fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow - #669

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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow#669
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Summary

This PR fixes a security vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow where GitHub context data was directly interpolated in run scripts, which could allow code injection attacks.

Changes

  • Added env: blocks to steps in release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
  • Replaced direct ${{ github.ref_name }} and ${{ github.sha }} interpolation with environment variables $REF_NAME and $GITHUB_SHA
  • All environment variables are properly quoted in the script to prevent injection

Security Impact

This fix prevents potential script injection attacks by ensuring GitHub context values are passed through controlled environment variables rather than directly interpolated into shell commands.

References

@fix-it-felix-sentry@claude
fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow
af28743
Use environment variables instead of direct GitHub context interpolation
in run scripts to prevent potential code injection attacks.
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1609
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/PRO-40
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fix-it-felix-sentry
fix-it-felix-sentryBot requested a review from a team as a code ownerApril 30, 2026 15:02
@linear-code

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VULN-1609 Command Injection vulnerability in getsentry/vroom .github/workflows/release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml

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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all 
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow - #669
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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow#669
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Summary
This PR fixes a security vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow where GitHub context data was directly interpolated in run scripts, which could allow code injection attacks.
Changes
  • Added env: blocks to steps in release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
  • Replaced direct ${{ github.ref_name }} and ${{ github.sha }} interpolation with environment variables $REF_NAME and $GITHUB_SHA
  • All environment variables are properly quoted in the script to prevent injection
Security Impact
This fix prevents potential script injection attacks by ensuring GitHub context values are passed through controlled environment variables rather than directly interpolated into shell commands.
References
@fix-it-felix-sentry@claude
fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow
af28743
Use environment variables instead of direct GitHub context interpolation
in run scripts to prevent potential code injection attacks.
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1609
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/PRO-40
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fix-it-felix-sentry
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requested a review
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VULN-1609 Command Injection vulnerability in getsentry/vroom .github/workflows/release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow - #669
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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow#669
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Summary
This PR fixes a security vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow where GitHub context data was directly interpolated in run scripts, which could allow code injection attacks.
Changes
  • Added env: blocks to steps in release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
  • Replaced direct ${{ github.ref_name }} and ${{ github.sha }} interpolation with environment variables $REF_NAME and $GITHUB_SHA
  • All environment variables are properly quoted in the script to prevent injection
Security Impact
This fix prevents potential script injection attacks by ensuring GitHub context values are passed through controlled environment variables rather than directly interpolated into shell commands.
References
@fix-it-felix-sentry@claude
fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow
af28743
Use environment variables instead of direct GitHub context interpolation
in run scripts to prevent potential code injection attacks.
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1609
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/PRO-40
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fix-it-felix-sentry
fix-it-felix-sentryBot
requested a review
from a team
as a code ownerApril 30, 2026 15:02
@linear-code
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VULN-1609 Command Injection vulnerability in getsentry/vroom .github/workflows/release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow - #669
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fix/vuln-1609-ghcr-version-tag-injection
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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow#669
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Summary
This PR fixes a security vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow where GitHub context data was directly interpolated in run scripts, which could allow code injection attacks.
Changes
  • Added env: blocks to steps in release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
  • Replaced direct ${{ github.ref_name }} and ${{ github.sha }} interpolation with environment variables $REF_NAME and $GITHUB_SHA
  • All environment variables are properly quoted in the script to prevent injection
Security Impact
This fix prevents potential script injection attacks by ensuring GitHub context values are passed through controlled environment variables rather than directly interpolated into shell commands.
References
@fix-it-felix-sentry@claude
fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow
af28743
Use environment variables instead of direct GitHub context interpolation
in run scripts to prevent potential code injection attacks.
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1609
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/PRO-40
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fix-it-felix-sentry
fix-it-felix-sentryBot
requested a review
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as a code ownerApril 30, 2026 15:02
@linear-code
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VULN-1609 Command Injection vulnerability in getsentry/vroom .github/workflows/release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow - #669
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fix-it-felix-sentry[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix/vuln-1609-ghcr-version-tag-injection
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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow#669
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Summary
This PR fixes a security vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow where GitHub context data was directly interpolated in run scripts, which could allow code injection attacks.
Changes
  • Added env: blocks to steps in release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
  • Replaced direct ${{ github.ref_name }} and ${{ github.sha }} interpolation with environment variables $REF_NAME and $GITHUB_SHA
  • All environment variables are properly quoted in the script to prevent injection
Security Impact
This fix prevents potential script injection attacks by ensuring GitHub context values are passed through controlled environment variables rather than directly interpolated into shell commands.
References
@fix-it-felix-sentry@claude
fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow
af28743
Use environment variables instead of direct GitHub context interpolation
in run scripts to prevent potential code injection attacks.
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1609
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/PRO-40
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fix-it-felix-sentry
fix-it-felix-sentryBot
requested a review
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as a code ownerApril 30, 2026 15:02
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VULN-1609 Command Injection vulnerability in getsentry/vroom .github/workflows/release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow - #669
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fix-it-felix-sentry[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix/vuln-1609-ghcr-version-tag-injection
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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow#669
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fix/vuln-1609-ghcr-version-tag-injection
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Summary
This PR fixes a security vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow where GitHub context data was directly interpolated in run scripts, which could allow code injection attacks.
Changes
  • Added env: blocks to steps in release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
  • Replaced direct ${{ github.ref_name }} and ${{ github.sha }} interpolation with environment variables $REF_NAME and $GITHUB_SHA
  • All environment variables are properly quoted in the script to prevent injection
Security Impact
This fix prevents potential script injection attacks by ensuring GitHub context values are passed through controlled environment variables rather than directly interpolated into shell commands.
References
@fix-it-felix-sentry@claude
fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow
af28743
Use environment variables instead of direct GitHub context interpolation
in run scripts to prevent potential code injection attacks.
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1609
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/PRO-40
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fix-it-felix-sentry
fix-it-felix-sentryBot
requested a review
from a team
as a code ownerApril 30, 2026 15:02
@linear-code
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VULN-1609 Command Injection vulnerability in getsentry/vroom .github/workflows/release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow - #669
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fix-it-felix-sentry[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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fix/vuln-1609-ghcr-version-tag-injection
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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow#669
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Summary
This PR fixes a security vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow where GitHub context data was directly interpolated in run scripts, which could allow code injection attacks.
Changes
  • Added env: blocks to steps in release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
  • Replaced direct ${{ github.ref_name }} and ${{ github.sha }} interpolation with environment variables $REF_NAME and $GITHUB_SHA
  • All environment variables are properly quoted in the script to prevent injection
Security Impact
This fix prevents potential script injection attacks by ensuring GitHub context values are passed through controlled environment variables rather than directly interpolated into shell commands.
References
@fix-it-felix-sentry@claude
fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow
af28743
Use environment variables instead of direct GitHub context interpolation
in run scripts to prevent potential code injection attacks.
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1609
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/PRO-40
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fix-it-felix-sentry
fix-it-felix-sentryBot
requested a review
from a team
as a code ownerApril 30, 2026 15:02
@linear-code
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VULN-1609 Command Injection vulnerability in getsentry/vroom .github/workflows/release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow - #669
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fix/vuln-1609-ghcr-version-tag-injection
Open
fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow#669
fix-it-felix-sentry[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
mainfrom 
fix/vuln-1609-ghcr-version-tag-injection
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Apr 30, 2026

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Summary
This PR fixes a security vulnerability in the GitHub Actions workflow where GitHub context data was directly interpolated in run scripts, which could allow code injection attacks.
Changes
  • Added env: blocks to steps in release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
  • Replaced direct ${{ github.ref_name }} and ${{ github.sha }} interpolation with environment variables $REF_NAME and $GITHUB_SHA
  • All environment variables are properly quoted in the script to prevent injection
Security Impact
This fix prevents potential script injection attacks by ensuring GitHub context values are passed through controlled environment variables rather than directly interpolated into shell commands.
References
@fix-it-felix-sentry@claude
fix: Prevent script injection in release workflow
af28743
Use environment variables instead of direct GitHub context interpolation
in run scripts to prevent potential code injection attacks.
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/VULN-1609
Fixes: https://linear.app/getsentry/issue/PRO-40
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
@fix-it-felix-sentry
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as a code ownerApril 30, 2026 15:02
@linear-code
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Apr 30, 2026

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VULN-1609 Command Injection vulnerability in getsentry/vroom .github/workflows/release-ghcr-version-tag.yaml
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