Generic service layer for AdonisJS 7 + Lucid ORM: paginated listing, multi-column fulltext search, declarative filters with a safe-by-default whitelist, date-range filters, sorting, preloads and Lucid scopes — all driven from the query string, none of it touching HttpContext.
Services stay testable in isolation and reusable from jobs, commands and other services. Controllers shrink to a few lines.
import{BaseService}from'@jantstack/adonis-searchable'importProductfrom'#models/product'exportdefaultclassProductsServiceextendsBaseService<typeofProduct>{protectedmodel=ProductprotectedsearchableColumns=['name','sku']protectedallowedFilters=['status','category_id','created_at']protectedindexWith=['category']}import{parseQueryParams}from'@jantstack/adonis-searchable'exportdefaultclassProductsController{constructor(privateservice=newProductsService()){}asyncindex({ request }: HttpContext){returnthis.service.index(parseQueryParams(request))}}That's a full listing endpoint with pagination, search, filters and preloads.
- Install
- Configuring a service
index()and the query string- Filters
- Preload whitelist
- Sorting
- CRUD and lifecycle hooks
- Escape hatch:
applyCustomFilters - API reference
- Design notes
- Compatibility
npm i @jantstack/adonis-searchablePeer dependencies: @adonisjs/core ^7 and @adonisjs/lucid ^22. No provider to register and no config file — you extend a class and you're done.
Engine-agnostic: the package emits no engine-specific SQL, so Postgres, MySQL and SQLite all work. (Fulltext search uses ILIKE on Postgres and LIKE elsewhere; column introspection uses each engine's standard catalog.)
Every knob is a protected property on the subclass:
| Property | Default | What it does |
|---|---|---|
model | (required) | The Lucid model the service operates on. |
searchableColumns | [] | Columns scanned by search. Empty = search does nothing. |
allowedFilters | serialized columns | Fields the client may filter by — see below. |
periodColumns | ['created_at', 'updated_at'] | Columns allowed in date-range filters. |
indexWith | [] | Relations preloaded by default in index(). |
showWith | [] | Relations preloaded by default in findOne(). |
allowedIncludes | per method: what that method preloads | What the client may request on top — see below. |
defaultPerPage | 25 | Page size when the client doesn't send one. |
maxPerPage | 100 | Ceiling for perPage — protects against ?perPage=100000. |
maxUnpaginatedLimit | 1000 | Row ceiling for paginate: false — the client's limit narrows it, never widens it. |
filterLimits | depth 5, 100 conditions, 500 whereIn values | Complexity ceilings for client-supplied filters. |
index(params) accepts a QueryParams object. parseQueryParams(request) builds it from the HTTP request — it is the only piece of the package that knows about HttpContext, so services stay transport-agnostic (write another adapter for GraphQL or gRPC and nothing else changes). It reads the query string on GET and merges the body on POST/PUT, supporting these conventions:
?page=2&per_page=50
&search=acme&search_columns[]=name&search_columns[]=sku
&filters[where][0][field]=status&filters[where][0][op]==&filters[where][0][value]=active
&period_filters[0][column]=created_at&period_filters[0][start]=2026-01-01&period_filters[0][end]=2026-03-31
&order_by=created_at&order_direction=desc
&with=category,category.parent
&scopes[withStatus]=delivered
&count=true
&paginate=false&limit=500
Query-string key → QueryParams property: per_page → perPage, search_columns[] → searchColumns, order_by/order_direction → orderBy/orderDirection, with (CSV or array) → includes, period_filters → period. search_input is accepted as a legacy alias of search.
| Param | Type | Notes |
|---|---|---|
page / perPage | number | perPage is clamped to maxPerPage. |
count | boolean | Returns { count } only — no rows, no meta. |
paginate | boolean | false returns { data } unpaginated (bounded by limit). |
limit | number | Row cap when paginate: false. |
search | string | Fulltext across searchableColumns. |
searchColumns | string[] | Narrows the search to a subset (intersected with the whitelist). |
filters | object | object[] | See Filters. |
period | object[] | { column, start?, end? }; column must be in periodColumns and the dates must be real YYYY-MM-DD. |
orderBy / orderDirection | string | orderBy must be a real and visible column — see Sorting. |
includes | string[] | Relations to preload; dot notation for nested (profile.wallets). Filtered by allowedIncludes. |
scopes | object | Lucid scopes to apply: { withStatus: 'delivered' }. |
paginationBaseUrl / paginationExtraQs | string / object | Build absolute pagination links in meta. |
Return shape:
// default{ data: Model[],meta: { total, perPage, currentPage, lastPage, firstPage, ...links}}// count: true{count: number}// paginate: false{ data: Model[]}Filters are declarative and arrive from the client, so the package is deny-by-default in the two places that matter: which fields can be filtered, and which operators are allowed.
Each key of a filter block is a method, each value an array of conditions:
| Family | Methods |
|---|---|
| Comparison | where, orWhere |
| Sets | whereIn, orWhereIn, whereNotIn, orWhereNotIn |
| Ranges | whereBetween, orWhereBetween, whereNotBetween, orWhereNotBetween |
| Nullability | whereNull, orWhereNull, whereNotNull, orWhereNotNull |
| JSON | whereJsonContains, orWhereJsonContains, whereJsonLength, orWhereJsonLength |
A condition is { field, op?, value?, values? }. Anything unrecognized is skipped silently — by design, since the input is untrusted.
awaitservice.index({filters: {where: [{field: 'status',op: '=',value: 'active'}],whereIn: [{field: 'category_id',values: [1,2,3]}],whereNotNull: [{field: 'published_at'}],},})The guiding principle is filterable ⊆ visible: if a column already travels in the API response, filtering by it reveals nothing new.
allowedFilters | Filterable | Use it when |
|---|---|---|
| (not declared) | columns the model serializes | internal CRUD, prototypes — safe with zero config |
['name', 'status'] | only those | public APIs: the filter contract stops following the schema |
[] | nothing | endpoints that must not accept filters at all |
ALLOW_ALL_FILTERS | every column, hidden ones included | internal tooling over non-sensitive models |
The default excludes anything marked @column({ serializeAs: null }) — a password hash, for instance. This matters: a like filter over a hidden column is a blind exfiltration oracle. An attacker probes character by character ($scrypt$a%, $scrypt$b%…) and reads the answer from which rows come back. Excluding non-serialized columns closes that without any configuration on your part.
import{SearchableService,ALLOW_ALL_FILTERS}from'@jantstack/adonis-searchable'importtype{AllowedFilters}from'@jantstack/adonis-searchable'classInternalAuditServiceextendsSearchableService<typeofAuditRow>{protectedmodel=AuditRowprotectedallowedFilters: AllowedFilters=ALLOW_ALL_FILTERS// explicit opt-in}The : AllowedFilters annotation is required — without it TypeScript widens the symbol and the assignment won't compile. Useful side effect: the opt-in is impossible to miss in code review.
The op of a condition is interpolated raw into SQL by Knex, so only these pass: =, !=, <>, >, >=, <, <=, like, ilike, not like, not ilike. Anything else (op = "IS NULL OR 1=1 --") drops the condition instead of injecting it.
awaitservice.index({filters: {where: [{field: 'status',op: '=',value: 'active'}],orGroup: [{where: [{field: 'priority',op: '>=',value: 8}]},{where: [{field: 'flagged',op: '=',value: true}]},],},})// WHERE status = 'active' AND (priority >= 8 OR flagged = true)Inside an orGroup, where conditions are rewritten to orWhere automatically. Nesting is recursive, and the field whitelist applies at every level.
Use -> to reach into a JSON path; the whitelist checks the root field:
{where: [{field: 'metadata->plan',op: '=',value: 'pro'}]}// needs 'metadata' allowed{whereJsonLength: [{field: 'tags',op: '>',value: 3}]}Filters are recursive and, on POST/PUT, they arrive in a JSON body with no depth limit of its own. Three ceilings bound the damage: depth 5, 100 applied conditions per request, and 500 values in a single whereIn (a condition count alone doesn't help — one whereIn with 100 000 values is still one condition). What exceeds them is dropped silently, like everything else in the filter pipeline. Raise or lower them per service:
protectedfilterLimits={maxDepth: 8,maxConditions: 250,maxInValues: 1000}An oversized whereIn is dropped whole rather than truncated: a truncated set answers a question the client didn't ask, and does it silently.
?with= is client input, so it gets the same treatment as filters. Two properties split the job:
indexWith/showWithsay what the service loads. They always apply — whether the client asks or not.allowedIncludessays what the client may ask for on top. Per method, and additive.
allowedIncludes | Client may preload | Use it when |
|---|---|---|
| (not declared) | exactly what that method preloads | the common case — zero extra config |
{ index: ['tags'], show: ['tags', 'audit'] } | that, plus the method's own preloads | opening the listing without opening the detail, or the reverse |
['tags'] | that, on both methods | the same extra everywhere |
ALLOW_ALL_INCLUDES | any relation on the model | internal tooling; this was the implicit behaviour before 2.0.0 |
The default is per method on purpose. A relation listed only in showWith doesn't become requestable on the listing: fetching one organization's invitations is proportionate; fetching them for the 25 rows of a page — every invited person's email — is a different thing. Nothing stops you from opening it, but opening it has to be something you wrote.
The explicit forms are additive: you never repeat in allowedIncludes what is already in indexWith or showWith. A relation preloaded by default travels in the response whether the client asks for it or not, so "denying" it would mean nothing.
A requested path also passes if it is a prefix of an allowed one (owner when owner.profile is allowed) — asking for less is always fine. The reverse is not: owner.profile when only owner is allowed is one level deeper than anyone authorized.
Without any of this, ?with=owner on a public listing pulls the entire related model into the response — including whatever that model serializes — and nested paths multiply the queries behind it.
orderBy must name a column that exists and that the model serializes. The first half is the SQL-injection guard; the second closes an oracle: sorting by a hidden column and paging through the results lets an attacker compare that value across rows and reconstruct it by position. Same principle as filters — sortable ⊆ visible — and ALLOW_ALL_FILTERS lifts both restrictions together.
orderDirection only ever reaches Knex as asc or desc.
BaseService adds create, update and destroy on top of SearchableService, each with optional hooks and transaction support:
exportdefaultclassOrdersServiceextendsBaseService<typeofOrder>{protectedmodel=OrderprotectedasyncbeforeCreate(data: Partial<Order>){data.reference??=generateReference()}protectedasyncafterCreate(record: Order,trx?: TransactionClientContract){awaitthis.notify(record,trx)}}Available hooks: beforeCreate, afterCreate, beforeUpdate, afterUpdate, beforeDestroy, afterDestroy. All optional, all awaited, all receiving the transaction when one is passed.
findOne(uuid, includes?) returns null when the row doesn't exist; findOneOrFail, update and destroy throw RecordNotFoundError instead. It carries status = 404, so a standard AdonisJS exception handler maps it without extra wiring.
For conditions the declarative system can't express — rich jsonb, joins, subqueries, tenant scoping — override the hook. It runs inside the same query builder, so it also constrains count and pagination:
exportdefaultclassOrdersServiceextendsBaseService<typeofOrder>{protectedmodel=OrderprotectedasyncapplyCustomFilters(query: ModelQueryBuilder,params: QueryParams){query.whereRaw("metadata @> ?",[JSON.stringify({region: this.region})])}}This is your code, not client input, so the field whitelist doesn't apply here — that's the point of the hatch. Keep any client-supplied value parameterized.
// FunctionsfunctionparseQueryParams(request: HttpContext['request']): QueryParams// ClassesclassSearchableService<TModel>{index(params?: QueryParams): Promise<PaginatedResult<TModel>|{count: number}|{data: []}>findOne(uuid: string,includes?: string[]): Promise<InstanceType<TModel>|null>findOneOrFail(uuid: string,includes?: string[]): Promise<InstanceType<TModel>>protectedbuildQuery(params: QueryParams): Promise<{query: ModelQueryBuilder}>protectedapplyCustomFilters?(query,params): void|Promise<void>}classBaseService<TModel>extendsSearchableService<TModel>{create(data,trx?): Promise<InstanceType<TModel>>update(uuid,data,trx?): Promise<InstanceType<TModel>>destroy(uuid,trx?): Promise<void>}classRecordNotFoundErrorextendsError{status=404}// SentinelsconstALLOW_ALL_FILTERS: unique symbolconstFILTERABLE_FROM_MODEL: unique symbol// the default for allowedFiltersconstALLOW_ALL_INCLUDES: unique symbolconstINCLUDES_FROM_SERVICE: unique symbol// the default for allowedIncludes// ConstantsconstMAX_FILTER_DEPTH=5constMAX_FILTER_CONDITIONS=100constMAX_FILTER_IN_VALUES=500// TypestypeAllowedFilters,AllowedIncludes,AllowedIncludesByMethod,IncludesMethod,FilterLimits,QueryParams,PaginatedResult,PaginationMeta,PeriodFilter,FilterBlock,FilterCondition,FilterMethodNo HttpContext. The service takes a plain object, so the same code serves an HTTP endpoint, a queue job, an ace command or another service. It's also what makes it testable without booting a server.
Silent skipping over errors. Unknown filter methods, non-whitelisted fields and unsafe operators are dropped, not rejected. Filters come from untrusted input; failing loudly turns every bad-faith query string into a 500. If your API needs explicit feedback, validate at the controller/validator layer.
Column introspection is cached per service instance: the orderBy guard reads the real table columns once; the default filter whitelist reads the model's own metadata and never touches the database.
Every client-controlled surface has a whitelist. Fields, operators, sort columns, preloads, scopes, search columns and every numeric bound. That symmetry is the point: a gap in one of them is worth more to an attacker than hardening the others further.
The package tests itself.npm test runs the full suite against in-memory SQLite — no Postgres, no migrations, no host application. CI runs it on Node 20, 22 and 24 before anything ships.
| Node | ≥ 20.6 |
| AdonisJS | ^7 (peer) |
| Lucid | ^22 (peer) |
| Databases | PostgreSQL, MySQL, SQLite |
| Module format | ESM only |
Extracted from the adonis7-base chassis, where it runs in production-shaped projects. It is maintained according to that chassis's needs: bug fixes and small additions are welcome, larger feature requests may not fit the roadmap.
MIT