Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase #573

Closed
Closed
Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase#573

Description

@ariard
ariard
opened on Apr 4, 2020

As we move toward production releases, we should establish a clear scope of the Trusted Computing Base, in the sense than any bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside TCB might jeopardize user funds, and therefore should have our special care.

Here a non-exhaustive list of Things We Must Get Right:

  • standard/consensus valid transactions
  • sounds and responsive feerate computation for dynamic bumping
  • reorg-safe ChannelMonitor
  • balanced/correcntess of state machine transition
  • enforceable commitment transaction (aka size good enough to propagate)
  • sane channel parameters (max_htlc_value_in_flight, ...)
  • onchain-to-offchain transition
  • safe CLTV deltas
  • efficient timing out HTLCs
  • spec compliance (or argumentation when we diverge)
  • parsing of onchain funds
  • onchain verification of channel points (cf utxo-related LN CVEs)
  • HTLC packet sanitization
  • reasonable default values
  • safe storage of witnessscript/output for unilateral claiming
  • any kind of DoS
  • correctness of funding_signed and funding_tx broadcast sequence
  • hash collision
  • prevent easy channel congestion (within what current spec allows)
  • correct weight computation for static fees
  • ...

For each point,we should a) check if code is correct b) document clearly security significance for future modifications and developers c) have extensive unit/functional/fuzzing/mutating testing coverage.

Compare to #565, which should teach library users on the security model/privacy trade-offs and how to comply with them, this should serve as a starting point for future audit of the codebase. At the end of review process, we should commit a document linking each point to its enforcement in the codebase and its tests.

This is really needed because spec compliance isn't enough to be safe, a lot of security
implications are loosely documented or let to the wisdom of implementers, and assume a good
knowledge of bitcoin first-layer.

(If you any other point we should look on, I invite you to add a comment)

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(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '

      Skip to content
      Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase #573
      Closed
      Closed
      Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase#573
      Description
      @ariard
      ariard
      opened on Apr 4, 2020
      As we move toward production releases, we should establish a clear scope of the Trusted Computing Base, in the sense than any bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside TCB might jeopardize user funds, and therefore should have our special care.
      Here a non-exhaustive list of Things We Must Get Right:
      • standard/consensus valid transactions
      • sounds and responsive feerate computation for dynamic bumping
      • reorg-safe ChannelMonitor
      • balanced/correcntess of state machine transition
      • enforceable commitment transaction (aka size good enough to propagate)
      • sane channel parameters (max_htlc_value_in_flight, ...)
      • onchain-to-offchain transition
      • safe CLTV deltas
      • efficient timing out HTLCs
      • spec compliance (or argumentation when we diverge)
      • parsing of onchain funds
      • onchain verification of channel points (cf utxo-related LN CVEs)
      • HTLC packet sanitization
      • reasonable default values
      • safe storage of witnessscript/output for unilateral claiming
      • any kind of DoS
      • correctness of funding_signed and funding_tx broadcast sequence
      • hash collision
      • prevent easy channel congestion (within what current spec allows)
      • correct weight computation for static fees
      • ...
      For each point,we should a) check if code is correct b) document clearly security significance for future modifications and developers c) have extensive unit/functional/fuzzing/mutating testing coverage.
      Compare to #565, which should teach library users on the security model/privacy trade-offs and how to comply with them, this should serve as a starting point for future audit of the codebase. At the end of review process, we should commit a document linking each point to its enforcement in the codebase and its tests.
      This is really needed because spec compliance isn't enough to be safe, a lot of security
      
implications are loosely documented or let to the wisdom of implementers, and assume a good
      
knowledge of bitcoin first-layer.
      (If you any other point we should look on, I invite you to add a comment)
      Metadata
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      Assignees
      No one assigned
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          None yet
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          No branches or pull requests
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix");
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})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

          Skip to content
          Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase #573
          Closed
          Closed
          Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase#573
          Description
          @ariard
          ariard
          opened on Apr 4, 2020
          As we move toward production releases, we should establish a clear scope of the Trusted Computing Base, in the sense than any bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside TCB might jeopardize user funds, and therefore should have our special care.
          Here a non-exhaustive list of Things We Must Get Right:
          • standard/consensus valid transactions
          • sounds and responsive feerate computation for dynamic bumping
          • reorg-safe ChannelMonitor
          • balanced/correcntess of state machine transition
          • enforceable commitment transaction (aka size good enough to propagate)
          • sane channel parameters (max_htlc_value_in_flight, ...)
          • onchain-to-offchain transition
          • safe CLTV deltas
          • efficient timing out HTLCs
          • spec compliance (or argumentation when we diverge)
          • parsing of onchain funds
          • onchain verification of channel points (cf utxo-related LN CVEs)
          • HTLC packet sanitization
          • reasonable default values
          • safe storage of witnessscript/output for unilateral claiming
          • any kind of DoS
          • correctness of funding_signed and funding_tx broadcast sequence
          • hash collision
          • prevent easy channel congestion (within what current spec allows)
          • correct weight computation for static fees
          • ...
          For each point,we should a) check if code is correct b) document clearly security significance for future modifications and developers c) have extensive unit/functional/fuzzing/mutating testing coverage.
          Compare to #565, which should teach library users on the security model/privacy trade-offs and how to comply with them, this should serve as a starting point for future audit of the codebase. At the end of review process, we should commit a document linking each point to its enforcement in the codebase and its tests.
          This is really needed because spec compliance isn't enough to be safe, a lot of security
          
implications are loosely documented or let to the wisdom of implementers, and assume a good
          
knowledge of bitcoin first-layer.
          (If you any other point we should look on, I invite you to add a comment)
          Metadata
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              No branches or pull requests
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms");
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} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

              Skip to content
              Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase #573
              Closed
              Closed
              Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase#573
              Description
              @ariard
              ariard
              opened on Apr 4, 2020
              As we move toward production releases, we should establish a clear scope of the Trusted Computing Base, in the sense than any bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside TCB might jeopardize user funds, and therefore should have our special care.
              Here a non-exhaustive list of Things We Must Get Right:
              • standard/consensus valid transactions
              • sounds and responsive feerate computation for dynamic bumping
              • reorg-safe ChannelMonitor
              • balanced/correcntess of state machine transition
              • enforceable commitment transaction (aka size good enough to propagate)
              • sane channel parameters (max_htlc_value_in_flight, ...)
              • onchain-to-offchain transition
              • safe CLTV deltas
              • efficient timing out HTLCs
              • spec compliance (or argumentation when we diverge)
              • parsing of onchain funds
              • onchain verification of channel points (cf utxo-related LN CVEs)
              • HTLC packet sanitization
              • reasonable default values
              • safe storage of witnessscript/output for unilateral claiming
              • any kind of DoS
              • correctness of funding_signed and funding_tx broadcast sequence
              • hash collision
              • prevent easy channel congestion (within what current spec allows)
              • correct weight computation for static fees
              • ...
              For each point,we should a) check if code is correct b) document clearly security significance for future modifications and developers c) have extensive unit/functional/fuzzing/mutating testing coverage.
              Compare to #565, which should teach library users on the security model/privacy trade-offs and how to comply with them, this should serve as a starting point for future audit of the codebase. At the end of review process, we should commit a document linking each point to its enforcement in the codebase and its tests.
              This is really needed because spec compliance isn't enough to be safe, a lot of security
              
implications are loosely documented or let to the wisdom of implementers, and assume a good
              
knowledge of bitcoin first-layer.
              (If you any other point we should look on, I invite you to add a comment)
              Metadata
              Metadata
              Assignees
              No one assigned
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                No labels
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                No type
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                  No branches or pull requests
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, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links");
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})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '

                  Skip to content
                  Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase #573
                  Closed
                  Closed
                  Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase#573
                  Description
                  @ariard
                  ariard
                  opened on Apr 4, 2020
                  As we move toward production releases, we should establish a clear scope of the Trusted Computing Base, in the sense than any bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside TCB might jeopardize user funds, and therefore should have our special care.
                  Here a non-exhaustive list of Things We Must Get Right:
                  • standard/consensus valid transactions
                  • sounds and responsive feerate computation for dynamic bumping
                  • reorg-safe ChannelMonitor
                  • balanced/correcntess of state machine transition
                  • enforceable commitment transaction (aka size good enough to propagate)
                  • sane channel parameters (max_htlc_value_in_flight, ...)
                  • onchain-to-offchain transition
                  • safe CLTV deltas
                  • efficient timing out HTLCs
                  • spec compliance (or argumentation when we diverge)
                  • parsing of onchain funds
                  • onchain verification of channel points (cf utxo-related LN CVEs)
                  • HTLC packet sanitization
                  • reasonable default values
                  • safe storage of witnessscript/output for unilateral claiming
                  • any kind of DoS
                  • correctness of funding_signed and funding_tx broadcast sequence
                  • hash collision
                  • prevent easy channel congestion (within what current spec allows)
                  • correct weight computation for static fees
                  • ...
                  For each point,we should a) check if code is correct b) document clearly security significance for future modifications and developers c) have extensive unit/functional/fuzzing/mutating testing coverage.
                  Compare to #565, which should teach library users on the security model/privacy trade-offs and how to comply with them, this should serve as a starting point for future audit of the codebase. At the end of review process, we should commit a document linking each point to its enforcement in the codebase and its tests.
                  This is really needed because spec compliance isn't enough to be safe, a lot of security
                  
implications are loosely documented or let to the wisdom of implementers, and assume a good
                  
knowledge of bitcoin first-layer.
                  (If you any other point we should look on, I invite you to add a comment)
                  Metadata
                  Metadata
                  Assignees
                  No one assigned
                    Labels
                    No labels
                    No labels
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                    No type
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                    No projects
                      Milestone
                      No milestone
                      Relationships
                      None yet
                      Development
                      No branches or pull requests
                      Issue actions
                      
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default");
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})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                      Skip to content
                      Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase #573
                      Closed
                      Closed
                      Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase#573
                      Description
                      @ariard
                      ariard
                      opened on Apr 4, 2020
                      As we move toward production releases, we should establish a clear scope of the Trusted Computing Base, in the sense than any bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside TCB might jeopardize user funds, and therefore should have our special care.
                      Here a non-exhaustive list of Things We Must Get Right:
                      • standard/consensus valid transactions
                      • sounds and responsive feerate computation for dynamic bumping
                      • reorg-safe ChannelMonitor
                      • balanced/correcntess of state machine transition
                      • enforceable commitment transaction (aka size good enough to propagate)
                      • sane channel parameters (max_htlc_value_in_flight, ...)
                      • onchain-to-offchain transition
                      • safe CLTV deltas
                      • efficient timing out HTLCs
                      • spec compliance (or argumentation when we diverge)
                      • parsing of onchain funds
                      • onchain verification of channel points (cf utxo-related LN CVEs)
                      • HTLC packet sanitization
                      • reasonable default values
                      • safe storage of witnessscript/output for unilateral claiming
                      • any kind of DoS
                      • correctness of funding_signed and funding_tx broadcast sequence
                      • hash collision
                      • prevent easy channel congestion (within what current spec allows)
                      • correct weight computation for static fees
                      • ...
                      For each point,we should a) check if code is correct b) document clearly security significance for future modifications and developers c) have extensive unit/functional/fuzzing/mutating testing coverage.
                      Compare to #565, which should teach library users on the security model/privacy trade-offs and how to comply with them, this should serve as a starting point for future audit of the codebase. At the end of review process, we should commit a document linking each point to its enforcement in the codebase and its tests.
                      This is really needed because spec compliance isn't enough to be safe, a lot of security
                      
implications are loosely documented or let to the wisdom of implementers, and assume a good
                      
knowledge of bitcoin first-layer.
                      (If you any other point we should look on, I invite you to add a comment)
                      Metadata
                      Metadata
                      Assignees
                      No one assigned
                        Labels
                        No labels
                        No labels
                        Type
                        No type
                        Projects
                        No projects
                          Milestone
                          No milestone
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                          None yet
                          Development
                          No branches or pull requests
                          Issue actions
                          
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers");
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})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '

                          Skip to content
                          Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase #573
                          Closed
                          Closed
                          Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase#573
                          Description
                          @ariard
                          ariard
                          opened on Apr 4, 2020
                          As we move toward production releases, we should establish a clear scope of the Trusted Computing Base, in the sense than any bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside TCB might jeopardize user funds, and therefore should have our special care.
                          Here a non-exhaustive list of Things We Must Get Right:
                          • standard/consensus valid transactions
                          • sounds and responsive feerate computation for dynamic bumping
                          • reorg-safe ChannelMonitor
                          • balanced/correcntess of state machine transition
                          • enforceable commitment transaction (aka size good enough to propagate)
                          • sane channel parameters (max_htlc_value_in_flight, ...)
                          • onchain-to-offchain transition
                          • safe CLTV deltas
                          • efficient timing out HTLCs
                          • spec compliance (or argumentation when we diverge)
                          • parsing of onchain funds
                          • onchain verification of channel points (cf utxo-related LN CVEs)
                          • HTLC packet sanitization
                          • reasonable default values
                          • safe storage of witnessscript/output for unilateral claiming
                          • any kind of DoS
                          • correctness of funding_signed and funding_tx broadcast sequence
                          • hash collision
                          • prevent easy channel congestion (within what current spec allows)
                          • correct weight computation for static fees
                          • ...
                          For each point,we should a) check if code is correct b) document clearly security significance for future modifications and developers c) have extensive unit/functional/fuzzing/mutating testing coverage.
                          Compare to #565, which should teach library users on the security model/privacy trade-offs and how to comply with them, this should serve as a starting point for future audit of the codebase. At the end of review process, we should commit a document linking each point to its enforcement in the codebase and its tests.
                          This is really needed because spec compliance isn't enough to be safe, a lot of security
                          
implications are loosely documented or let to the wisdom of implementers, and assume a good
                          
knowledge of bitcoin first-layer.
                          (If you any other point we should look on, I invite you to add a comment)
                          Metadata
                          Metadata
                          Assignees
                          No one assigned
                            Labels
                            No labels
                            No labels
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                            No type
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                            No projects
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                              No milestone
                              Relationships
                              None yet
                              Development
                              No branches or pull requests
                              Issue actions
                              
, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); }
})();
})();

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                              Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase #573
                              Closed
                              Closed
                              Extensive security review of Rust-Lightning codebase#573
                              Description
                              @ariard
                              ariard
                              opened on Apr 4, 2020
                              As we move toward production releases, we should establish a clear scope of the Trusted Computing Base, in the sense than any bugs or vulnerabilities occurring inside TCB might jeopardize user funds, and therefore should have our special care.
                              Here a non-exhaustive list of Things We Must Get Right:
                              • standard/consensus valid transactions
                              • sounds and responsive feerate computation for dynamic bumping
                              • reorg-safe ChannelMonitor
                              • balanced/correcntess of state machine transition
                              • enforceable commitment transaction (aka size good enough to propagate)
                              • sane channel parameters (max_htlc_value_in_flight, ...)
                              • onchain-to-offchain transition
                              • safe CLTV deltas
                              • efficient timing out HTLCs
                              • spec compliance (or argumentation when we diverge)
                              • parsing of onchain funds
                              • onchain verification of channel points (cf utxo-related LN CVEs)
                              • HTLC packet sanitization
                              • reasonable default values
                              • safe storage of witnessscript/output for unilateral claiming
                              • any kind of DoS
                              • correctness of funding_signed and funding_tx broadcast sequence
                              • hash collision
                              • prevent easy channel congestion (within what current spec allows)
                              • correct weight computation for static fees
                              • ...
                              For each point,we should a) check if code is correct b) document clearly security significance for future modifications and developers c) have extensive unit/functional/fuzzing/mutating testing coverage.
                              Compare to #565, which should teach library users on the security model/privacy trade-offs and how to comply with them, this should serve as a starting point for future audit of the codebase. At the end of review process, we should commit a document linking each point to its enforcement in the codebase and its tests.
                              This is really needed because spec compliance isn't enough to be safe, a lot of security
                              
implications are loosely documented or let to the wisdom of implementers, and assume a good
                              
knowledge of bitcoin first-layer.
                              (If you any other point we should look on, I invite you to add a comment)
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