This repository was archived by the owner on Jun 10, 2021. It is now read-only.

Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names - #24

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Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names#24
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Impact

A user who owns an ENS domain can set a "trapdoor", allowing them to transfer ownership to another user, and later regain ownership without the new owner's consent or awareness.

Patches

A new ENS deployment is being rolled out that fixes this vulnerability in the ENS registry. The registry is newly deployed at 0x00000000000C2E074eC69A0dFb2997BA6C7d2e1e.

Workarounds

Do not accept transfers of ENS domains from other users on the old registrar.

Check the migration guide in our docs.

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks
(function() {
function addCopyButtons() {
document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {
if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;
codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');
var btn = document.createElement('button');
btn.textContent = 'Copy';
btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';
btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };
btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };
btn.onclick = function() {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {
btn.textContent = 'Copied!';
setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);
});
};
codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';
codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);
});
}
addCopyButtons();
// Re-run on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

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This repository was archived by the owner on Jun 10, 2021. It is now read-only.

Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names - #24
Open
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Open
Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names#24
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Conversation
@ensbot
@ensbotensbot
commented
Jan 30, 2020

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Impact
A user who owns an ENS domain can set a "trapdoor", allowing them to transfer ownership to another user, and later regain ownership without the new owner's consent or awareness.
Patches
A new ENS deployment is being rolled out that fixes this vulnerability in the ENS registry. The registry is newly deployed at 0x00000000000C2E074eC69A0dFb2997BA6C7d2e1e.
Workarounds
Do not accept transfers of ENS domains from other users on the old registrar.
Check the migration guide in our docs.
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode
(function() {
var style = document.createElement('style');
style.textContent = '
.markdown-body {
color-scheme: dark light;
}
.markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }
.markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }
.markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }
.markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }
.markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }
.markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }
';
document.head.appendChild(style);
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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This repository was archived by the owner on Jun 10, 2021. It is now read-only.

Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names - #24
Open
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Open
Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names#24
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Conversation
@ensbot
@ensbotensbot
commented
Jan 30, 2020

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Copy Markdown

Impact
A user who owns an ENS domain can set a "trapdoor", allowing them to transfer ownership to another user, and later regain ownership without the new owner's consent or awareness.
Patches
A new ENS deployment is being rolled out that fixes this vulnerability in the ENS registry. The registry is newly deployed at 0x00000000000C2E074eC69A0dFb2997BA6C7d2e1e.
Workarounds
Do not accept transfers of ENS domains from other users on the old registrar.
Check the migration guide in our docs.
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer
(function() {
var ref = document.referrer;
var terms = [];
if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {
var url = new URL(ref);
var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');
if (q) {
terms = q.split(/\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });
}
}
if (terms.length === 0) return;
var style = document.createElement('style');
style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';
document.head.appendChild(style);
function highlight(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node
var text = node.textContent;
var found = false;
terms.forEach(function(term) {
var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\') + ')', 'gi');
if (regex.test(text)) {
found = true;
var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();
var parts = text.split(regex);
parts.forEach(function(part, i) {
if (i % 2 === 0) {
frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));
} else {
var span = document.createElement('span');
span.className = 'userscript-highlight';
span.textContent = part;
frag.appendChild(span);
}
});
node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);
}
});
} else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element
var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];
if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {
Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);
}
}
}
highlight(document.body);
// Re-highlight on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
mutations.forEach(function(m) {
m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);
});
});
});
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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This repository was archived by the owner on Jun 10, 2021. It is now read-only.

Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names - #24
Open
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Open
Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names#24
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Conversation
@ensbot
@ensbotensbot
commented
Jan 30, 2020

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Impact
A user who owns an ENS domain can set a "trapdoor", allowing them to transfer ownership to another user, and later regain ownership without the new owner's consent or awareness.
Patches
A new ENS deployment is being rolled out that fixes this vulnerability in the ENS registry. The registry is newly deployed at 0x00000000000C2E074eC69A0dFb2997BA6C7d2e1e.
Workarounds
Do not accept transfers of ENS domains from other users on the old registrar.
Check the migration guide in our docs.
Sign up for freeto subscribe to this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
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Development

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1 participant

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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page
(function() {
var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',
'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',
'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];
function cleanUrl(url) {
try {
var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);
var changed = false;
trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {
if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {
u.searchParams.delete(p);
changed = true;
}
});
return changed ? u.toString() : url;
} catch (e) {
return url;
}
}
function cleanLinks() {
document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {
var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);
if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;
});
}
cleanLinks();
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
mutations.forEach(function(m) {
m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 1) {
if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();
node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {
var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);
if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;
});
}
});
});
});
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

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This repository was archived by the owner on Jun 10, 2021. It is now read-only.

Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names - #24
Open
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Open
Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names#24
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Conversation
@ensbot
@ensbotensbot
commented
Jan 30, 2020

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Impact
A user who owns an ENS domain can set a "trapdoor", allowing them to transfer ownership to another user, and later regain ownership without the new owner's consent or awareness.
Patches
A new ENS deployment is being rolled out that fixes this vulnerability in the ENS registry. The registry is newly deployed at 0x00000000000C2E074eC69A0dFb2997BA6C7d2e1e.
Workarounds
Do not accept transfers of ENS domains from other users on the old registrar.
Check the migration guide in our docs.
Sign up for freeto subscribe to this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in.


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1 participant

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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube
(function() {
function tryTheater() {
var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label="Theater mode"], ytd-player #player button[title="Theater mode"]');
if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {
btn.click();
}
}
// Try immediately
tryTheater();
// Try after navigation (SPA)
var lastUrl = location.href;
setInterval(function() {
if (location.href !== lastUrl) {
lastUrl = location.href;
setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);
}
}, 1000);
// Also try on player load
var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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This repository was archived by the owner on Jun 10, 2021. It is now read-only.

Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names - #24
Open
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Open
Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names#24
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Conversation
@ensbot
@ensbotensbot
commented
Jan 30, 2020

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Impact
A user who owns an ENS domain can set a "trapdoor", allowing them to transfer ownership to another user, and later regain ownership without the new owner's consent or awareness.
Patches
A new ENS deployment is being rolled out that fixes this vulnerability in the ENS registry. The registry is newly deployed at 0x00000000000C2E074eC69A0dFb2997BA6C7d2e1e.
Workarounds
Do not accept transfers of ENS domains from other users on the old registrar.
Check the migration guide in our docs.
Sign up for freeto subscribe to this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in.


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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content
(function() {
function unstick() {
document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role="banner"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*="position: fixed"], [style*="position:sticky"]').forEach(function(el) {
if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {
el.style.position = 'static';
el.style.top = 'auto';
el.style.zIndex = 'auto';
}
});
}
unstick();
var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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This repository was archived by the owner on Jun 10, 2021. It is now read-only.

Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names - #24
Open
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Open
Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names#24
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Conversation
@ensbot
@ensbotensbot
commented
Jan 30, 2020

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Copy Markdown

Impact
A user who owns an ENS domain can set a "trapdoor", allowing them to transfer ownership to another user, and later regain ownership without the new owner's consent or awareness.
Patches
A new ENS deployment is being rolled out that fixes this vulnerability in the ENS registry. The registry is newly deployed at 0x00000000000C2E074eC69A0dFb2997BA6C7d2e1e.
Workarounds
Do not accept transfers of ENS domains from other users on the old registrar.
Check the migration guide in our docs.
Sign up for freeto subscribe to this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in.


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1 participant

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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site
(function() {
var enabled = true;
function applyDarkMode() {
if (!enabled) return;
// Create style element if it doesn't exist
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (!style) {
style = document.createElement('style');
style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';
document.head.appendChild(style);
}
// Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video
style.textContent = '
/* Invert everything except media */
html {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #1a1a2e !important;
}
/* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */
img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*="background-image"] {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
}
/* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */
.no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,
[data-theme="light"], [data-theme="light"],
.ace_editor, .ace_editor *,
.CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,
.monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,
.markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,
.highlight, .highlight *,
pre code, pre code * {
filter: none !important;
}
/* Fix common UI elements */
.modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #2d2d44 !important;
border-color: #444 !important;
}
/* Scrollbars */
::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }
::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }
/* Selection */
::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }
';
}
function removeDarkMode() {
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (style) style.remove();
}
// Toggle with Alt+Shift+D
document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {
if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {
e.preventDefault();
enabled = !enabled;
if (enabled) {
applyDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');
} else {
removeDarkMode();
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');
}
}
});
// Apply on load
applyDarkMode();
// Re-apply on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {
applyDarkMode();
}
});
observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });
console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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This repository was archived by the owner on Jun 10, 2021. It is now read-only.

Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names - #24
Open
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Open
Malicious takeover of previously owned ENS names#24
ensbot wants to merge 1 commit into
ethers-io:masterfrom 
ensbot:feature-branch-ensbot
Conversation
@ensbot
@ensbotensbot
commented
Jan 30, 2020

Copy link


Copy Markdown

Impact
A user who owns an ENS domain can set a "trapdoor", allowing them to transfer ownership to another user, and later regain ownership without the new owner's consent or awareness.
Patches
A new ENS deployment is being rolled out that fixes this vulnerability in the ENS registry. The registry is newly deployed at 0x00000000000C2E074eC69A0dFb2997BA6C7d2e1e.
Workarounds
Do not accept transfers of ENS domains from other users on the old registrar.
Check the migration guide in our docs.
Sign up for freeto subscribe to this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in.


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No one assigned


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Development

Successfully merging this pull request may close these issues.

1 participant

@ensbot