🛡️ Malware Incident Analysis Report

XMRig Cryptocurrency Miner — Forensic Investigation

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📋 Table of Contents

• Case Overview
• How It Was Discovered
  • Investigation Tools Used
  • Investigation Timeline
• Threat Summary
• File-by-File Analysis
• Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
  • File System IOCs
  • Network IOCs
  • Attacker Wallet
  • Persistence IOCs
• MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
• Why the Host AV Failed
• Impact Assessment
• Remediation Steps
• Sample Preservation
• Key Learning Points
• Conclusion

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📁 Case Overview

Field	Details
Analyst	Niraj
Date of Discovery	2025
Date of Analysis	May 16, 2026
Threat Type	Cryptocurrency Miner (Cryptojacker)
Malware Family	XMRig
Cryptocurrency Targeted	Monero (XMR)
Severity	HIGH
Status at Discovery	ACTIVE
Location	C:\Users\niraj\AppData\Roaming\windowshost\
Antivirus Detection (host AV)	⚠️ UNDETECTED — evaded the installed antivirus on the victim machine
VirusTotal Reference	5379df3d28d8…1bc49bc3

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🔍 How It Was Discovered

The malware was not detected by the antivirus running on the host. It was discovered through manual investigation after observing suspicious system behavior:

Upon laptop startup, CPU/memory usage immediately spiked to ~80% before any user applications were opened. This abnormal resource consumption at boot time raised suspicion and triggered a manual investigation.

Investigation Tools Used

Tool	Purpose in Investigation
Task Manager	Initial detection — observed unusual high CPU and listed svchost32.exe in the Details tab
Process Explorer	Confirmed svchost32.exe as a non-Microsoft process consuming excessive CPU and memory
Autoruns	Located the persistence entry — WindowsHostService scheduled task pointing to runhidden.vbs
Task Scheduler	Verified the persistence trigger and the exact command line
Process Monitor	Captured live Stratum mining traffic from svchost32.exe to a remote pool
TCPView	Confirmed the established outbound TCP connection to the mining pool
RamMap	Quantified the memory footprint of svchost32.exe
Notepad / Text Editor	Inspected runhidden.vbs, config.json, and SHA256SUMS

Investigation Timeline

Step 1 — Symptom Observed Laptop boots with ~80% CPU usage, no user apps open.

Step 2 — Task Manager Suspicious svchost32.exe visible in the Details tab.

Behaviour: Shows the renamed miner running alongside legitimate svchost.exe instances.
Use case: First visual confirmation that an unknown process is masquerading as a system process.

Step 3 — Process Explorer Inspected the process to see private bytes, working set, and threads.

Behaviour:svchost32.exe (PID 35592) holds ~2.45 GB working set with heavy CPU cycles.
Use case: Quantifies the resource theft caused by the miner.

Step 4 — Located the Malware Folder Drilled into AppData\Roaming\windowshost\.

Behaviour: 7 files staged in user AppData — exe, vbs, config, lock, certs, hash list.
Use case: Enumerates every artifact dropped by the attacker.

Step 5 — Inspected runhidden.vbs The hidden launcher used at logon.

Behaviour: Launches svchost32.exe with window style 0 (hidden) using WScript.Shell.Run.
Use case: Explains how the miner runs with no visible window or console.

Step 6 — Inspected config.json XMRig configuration with mining pool and wallet.

Behaviour: Pool URL pool.supportxmr.com:3333, attacker wallet, tls:false, nicehash:false.
Use case: Extracts the mining pool, wallet address, and protocol IOCs.

Step 7 — Inspected SHA256SUMS Confirms the binary origin.

Behaviour: Lists hashes for xmrig.exe, WinRing0x64.sys, config.json, and helper scripts.
Use case: Proves the dropped binary is an official XMRig 6.24.0 build, only renamed.

Step 8 — Process Monitor Built a filter for svchost32.exe / xmrig.exe to capture mining activity.

Behaviour: Includes svchost32.exe and xmrig.exe; excludes windowshost, Procmon, Procexp, Autoruns.
Use case: Documents the exact investigation methodology used to isolate miner events.

Step 9 — Captured Stratum Traffic Live TCP send/receive events to the pool.

Behaviour: Continuous TCP Send/Receive frames between svchost32.exe and ns31430818.ip-141-94-96.eu:3333.
Use case: Live evidence of active Stratum mining communication.

Step 10 — TCPView Confirmed the established outbound connection.

Behaviour:svchost32.exe PID 35592 — 192.168.1.64:52338 → 141.94.96.144:3333, state ESTABLISHED.
Use case: Pins down the live remote IP, port, and source PID for IOC and firewall blocking.

Step 11 — RamMap Confirmed memory consumption.

Behaviour:svchost32.exe shows a multi-MB total/working set among normal services.
Use case: Corroborates the memory impact reported by Process Explorer.

Step 12 — Autoruns Discovered the persistence entry.

Behaviour: Search for "windowshost" reveals a scheduled task named WindowsHostService.
Use case: Identifies the autostart mechanism keeping the miner alive across reboots.

Step 13 — Task Scheduler Verified the persistence trigger and command.

Behaviour: Task WindowsHostService runs wscript.exe "C:\Users\niraj\AppData\Roaming\windowshost\runhidden.vbs" at logon.
Use case: Confirms exactly how, when, and with what command the miner is auto-launched.

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🧩 Threat Summary

This is a trojanized XMRig cryptocurrency miner disguised as a legitimate Windows system process. The attacker renamed the XMRig mining executable to svchost32.exe to mimic the legitimate Windows service host process (svchost.exe). The malware completely evaded the host antivirus and was only found through manual forensic investigation.

The sample has been independently confirmed as a Monero miner on VirusTotal — most major engines flag it as XMRig, CoinMiner, or BitMiner (categories: miner / trojan / pua).

🔗 Reference: VirusTotal Report — 5379df3d...

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🗂️ File-by-File Analysis

1. svchost32.exe — Main Malicious Executable

Property	Value
True Identity	XMRig Miner (renamed from xmrig.exe)
Disguised As	Windows Service Host (svchost.exe)
Purpose	Mines Monero cryptocurrency using victim's CPU
Original Hash (from SHA256SUMS)	f29d673b032f7ff763dec032aefd6c5759a1583b211625f7f770017bedf03689
Host AV Detection	NONE — undetected by installed antivirus
VirusTotal	Flagged as XMRig / CoinMiner by majority of engines

Why it evades the host antivirus:

• XMRig is technically "legitimate" mining software — many AV vendors classify it as PUA (Potentially Unwanted Application).
• Placed in a user directory where AV real-time scanning may have exclusions.
• The renamed filename avoids signature rules targeting xmrig.exe.
• VBScript indirection adds another layer of evasion.

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2. config.json — Mining Configuration

Setting	Value	Meaning
Mining Pool	pool.supportxmr.com:3333	Public Monero mining pool
Wallet Address	42eXxkZXEKLD38gM4XpNxUitLdkt5f7yZFJXRswCjvqPX9BjRmSUCL5Nxw7AKAY5hbaWpfbxWyors87ZZfvvWXhd6uTvXcN	Attacker's Monero wallet
Worker Password	S	Pool authentication token
CPU Mining	Enabled — ALL 16 threads	Maximum resource theft
GPU Mining (OpenCL)	Disabled	—
GPU Mining (CUDA)	Disabled	—
Background Mode	true	Runs silently, no visible window
Pause on Active	false	Does NOT stop when user is active
Pause on Battery	false	Does NOT stop on battery power
Donate Level	1%	Minimal donation to XMRig developers
HTTP API	Disabled	No remote monitoring interface exposed
Algorithm	RandomX (auto)	Monero's proof-of-work algorithm
Huge Pages	Enabled	Optimizes mining performance
TLS	Disabled	Unencrypted pool connection

Critical observations:

• Uses all 16 CPU threads at maximum intensity — explains the 80% resource usage at startup.
• pause-on-active: false means it never stops, even when the user is working.
• pause-on-battery: false drains laptop battery aggressively.
• background: true ensures no visible console window appears.

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3. runhidden.vbs — Stealth Launcher (Persistence Mechanism)

SetobjShell=CreateObject("WScript.Shell")objShell.CurrentDirectory="C:\Users\niraj\AppData\Roaming\windowshost"objShell.Run"svchost32.exe",0,False

Property	Value
Purpose	Launches the miner with a completely hidden window
Technique	WScript.Shell.Run with window style 0 (SW_HIDE)
Blocking	False — script exits immediately after launch
Trigger	Scheduled task WindowsHostService at logon

The VBScript itself contains no overtly malicious code — it simply runs an executable — which is why it is not flagged by signature-based AV.

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4. running.lock — Process Lock File

Property	Value
Content	running
Purpose	Indicates the miner is currently active
Mechanism	Prevents multiple instances from running simultaneously

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5. cert.pem & cert_key.pem — TLS Certificate & Private Key

Property	Value
Subject	localhost
Issued	April 21, 2025
Expires	April 19, 2035 (10-year validity)
Key Type	RSA 2048-bit
Type	Self-signed

The HTTP API is disabled in config.json, but these certificates are bundled for the optional XMRig HTTPS API endpoint.

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6. SHA256SUMS — Origin Verification File

This file lists hashes for the original XMRig distribution, confirming the malware's source:

Original File	Purpose
xmrig.exe	The miner binary (renamed to svchost32.exe)
WinRing0x64.sys	Kernel driver for MSR register access
config.json	Mining configuration
start.cmd	Original start script
benchmark_10M.cmd / benchmark_1M.cmd	Benchmark scripts
pool_mine_example.cmd	Pool mining example
rtm_ghostrider_example.cmd	GhostRider algorithm example
solo_mine_example.cmd	Solo mining example

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🚨 Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

File System IOCs

Type	Indicator
Directory	C:\Users\niraj\AppData\Roaming\windowshost\
Executable	svchost32.exe (SHA256: f29d673b032f7ff763dec032aefd6c5759a1583b211625f7f770017bedf03689)
VBS Launcher	runhidden.vbs
Lock File	running.lock (contains running)
Config	config.json (XMRig format with pool/wallet)
Certificate	cert.pem (self-signed, CN=localhost)
Private Key	cert_key.pem (RSA 2048-bit)

Network IOCs

Type	Indicator
Mining Pool Domain (config)	pool.supportxmr.com
Resolved Pool Endpoint (observed)	ns31430818.ip-141-94-96.eu / 141.94.96.144
Port	3333 (Stratum protocol)
Protocol	TCP/Stratum (unencrypted)
Source Port (observed)	52338
Connection Type	Persistent outbound, ESTABLISHED

Attacker's Monero Wallet Address

42eXxkZXEKLD38gM4XpNxUitLdkt5f7yZFJXRswCjvqPX9BjRmSUCL5Nxw7AKAY5hbaWpfbxWyors87ZZfvvWXhd6uTvXcN

Persistence IOCs

Location	What to Look For
Task Scheduler	Task named WindowsHostService running wscript.exe runhidden.vbs
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	Entries pointing to runhidden.vbs
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run	Entries pointing to runhidden.vbs
shell:startup folder	Shortcut or VBS file

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🗺️ MITRE ATT&CK Framework Mapping

Technique ID	Tactic	Name	Usage in This Attack
T1496	Impact	Resource Hijacking	CPU used for Monero mining
T1036.005	Defense Evasion	Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name	svchost32.exe mimics svchost.exe
T1059.005	Execution	Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic	runhidden.vbs launches the miner
T1564.003	Defense Evasion	Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window	Window style 0 hides process
T1053.005	Persistence	Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task	WindowsHostService task at logon
T1547.001	Persistence	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys	(alternate persistence vector to check)
T1071	Command and Control	Application Layer Protocol	Stratum mining protocol over TCP
T1027	Defense Evasion	Obfuscated Files or Information	Renamed binary, indirect execution
T1074.001	Collection	Data Staged: Local Data Staging	All components staged in AppData\Roaming

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🛡️ Why the Host Antivirus Failed to Detect This

Evasion Technique	Explanation
Legitimate Tool Abuse	XMRig is open-source mining software; many AV vendors classify it as PUA, not malware, and may not block it by default.
File Renaming	Renaming xmrig.exe to svchost32.exe bypasses filename-based detection signatures.
Living-off-the-Land	Uses Windows-native VBScript (wscript.exe) for execution — a trusted Microsoft binary.
User-Space Location	AppData\Roaming is a legitimate application data folder; some AV products reduce scanning intensity here.
No Exploit Code	The malware contains no shellcode, exploits, or traditionally "malicious" code patterns.
Indirect Execution	VBS → EXE chain adds indirection that breaks simple behavioral detection.

Note: While the host AV missed it, VirusTotal cross-checks (sample report) show that the majority of engines do recognize this binary as XMRig / CoinMiner — the failure was specific to the host's installed product.

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📊 Impact Assessment

Impact Area	Severity	Description
CPU Usage	🔴 CRITICAL	All 16 CPU threads consumed at 100% capacity
System Performance	🔴 HIGH	System extremely slow, 80% resources consumed at boot
Battery Life	🔴 HIGH	Laptop battery drains rapidly due to constant full CPU load
Electricity Cost	🟡 MEDIUM	Increased power consumption at victim's expense
Hardware Lifespan	🟡 MEDIUM	Prolonged 100% CPU usage causes thermal stress
Network	🟢 LOW	Constant outbound connection to mining pool
Data Theft	✅ NONE OBSERVED	No data exfiltration capability detected in this configuration
Privacy	🟢 LOW	Wallet address and pool connection expose attacker's identity

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🔧 Remediation Steps

Phase 1 — Immediate Containment

1. Kill the process — Open Task Manager → find svchost32.exe → End Task.
2. Disconnect from network — Prevent further communication with the mining pool.
3. Verify process is dead — Use Process Explorer to confirm no child processes remain.

Phase 2 — Remove Persistence

4. Open Task Scheduler (taskschd.msc) → delete the WindowsHostService task.
5. Open Autoruns (run as Administrator) → remove any entry referencing runhidden.vbs, svchost32.exe, or windowshost.
6. Check the registry for any backup persistence:

   HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
   HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
   HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
   

7. Check Startup folders:shell:startup and shell:common startup.

Phase 3 — Remove Malware Files

8. Delete the entire malware directory:

   rmdir /s /q "C:\Users\niraj\AppData\Roaming\windowshost"

9. Search for related files — Check for copies in:
   • C:\Users\niraj\AppData\Local\Temp\
   • C:\ProgramData\
   • Other user profiles

Phase 4 — Block & Verify

10. Block the mining pool / observed IP at the firewall:

    netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block Mining Pool" dir=out action=block remoteip=141.94.96.144
    netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="Block SupportXMR" dir=out action=block remoteip=pool.supportxmr.com

11. Monitor CPU usage for 48 hours to confirm mining has stopped.
12. Run full antivirus scan with updated definitions (consider Malwarebytes or HitmanPro as a secondary scanner).

Phase 5 — Post-Incident

13. Change all passwords — Assume credentials may be compromised.
14. Investigate infection vector — phishing, cracked software, drive-by download, or USB?
15. Check for additional payloads — the dropper may have installed other malware.
16. Audit AV exclusions — ensure AppData\Roaming is not excluded from scanning.

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🗜️ Sample Preservation — windowshost.zip

The complete malware folder has been compressed into windowshost.zip and kept alongside this report for educational and incident-response purposes.

⚠️WARNING:windowshost.zip contains a live, working XMRig miner. Do not unzip or execute it on any production or personal system.

Safe Analysis Environments

Environment	Notes
VMware Workstation / Player	Use a Windows VM with networking set to Host-only or NAT with the mining pool blocked. Take a clean snapshot before extraction so you can roll back.
VirtualBox	Same precautions — host-only networking, snapshot first, no shared folders mounted as writable to the host.
Windows Sandbox	Lightweight isolated container shipped with Windows 10/11 Pro+. Files inside the sandbox are discarded on close, which is ideal for one-shot inspection.
REMnux + FLARE VM	Recommended dual-VM setup for static + dynamic analysis with full network capture (Wireshark, INetSim).

Recommended Workflow Inside the VM

1. Disable internet access (or route through INetSim/FakeNet) before unzipping.
2. Calculate hashes of every file and compare with the SHA256SUMS shipped in the archive.
3. Open config.json, runhidden.vbs, and SHA256SUMS in a text viewer — they are plain text.
4. Run static analysis on svchost32.exe (PE-bear, CFF Explorer, DIE) without executing.
5. Only execute under controlled conditions (Process Monitor + Wireshark running) if dynamic behavior is needed.
6. Revert the snapshot when done.

Recommended Analysis Tools

Tool	Purpose
VirusTotal	Cross-engine detection — sample report linked above
Wireshark	Capture Stratum traffic to the mining pool
x64dbg / IDA Free	Debug and analyze the PE
PE-bear / CFF Explorer / DIE	Static PE inspection (headers, imports, sections)
Any.Run / Hybrid Analysis	Online sandbox if you can't run a local VM
YARA	Write detection signatures from observed strings/imports

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📚 Key Learning Points

1. Antivirus alone is not enough — the host AV missed this entirely while VirusTotal engines did not.
2. Behavioral analysis matters — the 80% CPU usage was the only visible symptom.
3. Sysinternals tools are essential — Process Explorer, Autoruns, Process Monitor, TCPView, and RamMap revealed what AV could not.
4. Know your baseline — recognizing normal system behavior is what made the anomaly stand out.
5. Check process paths — the real svchost.exe only runs from C:\Windows\System32\, never from AppData.
6. Living-off-the-land techniques are common — attackers chain trusted Windows tools (VBScript, wscript, scheduled tasks) to avoid detection.

Red Flags Checklist

├── High CPU at startup with no user applications open
├── Process named similar to a system process (svchost32 vs svchost)
├── Executable running from AppData\Roaming (not System32)
├── Persistent outbound connections to known mining pools / Stratum ports
├── VBScript or PowerShell entries in Task Scheduler / startup
└── Lock files indicating background process management

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✅ Conclusion

This is a confirmed XMRig cryptocurrency miner operating covertly on the system. The attacker deployed a well-crafted evasion strategy that bypassed the host antivirus by:

1. Renaming the miner to mimic a Windows system process.
2. Using a VBScript launcher with a hidden window to execute it.
3. Persisting via a scheduled task disguised as WindowsHostService.
4. Staging files in a legitimate-looking AppData\Roaming directory.
5. Leveraging the fact that XMRig is technically "legitimate" software.

The malware was only discovered through manual forensic investigation using Sysinternals tools after the analyst noticed abnormal 80% CPU usage at startup. The sample is independently confirmed as a Monero miner by the majority of engines on VirusTotal:

🔗 https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/5379df3d28d83164b24cfa02833233514958652eca489b968ff6e36b1bc49bc3

This case demonstrates that antivirus alone is insufficient against well-disguised threats. Manual investigation skills and knowledge of system internals remain critical for identifying stealthy malware.

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Report generated for educational and incident response purposes.

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