Order blinded paths by reliability criteria#2912

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

The use of tor.clone() in announce_node_address is unnecessary since SocketAddress::OnionV2 implements the Copy trait. This means the tor variable can be passed directly without cloning, which would be more efficient.
- announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor.clone());+ announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor);
Committable suggestion
‼️IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
Suggested change
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor.clone());
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor);

Could you point me to lines of code where it implements the Copy trait?

@jkczyz, the output from the search does not directly show the Copy trait implementation for the SocketAddress enum. The snippet provided includes the definition of SocketAddress but does not include any derive attributes that might indicate the implementation of the Copy trait. It's possible that the relevant part of the code was not included in the output snippet. Without direct evidence from the provided output, I cannot confirm the Copy trait implementation for SocketAddress::OnionV2. My previous statement regarding the unnecessary use of .clone() may have been incorrect without this confirmation.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the definition of `SocketAddress` and check if it implements the `Copy` trait. rg "enum SocketAddress" -A 10
Length of output: 1118

tnull · 2024-03-07T11:01:54Z

I think choosing the right introduction points in order to optimize for a specific metric such as reliability is very related to finding optimal autopilot/attachment strategies. Using the node degree as a proxy metric for reliability seems like a solid first step, especially if we're talking about payment reliability.
A few more thoughts though: Further down the road we could also entertain a few other metrics that could make sense, for example optimizing for betweenness centrality or choosing introduction points according to k-Center optimization. (Some of our simulation results in this paper might be of interest here, see for example Fig. 1). Also, we could account for node uptime (regularity of node announcements?) or latency metrics, that might become available as part of the attributable errors proposal?
Doing anything more than just scoring by node degree might of course require us to pre-calculate and store more per-node metrics, so would probably only make sense if we'd ever come around to introduce a node score, possibly as part of #63?

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

Tip
Codebase Verification
The verification process did not find evidence of tests covering the scenario where no paths are found despite the recipient being announced, supporting the suggestion to add targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths. It's important to ensure comprehensive test coverage for this specific case to maintain robustness in error handling and fallback mechanisms.
Analysis chain
The logic to map peers to BlindedPath and take only up to MAX_PATHS paths is correctly implemented. However, it's important to ensure that the error handling when no paths are found (especially when the recipient is announced) is thoroughly tested to avoid scenarios where a one-hop path could have been used but wasn't due to an oversight.
Scripts Executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# It's recommended to add tests specifically covering the scenario where no paths are found# despite the recipient being announced, ensuring the fallback to a one-hop path works as expected.echo"Suggest adding targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths."
Length of output: 150
Script:
#!/bin/bash# First, find test files related to onion_message or messenger functionality fd 'test' --type f | grep -E 'onion_message|messenger|BlindedPath'# If relevant test files are found, search within those files for tests covering the specific scenario# Note: The actual search within files will be planned based on the output of the first command
Length of output: 114
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search within the identified test file for mentions of the scenario of interest rg -i 'no paths found|recipient announced|one-hop path|MAX_PATHS' lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
Length of output: 115

Is that scenario covered in creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path?

Given the information available and the results of the script execution, I couldn't find a test named creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path within the lightning/src/onion_message/ directory. It's possible that the test might not exist under that exact name, or it could be located in a different part of the codebase. If you have more details about the test's location or its exact name, that could help in locating it.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the test `creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path` within the codebase. rg 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/onion_message/
Length of output: 92

It is located in file lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs.

@jkczyz: The test creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path in lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs indeed covers the scenario of using a one-hop blinded path for offer payment. It verifies that an offer can be paid through such a path and checks the use of ephemeral public keys instead of exposing the node's public key, with the node's public key still being used as the introduction node of the blinded path. This test ensures that the functionality for creating and paying for offers using a one-hop blinded path is working as expected.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Extract the content of the test function from the specified file. rg --context 50 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
Length of output: 4238

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

The use of tor.clone() in announce_node_address is unnecessary since SocketAddress::OnionV2 implements the Copy trait. This means the tor variable can be passed directly without cloning, which would be more efficient.
- announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor.clone());+ announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor);
Committable suggestion
‼️IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
Suggested change
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor.clone());
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor);

Could you point me to lines of code where it implements the Copy trait?

@jkczyz, the output from the search does not directly show the Copy trait implementation for the SocketAddress enum. The snippet provided includes the definition of SocketAddress but does not include any derive attributes that might indicate the implementation of the Copy trait. It's possible that the relevant part of the code was not included in the output snippet. Without direct evidence from the provided output, I cannot confirm the Copy trait implementation for SocketAddress::OnionV2. My previous statement regarding the unnecessary use of .clone() may have been incorrect without this confirmation.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the definition of `SocketAddress` and check if it implements the `Copy` trait. rg "enum SocketAddress" -A 10
Length of output: 1118

tnull · 2024-03-07T11:01:54Z

I think choosing the right introduction points in order to optimize for a specific metric such as reliability is very related to finding optimal autopilot/attachment strategies. Using the node degree as a proxy metric for reliability seems like a solid first step, especially if we're talking about payment reliability.
A few more thoughts though: Further down the road we could also entertain a few other metrics that could make sense, for example optimizing for betweenness centrality or choosing introduction points according to k-Center optimization. (Some of our simulation results in this paper might be of interest here, see for example Fig. 1). Also, we could account for node uptime (regularity of node announcements?) or latency metrics, that might become available as part of the attributable errors proposal?
Doing anything more than just scoring by node degree might of course require us to pre-calculate and store more per-node metrics, so would probably only make sense if we'd ever come around to introduce a node score, possibly as part of #63?

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

Tip
Codebase Verification
The verification process did not find evidence of tests covering the scenario where no paths are found despite the recipient being announced, supporting the suggestion to add targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths. It's important to ensure comprehensive test coverage for this specific case to maintain robustness in error handling and fallback mechanisms.
Analysis chain
The logic to map peers to BlindedPath and take only up to MAX_PATHS paths is correctly implemented. However, it's important to ensure that the error handling when no paths are found (especially when the recipient is announced) is thoroughly tested to avoid scenarios where a one-hop path could have been used but wasn't due to an oversight.
Scripts Executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# It's recommended to add tests specifically covering the scenario where no paths are found# despite the recipient being announced, ensuring the fallback to a one-hop path works as expected.echo"Suggest adding targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths."
Length of output: 150
Script:
#!/bin/bash# First, find test files related to onion_message or messenger functionality fd 'test' --type f | grep -E 'onion_message|messenger|BlindedPath'# If relevant test files are found, search within those files for tests covering the specific scenario# Note: The actual search within files will be planned based on the output of the first command
Length of output: 114
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search within the identified test file for mentions of the scenario of interest rg -i 'no paths found|recipient announced|one-hop path|MAX_PATHS' lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
Length of output: 115

Is that scenario covered in creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path?

Given the information available and the results of the script execution, I couldn't find a test named creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path within the lightning/src/onion_message/ directory. It's possible that the test might not exist under that exact name, or it could be located in a different part of the codebase. If you have more details about the test's location or its exact name, that could help in locating it.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the test `creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path` within the codebase. rg 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/onion_message/
Length of output: 92

It is located in file lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs.

@jkczyz: The test creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path in lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs indeed covers the scenario of using a one-hop blinded path for offer payment. It verifies that an offer can be paid through such a path and checks the use of ephemeral public keys instead of exposing the node's public key, with the node's public key still being used as the introduction node of the blinded path. This test ensures that the functionality for creating and paying for offers using a one-hop blinded path is working as expected.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Extract the content of the test function from the specified file. rg --context 50 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
Length of output: 4238

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

The use of tor.clone() in announce_node_address is unnecessary since SocketAddress::OnionV2 implements the Copy trait. This means the tor variable can be passed directly without cloning, which would be more efficient.
- announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor.clone());+ announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor);
Committable suggestion
‼️IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
Suggested change
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor.clone());
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor);

Could you point me to lines of code where it implements the Copy trait?

@jkczyz, the output from the search does not directly show the Copy trait implementation for the SocketAddress enum. The snippet provided includes the definition of SocketAddress but does not include any derive attributes that might indicate the implementation of the Copy trait. It's possible that the relevant part of the code was not included in the output snippet. Without direct evidence from the provided output, I cannot confirm the Copy trait implementation for SocketAddress::OnionV2. My previous statement regarding the unnecessary use of .clone() may have been incorrect without this confirmation.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the definition of `SocketAddress` and check if it implements the `Copy` trait. rg "enum SocketAddress" -A 10
Length of output: 1118

tnull · 2024-03-07T11:01:54Z

I think choosing the right introduction points in order to optimize for a specific metric such as reliability is very related to finding optimal autopilot/attachment strategies. Using the node degree as a proxy metric for reliability seems like a solid first step, especially if we're talking about payment reliability.
A few more thoughts though: Further down the road we could also entertain a few other metrics that could make sense, for example optimizing for betweenness centrality or choosing introduction points according to k-Center optimization. (Some of our simulation results in this paper might be of interest here, see for example Fig. 1). Also, we could account for node uptime (regularity of node announcements?) or latency metrics, that might become available as part of the attributable errors proposal?
Doing anything more than just scoring by node degree might of course require us to pre-calculate and store more per-node metrics, so would probably only make sense if we'd ever come around to introduce a node score, possibly as part of #63?

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

Tip
Codebase Verification
The verification process did not find evidence of tests covering the scenario where no paths are found despite the recipient being announced, supporting the suggestion to add targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths. It's important to ensure comprehensive test coverage for this specific case to maintain robustness in error handling and fallback mechanisms.
Analysis chain
The logic to map peers to BlindedPath and take only up to MAX_PATHS paths is correctly implemented. However, it's important to ensure that the error handling when no paths are found (especially when the recipient is announced) is thoroughly tested to avoid scenarios where a one-hop path could have been used but wasn't due to an oversight.
Scripts Executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# It's recommended to add tests specifically covering the scenario where no paths are found# despite the recipient being announced, ensuring the fallback to a one-hop path works as expected.echo"Suggest adding targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths."
Length of output: 150
Script:
#!/bin/bash# First, find test files related to onion_message or messenger functionality fd 'test' --type f | grep -E 'onion_message|messenger|BlindedPath'# If relevant test files are found, search within those files for tests covering the specific scenario# Note: The actual search within files will be planned based on the output of the first command
Length of output: 114
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search within the identified test file for mentions of the scenario of interest rg -i 'no paths found|recipient announced|one-hop path|MAX_PATHS' lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
Length of output: 115

Is that scenario covered in creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path?

Given the information available and the results of the script execution, I couldn't find a test named creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path within the lightning/src/onion_message/ directory. It's possible that the test might not exist under that exact name, or it could be located in a different part of the codebase. If you have more details about the test's location or its exact name, that could help in locating it.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the test `creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path` within the codebase. rg 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/onion_message/
Length of output: 92

It is located in file lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs.

@jkczyz: The test creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path in lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs indeed covers the scenario of using a one-hop blinded path for offer payment. It verifies that an offer can be paid through such a path and checks the use of ephemeral public keys instead of exposing the node's public key, with the node's public key still being used as the introduction node of the blinded path. This test ensures that the functionality for creating and paying for offers using a one-hop blinded path is working as expected.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Extract the content of the test function from the specified file. rg --context 50 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
Length of output: 4238

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

The use of tor.clone() in announce_node_address is unnecessary since SocketAddress::OnionV2 implements the Copy trait. This means the tor variable can be passed directly without cloning, which would be more efficient.
- announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor.clone());+ announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor);
Committable suggestion
‼️IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
Suggested change
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor.clone());
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor);

Could you point me to lines of code where it implements the Copy trait?

@jkczyz, the output from the search does not directly show the Copy trait implementation for the SocketAddress enum. The snippet provided includes the definition of SocketAddress but does not include any derive attributes that might indicate the implementation of the Copy trait. It's possible that the relevant part of the code was not included in the output snippet. Without direct evidence from the provided output, I cannot confirm the Copy trait implementation for SocketAddress::OnionV2. My previous statement regarding the unnecessary use of .clone() may have been incorrect without this confirmation.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the definition of `SocketAddress` and check if it implements the `Copy` trait. rg "enum SocketAddress" -A 10
Length of output: 1118

tnull · 2024-03-07T11:01:54Z

I think choosing the right introduction points in order to optimize for a specific metric such as reliability is very related to finding optimal autopilot/attachment strategies. Using the node degree as a proxy metric for reliability seems like a solid first step, especially if we're talking about payment reliability.
A few more thoughts though: Further down the road we could also entertain a few other metrics that could make sense, for example optimizing for betweenness centrality or choosing introduction points according to k-Center optimization. (Some of our simulation results in this paper might be of interest here, see for example Fig. 1). Also, we could account for node uptime (regularity of node announcements?) or latency metrics, that might become available as part of the attributable errors proposal?
Doing anything more than just scoring by node degree might of course require us to pre-calculate and store more per-node metrics, so would probably only make sense if we'd ever come around to introduce a node score, possibly as part of #63?

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

Tip
Codebase Verification
The verification process did not find evidence of tests covering the scenario where no paths are found despite the recipient being announced, supporting the suggestion to add targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths. It's important to ensure comprehensive test coverage for this specific case to maintain robustness in error handling and fallback mechanisms.
Analysis chain
The logic to map peers to BlindedPath and take only up to MAX_PATHS paths is correctly implemented. However, it's important to ensure that the error handling when no paths are found (especially when the recipient is announced) is thoroughly tested to avoid scenarios where a one-hop path could have been used but wasn't due to an oversight.
Scripts Executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# It's recommended to add tests specifically covering the scenario where no paths are found# despite the recipient being announced, ensuring the fallback to a one-hop path works as expected.echo"Suggest adding targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths."
Length of output: 150
Script:
#!/bin/bash# First, find test files related to onion_message or messenger functionality fd 'test' --type f | grep -E 'onion_message|messenger|BlindedPath'# If relevant test files are found, search within those files for tests covering the specific scenario# Note: The actual search within files will be planned based on the output of the first command
Length of output: 114
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search within the identified test file for mentions of the scenario of interest rg -i 'no paths found|recipient announced|one-hop path|MAX_PATHS' lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
Length of output: 115

Is that scenario covered in creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path?

Given the information available and the results of the script execution, I couldn't find a test named creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path within the lightning/src/onion_message/ directory. It's possible that the test might not exist under that exact name, or it could be located in a different part of the codebase. If you have more details about the test's location or its exact name, that could help in locating it.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the test `creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path` within the codebase. rg 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/onion_message/
Length of output: 92

It is located in file lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs.

@jkczyz: The test creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path in lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs indeed covers the scenario of using a one-hop blinded path for offer payment. It verifies that an offer can be paid through such a path and checks the use of ephemeral public keys instead of exposing the node's public key, with the node's public key still being used as the introduction node of the blinded path. This test ensures that the functionality for creating and paying for offers using a one-hop blinded path is working as expected.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Extract the content of the test function from the specified file. rg --context 50 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
Length of output: 4238

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

The use of tor.clone() in announce_node_address is unnecessary since SocketAddress::OnionV2 implements the Copy trait. This means the tor variable can be passed directly without cloning, which would be more efficient.
- announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor.clone());+ announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor);
Committable suggestion
‼️IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
Suggested change
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor.clone());
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor);

Could you point me to lines of code where it implements the Copy trait?

@jkczyz, the output from the search does not directly show the Copy trait implementation for the SocketAddress enum. The snippet provided includes the definition of SocketAddress but does not include any derive attributes that might indicate the implementation of the Copy trait. It's possible that the relevant part of the code was not included in the output snippet. Without direct evidence from the provided output, I cannot confirm the Copy trait implementation for SocketAddress::OnionV2. My previous statement regarding the unnecessary use of .clone() may have been incorrect without this confirmation.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the definition of `SocketAddress` and check if it implements the `Copy` trait. rg "enum SocketAddress" -A 10
Length of output: 1118

tnull · 2024-03-07T11:01:54Z

I think choosing the right introduction points in order to optimize for a specific metric such as reliability is very related to finding optimal autopilot/attachment strategies. Using the node degree as a proxy metric for reliability seems like a solid first step, especially if we're talking about payment reliability.
A few more thoughts though: Further down the road we could also entertain a few other metrics that could make sense, for example optimizing for betweenness centrality or choosing introduction points according to k-Center optimization. (Some of our simulation results in this paper might be of interest here, see for example Fig. 1). Also, we could account for node uptime (regularity of node announcements?) or latency metrics, that might become available as part of the attributable errors proposal?
Doing anything more than just scoring by node degree might of course require us to pre-calculate and store more per-node metrics, so would probably only make sense if we'd ever come around to introduce a node score, possibly as part of #63?

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

Tip
Codebase Verification
The verification process did not find evidence of tests covering the scenario where no paths are found despite the recipient being announced, supporting the suggestion to add targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths. It's important to ensure comprehensive test coverage for this specific case to maintain robustness in error handling and fallback mechanisms.
Analysis chain
The logic to map peers to BlindedPath and take only up to MAX_PATHS paths is correctly implemented. However, it's important to ensure that the error handling when no paths are found (especially when the recipient is announced) is thoroughly tested to avoid scenarios where a one-hop path could have been used but wasn't due to an oversight.
Scripts Executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# It's recommended to add tests specifically covering the scenario where no paths are found# despite the recipient being announced, ensuring the fallback to a one-hop path works as expected.echo"Suggest adding targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths."
Length of output: 150
Script:
#!/bin/bash# First, find test files related to onion_message or messenger functionality fd 'test' --type f | grep -E 'onion_message|messenger|BlindedPath'# If relevant test files are found, search within those files for tests covering the specific scenario# Note: The actual search within files will be planned based on the output of the first command
Length of output: 114
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search within the identified test file for mentions of the scenario of interest rg -i 'no paths found|recipient announced|one-hop path|MAX_PATHS' lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
Length of output: 115

Is that scenario covered in creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path?

Given the information available and the results of the script execution, I couldn't find a test named creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path within the lightning/src/onion_message/ directory. It's possible that the test might not exist under that exact name, or it could be located in a different part of the codebase. If you have more details about the test's location or its exact name, that could help in locating it.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the test `creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path` within the codebase. rg 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/onion_message/
Length of output: 92

It is located in file lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs.

@jkczyz: The test creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path in lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs indeed covers the scenario of using a one-hop blinded path for offer payment. It verifies that an offer can be paid through such a path and checks the use of ephemeral public keys instead of exposing the node's public key, with the node's public key still being used as the introduction node of the blinded path. This test ensures that the functionality for creating and paying for offers using a one-hop blinded path is working as expected.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Extract the content of the test function from the specified file. rg --context 50 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
Length of output: 4238

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

The use of tor.clone() in announce_node_address is unnecessary since SocketAddress::OnionV2 implements the Copy trait. This means the tor variable can be passed directly without cloning, which would be more efficient.
- announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor.clone());+ announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor);
Committable suggestion
‼️IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
Suggested change
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor.clone());
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor);

Could you point me to lines of code where it implements the Copy trait?

@jkczyz, the output from the search does not directly show the Copy trait implementation for the SocketAddress enum. The snippet provided includes the definition of SocketAddress but does not include any derive attributes that might indicate the implementation of the Copy trait. It's possible that the relevant part of the code was not included in the output snippet. Without direct evidence from the provided output, I cannot confirm the Copy trait implementation for SocketAddress::OnionV2. My previous statement regarding the unnecessary use of .clone() may have been incorrect without this confirmation.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the definition of `SocketAddress` and check if it implements the `Copy` trait. rg "enum SocketAddress" -A 10
Length of output: 1118

tnull · 2024-03-07T11:01:54Z

I think choosing the right introduction points in order to optimize for a specific metric such as reliability is very related to finding optimal autopilot/attachment strategies. Using the node degree as a proxy metric for reliability seems like a solid first step, especially if we're talking about payment reliability.
A few more thoughts though: Further down the road we could also entertain a few other metrics that could make sense, for example optimizing for betweenness centrality or choosing introduction points according to k-Center optimization. (Some of our simulation results in this paper might be of interest here, see for example Fig. 1). Also, we could account for node uptime (regularity of node announcements?) or latency metrics, that might become available as part of the attributable errors proposal?
Doing anything more than just scoring by node degree might of course require us to pre-calculate and store more per-node metrics, so would probably only make sense if we'd ever come around to introduce a node score, possibly as part of #63?

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

Tip
Codebase Verification
The verification process did not find evidence of tests covering the scenario where no paths are found despite the recipient being announced, supporting the suggestion to add targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths. It's important to ensure comprehensive test coverage for this specific case to maintain robustness in error handling and fallback mechanisms.
Analysis chain
The logic to map peers to BlindedPath and take only up to MAX_PATHS paths is correctly implemented. However, it's important to ensure that the error handling when no paths are found (especially when the recipient is announced) is thoroughly tested to avoid scenarios where a one-hop path could have been used but wasn't due to an oversight.
Scripts Executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# It's recommended to add tests specifically covering the scenario where no paths are found# despite the recipient being announced, ensuring the fallback to a one-hop path works as expected.echo"Suggest adding targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths."
Length of output: 150
Script:
#!/bin/bash# First, find test files related to onion_message or messenger functionality fd 'test' --type f | grep -E 'onion_message|messenger|BlindedPath'# If relevant test files are found, search within those files for tests covering the specific scenario# Note: The actual search within files will be planned based on the output of the first command
Length of output: 114
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search within the identified test file for mentions of the scenario of interest rg -i 'no paths found|recipient announced|one-hop path|MAX_PATHS' lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
Length of output: 115

Is that scenario covered in creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path?

Given the information available and the results of the script execution, I couldn't find a test named creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path within the lightning/src/onion_message/ directory. It's possible that the test might not exist under that exact name, or it could be located in a different part of the codebase. If you have more details about the test's location or its exact name, that could help in locating it.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the test `creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path` within the codebase. rg 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/onion_message/
Length of output: 92

It is located in file lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs.

@jkczyz: The test creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path in lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs indeed covers the scenario of using a one-hop blinded path for offer payment. It verifies that an offer can be paid through such a path and checks the use of ephemeral public keys instead of exposing the node's public key, with the node's public key still being used as the introduction node of the blinded path. This test ensures that the functionality for creating and paying for offers using a one-hop blinded path is working as expected.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Extract the content of the test function from the specified file. rg --context 50 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
Length of output: 4238

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

The use of tor.clone() in announce_node_address is unnecessary since SocketAddress::OnionV2 implements the Copy trait. This means the tor variable can be passed directly without cloning, which would be more efficient.
- announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor.clone());+ announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor);
Committable suggestion
‼️IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
Suggested change
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor.clone());
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor);

Could you point me to lines of code where it implements the Copy trait?

@jkczyz, the output from the search does not directly show the Copy trait implementation for the SocketAddress enum. The snippet provided includes the definition of SocketAddress but does not include any derive attributes that might indicate the implementation of the Copy trait. It's possible that the relevant part of the code was not included in the output snippet. Without direct evidence from the provided output, I cannot confirm the Copy trait implementation for SocketAddress::OnionV2. My previous statement regarding the unnecessary use of .clone() may have been incorrect without this confirmation.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the definition of `SocketAddress` and check if it implements the `Copy` trait. rg "enum SocketAddress" -A 10
Length of output: 1118

tnull · 2024-03-07T11:01:54Z

I think choosing the right introduction points in order to optimize for a specific metric such as reliability is very related to finding optimal autopilot/attachment strategies. Using the node degree as a proxy metric for reliability seems like a solid first step, especially if we're talking about payment reliability.
A few more thoughts though: Further down the road we could also entertain a few other metrics that could make sense, for example optimizing for betweenness centrality or choosing introduction points according to k-Center optimization. (Some of our simulation results in this paper might be of interest here, see for example Fig. 1). Also, we could account for node uptime (regularity of node announcements?) or latency metrics, that might become available as part of the attributable errors proposal?
Doing anything more than just scoring by node degree might of course require us to pre-calculate and store more per-node metrics, so would probably only make sense if we'd ever come around to introduce a node score, possibly as part of #63?

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

Tip
Codebase Verification
The verification process did not find evidence of tests covering the scenario where no paths are found despite the recipient being announced, supporting the suggestion to add targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths. It's important to ensure comprehensive test coverage for this specific case to maintain robustness in error handling and fallback mechanisms.
Analysis chain
The logic to map peers to BlindedPath and take only up to MAX_PATHS paths is correctly implemented. However, it's important to ensure that the error handling when no paths are found (especially when the recipient is announced) is thoroughly tested to avoid scenarios where a one-hop path could have been used but wasn't due to an oversight.
Scripts Executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# It's recommended to add tests specifically covering the scenario where no paths are found# despite the recipient being announced, ensuring the fallback to a one-hop path works as expected.echo"Suggest adding targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths."
Length of output: 150
Script:
#!/bin/bash# First, find test files related to onion_message or messenger functionality fd 'test' --type f | grep -E 'onion_message|messenger|BlindedPath'# If relevant test files are found, search within those files for tests covering the specific scenario# Note: The actual search within files will be planned based on the output of the first command
Length of output: 114
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search within the identified test file for mentions of the scenario of interest rg -i 'no paths found|recipient announced|one-hop path|MAX_PATHS' lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
Length of output: 115

Is that scenario covered in creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path?

Given the information available and the results of the script execution, I couldn't find a test named creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path within the lightning/src/onion_message/ directory. It's possible that the test might not exist under that exact name, or it could be located in a different part of the codebase. If you have more details about the test's location or its exact name, that could help in locating it.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the test `creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path` within the codebase. rg 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/onion_message/
Length of output: 92

It is located in file lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs.

@jkczyz: The test creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path in lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs indeed covers the scenario of using a one-hop blinded path for offer payment. It verifies that an offer can be paid through such a path and checks the use of ephemeral public keys instead of exposing the node's public key, with the node's public key still being used as the introduction node of the blinded path. This test ensures that the functionality for creating and paying for offers using a one-hop blinded path is working as expected.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Extract the content of the test function from the specified file. rg --context 50 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
Length of output: 4238

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

The use of tor.clone() in announce_node_address is unnecessary since SocketAddress::OnionV2 implements the Copy trait. This means the tor variable can be passed directly without cloning, which would be more efficient.
- announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor.clone());+ announce_node_address(charlie, &[alice, bob, david, &nodes[4], &nodes[5]], tor);
Committable suggestion
‼️IMPORTANT
Carefully review the code before committing. Ensure that it accurately replaces the highlighted code, contains no missing lines, and has no issues with indentation.
Suggested change
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor.clone());
announce_node_address(charlie,&[alice, bob, david,&nodes[4],&nodes[5]], tor);

Could you point me to lines of code where it implements the Copy trait?

@jkczyz, the output from the search does not directly show the Copy trait implementation for the SocketAddress enum. The snippet provided includes the definition of SocketAddress but does not include any derive attributes that might indicate the implementation of the Copy trait. It's possible that the relevant part of the code was not included in the output snippet. Without direct evidence from the provided output, I cannot confirm the Copy trait implementation for SocketAddress::OnionV2. My previous statement regarding the unnecessary use of .clone() may have been incorrect without this confirmation.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the definition of `SocketAddress` and check if it implements the `Copy` trait. rg "enum SocketAddress" -A 10
Length of output: 1118

tnull · 2024-03-07T11:01:54Z

I think choosing the right introduction points in order to optimize for a specific metric such as reliability is very related to finding optimal autopilot/attachment strategies. Using the node degree as a proxy metric for reliability seems like a solid first step, especially if we're talking about payment reliability.
A few more thoughts though: Further down the road we could also entertain a few other metrics that could make sense, for example optimizing for betweenness centrality or choosing introduction points according to k-Center optimization. (Some of our simulation results in this paper might be of interest here, see for example Fig. 1). Also, we could account for node uptime (regularity of node announcements?) or latency metrics, that might become available as part of the attributable errors proposal?
Doing anything more than just scoring by node degree might of course require us to pre-calculate and store more per-node metrics, so would probably only make sense if we'd ever come around to introduce a node score, possibly as part of #63?

coderabbitai · 2024-02-28T22:12:10Z

Tip
Codebase Verification
The verification process did not find evidence of tests covering the scenario where no paths are found despite the recipient being announced, supporting the suggestion to add targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths. It's important to ensure comprehensive test coverage for this specific case to maintain robustness in error handling and fallback mechanisms.
Analysis chain
The logic to map peers to BlindedPath and take only up to MAX_PATHS paths is correctly implemented. However, it's important to ensure that the error handling when no paths are found (especially when the recipient is announced) is thoroughly tested to avoid scenarios where a one-hop path could have been used but wasn't due to an oversight.
Scripts Executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# It's recommended to add tests specifically covering the scenario where no paths are found# despite the recipient being announced, ensuring the fallback to a one-hop path works as expected.echo"Suggest adding targeted tests for the fallback logic to one-hop paths."
Length of output: 150
Script:
#!/bin/bash# First, find test files related to onion_message or messenger functionality fd 'test' --type f | grep -E 'onion_message|messenger|BlindedPath'# If relevant test files are found, search within those files for tests covering the specific scenario# Note: The actual search within files will be planned based on the output of the first command
Length of output: 114
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search within the identified test file for mentions of the scenario of interest rg -i 'no paths found|recipient announced|one-hop path|MAX_PATHS' lightning/src/onion_message/functional_tests.rs
Length of output: 115

Is that scenario covered in creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path?

Given the information available and the results of the script execution, I couldn't find a test named creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path within the lightning/src/onion_message/ directory. It's possible that the test might not exist under that exact name, or it could be located in a different part of the codebase. If you have more details about the test's location or its exact name, that could help in locating it.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Search for the test `creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path` within the codebase. rg 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/onion_message/
Length of output: 92

It is located in file lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs.

@jkczyz: The test creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path in lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs indeed covers the scenario of using a one-hop blinded path for offer payment. It verifies that an offer can be paid through such a path and checks the use of ephemeral public keys instead of exposing the node's public key, with the node's public key still being used as the introduction node of the blinded path. This test ensures that the functionality for creating and paying for offers using a one-hop blinded path is working as expected.
Analysis chain
Scripts executed
The following scripts were executed for the analysis:
Script:
#!/bin/bash# Extract the content of the test function from the specified file. rg --context 50 'fn creates_and_pays_for_offer_using_one_hop_blinded_path' lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
Length of output: 4238

-Original file line number
+Diff line change
@@ Expand Up / @@ -358,27 +358,36 @@ where @@
  const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3;
  let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
+ let is_recipient_announced =
+ network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
  let mut peer_info = peers.iter()
  // Limit to peers with announced channels
  .filter_map(|pubkey|
  network_graph
  .node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey))
  .filter(|info| info.channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS)
- .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only()))
+ .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only(), info.channels.len()))
  )
+ // Exclude Tor-only nodes when the recipient is announced.
+ .filter(|(_, is_tor_only, _)| !(*is_tor_only && is_recipient_announced))
  .collect::<Vec<_>>();
- peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only), (_, b_tor_only)| a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only));
+ // Prefer using non-Tor nodes with the most channels as the introduction node.
+ peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only, a_channels), (_, b_tor_only, b_channels)| {
+ a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only).then(a_channels.cmp(b_channels).reverse())
+ });
  let paths = peer_info.into_iter()
- .map(|(pubkey, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
+ .map(|(pubkey, _, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
  .map(|node_pks| BlindedPath::new_for_message(&node_pks, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx))
  .take(MAX_PATHS)
  .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>();
  match paths {
  Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths),
  _ => {
- if network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient)) {
+ if is_recipient_announced {
  BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx)
  .map(|path| vec![path])
  } else {
@@ Expand Down @@

-Original file line number
+Diff line change
@@ Expand Up / @@ -358,27 +358,36 @@ where @@
  const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3;
  let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
+ let is_recipient_announced =
+ network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
  let mut peer_info = peers.iter()
  // Limit to peers with announced channels
  .filter_map(|pubkey|
  network_graph
  .node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey))
  .filter(|info| info.channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS)
- .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only()))
+ .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only(), info.channels.len()))
  )
+ // Exclude Tor-only nodes when the recipient is announced.
+ .filter(|(_, is_tor_only, _)| !(*is_tor_only && is_recipient_announced))
  .collect::<Vec<_>>();
- peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only), (_, b_tor_only)| a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only));
+ // Prefer using non-Tor nodes with the most channels as the introduction node.
+ peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only, a_channels), (_, b_tor_only, b_channels)| {
+ a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only).then(a_channels.cmp(b_channels).reverse())
+ });
  let paths = peer_info.into_iter()
- .map(|(pubkey, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
+ .map(|(pubkey, _, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
  .map(|node_pks| BlindedPath::new_for_message(&node_pks, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx))
  .take(MAX_PATHS)
  .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>();
  match paths {
  Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths),
  _ => {
- if network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient)) {
+ if is_recipient_announced {
  BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx)
  .map(|path| vec![path])
  } else {
@@ Expand Down @@

-Original file line number
+Diff line change
@@ Expand Up / @@ -358,27 +358,36 @@ where @@
  const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3;
  let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
+ let is_recipient_announced =
+ network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
  let mut peer_info = peers.iter()
  // Limit to peers with announced channels
  .filter_map(|pubkey|
  network_graph
  .node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey))
  .filter(|info| info.channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS)
- .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only()))
+ .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only(), info.channels.len()))
  )
+ // Exclude Tor-only nodes when the recipient is announced.
+ .filter(|(_, is_tor_only, _)| !(*is_tor_only && is_recipient_announced))
  .collect::<Vec<_>>();
- peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only), (_, b_tor_only)| a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only));
+ // Prefer using non-Tor nodes with the most channels as the introduction node.
+ peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only, a_channels), (_, b_tor_only, b_channels)| {
+ a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only).then(a_channels.cmp(b_channels).reverse())
+ });
  let paths = peer_info.into_iter()
- .map(|(pubkey, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
+ .map(|(pubkey, _, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
  .map(|node_pks| BlindedPath::new_for_message(&node_pks, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx))
  .take(MAX_PATHS)
  .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>();
  match paths {
  Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths),
  _ => {
- if network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient)) {
+ if is_recipient_announced {
  BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx)
  .map(|path| vec![path])
  } else {
@@ Expand Down @@

-Original file line number
+Diff line change
@@ Expand Up / @@ -358,27 +358,36 @@ where @@
  const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3;
  let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
+ let is_recipient_announced =
+ network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
  let mut peer_info = peers.iter()
  // Limit to peers with announced channels
  .filter_map(|pubkey|
  network_graph
  .node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey))
  .filter(|info| info.channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS)
- .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only()))
+ .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only(), info.channels.len()))
  )
+ // Exclude Tor-only nodes when the recipient is announced.
+ .filter(|(_, is_tor_only, _)| !(*is_tor_only && is_recipient_announced))
  .collect::<Vec<_>>();
- peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only), (_, b_tor_only)| a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only));
+ // Prefer using non-Tor nodes with the most channels as the introduction node.
+ peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only, a_channels), (_, b_tor_only, b_channels)| {
+ a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only).then(a_channels.cmp(b_channels).reverse())
+ });
  let paths = peer_info.into_iter()
- .map(|(pubkey, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
+ .map(|(pubkey, _, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
  .map(|node_pks| BlindedPath::new_for_message(&node_pks, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx))
  .take(MAX_PATHS)
  .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>();
  match paths {
  Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths),
  _ => {
- if network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient)) {
+ if is_recipient_announced {
  BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx)
  .map(|path| vec![path])
  } else {
@@ Expand Down @@

-Original file line number
+Diff line change
@@ Expand Up / @@ -358,27 +358,36 @@ where @@
  const MIN_PEER_CHANNELS: usize = 3;
  let network_graph = self.network_graph.deref().read_only();
+ let is_recipient_announced =
+ network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient));
  let mut peer_info = peers.iter()
  // Limit to peers with announced channels
  .filter_map(|pubkey|
  network_graph
  .node(&NodeId::from_pubkey(pubkey))
  .filter(|info| info.channels.len() >= MIN_PEER_CHANNELS)
- .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only()))
+ .map(|info| (*pubkey, info.is_tor_only(), info.channels.len()))
  )
+ // Exclude Tor-only nodes when the recipient is announced.
+ .filter(|(_, is_tor_only, _)| !(*is_tor_only && is_recipient_announced))
  .collect::<Vec<_>>();
- peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only), (_, b_tor_only)| a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only));
+ // Prefer using non-Tor nodes with the most channels as the introduction node.
+ peer_info.sort_unstable_by(|(_, a_tor_only, a_channels), (_, b_tor_only, b_channels)| {
+ a_tor_only.cmp(b_tor_only).then(a_channels.cmp(b_channels).reverse())
+ });
  let paths = peer_info.into_iter()
- .map(|(pubkey, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
+ .map(|(pubkey, _, _)| vec![pubkey, recipient])
  .map(|node_pks| BlindedPath::new_for_message(&node_pks, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx))
  .take(MAX_PATHS)
  .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>();
  match paths {
  Ok(paths) if !paths.is_empty() => Ok(paths),
  _ => {
- if network_graph.nodes().contains_key(&NodeId::from_pubkey(&recipient)) {
+ if is_recipient_announced {
  BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(recipient, &*self.entropy_source, secp_ctx)
  .map(|path| vec![path])
  } else {
@@ Expand Down @@

Uh oh!

Order blinded paths by reliability criteria#2912

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Order blinded paths by reliability criteria #2912

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