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Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent#1585

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TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into from
Jul 1, 2022
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Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent #1585

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50 changes: 40 additions & 10 deletions lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
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Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -1729,6 +1729,26 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
} }
}

// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
// in-line tests later.

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {

@dunxendunxenJul 1, 2022

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Looks all bogus to me, but perhaps the beginning of a new age techno rap.

let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
Vec::from(&ret[..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}

impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2701,14 +2721,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
#[cfg(test)]
{
// If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
// appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
// actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else { panic!(); }
// If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
// appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
// actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
// In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
// script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
// and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
return true;
}

assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
} else { panic!(); }
}
return true;
}
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2793,10 +2820,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
|| (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
&& input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
!revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;

#[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);

Expand Down
40 changes: 38 additions & 2 deletions lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs
View file
Open in desktop
Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ use util::config::UserConfig;

use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9424,6 +9424,10 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
// funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
// security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
// un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
//
// Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
// previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
// gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
Expand All@@ -9434,9 +9438,19 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);

// Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
// 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
// its length.
let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);

let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
// Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
}

nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9466,6 +9480,28 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
} else { panic!(); }
} else { panic!(); }
assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

// Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
// as its not 32 bytes long.
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
txid: tx.txid(),
vout: idx as u32,
},
script_sig: Script::new(),
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
}).collect(),
output: vec![TxOut {
value: 1000,
script_pubkey: Script::new(),
}]
};
check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}

fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
Expand Down
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(function() {
function addCopyButtons() {
document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {
if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;
codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');
var btn = document.createElement('button');
btn.textContent = 'Copy';
btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';
btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };
btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };
btn.onclick = function() {
navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {
btn.textContent = 'Copied!';
setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);
});
};
codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';
codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);
});
}
addCopyButtons();
// Re-run on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent by TheBlueMatt · Pull Request #1585 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
Skip to content
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent#1585

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 Merged

TheBlueMatt
merged 1 commit into

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Jul 1, 2022
 Merged


Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent
#1585
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50 changes: 40 additions & 10 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -1729,6 +1729,26 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
	} }
}

// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
// in-line tests later.

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
@dunxendunxenJul 1, 2022

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Looks all bogus to me, but perhaps the beginning of a new age techno rap.
	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
	Vec::from(&ret[..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
	vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}

impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2701,14 +2721,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
 #[cfg(test)]
 {
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
 return true;
 }

 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 }
 return true;
 }
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2793,10 +2820,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;

 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);

Expand Down

40 changes: 38 additions & 2 deletions
lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ use util::config::UserConfig;

use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9424,6 +9424,10 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	// funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
	// security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
	// un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
	//
	// Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
	// previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
	// gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
Expand All@@ -9434,9 +9438,19 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

	let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);

	// Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
	// 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
	// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
	// its length.
	let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
	assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);

	let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
	for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
	}

	nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9466,6 +9480,28 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
 } else { panic!(); }
	} else { panic!(); }
	assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

	// Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
	// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
	// as its not 32 bytes long.
	let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 txid: tx.txid(),
 vout: idx as u32,
 },
 script_sig: Script::new(),
 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
 }).collect(),
 output: vec![TxOut {
 value: 1000,
 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
 }]
	};
	check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}

fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
Expand Down

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var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent by TheBlueMatt · Pull Request #1585 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
Skip to content
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent#1585

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Already on GitHub?
Sign in
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 Merged

TheBlueMatt
merged 1 commit into

from

Jul 1, 2022
 Merged


Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent
#1585
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50 changes: 40 additions & 10 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -1729,6 +1729,26 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
	} }
}

// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
// in-line tests later.

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
@dunxendunxenJul 1, 2022

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Choose a reason for hiding this comment

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Looks all bogus to me, but perhaps the beginning of a new age techno rap.
	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
	Vec::from(&ret[..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
	vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}

impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2701,14 +2721,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
 #[cfg(test)]
 {
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
 return true;
 }

 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 }
 return true;
 }
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2793,10 +2820,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;

 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);

Expand Down

40 changes: 38 additions & 2 deletions
lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ use util::config::UserConfig;

use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9424,6 +9424,10 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	// funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
	// security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
	// un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
	//
	// Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
	// previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
	// gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
Expand All@@ -9434,9 +9438,19 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

	let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);

	// Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
	// 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
	// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
	// its length.
	let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
	assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);

	let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
	for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
	}

	nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9466,6 +9480,28 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
 } else { panic!(); }
	} else { panic!(); }
	assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

	// Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
	// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
	// as its not 32 bytes long.
	let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 txid: tx.txid(),
 vout: idx as u32,
 },
 script_sig: Script::new(),
 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
 }).collect(),
 output: vec![TxOut {
 value: 1000,
 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
 }]
	};
	check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}

fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
Expand Down

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer
(function() {
var ref = document.referrer;
var terms = [];
if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {
var url = new URL(ref);
var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');
if (q) {
terms = q.split(/\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });
}
}
if (terms.length === 0) return;
var style = document.createElement('style');
style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';
document.head.appendChild(style);
function highlight(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node
var text = node.textContent;
var found = false;
terms.forEach(function(term) {
var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\') + ')', 'gi');
if (regex.test(text)) {
found = true;
var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();
var parts = text.split(regex);
parts.forEach(function(part, i) {
if (i % 2 === 0) {
frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));
} else {
var span = document.createElement('span');
span.className = 'userscript-highlight';
span.textContent = part;
frag.appendChild(span);
}
});
node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);
}
});
} else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element
var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];
if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {
Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);
}
}
}
highlight(document.body);
// Re-highlight on dynamic content
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
mutations.forEach(function(m) {
m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);
});
});
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observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent by TheBlueMatt · Pull Request #1585 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
Skip to content
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent#1585

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merged 1 commit into

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Jul 1, 2022
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Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent
#1585
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50 changes: 40 additions & 10 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -1729,6 +1729,26 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
	} }
}

// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
// in-line tests later.

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
@dunxendunxenJul 1, 2022

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Looks all bogus to me, but perhaps the beginning of a new age techno rap.
	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
	Vec::from(&ret[..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
	vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}

impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2701,14 +2721,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
 #[cfg(test)]
 {
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
 return true;
 }

 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 }
 return true;
 }
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2793,10 +2820,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;

 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);

Expand Down

40 changes: 38 additions & 2 deletions
lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ use util::config::UserConfig;

use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9424,6 +9424,10 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	// funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
	// security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
	// un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
	//
	// Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
	// previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
	// gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
Expand All@@ -9434,9 +9438,19 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

	let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);

	// Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
	// 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
	// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
	// its length.
	let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
	assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);

	let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
	for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
	}

	nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9466,6 +9480,28 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
 } else { panic!(); }
	} else { panic!(); }
	assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

	// Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
	// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
	// as its not 32 bytes long.
	let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 txid: tx.txid(),
 vout: idx as u32,
 },
 script_sig: Script::new(),
 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
 }).collect(),
 output: vec![TxOut {
 value: 1000,
 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
 }]
	};
	check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}

fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
Expand Down

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page
(function() {
var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',
'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',
'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];
function cleanUrl(url) {
try {
var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);
var changed = false;
trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {
if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {
u.searchParams.delete(p);
changed = true;
}
});
return changed ? u.toString() : url;
} catch (e) {
return url;
}
}
function cleanLinks() {
document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {
var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);
if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;
});
}
cleanLinks();
var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {
mutations.forEach(function(m) {
m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {
if (node.nodeType === 1) {
if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();
node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {
var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);
if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;
});
}
});
});
});
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "youtube.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent by TheBlueMatt · Pull Request #1585 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
Skip to content
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent#1585

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 Merged

TheBlueMatt
merged 1 commit into

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Jul 1, 2022
 Merged


Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent
#1585
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50 changes: 40 additions & 10 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -1729,6 +1729,26 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
	} }
}

// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
// in-line tests later.

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
@dunxendunxenJul 1, 2022

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Looks all bogus to me, but perhaps the beginning of a new age techno rap.
	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
	Vec::from(&ret[..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
	vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}

impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2701,14 +2721,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
 #[cfg(test)]
 {
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
 return true;
 }

 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 }
 return true;
 }
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2793,10 +2820,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;

 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);

Expand Down

40 changes: 38 additions & 2 deletions
lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ use util::config::UserConfig;

use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9424,6 +9424,10 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	// funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
	// security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
	// un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
	//
	// Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
	// previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
	// gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
Expand All@@ -9434,9 +9438,19 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

	let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);

	// Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
	// 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
	// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
	// its length.
	let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
	assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);

	let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
	for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
	}

	nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9466,6 +9480,28 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
 } else { panic!(); }
	} else { panic!(); }
	assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

	// Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
	// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
	// as its not 32 bytes long.
	let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 txid: tx.txid(),
 vout: idx as u32,
 },
 script_sig: Script::new(),
 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
 }).collect(),
 output: vec![TxOut {
 value: 1000,
 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
 }]
	};
	check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}

fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
Expand Down

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube
(function() {
function tryTheater() {
var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label="Theater mode"], ytd-player #player button[title="Theater mode"]');
if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {
btn.click();
}
}
// Try immediately
tryTheater();
// Try after navigation (SPA)
var lastUrl = location.href;
setInterval(function() {
if (location.href !== lastUrl) {
lastUrl = location.href;
setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);
}
}, 1000);
// Also try on player load
var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent by TheBlueMatt · Pull Request #1585 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
Skip to content
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent#1585

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Jul 1, 2022
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Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent
#1585
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50 changes: 40 additions & 10 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -1729,6 +1729,26 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
	} }
}

// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
// in-line tests later.

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
@dunxendunxenJul 1, 2022

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Looks all bogus to me, but perhaps the beginning of a new age techno rap.
	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
	Vec::from(&ret[..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
	vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}

impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2701,14 +2721,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
 #[cfg(test)]
 {
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
 return true;
 }

 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 }
 return true;
 }
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2793,10 +2820,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;

 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);

Expand Down

40 changes: 38 additions & 2 deletions
lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ use util::config::UserConfig;

use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9424,6 +9424,10 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	// funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
	// security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
	// un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
	//
	// Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
	// previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
	// gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
Expand All@@ -9434,9 +9438,19 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

	let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);

	// Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
	// 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
	// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
	// its length.
	let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
	assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);

	let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
	for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
	}

	nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9466,6 +9480,28 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
 } else { panic!(); }
	} else { panic!(); }
	assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

	// Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
	// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
	// as its not 32 bytes long.
	let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 txid: tx.txid(),
 vout: idx as u32,
 },
 script_sig: Script::new(),
 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
 }).collect(),
 output: vec![TxOut {
 value: 1000,
 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
 }]
	};
	check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}

fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
Expand Down

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content
(function() {
function unstick() {
document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role="banner"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*="position: fixed"], [style*="position:sticky"]').forEach(function(el) {
if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {
el.style.position = 'static';
el.style.top = 'auto';
el.style.zIndex = 'auto';
}
});
}
unstick();
var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);
observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });
})();
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "*";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent by TheBlueMatt · Pull Request #1585 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
Skip to content
Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent#1585

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 Merged

TheBlueMatt
merged 1 commit into

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Jul 1, 2022
 Merged


Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent
#1585
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50 changes: 40 additions & 10 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -1729,6 +1729,26 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
	} }
}

// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
// in-line tests later.

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
@dunxendunxenJul 1, 2022

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Looks all bogus to me, but perhaps the beginning of a new age techno rap.
	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
	Vec::from(&ret[..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
	vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}

impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2701,14 +2721,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
 #[cfg(test)]
 {
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
 return true;
 }

 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 }
 return true;
 }
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2793,10 +2820,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;

 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);

Expand Down

40 changes: 38 additions & 2 deletions
lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ use util::config::UserConfig;

use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9424,6 +9424,10 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	// funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
	// security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
	// un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
	//
	// Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
	// previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
	// gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
Expand All@@ -9434,9 +9438,19 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

	let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);

	// Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
	// 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
	// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
	// its length.
	let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
	assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);

	let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
	for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
	}

	nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9466,6 +9480,28 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
 } else { panic!(); }
	} else { panic!(); }
	assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

	// Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
	// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
	// as its not 32 bytes long.
	let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 txid: tx.txid(),
 vout: idx as u32,
 },
 script_sig: Script::new(),
 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
 }).collect(),
 output: vec![TxOut {
 value: 1000,
 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
 }]
	};
	check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}

fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
Expand Down

, 'i');
if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) {
// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site
(function() {
var enabled = true;
function applyDarkMode() {
if (!enabled) return;
// Create style element if it doesn't exist
var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');
if (!style) {
style = document.createElement('style');
style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';
document.head.appendChild(style);
}
// Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video
style.textContent = '
/* Invert everything except media */
html {
filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;
background: #1a1a2e !important;
}
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Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent by TheBlueMatt · Pull Request #1585 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent#1585

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TheBlueMatt
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Jul 1, 2022
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Fix spurious panic on bogus funding txn that confirm and are spent
#1585
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50 changes: 40 additions & 10 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -1729,6 +1729,26 @@ macro_rules! fail_unbroadcast_htlcs {
	} }
}

// In the `test_invalid_funding_tx` test, we need a bogus script which matches the HTLC-Accepted
// witness length match (ie is 136 bytes long). We generate one here which we also use in some
// in-line tests later.

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() -> Vec<u8> {
@dunxendunxenJul 1, 2022

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Looks all bogus to me, but perhaps the beginning of a new age techno rap.
	let mut ret = [opcodes::all::OP_NOP.into_u8(); 136];
	ret[131] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[132] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[133] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[134] = opcodes::all::OP_DROP.into_u8();
	ret[135] = opcodes::OP_TRUE.into_u8();
	Vec::from(&ret[..])
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub fn deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness() -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
	vec![Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program().into()].into()
}

impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
	/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Prunes old preimages if neither
	/// needed by holder commitment transactions HTCLs nor by counterparty ones. Unless we haven't already seen
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2701,14 +2721,21 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 if *idx == input.previous_output.vout {
 #[cfg(test)]
 {
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 // If the expected script is a known type, check that the witness
 // appears to be spending the correct type (ie that the match would
 // actually succeed in BIP 158/159-style filters).
 if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 if input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec() == deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program() {
 // In at least one test we use a deliberately bogus witness
 // script which hit an old panic. Thus, we check for that here
 // and avoid the assert if its the expected bogus script.
 return true;
 }

 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wsh(&Script::from(input.witness.last().unwrap().to_vec()), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else if _script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
 assert_eq!(&bitcoin::Address::p2wpkh(&bitcoin::PublicKey::from_slice(&input.witness.last().unwrap()).unwrap(), bitcoin::Network::Bitcoin).unwrap().script_pubkey(), _script_pubkey);
 } else { panic!(); }
 }
 return true;
 }
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -2793,10 +2820,13 @@ impl<Signer: Sign> ChannelMonitorImpl<Signer> {
 let prev_last_witness_len = input.witness.second_to_last().map(|w| w.len()).unwrap_or(0);
 let revocation_sig_claim = (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33)
 || (witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && prev_last_witness_len == 33);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);
 let accepted_preimage_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
 && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;
 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let accepted_timeout_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) && !revocation_sig_claim;
 let offered_preimage_claim = witness_items == 3 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC) &&
 !revocation_sig_claim && input.witness.second_to_last().unwrap().len() == 32;

 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
 let offered_timeout_claim = witness_items == 5 && htlctype == Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC);

Expand Down

40 changes: 38 additions & 2 deletions
lightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ use util::config::UserConfig;

use bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash;
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9424,6 +9424,10 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	// funding transactions from their counterparties, leading to a multi-implementation critical
	// security vulnerability (though we always sanitized properly, we've previously had
	// un-released crashes in the sanitization process).
	//
	// Further, if the funding transaction is consensus-valid, confirms, and is later spent, we'd
	// previously have crashed in `ChannelMonitor` even though we closed the channel as bogus and
	// gave up on it. We test this here by generating such a transaction.
	let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
	let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
	let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
Expand All@@ -9434,9 +9438,19 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
	nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));

	let (temporary_channel_id, mut tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);

	// Create a witness program which can be spent by a 4-empty-stack-elements witness and which is
	// 136 bytes long. This matches our "accepted HTLC preimage spend" matching, previously causing
	// a panic as we'd try to extract a 32 byte preimage from a witness element without checking
	// its length.
	let mut wit_program: Vec<u8> = channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness_program();
	assert!(chan_utils::HTLCType::scriptlen_to_htlctype(wit_program.len()).unwrap() ==
 chan_utils::HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC);

	let wit_program_script: Script = wit_program.clone().into();
	for output in tx.output.iter_mut() {
 // Make the confirmed funding transaction have a bogus script_pubkey
 output.script_pubkey = bitcoin::Script::new();
 output.script_pubkey = Script::new_v0_p2wsh(&wit_program_script.wscript_hash());
	}

	nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone(), 0).unwrap();
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -9466,6 +9480,28 @@ fn test_invalid_funding_tx() {
 } else { panic!(); }
	} else { panic!(); }
	assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels().len(), 0);

	// Now confirm a spend of the (bogus) funding transaction. As long as the witness is 5 elements
	// long the ChannelMonitor will try to read 32 bytes from the second-to-last element, panicing
	// as its not 32 bytes long.
	let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
 version: 2i32, lock_time: 0,
 input: tx.output.iter().enumerate().map(|(idx, _)| TxIn {
 previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
 txid: tx.txid(),
 vout: idx as u32,
 },
 script_sig: Script::new(),
 sequence: 0xfffffffd,
 witness: Witness::from_vec(channelmonitor::deliberately_bogus_accepted_htlc_witness())
 }).collect(),
 output: vec![TxOut {
 value: 1000,
 script_pubkey: Script::new(),
 }]
	};
	check_spends!(spend_tx, tx);
	mine_transaction(&nodes[1], &spend_tx);
}

fn do_test_tx_confirmed_skipping_blocks_immediate_broadcast(test_height_before_timelock: bool) {
Expand Down