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86 changes: 86 additions & 0 deletions text/0068-org-user-token-restriction.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
- Start Date: 2023-01-18
- RFC Type: feature
- RFC PR: -
- RFC Status: `draft`

# Summary

Provide an option to organization owners to disallow all user interaction with
their organization that is using a user API token for authentication.

# Motivation

Sentry treats users and organizations as two separate entities.
A user can be a part of multiple organizations.

An organization may have stricter requirements or a lower risk appetite
compared to a user. We provide options for organizations to require SSO and 2FA
to be enabled on a user account that wishes to interact with their organization.
However, a user can authenticate with a user API token, which inherently
does not require controls like a 2FA prompt.

As a result, protecting the user API token lies solely on the user.

Leaking secrets in source control, personal computers infected with malware, or
vendor breaches can lead to these tokens being compromised and exposes
an organization to increased risk.

If a user API token is leaked, an organization owner has two options:

1. Coordinate with the user to rotate their API token.
2. Remove the user from their organization.

An organization owner **cannot** delete another user's API token.

This also assumes the organization owner is made aware of the leaked token.
Currently, notification would only go to the user who owns the token.

# Proposed Solution

Owners should have more control on how user API tokens
interact with their organization.

In the majority of cases organization owners have requested the ability
to disallow interaction with their organization via a user API
token completely. These organizations typically follow our recommended
practice of using a custom integration for automation tasks.

**I'm proposing we add a toggle option under the organization settings
to disallow usage of user API tokens for authentication to their organization.**
Comment on lines +48 to +49

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Is this a setting that we would enable by default for new orgs?


## Pros

- Solves the concern for the majority of customers who are concerned about
user API tokens
- Relatively simple implementation

## Cons

- Organization owners do not have a way to determine if
their users are using personal API tokens
- An organization upon enabling this may find some of their automation
or integrations broken

# Supporting Data

Secret or API token leaks are commonplace:

- [CircleCI's recent breach (Jan 2023)](https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/)
- [Heroku and TravisCI token leaks](https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/)

# Related Work

- [Improved API Tokens](https://github.com/getsentry/rfcs/pull/32)

# Potential Future Work

- Allow organizations to require an SSO flow to authorize a user token before use.
- Instead of a simple on/off toggle, we could create a more complex _policy_ system
allowing user API tokens to be used for certain scopes within an org, meet
required maximum lifetimes, etc.

# Unanswered Questions

- How do we account for API application tokens?
- Should they still be allowed?
- What about those that are created in the backend by using integrations?
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
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86 changes: 86 additions & 0 deletions text/0068-org-user-token-restriction.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
- Start Date: 2023-01-18
- RFC Type: feature
- RFC PR: -
- RFC Status: `draft`

# Summary

Provide an option to organization owners to disallow all user interaction with
their organization that is using a user API token for authentication.

# Motivation

Sentry treats users and organizations as two separate entities.
A user can be a part of multiple organizations.

An organization may have stricter requirements or a lower risk appetite
compared to a user. We provide options for organizations to require SSO and 2FA
to be enabled on a user account that wishes to interact with their organization.
However, a user can authenticate with a user API token, which inherently
does not require controls like a 2FA prompt.

As a result, protecting the user API token lies solely on the user.

Leaking secrets in source control, personal computers infected with malware, or
vendor breaches can lead to these tokens being compromised and exposes
an organization to increased risk.

If a user API token is leaked, an organization owner has two options:

1. Coordinate with the user to rotate their API token.
2. Remove the user from their organization.

An organization owner **cannot** delete another user's API token.

This also assumes the organization owner is made aware of the leaked token.
Currently, notification would only go to the user who owns the token.

# Proposed Solution

Owners should have more control on how user API tokens
interact with their organization.

In the majority of cases organization owners have requested the ability
to disallow interaction with their organization via a user API
token completely. These organizations typically follow our recommended
practice of using a custom integration for automation tasks.

**I'm proposing we add a toggle option under the organization settings
to disallow usage of user API tokens for authentication to their organization.**
Comment on lines +48 to +49

Copy link
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Member

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

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Is this a setting that we would enable by default for new orgs?


## Pros

- Solves the concern for the majority of customers who are concerned about
user API tokens
- Relatively simple implementation

## Cons

- Organization owners do not have a way to determine if
their users are using personal API tokens
- An organization upon enabling this may find some of their automation
or integrations broken

# Supporting Data

Secret or API token leaks are commonplace:

- [CircleCI's recent breach (Jan 2023)](https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/)
- [Heroku and TravisCI token leaks](https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/)

# Related Work

- [Improved API Tokens](https://github.com/getsentry/rfcs/pull/32)

# Potential Future Work

- Allow organizations to require an SSO flow to authorize a user token before use.
- Instead of a simple on/off toggle, we could create a more complex _policy_ system
allowing user API tokens to be used for certain scopes within an org, meet
required maximum lifetimes, etc.

# Unanswered Questions

- How do we account for API application tokens?
- Should they still be allowed?
- What about those that are created in the backend by using integrations?
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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86 changes: 86 additions & 0 deletions text/0068-org-user-token-restriction.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
- Start Date: 2023-01-18
- RFC Type: feature
- RFC PR: -
- RFC Status: `draft`

# Summary

Provide an option to organization owners to disallow all user interaction with
their organization that is using a user API token for authentication.

# Motivation

Sentry treats users and organizations as two separate entities.
A user can be a part of multiple organizations.

An organization may have stricter requirements or a lower risk appetite
compared to a user. We provide options for organizations to require SSO and 2FA
to be enabled on a user account that wishes to interact with their organization.
However, a user can authenticate with a user API token, which inherently
does not require controls like a 2FA prompt.

As a result, protecting the user API token lies solely on the user.

Leaking secrets in source control, personal computers infected with malware, or
vendor breaches can lead to these tokens being compromised and exposes
an organization to increased risk.

If a user API token is leaked, an organization owner has two options:

1. Coordinate with the user to rotate their API token.
2. Remove the user from their organization.

An organization owner **cannot** delete another user's API token.

This also assumes the organization owner is made aware of the leaked token.
Currently, notification would only go to the user who owns the token.

# Proposed Solution

Owners should have more control on how user API tokens
interact with their organization.

In the majority of cases organization owners have requested the ability
to disallow interaction with their organization via a user API
token completely. These organizations typically follow our recommended
practice of using a custom integration for automation tasks.

**I'm proposing we add a toggle option under the organization settings
to disallow usage of user API tokens for authentication to their organization.**
Comment on lines +48 to +49

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Member

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Is this a setting that we would enable by default for new orgs?


## Pros

- Solves the concern for the majority of customers who are concerned about
user API tokens
- Relatively simple implementation

## Cons

- Organization owners do not have a way to determine if
their users are using personal API tokens
- An organization upon enabling this may find some of their automation
or integrations broken

# Supporting Data

Secret or API token leaks are commonplace:

- [CircleCI's recent breach (Jan 2023)](https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/)
- [Heroku and TravisCI token leaks](https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/)

# Related Work

- [Improved API Tokens](https://github.com/getsentry/rfcs/pull/32)

# Potential Future Work

- Allow organizations to require an SSO flow to authorize a user token before use.
- Instead of a simple on/off toggle, we could create a more complex _policy_ system
allowing user API tokens to be used for certain scopes within an org, meet
required maximum lifetimes, etc.

# Unanswered Questions

- How do we account for API application tokens?
- Should they still be allowed?
- What about those that are created in the backend by using integrations?
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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86 changes: 86 additions & 0 deletions text/0068-org-user-token-restriction.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
- Start Date: 2023-01-18
- RFC Type: feature
- RFC PR: -
- RFC Status: `draft`

# Summary

Provide an option to organization owners to disallow all user interaction with
their organization that is using a user API token for authentication.

# Motivation

Sentry treats users and organizations as two separate entities.
A user can be a part of multiple organizations.

An organization may have stricter requirements or a lower risk appetite
compared to a user. We provide options for organizations to require SSO and 2FA
to be enabled on a user account that wishes to interact with their organization.
However, a user can authenticate with a user API token, which inherently
does not require controls like a 2FA prompt.

As a result, protecting the user API token lies solely on the user.

Leaking secrets in source control, personal computers infected with malware, or
vendor breaches can lead to these tokens being compromised and exposes
an organization to increased risk.

If a user API token is leaked, an organization owner has two options:

1. Coordinate with the user to rotate their API token.
2. Remove the user from their organization.

An organization owner **cannot** delete another user's API token.

This also assumes the organization owner is made aware of the leaked token.
Currently, notification would only go to the user who owns the token.

# Proposed Solution

Owners should have more control on how user API tokens
interact with their organization.

In the majority of cases organization owners have requested the ability
to disallow interaction with their organization via a user API
token completely. These organizations typically follow our recommended
practice of using a custom integration for automation tasks.

**I'm proposing we add a toggle option under the organization settings
to disallow usage of user API tokens for authentication to their organization.**
Comment on lines +48 to +49

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Member

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Is this a setting that we would enable by default for new orgs?


## Pros

- Solves the concern for the majority of customers who are concerned about
user API tokens
- Relatively simple implementation

## Cons

- Organization owners do not have a way to determine if
their users are using personal API tokens
- An organization upon enabling this may find some of their automation
or integrations broken

# Supporting Data

Secret or API token leaks are commonplace:

- [CircleCI's recent breach (Jan 2023)](https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/)
- [Heroku and TravisCI token leaks](https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/)

# Related Work

- [Improved API Tokens](https://github.com/getsentry/rfcs/pull/32)

# Potential Future Work

- Allow organizations to require an SSO flow to authorize a user token before use.
- Instead of a simple on/off toggle, we could create a more complex _policy_ system
allowing user API tokens to be used for certain scopes within an org, meet
required maximum lifetimes, etc.

# Unanswered Questions

- How do we account for API application tokens?
- Should they still be allowed?
- What about those that are created in the backend by using integrations?
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
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86 changes: 86 additions & 0 deletions text/0068-org-user-token-restriction.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
- Start Date: 2023-01-18
- RFC Type: feature
- RFC PR: -
- RFC Status: `draft`

# Summary

Provide an option to organization owners to disallow all user interaction with
their organization that is using a user API token for authentication.

# Motivation

Sentry treats users and organizations as two separate entities.
A user can be a part of multiple organizations.

An organization may have stricter requirements or a lower risk appetite
compared to a user. We provide options for organizations to require SSO and 2FA
to be enabled on a user account that wishes to interact with their organization.
However, a user can authenticate with a user API token, which inherently
does not require controls like a 2FA prompt.

As a result, protecting the user API token lies solely on the user.

Leaking secrets in source control, personal computers infected with malware, or
vendor breaches can lead to these tokens being compromised and exposes
an organization to increased risk.

If a user API token is leaked, an organization owner has two options:

1. Coordinate with the user to rotate their API token.
2. Remove the user from their organization.

An organization owner **cannot** delete another user's API token.

This also assumes the organization owner is made aware of the leaked token.
Currently, notification would only go to the user who owns the token.

# Proposed Solution

Owners should have more control on how user API tokens
interact with their organization.

In the majority of cases organization owners have requested the ability
to disallow interaction with their organization via a user API
token completely. These organizations typically follow our recommended
practice of using a custom integration for automation tasks.

**I'm proposing we add a toggle option under the organization settings
to disallow usage of user API tokens for authentication to their organization.**
Comment on lines +48 to +49

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Member

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Is this a setting that we would enable by default for new orgs?


## Pros

- Solves the concern for the majority of customers who are concerned about
user API tokens
- Relatively simple implementation

## Cons

- Organization owners do not have a way to determine if
their users are using personal API tokens
- An organization upon enabling this may find some of their automation
or integrations broken

# Supporting Data

Secret or API token leaks are commonplace:

- [CircleCI's recent breach (Jan 2023)](https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/)
- [Heroku and TravisCI token leaks](https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/)

# Related Work

- [Improved API Tokens](https://github.com/getsentry/rfcs/pull/32)

# Potential Future Work

- Allow organizations to require an SSO flow to authorize a user token before use.
- Instead of a simple on/off toggle, we could create a more complex _policy_ system
allowing user API tokens to be used for certain scopes within an org, meet
required maximum lifetimes, etc.

# Unanswered Questions

- How do we account for API application tokens?
- Should they still be allowed?
- What about those that are created in the backend by using integrations?
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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86 changes: 86 additions & 0 deletions text/0068-org-user-token-restriction.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
- Start Date: 2023-01-18
- RFC Type: feature
- RFC PR: -
- RFC Status: `draft`

# Summary

Provide an option to organization owners to disallow all user interaction with
their organization that is using a user API token for authentication.

# Motivation

Sentry treats users and organizations as two separate entities.
A user can be a part of multiple organizations.

An organization may have stricter requirements or a lower risk appetite
compared to a user. We provide options for organizations to require SSO and 2FA
to be enabled on a user account that wishes to interact with their organization.
However, a user can authenticate with a user API token, which inherently
does not require controls like a 2FA prompt.

As a result, protecting the user API token lies solely on the user.

Leaking secrets in source control, personal computers infected with malware, or
vendor breaches can lead to these tokens being compromised and exposes
an organization to increased risk.

If a user API token is leaked, an organization owner has two options:

1. Coordinate with the user to rotate their API token.
2. Remove the user from their organization.

An organization owner **cannot** delete another user's API token.

This also assumes the organization owner is made aware of the leaked token.
Currently, notification would only go to the user who owns the token.

# Proposed Solution

Owners should have more control on how user API tokens
interact with their organization.

In the majority of cases organization owners have requested the ability
to disallow interaction with their organization via a user API
token completely. These organizations typically follow our recommended
practice of using a custom integration for automation tasks.

**I'm proposing we add a toggle option under the organization settings
to disallow usage of user API tokens for authentication to their organization.**
Comment on lines +48 to +49

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Member

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Is this a setting that we would enable by default for new orgs?


## Pros

- Solves the concern for the majority of customers who are concerned about
user API tokens
- Relatively simple implementation

## Cons

- Organization owners do not have a way to determine if
their users are using personal API tokens
- An organization upon enabling this may find some of their automation
or integrations broken

# Supporting Data

Secret or API token leaks are commonplace:

- [CircleCI's recent breach (Jan 2023)](https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/)
- [Heroku and TravisCI token leaks](https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/)

# Related Work

- [Improved API Tokens](https://github.com/getsentry/rfcs/pull/32)

# Potential Future Work

- Allow organizations to require an SSO flow to authorize a user token before use.
- Instead of a simple on/off toggle, we could create a more complex _policy_ system
allowing user API tokens to be used for certain scopes within an org, meet
required maximum lifetimes, etc.

# Unanswered Questions

- How do we account for API application tokens?
- Should they still be allowed?
- What about those that are created in the backend by using integrations?
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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86 changes: 86 additions & 0 deletions text/0068-org-user-token-restriction.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
- Start Date: 2023-01-18
- RFC Type: feature
- RFC PR: -
- RFC Status: `draft`

# Summary

Provide an option to organization owners to disallow all user interaction with
their organization that is using a user API token for authentication.

# Motivation

Sentry treats users and organizations as two separate entities.
A user can be a part of multiple organizations.

An organization may have stricter requirements or a lower risk appetite
compared to a user. We provide options for organizations to require SSO and 2FA
to be enabled on a user account that wishes to interact with their organization.
However, a user can authenticate with a user API token, which inherently
does not require controls like a 2FA prompt.

As a result, protecting the user API token lies solely on the user.

Leaking secrets in source control, personal computers infected with malware, or
vendor breaches can lead to these tokens being compromised and exposes
an organization to increased risk.

If a user API token is leaked, an organization owner has two options:

1. Coordinate with the user to rotate their API token.
2. Remove the user from their organization.

An organization owner **cannot** delete another user's API token.

This also assumes the organization owner is made aware of the leaked token.
Currently, notification would only go to the user who owns the token.

# Proposed Solution

Owners should have more control on how user API tokens
interact with their organization.

In the majority of cases organization owners have requested the ability
to disallow interaction with their organization via a user API
token completely. These organizations typically follow our recommended
practice of using a custom integration for automation tasks.

**I'm proposing we add a toggle option under the organization settings
to disallow usage of user API tokens for authentication to their organization.**
Comment on lines +48 to +49

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Is this a setting that we would enable by default for new orgs?


## Pros

- Solves the concern for the majority of customers who are concerned about
user API tokens
- Relatively simple implementation

## Cons

- Organization owners do not have a way to determine if
their users are using personal API tokens
- An organization upon enabling this may find some of their automation
or integrations broken

# Supporting Data

Secret or API token leaks are commonplace:

- [CircleCI's recent breach (Jan 2023)](https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/)
- [Heroku and TravisCI token leaks](https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/)

# Related Work

- [Improved API Tokens](https://github.com/getsentry/rfcs/pull/32)

# Potential Future Work

- Allow organizations to require an SSO flow to authorize a user token before use.
- Instead of a simple on/off toggle, we could create a more complex _policy_ system
allowing user API tokens to be used for certain scopes within an org, meet
required maximum lifetimes, etc.

# Unanswered Questions

- How do we account for API application tokens?
- Should they still be allowed?
- What about those that are created in the backend by using integrations?
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
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86 changes: 86 additions & 0 deletions text/0068-org-user-token-restriction.md
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
- Start Date: 2023-01-18
- RFC Type: feature
- RFC PR: -
- RFC Status: `draft`

# Summary

Provide an option to organization owners to disallow all user interaction with
their organization that is using a user API token for authentication.

# Motivation

Sentry treats users and organizations as two separate entities.
A user can be a part of multiple organizations.

An organization may have stricter requirements or a lower risk appetite
compared to a user. We provide options for organizations to require SSO and 2FA
to be enabled on a user account that wishes to interact with their organization.
However, a user can authenticate with a user API token, which inherently
does not require controls like a 2FA prompt.

As a result, protecting the user API token lies solely on the user.

Leaking secrets in source control, personal computers infected with malware, or
vendor breaches can lead to these tokens being compromised and exposes
an organization to increased risk.

If a user API token is leaked, an organization owner has two options:

1. Coordinate with the user to rotate their API token.
2. Remove the user from their organization.

An organization owner **cannot** delete another user's API token.

This also assumes the organization owner is made aware of the leaked token.
Currently, notification would only go to the user who owns the token.

# Proposed Solution

Owners should have more control on how user API tokens
interact with their organization.

In the majority of cases organization owners have requested the ability
to disallow interaction with their organization via a user API
token completely. These organizations typically follow our recommended
practice of using a custom integration for automation tasks.

**I'm proposing we add a toggle option under the organization settings
to disallow usage of user API tokens for authentication to their organization.**
Comment on lines +48 to +49

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Member

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

Is this a setting that we would enable by default for new orgs?


## Pros

- Solves the concern for the majority of customers who are concerned about
user API tokens
- Relatively simple implementation

## Cons

- Organization owners do not have a way to determine if
their users are using personal API tokens
- An organization upon enabling this may find some of their automation
or integrations broken

# Supporting Data

Secret or API token leaks are commonplace:

- [CircleCI's recent breach (Jan 2023)](https://circleci.com/blog/jan-4-2023-incident-report/)
- [Heroku and TravisCI token leaks](https://github.blog/2022-04-15-security-alert-stolen-oauth-user-tokens/)

# Related Work

- [Improved API Tokens](https://github.com/getsentry/rfcs/pull/32)

# Potential Future Work

- Allow organizations to require an SSO flow to authorize a user token before use.
- Instead of a simple on/off toggle, we could create a more complex _policy_ system
allowing user API tokens to be used for certain scopes within an org, meet
required maximum lifetimes, etc.

# Unanswered Questions

- How do we account for API application tokens?
- Should they still be allowed?
- What about those that are created in the backend by using integrations?