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Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor - #803

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t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor
Dec 7, 2020
Merged

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor#803
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor

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@ariard

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If option_anchor_outputs applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `local node's main output 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.

I think we may just make this an unconditional requirement, indifferently of anchors.

@halseth

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I think we can allow spending them all in a single tx, but perhaps recommend something like "if confirmation doesn't happen within X blocks from expiry, to_local should be swept separately as it might be pinned etc".

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I agree with @halseth, it's worth mentioning this potential attack (good find!) but we should be more permissive with implementers.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Note: if `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's

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IMO it's worth nothing more of the subtly here. If they're pinning, then in order to even get into the mempool, they're likely paying a relatively high fee, which means that if they do confirm, then there's the CSV period on the second level. Also the defender can mix things up themselves, by only sweeping one of the HTLC outputs, which would then invalidate the entire "tree" (possibly needing to pay high enough fees?) of the attacker.

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
it's not already known.
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if `option_anchor_outputs` applies:
- MUST *resolve* the _local node's main output_ in its own penalty transaction

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Perhaps this should be "should" instead? As there're other ways to defend against this, for example: sweep every output in its own transaction.

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@ariard

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@t-bastt-bast mentioned this pull request Oct 19, 2020
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OK, lots of good discussion at meeting about this. The spec says MAY, because if you do make one bit tx, you need to split (as HTLC txs can race you), but you also need to split because your big tx might be pinned.

It's worth noting this, for sure, but I think we can be simpler; also why pick on the to-local output? In theory any output could be largest, and you want that one.

@ariard

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LGTM

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ACK

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if confirmation doesn't happen before reaching `security_delay` blocks from
expiry:
- MUST *resolve* revoked outputs in their own, separate penalty transactions. A previous

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Feels like SHOULD is more correct here, since the sweeping node is aware of the risk and should be allowed to do as it pleases.

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I agree, @ariard I think this is the last pending point before we merge, what do you think?

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We've got the ACKs on this, should we wait til this is addressed? paging @ariard

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@niftyneiniftynei mentioned this pull request Nov 9, 2020
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If `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.
@ariard

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Merging as agreed during the last spec meeting.

@t-bast
t-bast merged commit 01b5674 into lightning:masterDec 7, 2020
optout21 pushed a commit to optout21/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2023
See lightning/bolts#803
This protect the justice claim of counterparty revoked output. As
otherwise if the all the revoked outputs claims are batched in a
single transaction, low-feerate HTLCs transactions can delay our
honest justice claim transaction until BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT expires.
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Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor by ariard · Pull Request #803 · lightning/bolts · GitHub
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Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor - #803

Merged
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor
Dec 7, 2020
Merged

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor#803
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor

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@ariard

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If option_anchor_outputs applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `local node's main output 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.

I think we may just make this an unconditional requirement, indifferently of anchors.

@halseth

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I think we can allow spending them all in a single tx, but perhaps recommend something like "if confirmation doesn't happen within X blocks from expiry, to_local should be swept separately as it might be pinned etc".

@t-bast

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I agree with @halseth, it's worth mentioning this potential attack (good find!) but we should be more permissive with implementers.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Note: if `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's

Copy link
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Collaborator

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

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IMO it's worth nothing more of the subtly here. If they're pinning, then in order to even get into the mempool, they're likely paying a relatively high fee, which means that if they do confirm, then there's the CSV period on the second level. Also the defender can mix things up themselves, by only sweeping one of the HTLC outputs, which would then invalidate the entire "tree" (possibly needing to pay high enough fees?) of the attacker.

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
it's not already known.
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if `option_anchor_outputs` applies:
- MUST *resolve* the _local node's main output_ in its own penalty transaction

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Perhaps this should be "should" instead? As there're other ways to defend against this, for example: sweep every output in its own transaction.

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@ariard

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
@t-bastt-bast mentioned this pull request Oct 19, 2020
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@rustyrussell

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OK, lots of good discussion at meeting about this. The spec says MAY, because if you do make one bit tx, you need to split (as HTLC txs can race you), but you also need to split because your big tx might be pinned.

It's worth noting this, for sure, but I think we can be simpler; also why pick on the to-local output? In theory any output could be largest, and you want that one.

@ariard

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LGTM

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ACK

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if confirmation doesn't happen before reaching `security_delay` blocks from
expiry:
- MUST *resolve* revoked outputs in their own, separate penalty transactions. A previous

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Feels like SHOULD is more correct here, since the sweeping node is aware of the risk and should be allowed to do as it pleases.

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I agree, @ariard I think this is the last pending point before we merge, what do you think?

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We've got the ACKs on this, should we wait til this is addressed? paging @ariard

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@niftyneiniftynei mentioned this pull request Nov 9, 2020
18 tasks
If `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.
@ariard

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Merging as agreed during the last spec meeting.

@t-bast
t-bast merged commit 01b5674 into lightning:masterDec 7, 2020
optout21 pushed a commit to optout21/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2023
See lightning/bolts#803
This protect the justice claim of counterparty revoked output. As
otherwise if the all the revoked outputs claims are batched in a
single transaction, low-feerate HTLCs transactions can delay our
honest justice claim transaction until BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT expires.
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Skip to content

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor - #803

Merged
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor
Dec 7, 2020
Merged

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor#803
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor

Conversation

@ariard

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If option_anchor_outputs applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `local node's main output 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.

I think we may just make this an unconditional requirement, indifferently of anchors.

@halseth

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I think we can allow spending them all in a single tx, but perhaps recommend something like "if confirmation doesn't happen within X blocks from expiry, to_local should be swept separately as it might be pinned etc".

@t-bast

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I agree with @halseth, it's worth mentioning this potential attack (good find!) but we should be more permissive with implementers.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Note: if `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Collaborator

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

The reason will be displayed to describe this comment to others. Learn more.

IMO it's worth nothing more of the subtly here. If they're pinning, then in order to even get into the mempool, they're likely paying a relatively high fee, which means that if they do confirm, then there's the CSV period on the second level. Also the defender can mix things up themselves, by only sweeping one of the HTLC outputs, which would then invalidate the entire "tree" (possibly needing to pay high enough fees?) of the attacker.

This comment was marked as abuse.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
it's not already known.
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if `option_anchor_outputs` applies:
- MUST *resolve* the _local node's main output_ in its own penalty transaction

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Perhaps this should be "should" instead? As there're other ways to defend against this, for example: sweep every output in its own transaction.

This comment was marked as abuse.

@ariard

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
@t-bastt-bast mentioned this pull request Oct 19, 2020
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@rustyrussell

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OK, lots of good discussion at meeting about this. The spec says MAY, because if you do make one bit tx, you need to split (as HTLC txs can race you), but you also need to split because your big tx might be pinned.

It's worth noting this, for sure, but I think we can be simpler; also why pick on the to-local output? In theory any output could be largest, and you want that one.

@ariard

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LGTM

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ACK

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if confirmation doesn't happen before reaching `security_delay` blocks from
expiry:
- MUST *resolve* revoked outputs in their own, separate penalty transactions. A previous

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Feels like SHOULD is more correct here, since the sweeping node is aware of the risk and should be allowed to do as it pleases.

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I agree, @ariard I think this is the last pending point before we merge, what do you think?

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We've got the ACKs on this, should we wait til this is addressed? paging @ariard

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@niftyneiniftynei mentioned this pull request Nov 9, 2020
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If `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.
@ariard

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@t-bast

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Merging as agreed during the last spec meeting.

@t-bast
t-bast merged commit 01b5674 into lightning:masterDec 7, 2020
optout21 pushed a commit to optout21/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2023
See lightning/bolts#803
This protect the justice claim of counterparty revoked output. As
otherwise if the all the revoked outputs claims are batched in a
single transaction, low-feerate HTLCs transactions can delay our
honest justice claim transaction until BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT expires.
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Skip to content

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor - #803

Merged
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor
Dec 7, 2020
Merged

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor#803
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor

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@ariard

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If option_anchor_outputs applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `local node's main output 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.

I think we may just make this an unconditional requirement, indifferently of anchors.

@halseth

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I think we can allow spending them all in a single tx, but perhaps recommend something like "if confirmation doesn't happen within X blocks from expiry, to_local should be swept separately as it might be pinned etc".

@t-bast

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I agree with @halseth, it's worth mentioning this potential attack (good find!) but we should be more permissive with implementers.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Note: if `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's

Copy link
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Collaborator

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IMO it's worth nothing more of the subtly here. If they're pinning, then in order to even get into the mempool, they're likely paying a relatively high fee, which means that if they do confirm, then there's the CSV period on the second level. Also the defender can mix things up themselves, by only sweeping one of the HTLC outputs, which would then invalidate the entire "tree" (possibly needing to pay high enough fees?) of the attacker.

This comment was marked as abuse.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
it's not already known.
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if `option_anchor_outputs` applies:
- MUST *resolve* the _local node's main output_ in its own penalty transaction

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Perhaps this should be "should" instead? As there're other ways to defend against this, for example: sweep every output in its own transaction.

This comment was marked as abuse.

@ariard

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
@t-bastt-bast mentioned this pull request Oct 19, 2020
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OK, lots of good discussion at meeting about this. The spec says MAY, because if you do make one bit tx, you need to split (as HTLC txs can race you), but you also need to split because your big tx might be pinned.

It's worth noting this, for sure, but I think we can be simpler; also why pick on the to-local output? In theory any output could be largest, and you want that one.

@ariard

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LGTM

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ACK

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if confirmation doesn't happen before reaching `security_delay` blocks from
expiry:
- MUST *resolve* revoked outputs in their own, separate penalty transactions. A previous

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Feels like SHOULD is more correct here, since the sweeping node is aware of the risk and should be allowed to do as it pleases.

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I agree, @ariard I think this is the last pending point before we merge, what do you think?

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We've got the ACKs on this, should we wait til this is addressed? paging @ariard

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@niftyneiniftynei mentioned this pull request Nov 9, 2020
18 tasks
If `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.
@ariard

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Merging as agreed during the last spec meeting.

@t-bast
t-bast merged commit 01b5674 into lightning:masterDec 7, 2020
optout21 pushed a commit to optout21/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2023
See lightning/bolts#803
This protect the justice claim of counterparty revoked output. As
otherwise if the all the revoked outputs claims are batched in a
single transaction, low-feerate HTLCs transactions can delay our
honest justice claim transaction until BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT expires.
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Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor - #803

Merged
t-bast merged 1 commit into
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ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor
Dec 7, 2020
Merged

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor#803
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor

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If option_anchor_outputs applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `local node's main output 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.

I think we may just make this an unconditional requirement, indifferently of anchors.

@halseth

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I think we can allow spending them all in a single tx, but perhaps recommend something like "if confirmation doesn't happen within X blocks from expiry, to_local should be swept separately as it might be pinned etc".

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I agree with @halseth, it's worth mentioning this potential attack (good find!) but we should be more permissive with implementers.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Note: if `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's

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IMO it's worth nothing more of the subtly here. If they're pinning, then in order to even get into the mempool, they're likely paying a relatively high fee, which means that if they do confirm, then there's the CSV period on the second level. Also the defender can mix things up themselves, by only sweeping one of the HTLC outputs, which would then invalidate the entire "tree" (possibly needing to pay high enough fees?) of the attacker.

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
it's not already known.
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if `option_anchor_outputs` applies:
- MUST *resolve* the _local node's main output_ in its own penalty transaction

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Perhaps this should be "should" instead? As there're other ways to defend against this, for example: sweep every output in its own transaction.

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@ariard

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@t-bastt-bast mentioned this pull request Oct 19, 2020
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OK, lots of good discussion at meeting about this. The spec says MAY, because if you do make one bit tx, you need to split (as HTLC txs can race you), but you also need to split because your big tx might be pinned.

It's worth noting this, for sure, but I think we can be simpler; also why pick on the to-local output? In theory any output could be largest, and you want that one.

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LGTM

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ACK

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if confirmation doesn't happen before reaching `security_delay` blocks from
expiry:
- MUST *resolve* revoked outputs in their own, separate penalty transactions. A previous

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Feels like SHOULD is more correct here, since the sweeping node is aware of the risk and should be allowed to do as it pleases.

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I agree, @ariard I think this is the last pending point before we merge, what do you think?

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We've got the ACKs on this, should we wait til this is addressed? paging @ariard

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@niftyneiniftynei mentioned this pull request Nov 9, 2020
18 tasks
If `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.
@ariard

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Merging as agreed during the last spec meeting.

@t-bast
t-bast merged commit 01b5674 into lightning:masterDec 7, 2020
optout21 pushed a commit to optout21/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2023
See lightning/bolts#803
This protect the justice claim of counterparty revoked output. As
otherwise if the all the revoked outputs claims are batched in a
single transaction, low-feerate HTLCs transactions can delay our
honest justice claim transaction until BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT expires.
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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube (function() { function tryTheater() { var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label="Theater mode"], ytd-player #player button[title="Theater mode"]'); if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) { btn.click(); } } // Try immediately tryTheater(); // Try after navigation (SPA) var lastUrl = location.href; setInterval(function() { if (location.href !== lastUrl) { lastUrl = location.href; setTimeout(tryTheater, 500); } }, 1000); // Also try on player load var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater); observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true }); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + ' Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor by ariard · Pull Request #803 · lightning/bolts · GitHub
Skip to content

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor - #803

Merged
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor
Dec 7, 2020
Merged

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor#803
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor

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@ariard

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If option_anchor_outputs applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `local node's main output 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.

I think we may just make this an unconditional requirement, indifferently of anchors.

@halseth

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I think we can allow spending them all in a single tx, but perhaps recommend something like "if confirmation doesn't happen within X blocks from expiry, to_local should be swept separately as it might be pinned etc".

@t-bast

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I agree with @halseth, it's worth mentioning this potential attack (good find!) but we should be more permissive with implementers.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Note: if `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's

Copy link
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Choose a reason for hiding this comment

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IMO it's worth nothing more of the subtly here. If they're pinning, then in order to even get into the mempool, they're likely paying a relatively high fee, which means that if they do confirm, then there's the CSV period on the second level. Also the defender can mix things up themselves, by only sweeping one of the HTLC outputs, which would then invalidate the entire "tree" (possibly needing to pay high enough fees?) of the attacker.

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
it's not already known.
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if `option_anchor_outputs` applies:
- MUST *resolve* the _local node's main output_ in its own penalty transaction

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Perhaps this should be "should" instead? As there're other ways to defend against this, for example: sweep every output in its own transaction.

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@ariard

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
@t-bastt-bast mentioned this pull request Oct 19, 2020
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OK, lots of good discussion at meeting about this. The spec says MAY, because if you do make one bit tx, you need to split (as HTLC txs can race you), but you also need to split because your big tx might be pinned.

It's worth noting this, for sure, but I think we can be simpler; also why pick on the to-local output? In theory any output could be largest, and you want that one.

@ariard

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LGTM

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ACK

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if confirmation doesn't happen before reaching `security_delay` blocks from
expiry:
- MUST *resolve* revoked outputs in their own, separate penalty transactions. A previous

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Feels like SHOULD is more correct here, since the sweeping node is aware of the risk and should be allowed to do as it pleases.

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I agree, @ariard I think this is the last pending point before we merge, what do you think?

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We've got the ACKs on this, should we wait til this is addressed? paging @ariard

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@niftyneiniftynei mentioned this pull request Nov 9, 2020
18 tasks
If `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.
@ariard

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@t-bast

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Merging as agreed during the last spec meeting.

@t-bast
t-bast merged commit 01b5674 into lightning:masterDec 7, 2020
optout21 pushed a commit to optout21/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2023
See lightning/bolts#803
This protect the justice claim of counterparty revoked output. As
otherwise if the all the revoked outputs claims are batched in a
single transaction, low-feerate HTLCs transactions can delay our
honest justice claim transaction until BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT expires.
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Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor - #803

Merged
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor
Dec 7, 2020
Merged

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor#803
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor

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@ariard

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If option_anchor_outputs applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `local node's main output 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.

I think we may just make this an unconditional requirement, indifferently of anchors.

@halseth

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I think we can allow spending them all in a single tx, but perhaps recommend something like "if confirmation doesn't happen within X blocks from expiry, to_local should be swept separately as it might be pinned etc".

@t-bast

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I agree with @halseth, it's worth mentioning this potential attack (good find!) but we should be more permissive with implementers.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Note: if `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's

Copy link
Copy Markdown
Collaborator

Choose a reason for hiding this comment

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IMO it's worth nothing more of the subtly here. If they're pinning, then in order to even get into the mempool, they're likely paying a relatively high fee, which means that if they do confirm, then there's the CSV period on the second level. Also the defender can mix things up themselves, by only sweeping one of the HTLC outputs, which would then invalidate the entire "tree" (possibly needing to pay high enough fees?) of the attacker.

This comment was marked as abuse.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
it's not already known.
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if `option_anchor_outputs` applies:
- MUST *resolve* the _local node's main output_ in its own penalty transaction

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Perhaps this should be "should" instead? As there're other ways to defend against this, for example: sweep every output in its own transaction.

This comment was marked as abuse.

@ariard

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
@t-bastt-bast mentioned this pull request Oct 19, 2020
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OK, lots of good discussion at meeting about this. The spec says MAY, because if you do make one bit tx, you need to split (as HTLC txs can race you), but you also need to split because your big tx might be pinned.

It's worth noting this, for sure, but I think we can be simpler; also why pick on the to-local output? In theory any output could be largest, and you want that one.

@ariard

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LGTM

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ACK

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if confirmation doesn't happen before reaching `security_delay` blocks from
expiry:
- MUST *resolve* revoked outputs in their own, separate penalty transactions. A previous

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Feels like SHOULD is more correct here, since the sweeping node is aware of the risk and should be allowed to do as it pleases.

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I agree, @ariard I think this is the last pending point before we merge, what do you think?

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We've got the ACKs on this, should we wait til this is addressed? paging @ariard

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@niftyneiniftynei mentioned this pull request Nov 9, 2020
18 tasks
If `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.
@ariard

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@t-bast

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Merging as agreed during the last spec meeting.

@t-bast
t-bast merged commit 01b5674 into lightning:masterDec 7, 2020
optout21 pushed a commit to optout21/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2023
See lightning/bolts#803
This protect the justice claim of counterparty revoked output. As
otherwise if the all the revoked outputs claims are batched in a
single transaction, low-feerate HTLCs transactions can delay our
honest justice claim transaction until BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT expires.
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Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor - #803

Merged
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor
Dec 7, 2020
Merged

Require to claim revoked local output in its own penalty tx post-anchor#803
t-bast merged 1 commit into
lightning:masterfrom
ariard:2020-10-no-aggregation-post-anchor

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@ariard

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If option_anchor_outputs applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `local node's main output 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.

I think we may just make this an unconditional requirement, indifferently of anchors.

@halseth

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I think we can allow spending them all in a single tx, but perhaps recommend something like "if confirmation doesn't happen within X blocks from expiry, to_local should be swept separately as it might be pinned etc".

@t-bast

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I agree with @halseth, it's worth mentioning this potential attack (good find!) but we should be more permissive with implementers.

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
Note: if `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's

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IMO it's worth nothing more of the subtly here. If they're pinning, then in order to even get into the mempool, they're likely paying a relatively high fee, which means that if they do confirm, then there's the CSV period on the second level. Also the defender can mix things up themselves, by only sweeping one of the HTLC outputs, which would then invalidate the entire "tree" (possibly needing to pay high enough fees?) of the attacker.

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
it's not already known.
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if `option_anchor_outputs` applies:
- MUST *resolve* the _local node's main output_ in its own penalty transaction

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Perhaps this should be "should" instead? As there're other ways to defend against this, for example: sweep every output in its own transaction.

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@ariard

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Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
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@t-bastt-bast mentioned this pull request Oct 19, 2020
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@rustyrussell

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OK, lots of good discussion at meeting about this. The spec says MAY, because if you do make one bit tx, you need to split (as HTLC txs can race you), but you also need to split because your big tx might be pinned.

It's worth noting this, for sure, but I think we can be simpler; also why pick on the to-local output? In theory any output could be largest, and you want that one.

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LGTM

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ACK

Comment thread05-onchain.md Outdated
- MAY use a single transaction to *resolve* all the outputs.
- if confirmation doesn't happen before reaching `security_delay` blocks from
expiry:
- MUST *resolve* revoked outputs in their own, separate penalty transactions. A previous

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Feels like SHOULD is more correct here, since the sweeping node is aware of the risk and should be allowed to do as it pleases.

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I agree, @ariard I think this is the last pending point before we merge, what do you think?

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We've got the ACKs on this, should we wait til this is addressed? paging @ariard

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@niftyneiniftynei mentioned this pull request Nov 9, 2020
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If `option_anchor_outputs` applies, the cheating node can pin spends of its
HTLC-timeout/HTLC-success outputs thanks to SIGHASH_SINGLE malleability.
Using a single penalty transaction for all revoked outputs is thus unsafe as it
could be blocked to propagate long enough for the `_local node's main output_ 's
relative timelock to expire and the cheating party escaping the penalty on this
output.
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@t-bast

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Merging as agreed during the last spec meeting.

@t-bast
t-bast merged commit 01b5674 into lightning:masterDec 7, 2020
optout21 pushed a commit to optout21/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jul 24, 2023
See lightning/bolts#803
This protect the justice claim of counterparty revoked output. As
otherwise if the all the revoked outputs claims are batched in a
single transaction, low-feerate HTLCs transactions can delay our
honest justice claim transaction until BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT expires.
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6 participants

@ariard@halseth@t-bast@rustyrussell@Roasbeef@niftynei