Notifications handler lets the request body override the authenticated username

[feruzm]

Summary

PrivateApi.Notifications (dotnet/EcencyApi/Handlers/PrivateApi.UserData1.cs:14-62) lets a value in the request body decide whose notifications are returned, instead of deriving that solely from the validated auth code. The result is that the endpoint does not actually authenticate the reader.

Found while tracing the notification delivery path for the follow outage (ecency/enotify-py#20). Not related to that fix, and not a regression from the dotnet port: the header comment says this is a port of src/server/handlers/private-api.ts lines 1004-1257, so the same shape exists upstream and should be checked there too.

The logic

var username = await ValidateCode(body);
var user = body.Field("user");

if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(username))
{
 if (!JsJson.IsTruthy(user))
 {
 await ctx.SendText(401, "Unauthorized");
 return;
 }
 username = UserData1Helpers.Template(user); // (1)
}
// if user defined but not same as user's code
if (JsJson.IsTruthy(user))
{
 username = UserData1Helpers.Template(user); // (2)
}

Two separate problems:

1. No code required. When ValidateCode yields nothing, a present user field satisfies the guard and becomes the account queried. The 401 is only reachable when user is absent, so supplying it is enough to pass.
2. A valid code is overridden anyway. Block (2) runs unconditionally, so even a correctly authenticated caller has their identity replaced by whatever the body says. The comment above it describes an intent ("if user defined but not same as user's code") that the code never implements: there is no comparison.

UnreadNotifications immediately below, at :81-92, is the correct pattern for the same data:

var username = await ValidateCode(body);
if (string.IsNullOrEmpty(username))
{
 await ctx.SendText(401, "Unauthorized");
 return;
}

Second issue in the same handler

username, filter, since and limit are interpolated into the upstream path (:38-58) through Template(), which is a JS string-coercion emulator (:396-416) and performs no URL encoding. Values containing path or query separators therefore reach the upstream request as structure rather than as data, so a caller can influence which upstream endpoint is hit, not just its arguments.

The practical consequence is that the api-proxy nginx per-path allowlist is currently acting as a security control rather than as routing hygiene. It is the thing bounding which upstream endpoints are reachable this way, and it was not designed for that job.

Suggested fix

1. Derive username from ValidateCode only. If the endpoint genuinely needs to serve another account, compare explicitly and reject a mismatch rather than overwriting, which is what the existing comment already implies was intended.
2. Percent-encode every interpolated segment, or build the upstream URI from typed components so a value cannot contribute path or query structure.
3. Apply the same review to the TypeScript original this was ported from, and audit the rest of PrivateApi.UserData1.cs for other handlers reading an identity from the body. Notifications is the only one with the override pattern today, but the encoding issue is worth checking more broadly.
4. Worth a regression test asserting that a request whose body names a different account than its code either 401s or serves the code's account.

Scope

Read-only exposure of notification activity for an arbitrary named account. No write path, no credential disclosure. Deliberately not including a reproduction request here since the repository is public.