Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions - #1887

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid
Dec 3, 2022
Merged

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions#1887
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid

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The `derive_{public,private}_key` methods hash the two input keys
and then add them to the input public key. Because addition can
fail if the tweak is the inverse of the secret key this method
currently returns a `Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the SHA-256 hash of the
`base_point` (and other data) must be the inverse of the
`base_point`('s secret key). Because changing the `base_point`
changes the hash in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such a `base_point`.
The `derive_{public,private}_revocation_key` methods hash the two
input keys and then multiply the two input keys by hashed values
before adding them together. Because addition can fail if the tweak
is the inverse of the secret key this method currently returns a
`Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the point-multiplied-by-hash
values must be the inverse of each other, however each point
commits the SHA-256 hash of both keys together. Thus, because
changing either key changes the hashes (and the ultimate points
added together) in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such points.
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {

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Reviewed this change (and the 3 following it) and confirmed that all the .expects are actually for cryptographically unreachable branches.

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Nice, this will help clean up some return parameters in #1825.

Comment threadlightning/src/chain/package.rs
@arik-so

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Looks good and seems safe to me. Not a lawyer though.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 14d2e97 into lightningdevkit:mainDec 3, 2022
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@TheBlueMatt@arik-so@tnull@apoelstra@wpaulino
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Add copy buttons to all
 blocks\n(function() {\n function addCopyButtons() {\n document.querySelectorAll('pre code').forEach(function(codeBlock) {\n if (codeBlock.parentElement.hasAttribute('data-copy-added')) return;\n codeBlock.parentElement.setAttribute('data-copy-added', 'true');\n \n var btn = document.createElement('button');\n btn.textContent = 'Copy';\n btn.style.cssText = 'position:absolute;top:4px;right:4px;padding:2px 8px;font-size:11px;background:#4ecdc4;border:none;border-radius:4px;color:#1a1a2e;cursor:pointer;opacity:0.7;transition:opacity 0.2s;';\n btn.onmouseover = function() { this.style.opacity = '1'; };\n btn.onmouseout = function() { this.style.opacity = '0.7'; };\n btn.onclick = function() {\n navigator.clipboard.writeText(codeBlock.textContent).then(function() {\n btn.textContent = 'Copied!';\n setTimeout(function() { btn.textContent = 'Copy'; }, 1500);\n });\n };\n codeBlock.parentElement.style.position = 'relative';\n codeBlock.parentElement.appendChild(btn);\n });\n }\n \n addCopyButtons();\n \n // Re-run on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(addCopyButtons);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks");
}
} catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Add Copy Buttons to Code Blocks]', __e); }
})();
(function(){
try {
var __m = "github.com";
var __re = new RegExp('^' + "github\\.com" + '
Skip to content

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions - #1887

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid
Dec 3, 2022
Merged

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions#1887
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid

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@TheBlueMatt

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The `derive_{public,private}_key` methods hash the two input keys
and then add them to the input public key. Because addition can
fail if the tweak is the inverse of the secret key this method
currently returns a `Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the SHA-256 hash of the
`base_point` (and other data) must be the inverse of the
`base_point`('s secret key). Because changing the `base_point`
changes the hash in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such a `base_point`.
The `derive_{public,private}_revocation_key` methods hash the two
input keys and then multiply the two input keys by hashed values
before adding them together. Because addition can fail if the tweak
is the inverse of the secret key this method currently returns a
`Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the point-multiplied-by-hash
values must be the inverse of each other, however each point
commits the SHA-256 hash of both keys together. Thus, because
changing either key changes the hashes (and the ultimate points
added together) in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such points.
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {

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Reviewed this change (and the 3 following it) and confirmed that all the .expects are actually for cryptographically unreachable branches.

@wpaulinowpaulino left a comment

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Nice, this will help clean up some return parameters in #1825.

Comment threadlightning/src/chain/package.rs
@arik-so

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Looks good and seems safe to me. Not a lawyer though.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 14d2e97 into lightningdevkit:mainDec 3, 2022
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5 participants

@TheBlueMatt@arik-so@tnull@apoelstra@wpaulino
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Force GitHub README to respect dark mode\n(function() {\n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '\n .markdown-body {\n color-scheme: dark light;\n }\n .markdown-body pre { background: #161b22 !important; }\n .markdown-body code { background: rgba(110, 118, 129, 0.4) !important; }\n .markdown-body table th, .markdown-body table td { border-color: #30363d !important; }\n .markdown-body img { background: #0d1117; }\n .markdown-body blockquote { border-left-color: #8b949e; }\n .markdown-body hr { border-color: #30363d; }\n ';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n})();", "GitHub Dark Mode README Fix"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:GitHub Dark Mode README Fix]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions - #1887

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid
Dec 3, 2022
Merged

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions#1887
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid

Conversation

@TheBlueMatt

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No description provided.

The `derive_{public,private}_key` methods hash the two input keys
and then add them to the input public key. Because addition can
fail if the tweak is the inverse of the secret key this method
currently returns a `Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the SHA-256 hash of the
`base_point` (and other data) must be the inverse of the
`base_point`('s secret key). Because changing the `base_point`
changes the hash in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such a `base_point`.
The `derive_{public,private}_revocation_key` methods hash the two
input keys and then multiply the two input keys by hashed values
before adding them together. Because addition can fail if the tweak
is the inverse of the secret key this method currently returns a
`Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the point-multiplied-by-hash
values must be the inverse of each other, however each point
commits the SHA-256 hash of both keys together. Thus, because
changing either key changes the hashes (and the ultimate points
added together) in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such points.
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {

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Reviewed this change (and the 3 following it) and confirmed that all the .expects are actually for cryptographically unreachable branches.

@wpaulinowpaulino left a comment

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Nice, this will help clean up some return parameters in #1825.

Comment threadlightning/src/chain/package.rs
@arik-so

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Looks good and seems safe to me. Not a lawyer though.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 14d2e97 into lightningdevkit:mainDec 3, 2022
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5 participants

@TheBlueMatt@arik-so@tnull@apoelstra@wpaulino
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Highlight search terms from Google/DuckDuckGo/Bing referrer\n(function() {\n var ref = document.referrer;\n var terms = [];\n \n if (ref.includes('google.com') || ref.includes('duckduckgo.com') || ref.includes('bing.com')) {\n var url = new URL(ref);\n var q = url.searchParams.get('q') || url.searchParams.get('p');\n if (q) {\n terms = q.split(/\\s+/).filter(function(t) { return t.length > 2; });\n }\n }\n \n if (terms.length === 0) return;\n \n var style = document.createElement('style');\n style.textContent = '.userscript-highlight { background: #fbbf24; color: #1a1a2e; padding: 1px 3px; border-radius: 2px; }';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n \n function highlight(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 3) { // text node\n var text = node.textContent;\n var found = false;\n terms.forEach(function(term) {\n var regex = new RegExp('(' + term.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\\]\\\\]/g, '\\\\') + ')', 'gi');\n if (regex.test(text)) {\n found = true;\n var frag = document.createDocumentFragment();\n var parts = text.split(regex);\n parts.forEach(function(part, i) {\n if (i % 2 === 0) {\n frag.appendChild(document.createTextNode(part));\n } else {\n var span = document.createElement('span');\n span.className = 'userscript-highlight';\n span.textContent = part;\n frag.appendChild(span);\n }\n });\n node.parentNode.replaceChild(frag, node);\n }\n });\n } else if (node.nodeType === 1 && node.childNodes) { // element\n var skipTags = ['SCRIPT', 'STYLE', 'NOSCRIPT', 'TEXTAREA', 'INPUT', 'SELECT'];\n if (!skipTags.includes(node.tagName)) {\n Array.from(node.childNodes).forEach(highlight);\n }\n }\n }\n \n highlight(document.body);\n \n // Re-highlight on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1 || node.nodeType === 3) highlight(node);\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Highlight Search Terms"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Highlight Search Terms]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions - #1887

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid
Dec 3, 2022
Merged

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions#1887
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid

Conversation

@TheBlueMatt

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No description provided.

The `derive_{public,private}_key` methods hash the two input keys
and then add them to the input public key. Because addition can
fail if the tweak is the inverse of the secret key this method
currently returns a `Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the SHA-256 hash of the
`base_point` (and other data) must be the inverse of the
`base_point`('s secret key). Because changing the `base_point`
changes the hash in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such a `base_point`.
The `derive_{public,private}_revocation_key` methods hash the two
input keys and then multiply the two input keys by hashed values
before adding them together. Because addition can fail if the tweak
is the inverse of the secret key this method currently returns a
`Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the point-multiplied-by-hash
values must be the inverse of each other, however each point
commits the SHA-256 hash of both keys together. Thus, because
changing either key changes the hashes (and the ultimate points
added together) in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such points.
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {

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Reviewed this change (and the 3 following it) and confirmed that all the .expects are actually for cryptographically unreachable branches.

@wpaulinowpaulino left a comment

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Nice, this will help clean up some return parameters in #1825.

Comment threadlightning/src/chain/package.rs
@arik-so

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Looks good and seems safe to me. Not a lawyer though.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 14d2e97 into lightningdevkit:mainDec 3, 2022
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5 participants

@TheBlueMatt@arik-so@tnull@apoelstra@wpaulino
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
Skip to content

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions - #1887

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid
Dec 3, 2022
Merged

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions#1887
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid

Conversation

@TheBlueMatt

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No description provided.

The `derive_{public,private}_key` methods hash the two input keys
and then add them to the input public key. Because addition can
fail if the tweak is the inverse of the secret key this method
currently returns a `Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the SHA-256 hash of the
`base_point` (and other data) must be the inverse of the
`base_point`('s secret key). Because changing the `base_point`
changes the hash in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such a `base_point`.
The `derive_{public,private}_revocation_key` methods hash the two
input keys and then multiply the two input keys by hashed values
before adding them together. Because addition can fail if the tweak
is the inverse of the secret key this method currently returns a
`Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the point-multiplied-by-hash
values must be the inverse of each other, however each point
commits the SHA-256 hash of both keys together. Thus, because
changing either key changes the hashes (and the ultimate points
added together) in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such points.
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {

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Reviewed this change (and the 3 following it) and confirmed that all the .expects are actually for cryptographically unreachable branches.

@wpaulinowpaulino left a comment

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Nice, this will help clean up some return parameters in #1825.

Comment threadlightning/src/chain/package.rs
@arik-so

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Looks good and seems safe to me. Not a lawyer though.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 14d2e97 into lightningdevkit:mainDec 3, 2022
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5 participants

@TheBlueMatt@arik-so@tnull@apoelstra@wpaulino
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Auto-enable theater mode on YouTube\n(function() {\n function tryTheater() {\n var btn = document.querySelector('button[aria-label=\"Theater mode\"], ytd-player #player button[title=\"Theater mode\"]');\n if (btn && !btn.classList.contains('activated')) {\n btn.click();\n }\n }\n \n // Try immediately\n tryTheater();\n \n // Try after navigation (SPA)\n var lastUrl = location.href;\n setInterval(function() {\n if (location.href !== lastUrl) {\n lastUrl = location.href;\n setTimeout(tryTheater, 500);\n }\n }, 1000);\n \n // Also try on player load\n var observer = new MutationObserver(tryTheater);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "YouTube Theater Mode Default"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:YouTube Theater Mode Default]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
Skip to content

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions - #1887

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid
Dec 3, 2022
Merged

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions#1887
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid

Conversation

@TheBlueMatt

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No description provided.

The `derive_{public,private}_key` methods hash the two input keys
and then add them to the input public key. Because addition can
fail if the tweak is the inverse of the secret key this method
currently returns a `Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the SHA-256 hash of the
`base_point` (and other data) must be the inverse of the
`base_point`('s secret key). Because changing the `base_point`
changes the hash in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such a `base_point`.
The `derive_{public,private}_revocation_key` methods hash the two
input keys and then multiply the two input keys by hashed values
before adding them together. Because addition can fail if the tweak
is the inverse of the secret key this method currently returns a
`Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the point-multiplied-by-hash
values must be the inverse of each other, however each point
commits the SHA-256 hash of both keys together. Thus, because
changing either key changes the hashes (and the ultimate points
added together) in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such points.
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {

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Reviewed this change (and the 3 following it) and confirmed that all the .expects are actually for cryptographically unreachable branches.

@wpaulinowpaulino left a comment

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Nice, this will help clean up some return parameters in #1825.

Comment threadlightning/src/chain/package.rs
@arik-so

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Looks good and seems safe to me. Not a lawyer though.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 14d2e97 into lightningdevkit:mainDec 3, 2022
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5 participants

@TheBlueMatt@arik-so@tnull@apoelstra@wpaulino
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content\n(function() {\n function unstick() {\n document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role=\"banner\"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*=\"position: fixed\"], [style*=\"position:sticky\"]').forEach(function(el) {\n if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || \n getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') {\n el.style.position = 'static';\n el.style.top = 'auto';\n el.style.zIndex = 'auto';\n }\n });\n }\n \n unstick();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick);\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] });\n})();", "Kill Sticky Headers"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + '
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Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions - #1887

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid
Dec 3, 2022
Merged

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions#1887
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid

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The `derive_{public,private}_key` methods hash the two input keys
and then add them to the input public key. Because addition can
fail if the tweak is the inverse of the secret key this method
currently returns a `Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the SHA-256 hash of the
`base_point` (and other data) must be the inverse of the
`base_point`('s secret key). Because changing the `base_point`
changes the hash in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such a `base_point`.
The `derive_{public,private}_revocation_key` methods hash the two
input keys and then multiply the two input keys by hashed values
before adding them together. Because addition can fail if the tweak
is the inverse of the secret key this method currently returns a
`Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the point-multiplied-by-hash
values must be the inverse of each other, however each point
commits the SHA-256 hash of both keys together. Thus, because
changing either key changes the hashes (and the ultimate points
added together) in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such points.
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {

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Reviewed this change (and the 3 following it) and confirmed that all the .expects are actually for cryptographically unreachable branches.

@wpaulinowpaulino left a comment

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Nice, this will help clean up some return parameters in #1825.

Comment threadlightning/src/chain/package.rs
@arik-so

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Looks good and seems safe to me. Not a lawyer though.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 14d2e97 into lightningdevkit:mainDec 3, 2022
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@TheBlueMatt@arik-so@tnull@apoelstra@wpaulino
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Universal Dark Mode - works on any site\n(function() {\n var enabled = true;\n \n function applyDarkMode() {\n if (!enabled) return;\n \n // Create style element if it doesn't exist\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (!style) {\n style = document.createElement('style');\n style.id = 'universal-dark-mode-style';\n document.head.appendChild(style);\n }\n \n // Dark mode CSS - inverts colors but preserves images/video\n style.textContent = '\n /* Invert everything except media */\n html {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #1a1a2e !important;\n }\n \n /* Restore images, videos, iframes, canvas */\n img, video, iframe, canvas, svg, picture, [style*=\"background-image\"] {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n }\n \n /* Preserve specific elements that should not be inverted */\n .no-dark-mode, .no-dark-mode *,\n [data-theme=\"light\"], [data-theme=\"light\"],\n .ace_editor, .ace_editor *,\n .CodeMirror, .CodeMirror *,\n .monaco-editor, .monaco-editor *,\n .markdown-body pre, .markdown-body pre *,\n .highlight, .highlight *,\n pre code, pre code * {\n filter: none !important;\n }\n \n /* Fix common UI elements */\n .modal, .popup, .dropdown-menu, .tooltip, .popover {\n filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg) !important;\n background: #2d2d44 !important;\n border-color: #444 !important;\n }\n \n /* Scrollbars */\n ::-webkit-scrollbar { background: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb { background: #444 !important; }\n ::-webkit-scrollbar-thumb:hover { background: #555 !important; }\n \n /* Selection */\n ::selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ::-moz-selection { background: #4ecdc4 !important; color: #1a1a2e !important; }\n ';\n }\n \n function removeDarkMode() {\n var style = document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style');\n if (style) style.remove();\n }\n \n // Toggle with Alt+Shift+D\n document.addEventListener('keydown', function(e) {\n if (e.altKey && e.shiftKey && e.key === 'D') {\n e.preventDefault();\n enabled = !enabled;\n if (enabled) {\n applyDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Enabled');\n } else {\n removeDarkMode();\n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Disabled');\n }\n }\n });\n \n // Apply on load\n applyDarkMode();\n \n // Re-apply on dynamic content\n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n if (enabled && !document.getElementById('universal-dark-mode-style')) {\n applyDarkMode();\n }\n });\n observer.observe(document.head, { childList: true });\n \n console.log('[Universal Dark Mode] Loaded - Press Alt+Shift+D to toggle');\n})();", "Universal Dark Mode"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Universal Dark Mode]', __e); } })(); })();
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Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions - #1887

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid
Dec 3, 2022
Merged

Remove cryptographically unreachable error conditions#1887
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
TheBlueMatt:2022-11-definitely-valid

Conversation

@TheBlueMatt

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No description provided.

The `derive_{public,private}_key` methods hash the two input keys
and then add them to the input public key. Because addition can
fail if the tweak is the inverse of the secret key this method
currently returns a `Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the SHA-256 hash of the
`base_point` (and other data) must be the inverse of the
`base_point`('s secret key). Because changing the `base_point`
changes the hash in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such a `base_point`.
The `derive_{public,private}_revocation_key` methods hash the two
input keys and then multiply the two input keys by hashed values
before adding them together. Because addition can fail if the tweak
is the inverse of the secret key this method currently returns a
`Result`.
However, it is not cryptographically possible to reach the error
case - in order to create an issue, the point-multiplied-by-hash
values must be the inverse of each other, however each point
commits the SHA-256 hash of both keys together. Thus, because
changing either key changes the hashes (and the ultimate points
added together) in an unpredictable way, there should be no way to
construct such points.
/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
/// generated (ie our own).
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> SecretKey {

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Reviewed this change (and the 3 following it) and confirmed that all the .expects are actually for cryptographically unreachable branches.

@wpaulinowpaulino left a comment

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Nice, this will help clean up some return parameters in #1825.

Comment threadlightning/src/chain/package.rs
@arik-so

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Looks good and seems safe to me. Not a lawyer though.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 14d2e97 into lightningdevkit:mainDec 3, 2022
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5 participants

@TheBlueMatt@arik-so@tnull@apoelstra@wpaulino