a special certificate delegated by the server certificate issuer).
  • Note that validation when receiving OCSP response on client-side is not affected by this bug and is extensively tested, only the server part is affected by the bug.
  • Server validating the OCSP response before sending it out is only to play nice and not send invalid OCSP responses out. This bug DOES NOT create security vulnerability because clients are expected to independently validate the OCSP response themselves.
    
Fixed in main by PR Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Response #96792
The two issues mentioned above may lead to following undesired behaviors:
  • Server caches an invalid OCSP staple (e.g. error page due to OCSP server outage), and keeps sending it out.
  • Server stops refreshing the OCSP staple and keeps sending the old one even after its validity expired.
  • Server sends out OCSP staple which it does not consider valid
Customer Impact
Android clients cannot connect to .NET 7+ servers affected by this bug because the OCSP information may get outdated (and not refreshed) and Android 9+'s application default security restrictions don't allow HTTP connections by default.
Regression
No, sending OCSP staples from .NET servers is a new feature in .NET 7.
Testing
Locally reproduced affected scenario and extensively tested manually.
Customer validated private 7.0 bits.
There is extensive existing test coverage on client-side OCSP usage/validation. Missing E2E server-side automated test coverage is planned for upcoming weeks.
Risk
Small to medium. Code touched by this PR is not used in other code paths than OCSP, so only "Sending OCSP staples from a server" scenario is affected.
rzikmand others
added 2 commits
January 11, 2024 14:20
@rzikm@bartonjs
Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Resp…
df4171f
…onse (dotnet#96792)
* Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when validating OCSP_Response
* Code review feedback
* More code review feedback
* Update src/libraries/System.Net.Security/src/System/Net/Security/SslStreamCertificateContext.Linux.cs
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
* Fix compilation
* Always include root certificate
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
@rzikm
Recover from failed OCSP download. (dotnet#96448)
174b8c0
* Recover from failed OCSP check.
* Add 5s back-off after failed OCSP querry
@ghostghost
assigned rzikmJan 11, 2024
@ghost
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Jan 11, 2024

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Issue Details
Description
Customer Impact
Regression
Testing
Risk
Package authoring signed off?
IMPORTANT: If this change touches code that ships in a NuGet package, please make certain that you have added any necessary package authoring and gotten it explicitly reviewed.
Author:rzikm
Assignees:rzikm
Labels:
area-System.Net.Security
Milestone:-
@rzikmrzikm
added this to the 8.0.x milestone
Jan 11, 2024
@build-analysisbuild-analysisBot
mentioned this pull request
Jan 11, 2024

Open

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@carlossanlop
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Jan 12, 2024

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I see this is still a draft. Friendly reminder that Tuesday January 16th 4pm is the Code Complete deadline for the February Release. If all requirements are met, please merge your PR before that date and time to ensure this fix gets included in that Release. Otherwise it will have to wait until March.
@rzikm
rzikm
marked this pull request as ready for review
January 15, 2024 08:27
@rzikm
rzikm
requested a review
from bartonjsJanuary 15, 2024 08:28
@karelzkarelz
added

Servicing-consider
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os-linux
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Approved by Tactics (@SteveMCarroll) on 1/15 via email - label updated to Servicing-approved.
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 Merged

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@karelz@rzikm can we get a sign-off for this PR as well?
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LGTM
@carlossanlopcarlossanlop
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
 Merged

@rzikm@wfurt
Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch (dotnet#96972)
cabb320
* Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch
* Code review feedback
@wfurt
wfurt
merged commit 85c2772
into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingJan 16, 2024
@github-actionsgithub-actionsBot
locked and limited conversation to collaborators
Feb 16, 2024
@karelzkarelz
modified the milestones:
8.0.x, 8.0.2Jun 25, 2024
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux - #96838
Merged
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Jan 16, 2024
Merged
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux#96838
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
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@rzikmrzikm
commented
Jan 11, 2024•

edited by wfurt

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Backport of PR #96792, PR #96448, PR #90200 and PR #96972.
Fixes#96770, #96659 and #89907
Description
Regression: No, .NET 6 didn't have OCSP staple feature.

Customer: Internal partner team - blocking migration from Windows to Linux.
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) stapling is an optimization where instead of clients individually retrieving revocation status of the server certificate, server will fetch the OCSP response itself and send it to clients during connection handshake. The authenticity of the response is assured by a digital signature.
First bug in .NET 7.0+ ... An invalid response can get cached and the server would fail to refresh it. The server would then keep sending the old, cached and potentially malformed OCSP response. This bug is triggered when either:
Second bug in .NET 7.0+ ... Validation of OCSP response always fails when the method of "delegated signing" is used (delegated signing means that the OCSP response is signed by a special certificate delegated by the server certificate issuer).
  • Note that validation when receiving OCSP response on client-side is not affected by this bug and is extensively tested, only the server part is affected by the bug.
  • Server validating the OCSP response before sending it out is only to play nice and not send invalid OCSP responses out. This bug DOES NOT create security vulnerability because clients are expected to independently validate the OCSP response themselves.
    
Fixed in main by PR Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Response #96792
The two issues mentioned above may lead to following undesired behaviors:
  • Server caches an invalid OCSP staple (e.g. error page due to OCSP server outage), and keeps sending it out.
  • Server stops refreshing the OCSP staple and keeps sending the old one even after its validity expired.
  • Server sends out OCSP staple which it does not consider valid
Customer Impact
Android clients cannot connect to .NET 7+ servers affected by this bug because the OCSP information may get outdated (and not refreshed) and Android 9+'s application default security restrictions don't allow HTTP connections by default.
Regression
No, sending OCSP staples from .NET servers is a new feature in .NET 7.
Testing
Locally reproduced affected scenario and extensively tested manually.
Customer validated private 7.0 bits.
There is extensive existing test coverage on client-side OCSP usage/validation. Missing E2E server-side automated test coverage is planned for upcoming weeks.
Risk
Small to medium. Code touched by this PR is not used in other code paths than OCSP, so only "Sending OCSP staples from a server" scenario is affected.
rzikmand others
added 2 commits
January 11, 2024 14:20
@rzikm@bartonjs
Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Resp…
df4171f
…onse (dotnet#96792)
* Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when validating OCSP_Response
* Code review feedback
* More code review feedback
* Update src/libraries/System.Net.Security/src/System/Net/Security/SslStreamCertificateContext.Linux.cs
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
* Fix compilation
* Always include root certificate
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
@rzikm
Recover from failed OCSP download. (dotnet#96448)
174b8c0
* Recover from failed OCSP check.
* Add 5s back-off after failed OCSP querry
@ghostghost
assigned rzikmJan 11, 2024
@ghost
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commented
Jan 11, 2024

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Issue Details
Description
Customer Impact
Regression
Testing
Risk
Package authoring signed off?
IMPORTANT: If this change touches code that ships in a NuGet package, please make certain that you have added any necessary package authoring and gotten it explicitly reviewed.
Author:rzikm
Assignees:rzikm
Labels:
area-System.Net.Security
Milestone:-
@rzikmrzikm
added this to the 8.0.x milestone
Jan 11, 2024
@build-analysisbuild-analysisBot
mentioned this pull request
Jan 11, 2024

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@carlossanlop
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I see this is still a draft. Friendly reminder that Tuesday January 16th 4pm is the Code Complete deadline for the February Release. If all requirements are met, please merge your PR before that date and time to ensure this fix gets included in that Release. Otherwise it will have to wait until March.
@rzikm
rzikm
marked this pull request as ready for review
January 15, 2024 08:27
@rzikm
rzikm
requested a review
from bartonjsJanuary 15, 2024 08:28
@karelzkarelz
added

Servicing-consider
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os-linux
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and removed

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Approved by Tactics (@SteveMCarroll) on 1/15 via email - label updated to Servicing-approved.
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@karelz@rzikm can we get a sign-off for this PR as well?
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LGTM
@carlossanlopcarlossanlop
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
 Merged

@rzikm@wfurt
Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch (dotnet#96972)
cabb320
* Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch
* Code review feedback
@wfurt
wfurt
merged commit 85c2772
into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingJan 16, 2024
@github-actionsgithub-actionsBot
locked and limited conversation to collaborators
Feb 16, 2024
@karelzkarelz
modified the milestones:
8.0.x, 8.0.2Jun 25, 2024
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux - #96838
Merged
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Jan 16, 2024
Merged
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux#96838
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
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Jan 11, 2024•

edited by wfurt

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Backport of PR #96792, PR #96448, PR #90200 and PR #96972.
Fixes#96770, #96659 and #89907
Description
Regression: No, .NET 6 didn't have OCSP staple feature.

Customer: Internal partner team - blocking migration from Windows to Linux.
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) stapling is an optimization where instead of clients individually retrieving revocation status of the server certificate, server will fetch the OCSP response itself and send it to clients during connection handshake. The authenticity of the response is assured by a digital signature.
First bug in .NET 7.0+ ... An invalid response can get cached and the server would fail to refresh it. The server would then keep sending the old, cached and potentially malformed OCSP response. This bug is triggered when either:
Second bug in .NET 7.0+ ... Validation of OCSP response always fails when the method of "delegated signing" is used (delegated signing means that the OCSP response is signed by a special certificate delegated by the server certificate issuer).
  • Note that validation when receiving OCSP response on client-side is not affected by this bug and is extensively tested, only the server part is affected by the bug.
  • Server validating the OCSP response before sending it out is only to play nice and not send invalid OCSP responses out. This bug DOES NOT create security vulnerability because clients are expected to independently validate the OCSP response themselves.
    
Fixed in main by PR Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Response #96792
The two issues mentioned above may lead to following undesired behaviors:
  • Server caches an invalid OCSP staple (e.g. error page due to OCSP server outage), and keeps sending it out.
  • Server stops refreshing the OCSP staple and keeps sending the old one even after its validity expired.
  • Server sends out OCSP staple which it does not consider valid
Customer Impact
Android clients cannot connect to .NET 7+ servers affected by this bug because the OCSP information may get outdated (and not refreshed) and Android 9+'s application default security restrictions don't allow HTTP connections by default.
Regression
No, sending OCSP staples from .NET servers is a new feature in .NET 7.
Testing
Locally reproduced affected scenario and extensively tested manually.
Customer validated private 7.0 bits.
There is extensive existing test coverage on client-side OCSP usage/validation. Missing E2E server-side automated test coverage is planned for upcoming weeks.
Risk
Small to medium. Code touched by this PR is not used in other code paths than OCSP, so only "Sending OCSP staples from a server" scenario is affected.
rzikmand others
added 2 commits
January 11, 2024 14:20
@rzikm@bartonjs
Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Resp…
df4171f
…onse (dotnet#96792)
* Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when validating OCSP_Response
* Code review feedback
* More code review feedback
* Update src/libraries/System.Net.Security/src/System/Net/Security/SslStreamCertificateContext.Linux.cs
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
* Fix compilation
* Always include root certificate
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
@rzikm
Recover from failed OCSP download. (dotnet#96448)
174b8c0
* Recover from failed OCSP check.
* Add 5s back-off after failed OCSP querry
@ghostghost
assigned rzikmJan 11, 2024
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Issue Details
Description
Customer Impact
Regression
Testing
Risk
Package authoring signed off?
IMPORTANT: If this change touches code that ships in a NuGet package, please make certain that you have added any necessary package authoring and gotten it explicitly reviewed.
Author:rzikm
Assignees:rzikm
Labels:
area-System.Net.Security
Milestone:-
@rzikmrzikm
added this to the 8.0.x milestone
Jan 11, 2024
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Jan 11, 2024

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@carlossanlop
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Jan 12, 2024

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I see this is still a draft. Friendly reminder that Tuesday January 16th 4pm is the Code Complete deadline for the February Release. If all requirements are met, please merge your PR before that date and time to ensure this fix gets included in that Release. Otherwise it will have to wait until March.
@rzikm
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marked this pull request as ready for review
January 15, 2024 08:27
@rzikm
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from bartonjsJanuary 15, 2024 08:28
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Approved by Tactics (@SteveMCarroll) on 1/15 via email - label updated to Servicing-approved.
@rzikmrzikm
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Jan 16, 2024
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@karelz@rzikm can we get a sign-off for this PR as well?
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LGTM
@carlossanlopcarlossanlop
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
 Merged

@rzikm@wfurt
Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch (dotnet#96972)
cabb320
* Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch
* Code review feedback
@wfurt
wfurt
merged commit 85c2772
into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingJan 16, 2024
@github-actionsgithub-actionsBot
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Feb 16, 2024
@karelzkarelz
modified the milestones:
8.0.x, 8.0.2Jun 25, 2024
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@rzikm@carlossanlop@karelz@bartonjs@wfurt

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

Skip to content
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux - #96838
Merged
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Jan 16, 2024
Merged
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux#96838
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Conversation
@rzikm
@rzikmrzikm
commented
Jan 11, 2024•

edited by wfurt

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Backport of PR #96792, PR #96448, PR #90200 and PR #96972.
Fixes#96770, #96659 and #89907
Description
Regression: No, .NET 6 didn't have OCSP staple feature.

Customer: Internal partner team - blocking migration from Windows to Linux.
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) stapling is an optimization where instead of clients individually retrieving revocation status of the server certificate, server will fetch the OCSP response itself and send it to clients during connection handshake. The authenticity of the response is assured by a digital signature.
First bug in .NET 7.0+ ... An invalid response can get cached and the server would fail to refresh it. The server would then keep sending the old, cached and potentially malformed OCSP response. This bug is triggered when either:
Second bug in .NET 7.0+ ... Validation of OCSP response always fails when the method of "delegated signing" is used (delegated signing means that the OCSP response is signed by a special certificate delegated by the server certificate issuer).
  • Note that validation when receiving OCSP response on client-side is not affected by this bug and is extensively tested, only the server part is affected by the bug.
  • Server validating the OCSP response before sending it out is only to play nice and not send invalid OCSP responses out. This bug DOES NOT create security vulnerability because clients are expected to independently validate the OCSP response themselves.
    
Fixed in main by PR Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Response #96792
The two issues mentioned above may lead to following undesired behaviors:
  • Server caches an invalid OCSP staple (e.g. error page due to OCSP server outage), and keeps sending it out.
  • Server stops refreshing the OCSP staple and keeps sending the old one even after its validity expired.
  • Server sends out OCSP staple which it does not consider valid
Customer Impact
Android clients cannot connect to .NET 7+ servers affected by this bug because the OCSP information may get outdated (and not refreshed) and Android 9+'s application default security restrictions don't allow HTTP connections by default.
Regression
No, sending OCSP staples from .NET servers is a new feature in .NET 7.
Testing
Locally reproduced affected scenario and extensively tested manually.
Customer validated private 7.0 bits.
There is extensive existing test coverage on client-side OCSP usage/validation. Missing E2E server-side automated test coverage is planned for upcoming weeks.
Risk
Small to medium. Code touched by this PR is not used in other code paths than OCSP, so only "Sending OCSP staples from a server" scenario is affected.
rzikmand others
added 2 commits
January 11, 2024 14:20
@rzikm@bartonjs
Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Resp…
df4171f
…onse (dotnet#96792)
* Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when validating OCSP_Response
* Code review feedback
* More code review feedback
* Update src/libraries/System.Net.Security/src/System/Net/Security/SslStreamCertificateContext.Linux.cs
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
* Fix compilation
* Always include root certificate
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
@rzikm
Recover from failed OCSP download. (dotnet#96448)
174b8c0
* Recover from failed OCSP check.
* Add 5s back-off after failed OCSP querry
@ghostghost
assigned rzikmJan 11, 2024
@ghost
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Jan 11, 2024

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Issue Details
Description
Customer Impact
Regression
Testing
Risk
Package authoring signed off?
IMPORTANT: If this change touches code that ships in a NuGet package, please make certain that you have added any necessary package authoring and gotten it explicitly reviewed.
Author:rzikm
Assignees:rzikm
Labels:
area-System.Net.Security
Milestone:-
@rzikmrzikm
added this to the 8.0.x milestone
Jan 11, 2024
@build-analysisbuild-analysisBot
mentioned this pull request
Jan 11, 2024

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@carlossanlop
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Jan 12, 2024

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I see this is still a draft. Friendly reminder that Tuesday January 16th 4pm is the Code Complete deadline for the February Release. If all requirements are met, please merge your PR before that date and time to ensure this fix gets included in that Release. Otherwise it will have to wait until March.
@rzikm
rzikm
marked this pull request as ready for review
January 15, 2024 08:27
@rzikm
rzikm
requested a review
from bartonjsJanuary 15, 2024 08:28
@karelzkarelz
added

Servicing-consider
Issue for next servicing release review
Servicing-approved
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os-linux
Linux OS (any supported distro)
and removed

Servicing-consider
Issue for next servicing release review
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Jan 15, 2024
@karelz
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Approved by Tactics (@SteveMCarroll) on 1/15 via email - label updated to Servicing-approved.
@rzikmrzikm
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
 Merged

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@karelz@rzikm can we get a sign-off for this PR as well?
@rzikm
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wfurt
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LGTM
@carlossanlopcarlossanlop
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
 Merged

@rzikm@wfurt
Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch (dotnet#96972)
cabb320
* Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch
* Code review feedback
@wfurt
wfurt
merged commit 85c2772
into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingJan 16, 2024
@github-actionsgithub-actionsBot
locked and limited conversation to collaborators
Feb 16, 2024
@karelzkarelz
modified the milestones:
8.0.x, 8.0.2Jun 25, 2024
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@wfurtwfurtwfurt approved these changes
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5 participants

@rzikm@carlossanlop@karelz@bartonjs@wfurt

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux - #96838
Merged
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Jan 16, 2024
Merged
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux#96838
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Conversation
@rzikm
@rzikmrzikm
commented
Jan 11, 2024•

edited by wfurt

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Backport of PR #96792, PR #96448, PR #90200 and PR #96972.
Fixes#96770, #96659 and #89907
Description
Regression: No, .NET 6 didn't have OCSP staple feature.

Customer: Internal partner team - blocking migration from Windows to Linux.
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) stapling is an optimization where instead of clients individually retrieving revocation status of the server certificate, server will fetch the OCSP response itself and send it to clients during connection handshake. The authenticity of the response is assured by a digital signature.
First bug in .NET 7.0+ ... An invalid response can get cached and the server would fail to refresh it. The server would then keep sending the old, cached and potentially malformed OCSP response. This bug is triggered when either:
Second bug in .NET 7.0+ ... Validation of OCSP response always fails when the method of "delegated signing" is used (delegated signing means that the OCSP response is signed by a special certificate delegated by the server certificate issuer).
  • Note that validation when receiving OCSP response on client-side is not affected by this bug and is extensively tested, only the server part is affected by the bug.
  • Server validating the OCSP response before sending it out is only to play nice and not send invalid OCSP responses out. This bug DOES NOT create security vulnerability because clients are expected to independently validate the OCSP response themselves.
    
Fixed in main by PR Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Response #96792
The two issues mentioned above may lead to following undesired behaviors:
  • Server caches an invalid OCSP staple (e.g. error page due to OCSP server outage), and keeps sending it out.
  • Server stops refreshing the OCSP staple and keeps sending the old one even after its validity expired.
  • Server sends out OCSP staple which it does not consider valid
Customer Impact
Android clients cannot connect to .NET 7+ servers affected by this bug because the OCSP information may get outdated (and not refreshed) and Android 9+'s application default security restrictions don't allow HTTP connections by default.
Regression
No, sending OCSP staples from .NET servers is a new feature in .NET 7.
Testing
Locally reproduced affected scenario and extensively tested manually.
Customer validated private 7.0 bits.
There is extensive existing test coverage on client-side OCSP usage/validation. Missing E2E server-side automated test coverage is planned for upcoming weeks.
Risk
Small to medium. Code touched by this PR is not used in other code paths than OCSP, so only "Sending OCSP staples from a server" scenario is affected.
rzikmand others
added 2 commits
January 11, 2024 14:20
@rzikm@bartonjs
Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Resp…
df4171f
…onse (dotnet#96792)
* Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when validating OCSP_Response
* Code review feedback
* More code review feedback
* Update src/libraries/System.Net.Security/src/System/Net/Security/SslStreamCertificateContext.Linux.cs
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
* Fix compilation
* Always include root certificate
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
@rzikm
Recover from failed OCSP download. (dotnet#96448)
174b8c0
* Recover from failed OCSP check.
* Add 5s back-off after failed OCSP querry
@ghostghost
assigned rzikmJan 11, 2024
@ghost
ghost
commented
Jan 11, 2024

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Issue Details
Description
Customer Impact
Regression
Testing
Risk
Package authoring signed off?
IMPORTANT: If this change touches code that ships in a NuGet package, please make certain that you have added any necessary package authoring and gotten it explicitly reviewed.
Author:rzikm
Assignees:rzikm
Labels:
area-System.Net.Security
Milestone:-
@rzikmrzikm
added this to the 8.0.x milestone
Jan 11, 2024
@build-analysisbuild-analysisBot
mentioned this pull request
Jan 11, 2024

Open

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@carlossanlop
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Jan 12, 2024

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I see this is still a draft. Friendly reminder that Tuesday January 16th 4pm is the Code Complete deadline for the February Release. If all requirements are met, please merge your PR before that date and time to ensure this fix gets included in that Release. Otherwise it will have to wait until March.
@rzikm
rzikm
marked this pull request as ready for review
January 15, 2024 08:27
@rzikm
rzikm
requested a review
from bartonjsJanuary 15, 2024 08:28
@karelzkarelz
added

Servicing-consider
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os-linux
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Approved by Tactics (@SteveMCarroll) on 1/15 via email - label updated to Servicing-approved.
@rzikmrzikm
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
 Merged

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@karelz@rzikm can we get a sign-off for this PR as well?
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LGTM
@carlossanlopcarlossanlop
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
 Merged

@rzikm@wfurt
Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch (dotnet#96972)
cabb320
* Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch
* Code review feedback
@wfurt
wfurt
merged commit 85c2772
into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingJan 16, 2024
@github-actionsgithub-actionsBot
locked and limited conversation to collaborators
Feb 16, 2024
@karelzkarelz
modified the milestones:
8.0.x, 8.0.2Jun 25, 2024
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@wfurtwfurtwfurt approved these changes
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@rzikm@carlossanlop@karelz@bartonjs@wfurt

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

Skip to content
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux - #96838
Merged
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Jan 16, 2024
Merged
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux#96838
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Conversation
@rzikm
@rzikmrzikm
commented
Jan 11, 2024•

edited by wfurt

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Backport of PR #96792, PR #96448, PR #90200 and PR #96972.
Fixes#96770, #96659 and #89907
Description
Regression: No, .NET 6 didn't have OCSP staple feature.

Customer: Internal partner team - blocking migration from Windows to Linux.
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) stapling is an optimization where instead of clients individually retrieving revocation status of the server certificate, server will fetch the OCSP response itself and send it to clients during connection handshake. The authenticity of the response is assured by a digital signature.
First bug in .NET 7.0+ ... An invalid response can get cached and the server would fail to refresh it. The server would then keep sending the old, cached and potentially malformed OCSP response. This bug is triggered when either:
Second bug in .NET 7.0+ ... Validation of OCSP response always fails when the method of "delegated signing" is used (delegated signing means that the OCSP response is signed by a special certificate delegated by the server certificate issuer).
  • Note that validation when receiving OCSP response on client-side is not affected by this bug and is extensively tested, only the server part is affected by the bug.
  • Server validating the OCSP response before sending it out is only to play nice and not send invalid OCSP responses out. This bug DOES NOT create security vulnerability because clients are expected to independently validate the OCSP response themselves.
    
Fixed in main by PR Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Response #96792
The two issues mentioned above may lead to following undesired behaviors:
  • Server caches an invalid OCSP staple (e.g. error page due to OCSP server outage), and keeps sending it out.
  • Server stops refreshing the OCSP staple and keeps sending the old one even after its validity expired.
  • Server sends out OCSP staple which it does not consider valid
Customer Impact
Android clients cannot connect to .NET 7+ servers affected by this bug because the OCSP information may get outdated (and not refreshed) and Android 9+'s application default security restrictions don't allow HTTP connections by default.
Regression
No, sending OCSP staples from .NET servers is a new feature in .NET 7.
Testing
Locally reproduced affected scenario and extensively tested manually.
Customer validated private 7.0 bits.
There is extensive existing test coverage on client-side OCSP usage/validation. Missing E2E server-side automated test coverage is planned for upcoming weeks.
Risk
Small to medium. Code touched by this PR is not used in other code paths than OCSP, so only "Sending OCSP staples from a server" scenario is affected.
rzikmand others
added 2 commits
January 11, 2024 14:20
@rzikm@bartonjs
Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Resp…
df4171f
…onse (dotnet#96792)
* Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when validating OCSP_Response
* Code review feedback
* More code review feedback
* Update src/libraries/System.Net.Security/src/System/Net/Security/SslStreamCertificateContext.Linux.cs
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
* Fix compilation
* Always include root certificate
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
@rzikm
Recover from failed OCSP download. (dotnet#96448)
174b8c0
* Recover from failed OCSP check.
* Add 5s back-off after failed OCSP querry
@ghostghost
assigned rzikmJan 11, 2024
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IMPORTANT: If this change touches code that ships in a NuGet package, please make certain that you have added any necessary package authoring and gotten it explicitly reviewed.
Author:rzikm
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I see this is still a draft. Friendly reminder that Tuesday January 16th 4pm is the Code Complete deadline for the February Release. If all requirements are met, please merge your PR before that date and time to ensure this fix gets included in that Release. Otherwise it will have to wait until March.
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Approved by Tactics (@SteveMCarroll) on 1/15 via email - label updated to Servicing-approved.
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@karelz@rzikm can we get a sign-off for this PR as well?
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LGTM
@carlossanlopcarlossanlop
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
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@rzikm@wfurt
Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch (dotnet#96972)
cabb320
* Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch
* Code review feedback
@wfurt
wfurt
merged commit 85c2772
into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingJan 16, 2024
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux - #96838
Merged
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
Jan 16, 2024
Merged
[release/8.0] Fix server-side OCSP stapling on Linux#96838
wfurt merged 3 commits into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingfrom 
rzikm:ocsp-verify-fix-8.0
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Backport of PR #96792, PR #96448, PR #90200 and PR #96972.
Fixes#96770, #96659 and #89907
Description
Regression: No, .NET 6 didn't have OCSP staple feature.

Customer: Internal partner team - blocking migration from Windows to Linux.
OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) stapling is an optimization where instead of clients individually retrieving revocation status of the server certificate, server will fetch the OCSP response itself and send it to clients during connection handshake. The authenticity of the response is assured by a digital signature.
First bug in .NET 7.0+ ... An invalid response can get cached and the server would fail to refresh it. The server would then keep sending the old, cached and potentially malformed OCSP response. This bug is triggered when either:
Second bug in .NET 7.0+ ... Validation of OCSP response always fails when the method of "delegated signing" is used (delegated signing means that the OCSP response is signed by a special certificate delegated by the server certificate issuer).
  • Note that validation when receiving OCSP response on client-side is not affected by this bug and is extensively tested, only the server part is affected by the bug.
  • Server validating the OCSP response before sending it out is only to play nice and not send invalid OCSP responses out. This bug DOES NOT create security vulnerability because clients are expected to independently validate the OCSP response themselves.
    
Fixed in main by PR Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Response #96792
The two issues mentioned above may lead to following undesired behaviors:
  • Server caches an invalid OCSP staple (e.g. error page due to OCSP server outage), and keeps sending it out.
  • Server stops refreshing the OCSP staple and keeps sending the old one even after its validity expired.
  • Server sends out OCSP staple which it does not consider valid
Customer Impact
Android clients cannot connect to .NET 7+ servers affected by this bug because the OCSP information may get outdated (and not refreshed) and Android 9+'s application default security restrictions don't allow HTTP connections by default.
Regression
No, sending OCSP staples from .NET servers is a new feature in .NET 7.
Testing
Locally reproduced affected scenario and extensively tested manually.
Customer validated private 7.0 bits.
There is extensive existing test coverage on client-side OCSP usage/validation. Missing E2E server-side automated test coverage is planned for upcoming weeks.
Risk
Small to medium. Code touched by this PR is not used in other code paths than OCSP, so only "Sending OCSP staples from a server" scenario is affected.
rzikmand others
added 2 commits
January 11, 2024 14:20
@rzikm@bartonjs
Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when stapling OCSP_Resp…
df4171f
…onse (dotnet#96792)
* Add entire issuer chain to trusted X509_STORE when validating OCSP_Response
* Code review feedback
* More code review feedback
* Update src/libraries/System.Net.Security/src/System/Net/Security/SslStreamCertificateContext.Linux.cs
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
* Fix compilation
* Always include root certificate
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremy Barton <jbarton@microsoft.com>
@rzikm
Recover from failed OCSP download. (dotnet#96448)
174b8c0
* Recover from failed OCSP check.
* Add 5s back-off after failed OCSP querry
@ghostghost
assigned rzikmJan 11, 2024
@ghost
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Jan 11, 2024

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Tagging subscribers to this area: @dotnet/ncl, @bartonjs, @vcsjones

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Issue Details
Description
Customer Impact
Regression
Testing
Risk
Package authoring signed off?
IMPORTANT: If this change touches code that ships in a NuGet package, please make certain that you have added any necessary package authoring and gotten it explicitly reviewed.
Author:rzikm
Assignees:rzikm
Labels:
area-System.Net.Security
Milestone:-
@rzikmrzikm
added this to the 8.0.x milestone
Jan 11, 2024
@build-analysisbuild-analysisBot
mentioned this pull request
Jan 11, 2024

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@carlossanlop
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Jan 12, 2024

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I see this is still a draft. Friendly reminder that Tuesday January 16th 4pm is the Code Complete deadline for the February Release. If all requirements are met, please merge your PR before that date and time to ensure this fix gets included in that Release. Otherwise it will have to wait until March.
@rzikm
rzikm
marked this pull request as ready for review
January 15, 2024 08:27
@rzikm
rzikm
requested a review
from bartonjsJanuary 15, 2024 08:28
@karelzkarelz
added

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Approved by Tactics (@SteveMCarroll) on 1/15 via email - label updated to Servicing-approved.
@rzikmrzikm
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
 Merged

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@karelz@rzikm can we get a sign-off for this PR as well?
@rzikm
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wfurt
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LGTM
@carlossanlopcarlossanlop
mentioned this pull request
Jan 16, 2024
 Merged

@rzikm@wfurt
Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch (dotnet#96972)
cabb320
* Don't shorten OCSP expriation on failed server OCSP fetch
* Code review feedback
@wfurt
wfurt
merged commit 85c2772
into
dotnet:release/8.0-stagingJan 16, 2024
@github-actionsgithub-actionsBot
locked and limited conversation to collaborators
Feb 16, 2024
@karelzkarelz
modified the milestones:
8.0.x, 8.0.2Jun 25, 2024
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@wfurtwfurtwfurt approved these changes
@bartonjsbartonjsbartonjs approved these changes

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@carlossanlopcarlossanlopcarlossanlop left review comments
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