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Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. - #445

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TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
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Feb 10, 2020
Merged

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $.#445
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
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TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix

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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.

Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment on lines +6991 to +6993
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
&SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 3)).unwrap());
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 1);

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Could what's going on with (1 << 48) - 3) and (1 << 48) - 3) be made more explicit somehow? Not sure of the best way to do it. Could be as simple as well named variables... or better yet an abstraction that hides this math but makes it clear that the commitment number was advanced one too many times.

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A bit better? I copied the INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER const here to make the math clear.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from 51f96c4 to ecfe862CompareFebruary 6, 2020 00:56
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from ecfe862 to 1443509CompareFebruary 8, 2020 01:03
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 88b7dcd into lightningdevkit:masterFeb 10, 2020
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Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. by TheBlueMatt · Pull Request #445 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. - #445

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix
Feb 10, 2020
Merged

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $.#445
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix

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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.

Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment on lines +6991 to +6993
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
&SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 3)).unwrap());
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 1);

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Could what's going on with (1 << 48) - 3) and (1 << 48) - 3) be made more explicit somehow? Not sure of the best way to do it. Could be as simple as well named variables... or better yet an abstraction that hides this math but makes it clear that the commitment number was advanced one too many times.

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A bit better? I copied the INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER const here to make the math clear.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from 51f96c4 to ecfe862CompareFebruary 6, 2020 00:56
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from ecfe862 to 1443509CompareFebruary 8, 2020 01:03
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 88b7dcd into lightningdevkit:masterFeb 10, 2020
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Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. - #445

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix
Feb 10, 2020
Merged

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $.#445
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix

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@TheBlueMatt

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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.

Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment on lines +6991 to +6993
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
&SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 3)).unwrap());
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 1);

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Could what's going on with (1 << 48) - 3) and (1 << 48) - 3) be made more explicit somehow? Not sure of the best way to do it. Could be as simple as well named variables... or better yet an abstraction that hides this math but makes it clear that the commitment number was advanced one too many times.

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A bit better? I copied the INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER const here to make the math clear.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from 51f96c4 to ecfe862CompareFebruary 6, 2020 00:56
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from ecfe862 to 1443509CompareFebruary 8, 2020 01:03
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 88b7dcd into lightningdevkit:masterFeb 10, 2020
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@TheBlueMatt@jkczyz
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Skip to content

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. - #445

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix
Feb 10, 2020
Merged

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $.#445
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix

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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.

Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment on lines +6991 to +6993
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
&SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 3)).unwrap());
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 1);

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Could what's going on with (1 << 48) - 3) and (1 << 48) - 3) be made more explicit somehow? Not sure of the best way to do it. Could be as simple as well named variables... or better yet an abstraction that hides this math but makes it clear that the commitment number was advanced one too many times.

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A bit better? I copied the INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER const here to make the math clear.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from 51f96c4 to ecfe862CompareFebruary 6, 2020 00:56
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from ecfe862 to 1443509CompareFebruary 8, 2020 01:03
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 88b7dcd into lightningdevkit:masterFeb 10, 2020
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Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. - #445

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TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix
Feb 10, 2020
Merged

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $.#445
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix

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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.

Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment on lines +6991 to +6993
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
&SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 3)).unwrap());
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 1);

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Could what's going on with (1 << 48) - 3) and (1 << 48) - 3) be made more explicit somehow? Not sure of the best way to do it. Could be as simple as well named variables... or better yet an abstraction that hides this math but makes it clear that the commitment number was advanced one too many times.

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A bit better? I copied the INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER const here to make the math clear.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from 51f96c4 to ecfe862CompareFebruary 6, 2020 00:56
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from ecfe862 to 1443509CompareFebruary 8, 2020 01:03
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 88b7dcd into lightningdevkit:masterFeb 10, 2020
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Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. - #445

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix
Feb 10, 2020
Merged

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $.#445
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix

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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.

Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment on lines +6991 to +6993
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
&SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 3)).unwrap());
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 1);

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Could what's going on with (1 << 48) - 3) and (1 << 48) - 3) be made more explicit somehow? Not sure of the best way to do it. Could be as simple as well named variables... or better yet an abstraction that hides this math but makes it clear that the commitment number was advanced one too many times.

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A bit better? I copied the INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER const here to make the math clear.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from 51f96c4 to ecfe862CompareFebruary 6, 2020 00:56
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from ecfe862 to 1443509CompareFebruary 8, 2020 01:03
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 88b7dcd into lightningdevkit:masterFeb 10, 2020
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@TheBlueMatt@jkczyz
, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { // Remove or un-stick sticky/fixed headers that block content (function() { function unstick() { document.querySelectorAll('header, nav, [role="banner"], .header, .navbar, .sticky, .fixed-top, [style*="position: fixed"], [style*="position:sticky"]').forEach(function(el) { if (el.style.position === 'fixed' || el.style.position === 'sticky' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'fixed' || getComputedStyle(el).position === 'sticky') { el.style.position = 'static'; el.style.top = 'auto'; el.style.zIndex = 'auto'; } }); } unstick(); var observer = new MutationObserver(unstick); observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true, attributes: true, attributeFilter: ['style', 'class'] }); })(); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Kill Sticky Headers]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "*"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + ".*" + ' Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. by TheBlueMatt · Pull Request #445 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. - #445

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TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix
Feb 10, 2020
Merged

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $.#445
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix

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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.

Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment on lines +6991 to +6993
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
&SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 3)).unwrap());
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 1);

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Could what's going on with (1 << 48) - 3) and (1 << 48) - 3) be made more explicit somehow? Not sure of the best way to do it. Could be as simple as well named variables... or better yet an abstraction that hides this math but makes it clear that the commitment number was advanced one too many times.

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A bit better? I copied the INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER const here to make the math clear.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from 51f96c4 to ecfe862CompareFebruary 6, 2020 00:56
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from ecfe862 to 1443509CompareFebruary 8, 2020 01:03
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 88b7dcd into lightningdevkit:masterFeb 10, 2020
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@TheBlueMatt@jkczyz
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Skip to content

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $. - #445

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix
Feb 10, 2020
Merged

Fix EnforcingChannelKeys panic when our counterparty burns their $.#445
TheBlueMatt merged 2 commits into
lightningdevkit:masterfrom
TheBlueMatt:2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix

Conversation

@TheBlueMatt

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If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.

Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/functional_tests.rs Outdated
Comment on lines +6991 to +6993
let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(),
&SecretKey::from_slice(&chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 3)).unwrap());
let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&commitment_seed, (1 << 48) - 1);

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Could what's going on with (1 << 48) - 3) and (1 << 48) - 3) be made more explicit somehow? Not sure of the best way to do it. Could be as simple as well named variables... or better yet an abstraction that hides this math but makes it clear that the commitment number was advanced one too many times.

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A bit better? I copied the INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER const here to make the math clear.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from 51f96c4 to ecfe862CompareFebruary 6, 2020 00:56
Comment threadlightning/src/ln/channel.rs Outdated
If our counterparty burns their funds by revoking their current
commitment transaction before we've sent them a new one, we'll step
forward the remote commitment number. This would be otherwise fine
(and may even encourage them to broadcast their revoked state(s) on
chain), except that our new EnforcingChannelKeys expects us to not
jump forward in time. Since it isn't too important that we punish
our counterparty in such a corner-case, we opt to just close the
channel in such a case and move on.
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMattforce-pushed the 2020-01-fuzz-enforcer-fix branch from ecfe862 to 1443509CompareFebruary 8, 2020 01:03
@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 88b7dcd into lightningdevkit:masterFeb 10, 2020
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2 participants

@TheBlueMatt@jkczyz