Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated - #4684

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wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated
Jun 16, 2026
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Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated#4684
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
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The chanmon_consistency fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where signer_pending_revoke_and_ack and monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack could both describe the same owed revoke_and_ack.

The channel first received a commitment_signed whose monitor update completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret, leaving signer_pending_revoke_and_ack set. Later, receiving the peer revoke_and_ack freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor update. While that monitor update was still blocked, channel_reestablish saw the peer one state behind and recorded monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack, plus the corresponding monitor-pending commitment_signed, so the messages could be replayed once monitor updating was restored.

If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released, signer_maybe_unblocked generated and sent the RAA using signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. The monitor-pending flag was not cleared at that point, so monitor_updating_restored later generated the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and force-closed.

Fix this by clearing monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA, alongside signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. All resend paths regenerate RAAs through this helper, so successful generation through either pending path satisfies the other pending record. If generation fails, pending signer state is still left set and monitor-pending state remains available for monitor restoration to retry.

This failure was discovered in https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/actions/runs/26905971318/job/79370860747.

@wpaulinowpaulino added this to the 0.3 milestone Jun 11, 2026
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No new issues found.

The production change (lightning/src/ln/channel.rs:10262-10268) clears monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack in signer_maybe_unblocked when the signer-pending path successfully regenerates an RAA. On re-verification:

  • The clear is placed after the resend-order reblocking logic (10250-10261), so an RAA that gets nulled by the CommitmentFirst reorder correctly leaves monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack set for later retry. This placement is correct.
  • The reverse duplicate (monitor path then signer path) is already prevented by get_last_revoke_and_ack clearing signer_pending_revoke_and_ack on success (line 10352).
  • monitor_updating_restored clears monitor_pending unconditionally (10047), so the held update no longer regenerates the RAA after the signer path sent it.

Minor non-blocking observation (not a code bug): the PR description and inline comment frame the fix as happening "whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA," but the change is actually in signer_maybe_unblocked, not the helper. The implementation is nonetheless functionally complete and the chosen location is in fact safer than placing it in the helper would be.

The symmetric commitment_signed resend path remains untreated, as noted in my prior review — still out of scope for the bug this PR targets.

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

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I'm a bit confused here, why is it safe to always send an RAA (via get_last_revoke_and_ack) based on only signer_pending_... or monitor_pending_...? eg if we reconnect and find that we owe a commitment_signed that is blocked on the signer but have a blocked revoke_and_ack on a monitor update, we'll set signer_pending_raa and then send it if the signer completes even if the monitor is pending.

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The `chanmon_consistency` fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where
`signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` and `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`
could both describe the same owed `revoke_and_ack`.
The channel first received a `commitment_signed` whose monitor update
completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret,
leaving `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` set. Later, receiving the peer
`revoke_and_ack` freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor
update. While that monitor update was still blocked,
`channel_reestablish` saw the peer one state behind and recorded
`monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`, plus the corresponding monitor-pending
`commitment_signed`, so the messages could be replayed once monitor
updating was restored.
If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released,
`signer_maybe_unblocked` generated and sent the already monitor-safe RAA
using `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack`. The monitor-pending flag was not
cleared at that point, so `monitor_updating_restored` later generated
the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already
advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the
duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and
force-closed.
Fix this by clearing `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack` in the
signer-resume path only once a signer-pending RAA is actually being
returned.
@wpaulino
wpaulinoforce-pushed the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch from 38f6df2 to 27223fdCompareJune 15, 2026 17:29
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wpaulino commented Jun 15, 2026

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

I think we can, though I do wonder why this went uncaught for so long if it actually was an issue in those releases as well. Something about our current fuzz harness made this much easier to find.

EDIT: It's reachable in the fuzzer now because there's a path to reload with a stale manager.

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This is a trivial fix.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 55fb60b into lightningdevkit:mainJun 16, 2026
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@wpaulino
wpaulino deleted the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch June 16, 2026 16:36
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Backported in #4706

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Backported to 0.1 in #4710.

TheBlueMatt added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2026
v0.1.10 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Loupe de Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* Async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence operations which complete, but are
not marked as complete in a persisted `ChannelManager` prior to restart,
followed immediately by a block connection and then another restart could
result in some channel operations hanging leading for force-closures (#4377).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (#4590).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (#4684).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (#4651).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (#4707).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (#4595).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (#4537, #4618).
Security
========
0.1.10 fixes a sanitization issue and several denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. This method is called from `payment_parameters_from_invoice` and
`payment_parameters_from_variable_amount_invoice` (#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (#4716).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (#4718).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (#4593, #4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
TheBlueMatt added a commit to TheBlueMatt/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2026
v0.2.3 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Through the Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (lightningdevkit#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (lightningdevkit#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* `Features::supports_zero_conf` no longer clears the `ZeroConf` features and
`Features::requires_zero_conf` now correctly reports required, rather than
supported, status (lightningdevkit#4517).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (lightningdevkit#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (lightningdevkit#4590).
* LSPS1, LSPS2, and LSPS5 persistence will no longer get stuck and refuse to
persist again after a single failure from the KVStore (lightningdevkit#4597, lightningdevkit#4282).
* Dropping the future returned by
`OutputSweeper::regenerate_and_broadcast_spend_if_necessary` no longer
results in future calls to the same method being spuriously ignored (lightningdevkit#4598).
* Used async-receive offers are no longer refreshed on every timer tick once
their refresh time is reached (lightningdevkit#4672).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (lightningdevkit#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (lightningdevkit#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (lightningdevkit#4684).
* If we had exactly zero balance in a zero-fee-commitment channel, the
counterparty was able to splice all of their balance out, violating the
reserve requirements they'd otherwise be forced to keep (lightningdevkit#4580).
* Providing an `Event::HTLCIntercepted` to the `LSPS2ServiceHandler` twice no
longer results in spuriously opening a channel early (lightningdevkit#4656).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (lightningdevkit#4651).
* `AnchorDescriptor::previous_utxo` now provides the correct `script_pubkey`
for non-zero-commitment-fee anchor channels (lightningdevkit#4669).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (lightningdevkit#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (lightningdevkit#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (lightningdevkit#4707).
* `LSPS2ServiceHandler::channel_open_failed` now correctly fails intercepted
HTLCs rather than allowing them to fail just before expiry (lightningdevkit#4677).
* `StaticInvoice::is_offer_expired` was corrected to check offer, rather than
static invoice, expiry (lightningdevkit#4594).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (lightningdevkit#4595).
* Replay protection for LSPS5 signatures now detects replays which are only
different in the encoded signature's case (lightningdevkit#4701).
* When `lightning-liquidity` is configured in the background processor, there
is no longer a stream of `Persisting LiquidityManager...` log spam (lightningdevkit#4246).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (lightningdevkit#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (lightningdevkit#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (lightningdevkit#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (lightningdevkit#4537, lightningdevkit#4618, lightningdevkit#4026)
Security
========
0.2.3 fixes several underestimates of the anchor reserves required to ensure we
can reliably close channels, several denial-of-service vulnerabilities and a
sanitization issue.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. Note that this method is called from
`PaymentParameters::from_bolt11_invoice` (lightningdevkit#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (lightningdevkit#4716).
* Parsing an `LSPSDateTime` which is before 1970 no longer panics. This is
reachable when parsing messages from counterparties (lightningdevkit#4715).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (lightningdevkit#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (lightningdevkit#4718).
* When using the `anchor_channel_reserves` module to calculate reserves
required to pay for fees when closing anchor channels, zero-fee-commitment
channels were not considered. This could allow a counterparty to open many
channels, leaving us unable to properly force-close (lightningdevkit#4592).
* The `anchor_channel_reserves` module overestimated the value of `Utxo`s in
the wallet by ignoring the `TxIn` cost to spend them (lightningdevkit#4670).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (lightningdevkit#4593, lightningdevkit#4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (lightningdevkit#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (lightningdevkit#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (lightningdevkit#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
Conflicts resolved in:
* lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
* lightning/src/events/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
* lightning/src/ln/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
* lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
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Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated - #4684

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated
Jun 16, 2026
Merged

Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated#4684
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated

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The chanmon_consistency fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where signer_pending_revoke_and_ack and monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack could both describe the same owed revoke_and_ack.

The channel first received a commitment_signed whose monitor update completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret, leaving signer_pending_revoke_and_ack set. Later, receiving the peer revoke_and_ack freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor update. While that monitor update was still blocked, channel_reestablish saw the peer one state behind and recorded monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack, plus the corresponding monitor-pending commitment_signed, so the messages could be replayed once monitor updating was restored.

If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released, signer_maybe_unblocked generated and sent the RAA using signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. The monitor-pending flag was not cleared at that point, so monitor_updating_restored later generated the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and force-closed.

Fix this by clearing monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA, alongside signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. All resend paths regenerate RAAs through this helper, so successful generation through either pending path satisfies the other pending record. If generation fails, pending signer state is still left set and monitor-pending state remains available for monitor restoration to retry.

This failure was discovered in https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/actions/runs/26905971318/job/79370860747.

@wpaulinowpaulino added this to the 0.3 milestone Jun 11, 2026
@wpaulinowpaulino self-assigned this Jun 11, 2026
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I'll wait for their review and will help manage the review process.
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No new issues found.

The production change (lightning/src/ln/channel.rs:10262-10268) clears monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack in signer_maybe_unblocked when the signer-pending path successfully regenerates an RAA. On re-verification:

  • The clear is placed after the resend-order reblocking logic (10250-10261), so an RAA that gets nulled by the CommitmentFirst reorder correctly leaves monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack set for later retry. This placement is correct.
  • The reverse duplicate (monitor path then signer path) is already prevented by get_last_revoke_and_ack clearing signer_pending_revoke_and_ack on success (line 10352).
  • monitor_updating_restored clears monitor_pending unconditionally (10047), so the held update no longer regenerates the RAA after the signer path sent it.

Minor non-blocking observation (not a code bug): the PR description and inline comment frame the fix as happening "whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA," but the change is actually in signer_maybe_unblocked, not the helper. The implementation is nonetheless functionally complete and the chosen location is in fact safer than placing it in the helper would be.

The symmetric commitment_signed resend path remains untreated, as noted in my prior review — still out of scope for the bug this PR targets.

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

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I'm a bit confused here, why is it safe to always send an RAA (via get_last_revoke_and_ack) based on only signer_pending_... or monitor_pending_...? eg if we reconnect and find that we owe a commitment_signed that is blocked on the signer but have a blocked revoke_and_ack on a monitor update, we'll set signer_pending_raa and then send it if the signer completes even if the monitor is pending.

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The `chanmon_consistency` fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where
`signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` and `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`
could both describe the same owed `revoke_and_ack`.
The channel first received a `commitment_signed` whose monitor update
completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret,
leaving `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` set. Later, receiving the peer
`revoke_and_ack` freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor
update. While that monitor update was still blocked,
`channel_reestablish` saw the peer one state behind and recorded
`monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`, plus the corresponding monitor-pending
`commitment_signed`, so the messages could be replayed once monitor
updating was restored.
If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released,
`signer_maybe_unblocked` generated and sent the already monitor-safe RAA
using `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack`. The monitor-pending flag was not
cleared at that point, so `monitor_updating_restored` later generated
the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already
advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the
duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and
force-closed.
Fix this by clearing `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack` in the
signer-resume path only once a signer-pending RAA is actually being
returned.
@wpaulino
wpaulinoforce-pushed the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch from 38f6df2 to 27223fdCompareJune 15, 2026 17:29
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wpaulino commented Jun 15, 2026

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

I think we can, though I do wonder why this went uncaught for so long if it actually was an issue in those releases as well. Something about our current fuzz harness made this much easier to find.

EDIT: It's reachable in the fuzzer now because there's a path to reload with a stale manager.

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This is a trivial fix.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 55fb60b into lightningdevkit:mainJun 16, 2026
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@wpaulino
wpaulino deleted the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch June 16, 2026 16:36
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Backported in #4706

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Backported to 0.1 in #4710.

TheBlueMatt added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2026
v0.1.10 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Loupe de Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* Async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence operations which complete, but are
not marked as complete in a persisted `ChannelManager` prior to restart,
followed immediately by a block connection and then another restart could
result in some channel operations hanging leading for force-closures (#4377).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (#4590).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (#4684).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (#4651).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (#4707).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (#4595).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (#4537, #4618).
Security
========
0.1.10 fixes a sanitization issue and several denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. This method is called from `payment_parameters_from_invoice` and
`payment_parameters_from_variable_amount_invoice` (#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (#4716).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (#4718).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (#4593, #4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
TheBlueMatt added a commit to TheBlueMatt/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2026
v0.2.3 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Through the Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (lightningdevkit#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (lightningdevkit#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* `Features::supports_zero_conf` no longer clears the `ZeroConf` features and
`Features::requires_zero_conf` now correctly reports required, rather than
supported, status (lightningdevkit#4517).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (lightningdevkit#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (lightningdevkit#4590).
* LSPS1, LSPS2, and LSPS5 persistence will no longer get stuck and refuse to
persist again after a single failure from the KVStore (lightningdevkit#4597, lightningdevkit#4282).
* Dropping the future returned by
`OutputSweeper::regenerate_and_broadcast_spend_if_necessary` no longer
results in future calls to the same method being spuriously ignored (lightningdevkit#4598).
* Used async-receive offers are no longer refreshed on every timer tick once
their refresh time is reached (lightningdevkit#4672).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (lightningdevkit#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (lightningdevkit#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (lightningdevkit#4684).
* If we had exactly zero balance in a zero-fee-commitment channel, the
counterparty was able to splice all of their balance out, violating the
reserve requirements they'd otherwise be forced to keep (lightningdevkit#4580).
* Providing an `Event::HTLCIntercepted` to the `LSPS2ServiceHandler` twice no
longer results in spuriously opening a channel early (lightningdevkit#4656).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (lightningdevkit#4651).
* `AnchorDescriptor::previous_utxo` now provides the correct `script_pubkey`
for non-zero-commitment-fee anchor channels (lightningdevkit#4669).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (lightningdevkit#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (lightningdevkit#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (lightningdevkit#4707).
* `LSPS2ServiceHandler::channel_open_failed` now correctly fails intercepted
HTLCs rather than allowing them to fail just before expiry (lightningdevkit#4677).
* `StaticInvoice::is_offer_expired` was corrected to check offer, rather than
static invoice, expiry (lightningdevkit#4594).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (lightningdevkit#4595).
* Replay protection for LSPS5 signatures now detects replays which are only
different in the encoded signature's case (lightningdevkit#4701).
* When `lightning-liquidity` is configured in the background processor, there
is no longer a stream of `Persisting LiquidityManager...` log spam (lightningdevkit#4246).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (lightningdevkit#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (lightningdevkit#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (lightningdevkit#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (lightningdevkit#4537, lightningdevkit#4618, lightningdevkit#4026)
Security
========
0.2.3 fixes several underestimates of the anchor reserves required to ensure we
can reliably close channels, several denial-of-service vulnerabilities and a
sanitization issue.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. Note that this method is called from
`PaymentParameters::from_bolt11_invoice` (lightningdevkit#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (lightningdevkit#4716).
* Parsing an `LSPSDateTime` which is before 1970 no longer panics. This is
reachable when parsing messages from counterparties (lightningdevkit#4715).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (lightningdevkit#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (lightningdevkit#4718).
* When using the `anchor_channel_reserves` module to calculate reserves
required to pay for fees when closing anchor channels, zero-fee-commitment
channels were not considered. This could allow a counterparty to open many
channels, leaving us unable to properly force-close (lightningdevkit#4592).
* The `anchor_channel_reserves` module overestimated the value of `Utxo`s in
the wallet by ignoring the `TxIn` cost to spend them (lightningdevkit#4670).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (lightningdevkit#4593, lightningdevkit#4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (lightningdevkit#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (lightningdevkit#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (lightningdevkit#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
Conflicts resolved in:
* lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
* lightning/src/events/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
* lightning/src/ln/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
* lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
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@wpaulino@ldk-reviews-bot@ldk-claude-review-bot@TheBlueMatt
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Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated - #4684

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TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated
Jun 16, 2026
Merged

Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated#4684
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated

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The chanmon_consistency fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where signer_pending_revoke_and_ack and monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack could both describe the same owed revoke_and_ack.

The channel first received a commitment_signed whose monitor update completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret, leaving signer_pending_revoke_and_ack set. Later, receiving the peer revoke_and_ack freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor update. While that monitor update was still blocked, channel_reestablish saw the peer one state behind and recorded monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack, plus the corresponding monitor-pending commitment_signed, so the messages could be replayed once monitor updating was restored.

If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released, signer_maybe_unblocked generated and sent the RAA using signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. The monitor-pending flag was not cleared at that point, so monitor_updating_restored later generated the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and force-closed.

Fix this by clearing monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA, alongside signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. All resend paths regenerate RAAs through this helper, so successful generation through either pending path satisfies the other pending record. If generation fails, pending signer state is still left set and monitor-pending state remains available for monitor restoration to retry.

This failure was discovered in https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/actions/runs/26905971318/job/79370860747.

@wpaulinowpaulino added this to the 0.3 milestone Jun 11, 2026
@wpaulinowpaulino self-assigned this Jun 11, 2026
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👋 Thanks for assigning @TheBlueMatt as a reviewer!
I'll wait for their review and will help manage the review process.
Once they submit their review, I'll check if a second reviewer would be helpful.

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No new issues found.

The production change (lightning/src/ln/channel.rs:10262-10268) clears monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack in signer_maybe_unblocked when the signer-pending path successfully regenerates an RAA. On re-verification:

  • The clear is placed after the resend-order reblocking logic (10250-10261), so an RAA that gets nulled by the CommitmentFirst reorder correctly leaves monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack set for later retry. This placement is correct.
  • The reverse duplicate (monitor path then signer path) is already prevented by get_last_revoke_and_ack clearing signer_pending_revoke_and_ack on success (line 10352).
  • monitor_updating_restored clears monitor_pending unconditionally (10047), so the held update no longer regenerates the RAA after the signer path sent it.

Minor non-blocking observation (not a code bug): the PR description and inline comment frame the fix as happening "whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA," but the change is actually in signer_maybe_unblocked, not the helper. The implementation is nonetheless functionally complete and the chosen location is in fact safer than placing it in the helper would be.

The symmetric commitment_signed resend path remains untreated, as noted in my prior review — still out of scope for the bug this PR targets.

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Hey @TheBlueMatt! This PR has been waiting for your review.
Please take a look when you have a chance. If you're unable to review, please let us know so we can find another reviewer.

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

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I'm a bit confused here, why is it safe to always send an RAA (via get_last_revoke_and_ack) based on only signer_pending_... or monitor_pending_...? eg if we reconnect and find that we owe a commitment_signed that is blocked on the signer but have a blocked revoke_and_ack on a monitor update, we'll set signer_pending_raa and then send it if the signer completes even if the monitor is pending.

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The `chanmon_consistency` fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where
`signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` and `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`
could both describe the same owed `revoke_and_ack`.
The channel first received a `commitment_signed` whose monitor update
completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret,
leaving `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` set. Later, receiving the peer
`revoke_and_ack` freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor
update. While that monitor update was still blocked,
`channel_reestablish` saw the peer one state behind and recorded
`monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`, plus the corresponding monitor-pending
`commitment_signed`, so the messages could be replayed once monitor
updating was restored.
If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released,
`signer_maybe_unblocked` generated and sent the already monitor-safe RAA
using `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack`. The monitor-pending flag was not
cleared at that point, so `monitor_updating_restored` later generated
the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already
advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the
duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and
force-closed.
Fix this by clearing `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack` in the
signer-resume path only once a signer-pending RAA is actually being
returned.
@wpaulino
wpaulinoforce-pushed the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch from 38f6df2 to 27223fdCompareJune 15, 2026 17:29
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wpaulino commented Jun 15, 2026

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

I think we can, though I do wonder why this went uncaught for so long if it actually was an issue in those releases as well. Something about our current fuzz harness made this much easier to find.

EDIT: It's reachable in the fuzzer now because there's a path to reload with a stale manager.

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This is a trivial fix.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 55fb60b into lightningdevkit:mainJun 16, 2026
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@wpaulino
wpaulino deleted the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch June 16, 2026 16:36
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Backported in #4706

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Backported to 0.1 in #4710.

TheBlueMatt added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2026
v0.1.10 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Loupe de Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* Async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence operations which complete, but are
not marked as complete in a persisted `ChannelManager` prior to restart,
followed immediately by a block connection and then another restart could
result in some channel operations hanging leading for force-closures (#4377).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (#4590).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (#4684).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (#4651).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (#4707).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (#4595).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (#4537, #4618).
Security
========
0.1.10 fixes a sanitization issue and several denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. This method is called from `payment_parameters_from_invoice` and
`payment_parameters_from_variable_amount_invoice` (#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (#4716).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (#4718).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (#4593, #4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
TheBlueMatt added a commit to TheBlueMatt/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2026
v0.2.3 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Through the Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (lightningdevkit#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (lightningdevkit#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* `Features::supports_zero_conf` no longer clears the `ZeroConf` features and
`Features::requires_zero_conf` now correctly reports required, rather than
supported, status (lightningdevkit#4517).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (lightningdevkit#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (lightningdevkit#4590).
* LSPS1, LSPS2, and LSPS5 persistence will no longer get stuck and refuse to
persist again after a single failure from the KVStore (lightningdevkit#4597, lightningdevkit#4282).
* Dropping the future returned by
`OutputSweeper::regenerate_and_broadcast_spend_if_necessary` no longer
results in future calls to the same method being spuriously ignored (lightningdevkit#4598).
* Used async-receive offers are no longer refreshed on every timer tick once
their refresh time is reached (lightningdevkit#4672).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (lightningdevkit#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (lightningdevkit#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (lightningdevkit#4684).
* If we had exactly zero balance in a zero-fee-commitment channel, the
counterparty was able to splice all of their balance out, violating the
reserve requirements they'd otherwise be forced to keep (lightningdevkit#4580).
* Providing an `Event::HTLCIntercepted` to the `LSPS2ServiceHandler` twice no
longer results in spuriously opening a channel early (lightningdevkit#4656).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (lightningdevkit#4651).
* `AnchorDescriptor::previous_utxo` now provides the correct `script_pubkey`
for non-zero-commitment-fee anchor channels (lightningdevkit#4669).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (lightningdevkit#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (lightningdevkit#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (lightningdevkit#4707).
* `LSPS2ServiceHandler::channel_open_failed` now correctly fails intercepted
HTLCs rather than allowing them to fail just before expiry (lightningdevkit#4677).
* `StaticInvoice::is_offer_expired` was corrected to check offer, rather than
static invoice, expiry (lightningdevkit#4594).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (lightningdevkit#4595).
* Replay protection for LSPS5 signatures now detects replays which are only
different in the encoded signature's case (lightningdevkit#4701).
* When `lightning-liquidity` is configured in the background processor, there
is no longer a stream of `Persisting LiquidityManager...` log spam (lightningdevkit#4246).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (lightningdevkit#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (lightningdevkit#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (lightningdevkit#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (lightningdevkit#4537, lightningdevkit#4618, lightningdevkit#4026)
Security
========
0.2.3 fixes several underestimates of the anchor reserves required to ensure we
can reliably close channels, several denial-of-service vulnerabilities and a
sanitization issue.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. Note that this method is called from
`PaymentParameters::from_bolt11_invoice` (lightningdevkit#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (lightningdevkit#4716).
* Parsing an `LSPSDateTime` which is before 1970 no longer panics. This is
reachable when parsing messages from counterparties (lightningdevkit#4715).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (lightningdevkit#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (lightningdevkit#4718).
* When using the `anchor_channel_reserves` module to calculate reserves
required to pay for fees when closing anchor channels, zero-fee-commitment
channels were not considered. This could allow a counterparty to open many
channels, leaving us unable to properly force-close (lightningdevkit#4592).
* The `anchor_channel_reserves` module overestimated the value of `Utxo`s in
the wallet by ignoring the `TxIn` cost to spend them (lightningdevkit#4670).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (lightningdevkit#4593, lightningdevkit#4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (lightningdevkit#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (lightningdevkit#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (lightningdevkit#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
Conflicts resolved in:
* lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
* lightning/src/events/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
* lightning/src/ln/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
* lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
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Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated - #4684

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TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated
Jun 16, 2026
Merged

Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated#4684
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated

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The chanmon_consistency fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where signer_pending_revoke_and_ack and monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack could both describe the same owed revoke_and_ack.

The channel first received a commitment_signed whose monitor update completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret, leaving signer_pending_revoke_and_ack set. Later, receiving the peer revoke_and_ack freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor update. While that monitor update was still blocked, channel_reestablish saw the peer one state behind and recorded monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack, plus the corresponding monitor-pending commitment_signed, so the messages could be replayed once monitor updating was restored.

If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released, signer_maybe_unblocked generated and sent the RAA using signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. The monitor-pending flag was not cleared at that point, so monitor_updating_restored later generated the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and force-closed.

Fix this by clearing monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA, alongside signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. All resend paths regenerate RAAs through this helper, so successful generation through either pending path satisfies the other pending record. If generation fails, pending signer state is still left set and monitor-pending state remains available for monitor restoration to retry.

This failure was discovered in https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/actions/runs/26905971318/job/79370860747.

@wpaulinowpaulino added this to the 0.3 milestone Jun 11, 2026
@wpaulinowpaulino self-assigned this Jun 11, 2026
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👋 Thanks for assigning @TheBlueMatt as a reviewer!
I'll wait for their review and will help manage the review process.
Once they submit their review, I'll check if a second reviewer would be helpful.

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No new issues found.

The production change (lightning/src/ln/channel.rs:10262-10268) clears monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack in signer_maybe_unblocked when the signer-pending path successfully regenerates an RAA. On re-verification:

  • The clear is placed after the resend-order reblocking logic (10250-10261), so an RAA that gets nulled by the CommitmentFirst reorder correctly leaves monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack set for later retry. This placement is correct.
  • The reverse duplicate (monitor path then signer path) is already prevented by get_last_revoke_and_ack clearing signer_pending_revoke_and_ack on success (line 10352).
  • monitor_updating_restored clears monitor_pending unconditionally (10047), so the held update no longer regenerates the RAA after the signer path sent it.

Minor non-blocking observation (not a code bug): the PR description and inline comment frame the fix as happening "whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA," but the change is actually in signer_maybe_unblocked, not the helper. The implementation is nonetheless functionally complete and the chosen location is in fact safer than placing it in the helper would be.

The symmetric commitment_signed resend path remains untreated, as noted in my prior review — still out of scope for the bug this PR targets.

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Hey @TheBlueMatt! This PR has been waiting for your review.
Please take a look when you have a chance. If you're unable to review, please let us know so we can find another reviewer.

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

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I'm a bit confused here, why is it safe to always send an RAA (via get_last_revoke_and_ack) based on only signer_pending_... or monitor_pending_...? eg if we reconnect and find that we owe a commitment_signed that is blocked on the signer but have a blocked revoke_and_ack on a monitor update, we'll set signer_pending_raa and then send it if the signer completes even if the monitor is pending.

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The `chanmon_consistency` fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where
`signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` and `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`
could both describe the same owed `revoke_and_ack`.
The channel first received a `commitment_signed` whose monitor update
completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret,
leaving `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` set. Later, receiving the peer
`revoke_and_ack` freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor
update. While that monitor update was still blocked,
`channel_reestablish` saw the peer one state behind and recorded
`monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`, plus the corresponding monitor-pending
`commitment_signed`, so the messages could be replayed once monitor
updating was restored.
If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released,
`signer_maybe_unblocked` generated and sent the already monitor-safe RAA
using `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack`. The monitor-pending flag was not
cleared at that point, so `monitor_updating_restored` later generated
the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already
advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the
duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and
force-closed.
Fix this by clearing `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack` in the
signer-resume path only once a signer-pending RAA is actually being
returned.
@wpaulino
wpaulinoforce-pushed the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch from 38f6df2 to 27223fdCompareJune 15, 2026 17:29
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wpaulino commented Jun 15, 2026

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

I think we can, though I do wonder why this went uncaught for so long if it actually was an issue in those releases as well. Something about our current fuzz harness made this much easier to find.

EDIT: It's reachable in the fuzzer now because there's a path to reload with a stale manager.

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This is a trivial fix.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 55fb60b into lightningdevkit:mainJun 16, 2026
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@wpaulino
wpaulino deleted the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch June 16, 2026 16:36
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Backported in #4706

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Backported to 0.1 in #4710.

TheBlueMatt added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2026
v0.1.10 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Loupe de Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* Async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence operations which complete, but are
not marked as complete in a persisted `ChannelManager` prior to restart,
followed immediately by a block connection and then another restart could
result in some channel operations hanging leading for force-closures (#4377).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (#4590).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (#4684).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (#4651).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (#4707).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (#4595).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (#4537, #4618).
Security
========
0.1.10 fixes a sanitization issue and several denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. This method is called from `payment_parameters_from_invoice` and
`payment_parameters_from_variable_amount_invoice` (#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (#4716).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (#4718).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (#4593, #4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
TheBlueMatt added a commit to TheBlueMatt/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2026
v0.2.3 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Through the Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (lightningdevkit#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (lightningdevkit#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* `Features::supports_zero_conf` no longer clears the `ZeroConf` features and
`Features::requires_zero_conf` now correctly reports required, rather than
supported, status (lightningdevkit#4517).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (lightningdevkit#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (lightningdevkit#4590).
* LSPS1, LSPS2, and LSPS5 persistence will no longer get stuck and refuse to
persist again after a single failure from the KVStore (lightningdevkit#4597, lightningdevkit#4282).
* Dropping the future returned by
`OutputSweeper::regenerate_and_broadcast_spend_if_necessary` no longer
results in future calls to the same method being spuriously ignored (lightningdevkit#4598).
* Used async-receive offers are no longer refreshed on every timer tick once
their refresh time is reached (lightningdevkit#4672).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (lightningdevkit#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (lightningdevkit#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (lightningdevkit#4684).
* If we had exactly zero balance in a zero-fee-commitment channel, the
counterparty was able to splice all of their balance out, violating the
reserve requirements they'd otherwise be forced to keep (lightningdevkit#4580).
* Providing an `Event::HTLCIntercepted` to the `LSPS2ServiceHandler` twice no
longer results in spuriously opening a channel early (lightningdevkit#4656).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (lightningdevkit#4651).
* `AnchorDescriptor::previous_utxo` now provides the correct `script_pubkey`
for non-zero-commitment-fee anchor channels (lightningdevkit#4669).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (lightningdevkit#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (lightningdevkit#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (lightningdevkit#4707).
* `LSPS2ServiceHandler::channel_open_failed` now correctly fails intercepted
HTLCs rather than allowing them to fail just before expiry (lightningdevkit#4677).
* `StaticInvoice::is_offer_expired` was corrected to check offer, rather than
static invoice, expiry (lightningdevkit#4594).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (lightningdevkit#4595).
* Replay protection for LSPS5 signatures now detects replays which are only
different in the encoded signature's case (lightningdevkit#4701).
* When `lightning-liquidity` is configured in the background processor, there
is no longer a stream of `Persisting LiquidityManager...` log spam (lightningdevkit#4246).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (lightningdevkit#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (lightningdevkit#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (lightningdevkit#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (lightningdevkit#4537, lightningdevkit#4618, lightningdevkit#4026)
Security
========
0.2.3 fixes several underestimates of the anchor reserves required to ensure we
can reliably close channels, several denial-of-service vulnerabilities and a
sanitization issue.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. Note that this method is called from
`PaymentParameters::from_bolt11_invoice` (lightningdevkit#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (lightningdevkit#4716).
* Parsing an `LSPSDateTime` which is before 1970 no longer panics. This is
reachable when parsing messages from counterparties (lightningdevkit#4715).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (lightningdevkit#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (lightningdevkit#4718).
* When using the `anchor_channel_reserves` module to calculate reserves
required to pay for fees when closing anchor channels, zero-fee-commitment
channels were not considered. This could allow a counterparty to open many
channels, leaving us unable to properly force-close (lightningdevkit#4592).
* The `anchor_channel_reserves` module overestimated the value of `Utxo`s in
the wallet by ignoring the `TxIn` cost to spend them (lightningdevkit#4670).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (lightningdevkit#4593, lightningdevkit#4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (lightningdevkit#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (lightningdevkit#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (lightningdevkit#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
Conflicts resolved in:
* lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
* lightning/src/events/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
* lightning/src/ln/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
* lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
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, 'i'); if (__m === '*' || __re.test(location.href)) { injectUserscript("// Strip utm_, fbclid, gclid, etc. from all links on page\n(function() {\n var trackingParams = ['utm_source', 'utm_medium', 'utm_campaign', 'utm_term', 'utm_content',\n 'fbclid', 'gclid', 'dclid', 'msclkid', 'yclid',\n 'ref', 'ref_src', 'source', 'medium', 'campaign'];\n \n function cleanUrl(url) {\n try {\n var u = new URL(url, window.location.origin);\n var changed = false;\n trackingParams.forEach(function(p) {\n if (u.searchParams.has(p)) {\n u.searchParams.delete(p);\n changed = true;\n }\n });\n return changed ? u.toString() : url;\n } catch (e) {\n return url;\n }\n }\n \n function cleanLinks() {\n document.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n \n cleanLinks();\n \n var observer = new MutationObserver(function(mutations) {\n mutations.forEach(function(m) {\n m.addedNodes.forEach(function(node) {\n if (node.nodeType === 1) {\n if (node.tagName === 'A') cleanLinks();\n node.querySelectorAll('a[href]').forEach(function(a) {\n var clean = cleanUrl(a.href);\n if (clean !== a.href) a.href = clean;\n });\n }\n });\n });\n });\n observer.observe(document.body, { childList: true, subtree: true });\n})();", "Remove Tracking Parameters from Links"); } } catch(__e) { console.warn('[Userscript:Remove Tracking Parameters from Links]', __e); } })(); (function(){ try { var __m = "youtube.com"; var __re = new RegExp('^' + "youtube\\.com" + '
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Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated - #4684

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lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated
Jun 16, 2026
Merged

Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated#4684
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
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wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated

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The chanmon_consistency fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where signer_pending_revoke_and_ack and monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack could both describe the same owed revoke_and_ack.

The channel first received a commitment_signed whose monitor update completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret, leaving signer_pending_revoke_and_ack set. Later, receiving the peer revoke_and_ack freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor update. While that monitor update was still blocked, channel_reestablish saw the peer one state behind and recorded monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack, plus the corresponding monitor-pending commitment_signed, so the messages could be replayed once monitor updating was restored.

If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released, signer_maybe_unblocked generated and sent the RAA using signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. The monitor-pending flag was not cleared at that point, so monitor_updating_restored later generated the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and force-closed.

Fix this by clearing monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA, alongside signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. All resend paths regenerate RAAs through this helper, so successful generation through either pending path satisfies the other pending record. If generation fails, pending signer state is still left set and monitor-pending state remains available for monitor restoration to retry.

This failure was discovered in https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/actions/runs/26905971318/job/79370860747.

@wpaulinowpaulino added this to the 0.3 milestone Jun 11, 2026
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No new issues found.

The production change (lightning/src/ln/channel.rs:10262-10268) clears monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack in signer_maybe_unblocked when the signer-pending path successfully regenerates an RAA. On re-verification:

  • The clear is placed after the resend-order reblocking logic (10250-10261), so an RAA that gets nulled by the CommitmentFirst reorder correctly leaves monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack set for later retry. This placement is correct.
  • The reverse duplicate (monitor path then signer path) is already prevented by get_last_revoke_and_ack clearing signer_pending_revoke_and_ack on success (line 10352).
  • monitor_updating_restored clears monitor_pending unconditionally (10047), so the held update no longer regenerates the RAA after the signer path sent it.

Minor non-blocking observation (not a code bug): the PR description and inline comment frame the fix as happening "whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA," but the change is actually in signer_maybe_unblocked, not the helper. The implementation is nonetheless functionally complete and the chosen location is in fact safer than placing it in the helper would be.

The symmetric commitment_signed resend path remains untreated, as noted in my prior review — still out of scope for the bug this PR targets.

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

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I'm a bit confused here, why is it safe to always send an RAA (via get_last_revoke_and_ack) based on only signer_pending_... or monitor_pending_...? eg if we reconnect and find that we owe a commitment_signed that is blocked on the signer but have a blocked revoke_and_ack on a monitor update, we'll set signer_pending_raa and then send it if the signer completes even if the monitor is pending.

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The `chanmon_consistency` fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where
`signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` and `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`
could both describe the same owed `revoke_and_ack`.
The channel first received a `commitment_signed` whose monitor update
completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret,
leaving `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` set. Later, receiving the peer
`revoke_and_ack` freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor
update. While that monitor update was still blocked,
`channel_reestablish` saw the peer one state behind and recorded
`monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`, plus the corresponding monitor-pending
`commitment_signed`, so the messages could be replayed once monitor
updating was restored.
If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released,
`signer_maybe_unblocked` generated and sent the already monitor-safe RAA
using `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack`. The monitor-pending flag was not
cleared at that point, so `monitor_updating_restored` later generated
the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already
advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the
duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and
force-closed.
Fix this by clearing `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack` in the
signer-resume path only once a signer-pending RAA is actually being
returned.
@wpaulino
wpaulinoforce-pushed the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch from 38f6df2 to 27223fdCompareJune 15, 2026 17:29
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wpaulino commented Jun 15, 2026

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

I think we can, though I do wonder why this went uncaught for so long if it actually was an issue in those releases as well. Something about our current fuzz harness made this much easier to find.

EDIT: It's reachable in the fuzzer now because there's a path to reload with a stale manager.

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This is a trivial fix.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 55fb60b into lightningdevkit:mainJun 16, 2026
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@wpaulino
wpaulino deleted the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch June 16, 2026 16:36
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Backported in #4706

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Backported to 0.1 in #4710.

TheBlueMatt added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2026
v0.1.10 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Loupe de Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* Async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence operations which complete, but are
not marked as complete in a persisted `ChannelManager` prior to restart,
followed immediately by a block connection and then another restart could
result in some channel operations hanging leading for force-closures (#4377).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (#4590).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (#4684).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (#4651).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (#4707).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (#4595).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (#4537, #4618).
Security
========
0.1.10 fixes a sanitization issue and several denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. This method is called from `payment_parameters_from_invoice` and
`payment_parameters_from_variable_amount_invoice` (#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (#4716).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (#4718).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (#4593, #4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
TheBlueMatt added a commit to TheBlueMatt/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2026
v0.2.3 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Through the Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (lightningdevkit#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (lightningdevkit#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* `Features::supports_zero_conf` no longer clears the `ZeroConf` features and
`Features::requires_zero_conf` now correctly reports required, rather than
supported, status (lightningdevkit#4517).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (lightningdevkit#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (lightningdevkit#4590).
* LSPS1, LSPS2, and LSPS5 persistence will no longer get stuck and refuse to
persist again after a single failure from the KVStore (lightningdevkit#4597, lightningdevkit#4282).
* Dropping the future returned by
`OutputSweeper::regenerate_and_broadcast_spend_if_necessary` no longer
results in future calls to the same method being spuriously ignored (lightningdevkit#4598).
* Used async-receive offers are no longer refreshed on every timer tick once
their refresh time is reached (lightningdevkit#4672).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (lightningdevkit#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (lightningdevkit#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (lightningdevkit#4684).
* If we had exactly zero balance in a zero-fee-commitment channel, the
counterparty was able to splice all of their balance out, violating the
reserve requirements they'd otherwise be forced to keep (lightningdevkit#4580).
* Providing an `Event::HTLCIntercepted` to the `LSPS2ServiceHandler` twice no
longer results in spuriously opening a channel early (lightningdevkit#4656).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (lightningdevkit#4651).
* `AnchorDescriptor::previous_utxo` now provides the correct `script_pubkey`
for non-zero-commitment-fee anchor channels (lightningdevkit#4669).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (lightningdevkit#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (lightningdevkit#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (lightningdevkit#4707).
* `LSPS2ServiceHandler::channel_open_failed` now correctly fails intercepted
HTLCs rather than allowing them to fail just before expiry (lightningdevkit#4677).
* `StaticInvoice::is_offer_expired` was corrected to check offer, rather than
static invoice, expiry (lightningdevkit#4594).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (lightningdevkit#4595).
* Replay protection for LSPS5 signatures now detects replays which are only
different in the encoded signature's case (lightningdevkit#4701).
* When `lightning-liquidity` is configured in the background processor, there
is no longer a stream of `Persisting LiquidityManager...` log spam (lightningdevkit#4246).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (lightningdevkit#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (lightningdevkit#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (lightningdevkit#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (lightningdevkit#4537, lightningdevkit#4618, lightningdevkit#4026)
Security
========
0.2.3 fixes several underestimates of the anchor reserves required to ensure we
can reliably close channels, several denial-of-service vulnerabilities and a
sanitization issue.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. Note that this method is called from
`PaymentParameters::from_bolt11_invoice` (lightningdevkit#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (lightningdevkit#4716).
* Parsing an `LSPSDateTime` which is before 1970 no longer panics. This is
reachable when parsing messages from counterparties (lightningdevkit#4715).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (lightningdevkit#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (lightningdevkit#4718).
* When using the `anchor_channel_reserves` module to calculate reserves
required to pay for fees when closing anchor channels, zero-fee-commitment
channels were not considered. This could allow a counterparty to open many
channels, leaving us unable to properly force-close (lightningdevkit#4592).
* The `anchor_channel_reserves` module overestimated the value of `Utxo`s in
the wallet by ignoring the `TxIn` cost to spend them (lightningdevkit#4670).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (lightningdevkit#4593, lightningdevkit#4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (lightningdevkit#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (lightningdevkit#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (lightningdevkit#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
Conflicts resolved in:
* lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
* lightning/src/events/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
* lightning/src/ln/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
* lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
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@wpaulino@ldk-reviews-bot@ldk-claude-review-bot@TheBlueMatt
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Skip to content

Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated - #4684

Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated
Jun 16, 2026
Merged

Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated#4684
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated

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The chanmon_consistency fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where signer_pending_revoke_and_ack and monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack could both describe the same owed revoke_and_ack.

The channel first received a commitment_signed whose monitor update completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret, leaving signer_pending_revoke_and_ack set. Later, receiving the peer revoke_and_ack freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor update. While that monitor update was still blocked, channel_reestablish saw the peer one state behind and recorded monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack, plus the corresponding monitor-pending commitment_signed, so the messages could be replayed once monitor updating was restored.

If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released, signer_maybe_unblocked generated and sent the RAA using signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. The monitor-pending flag was not cleared at that point, so monitor_updating_restored later generated the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and force-closed.

Fix this by clearing monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA, alongside signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. All resend paths regenerate RAAs through this helper, so successful generation through either pending path satisfies the other pending record. If generation fails, pending signer state is still left set and monitor-pending state remains available for monitor restoration to retry.

This failure was discovered in https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/actions/runs/26905971318/job/79370860747.

@wpaulinowpaulino added this to the 0.3 milestone Jun 11, 2026
@wpaulinowpaulino self-assigned this Jun 11, 2026
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👋 Thanks for assigning @TheBlueMatt as a reviewer!
I'll wait for their review and will help manage the review process.
Once they submit their review, I'll check if a second reviewer would be helpful.

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No new issues found.

The production change (lightning/src/ln/channel.rs:10262-10268) clears monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack in signer_maybe_unblocked when the signer-pending path successfully regenerates an RAA. On re-verification:

  • The clear is placed after the resend-order reblocking logic (10250-10261), so an RAA that gets nulled by the CommitmentFirst reorder correctly leaves monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack set for later retry. This placement is correct.
  • The reverse duplicate (monitor path then signer path) is already prevented by get_last_revoke_and_ack clearing signer_pending_revoke_and_ack on success (line 10352).
  • monitor_updating_restored clears monitor_pending unconditionally (10047), so the held update no longer regenerates the RAA after the signer path sent it.

Minor non-blocking observation (not a code bug): the PR description and inline comment frame the fix as happening "whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA," but the change is actually in signer_maybe_unblocked, not the helper. The implementation is nonetheless functionally complete and the chosen location is in fact safer than placing it in the helper would be.

The symmetric commitment_signed resend path remains untreated, as noted in my prior review — still out of scope for the bug this PR targets.

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

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I'm a bit confused here, why is it safe to always send an RAA (via get_last_revoke_and_ack) based on only signer_pending_... or monitor_pending_...? eg if we reconnect and find that we owe a commitment_signed that is blocked on the signer but have a blocked revoke_and_ack on a monitor update, we'll set signer_pending_raa and then send it if the signer completes even if the monitor is pending.

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The `chanmon_consistency` fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where
`signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` and `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`
could both describe the same owed `revoke_and_ack`.
The channel first received a `commitment_signed` whose monitor update
completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret,
leaving `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` set. Later, receiving the peer
`revoke_and_ack` freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor
update. While that monitor update was still blocked,
`channel_reestablish` saw the peer one state behind and recorded
`monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`, plus the corresponding monitor-pending
`commitment_signed`, so the messages could be replayed once monitor
updating was restored.
If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released,
`signer_maybe_unblocked` generated and sent the already monitor-safe RAA
using `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack`. The monitor-pending flag was not
cleared at that point, so `monitor_updating_restored` later generated
the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already
advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the
duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and
force-closed.
Fix this by clearing `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack` in the
signer-resume path only once a signer-pending RAA is actually being
returned.
@wpaulino
wpaulinoforce-pushed the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch from 38f6df2 to 27223fdCompareJune 15, 2026 17:29
@wpaulino

wpaulino commented Jun 15, 2026

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

I think we can, though I do wonder why this went uncaught for so long if it actually was an issue in those releases as well. Something about our current fuzz harness made this much easier to find.

EDIT: It's reachable in the fuzzer now because there's a path to reload with a stale manager.

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This is a trivial fix.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 55fb60b into lightningdevkit:mainJun 16, 2026
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Backported in #4706

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Backported to 0.1 in #4710.

TheBlueMatt added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2026
v0.1.10 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Loupe de Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* Async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence operations which complete, but are
not marked as complete in a persisted `ChannelManager` prior to restart,
followed immediately by a block connection and then another restart could
result in some channel operations hanging leading for force-closures (#4377).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (#4590).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (#4684).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (#4651).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (#4707).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (#4595).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (#4537, #4618).
Security
========
0.1.10 fixes a sanitization issue and several denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. This method is called from `payment_parameters_from_invoice` and
`payment_parameters_from_variable_amount_invoice` (#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (#4716).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (#4718).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (#4593, #4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
TheBlueMatt added a commit to TheBlueMatt/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2026
v0.2.3 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Through the Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (lightningdevkit#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (lightningdevkit#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* `Features::supports_zero_conf` no longer clears the `ZeroConf` features and
`Features::requires_zero_conf` now correctly reports required, rather than
supported, status (lightningdevkit#4517).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (lightningdevkit#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (lightningdevkit#4590).
* LSPS1, LSPS2, and LSPS5 persistence will no longer get stuck and refuse to
persist again after a single failure from the KVStore (lightningdevkit#4597, lightningdevkit#4282).
* Dropping the future returned by
`OutputSweeper::regenerate_and_broadcast_spend_if_necessary` no longer
results in future calls to the same method being spuriously ignored (lightningdevkit#4598).
* Used async-receive offers are no longer refreshed on every timer tick once
their refresh time is reached (lightningdevkit#4672).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (lightningdevkit#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (lightningdevkit#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (lightningdevkit#4684).
* If we had exactly zero balance in a zero-fee-commitment channel, the
counterparty was able to splice all of their balance out, violating the
reserve requirements they'd otherwise be forced to keep (lightningdevkit#4580).
* Providing an `Event::HTLCIntercepted` to the `LSPS2ServiceHandler` twice no
longer results in spuriously opening a channel early (lightningdevkit#4656).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (lightningdevkit#4651).
* `AnchorDescriptor::previous_utxo` now provides the correct `script_pubkey`
for non-zero-commitment-fee anchor channels (lightningdevkit#4669).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (lightningdevkit#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (lightningdevkit#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (lightningdevkit#4707).
* `LSPS2ServiceHandler::channel_open_failed` now correctly fails intercepted
HTLCs rather than allowing them to fail just before expiry (lightningdevkit#4677).
* `StaticInvoice::is_offer_expired` was corrected to check offer, rather than
static invoice, expiry (lightningdevkit#4594).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (lightningdevkit#4595).
* Replay protection for LSPS5 signatures now detects replays which are only
different in the encoded signature's case (lightningdevkit#4701).
* When `lightning-liquidity` is configured in the background processor, there
is no longer a stream of `Persisting LiquidityManager...` log spam (lightningdevkit#4246).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (lightningdevkit#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (lightningdevkit#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (lightningdevkit#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (lightningdevkit#4537, lightningdevkit#4618, lightningdevkit#4026)
Security
========
0.2.3 fixes several underestimates of the anchor reserves required to ensure we
can reliably close channels, several denial-of-service vulnerabilities and a
sanitization issue.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. Note that this method is called from
`PaymentParameters::from_bolt11_invoice` (lightningdevkit#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (lightningdevkit#4716).
* Parsing an `LSPSDateTime` which is before 1970 no longer panics. This is
reachable when parsing messages from counterparties (lightningdevkit#4715).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (lightningdevkit#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (lightningdevkit#4718).
* When using the `anchor_channel_reserves` module to calculate reserves
required to pay for fees when closing anchor channels, zero-fee-commitment
channels were not considered. This could allow a counterparty to open many
channels, leaving us unable to properly force-close (lightningdevkit#4592).
* The `anchor_channel_reserves` module overestimated the value of `Utxo`s in
the wallet by ignoring the `TxIn` cost to spend them (lightningdevkit#4670).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (lightningdevkit#4593, lightningdevkit#4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (lightningdevkit#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (lightningdevkit#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (lightningdevkit#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
Conflicts resolved in:
* lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
* lightning/src/events/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
* lightning/src/ln/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
* lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
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Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated - #4684

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TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated
Jun 16, 2026
Merged

Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated#4684
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated

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The chanmon_consistency fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where signer_pending_revoke_and_ack and monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack could both describe the same owed revoke_and_ack.

The channel first received a commitment_signed whose monitor update completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret, leaving signer_pending_revoke_and_ack set. Later, receiving the peer revoke_and_ack freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor update. While that monitor update was still blocked, channel_reestablish saw the peer one state behind and recorded monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack, plus the corresponding monitor-pending commitment_signed, so the messages could be replayed once monitor updating was restored.

If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released, signer_maybe_unblocked generated and sent the RAA using signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. The monitor-pending flag was not cleared at that point, so monitor_updating_restored later generated the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and force-closed.

Fix this by clearing monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA, alongside signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. All resend paths regenerate RAAs through this helper, so successful generation through either pending path satisfies the other pending record. If generation fails, pending signer state is still left set and monitor-pending state remains available for monitor restoration to retry.

This failure was discovered in https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/actions/runs/26905971318/job/79370860747.

@wpaulinowpaulino added this to the 0.3 milestone Jun 11, 2026
@wpaulinowpaulino self-assigned this Jun 11, 2026
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👋 Thanks for assigning @TheBlueMatt as a reviewer!
I'll wait for their review and will help manage the review process.
Once they submit their review, I'll check if a second reviewer would be helpful.

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No new issues found.

The production change (lightning/src/ln/channel.rs:10262-10268) clears monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack in signer_maybe_unblocked when the signer-pending path successfully regenerates an RAA. On re-verification:

  • The clear is placed after the resend-order reblocking logic (10250-10261), so an RAA that gets nulled by the CommitmentFirst reorder correctly leaves monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack set for later retry. This placement is correct.
  • The reverse duplicate (monitor path then signer path) is already prevented by get_last_revoke_and_ack clearing signer_pending_revoke_and_ack on success (line 10352).
  • monitor_updating_restored clears monitor_pending unconditionally (10047), so the held update no longer regenerates the RAA after the signer path sent it.

Minor non-blocking observation (not a code bug): the PR description and inline comment frame the fix as happening "whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA," but the change is actually in signer_maybe_unblocked, not the helper. The implementation is nonetheless functionally complete and the chosen location is in fact safer than placing it in the helper would be.

The symmetric commitment_signed resend path remains untreated, as noted in my prior review — still out of scope for the bug this PR targets.

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Hey @TheBlueMatt! This PR has been waiting for your review.
Please take a look when you have a chance. If you're unable to review, please let us know so we can find another reviewer.

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

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I'm a bit confused here, why is it safe to always send an RAA (via get_last_revoke_and_ack) based on only signer_pending_... or monitor_pending_...? eg if we reconnect and find that we owe a commitment_signed that is blocked on the signer but have a blocked revoke_and_ack on a monitor update, we'll set signer_pending_raa and then send it if the signer completes even if the monitor is pending.

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The `chanmon_consistency` fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where
`signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` and `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`
could both describe the same owed `revoke_and_ack`.
The channel first received a `commitment_signed` whose monitor update
completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret,
leaving `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` set. Later, receiving the peer
`revoke_and_ack` freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor
update. While that monitor update was still blocked,
`channel_reestablish` saw the peer one state behind and recorded
`monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`, plus the corresponding monitor-pending
`commitment_signed`, so the messages could be replayed once monitor
updating was restored.
If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released,
`signer_maybe_unblocked` generated and sent the already monitor-safe RAA
using `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack`. The monitor-pending flag was not
cleared at that point, so `monitor_updating_restored` later generated
the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already
advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the
duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and
force-closed.
Fix this by clearing `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack` in the
signer-resume path only once a signer-pending RAA is actually being
returned.
@wpaulino
wpaulinoforce-pushed the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch from 38f6df2 to 27223fdCompareJune 15, 2026 17:29
@wpaulino

wpaulino commented Jun 15, 2026

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

I think we can, though I do wonder why this went uncaught for so long if it actually was an issue in those releases as well. Something about our current fuzz harness made this much easier to find.

EDIT: It's reachable in the fuzzer now because there's a path to reload with a stale manager.

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This is a trivial fix.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 55fb60b into lightningdevkit:mainJun 16, 2026
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@wpaulino
wpaulino deleted the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch June 16, 2026 16:36
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Backported in #4706

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Backported to 0.1 in #4710.

TheBlueMatt added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2026
v0.1.10 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Loupe de Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* Async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence operations which complete, but are
not marked as complete in a persisted `ChannelManager` prior to restart,
followed immediately by a block connection and then another restart could
result in some channel operations hanging leading for force-closures (#4377).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (#4590).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (#4684).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (#4651).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (#4707).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (#4595).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (#4537, #4618).
Security
========
0.1.10 fixes a sanitization issue and several denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. This method is called from `payment_parameters_from_invoice` and
`payment_parameters_from_variable_amount_invoice` (#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (#4716).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (#4718).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (#4593, #4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
TheBlueMatt added a commit to TheBlueMatt/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2026
v0.2.3 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Through the Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (lightningdevkit#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (lightningdevkit#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* `Features::supports_zero_conf` no longer clears the `ZeroConf` features and
`Features::requires_zero_conf` now correctly reports required, rather than
supported, status (lightningdevkit#4517).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (lightningdevkit#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (lightningdevkit#4590).
* LSPS1, LSPS2, and LSPS5 persistence will no longer get stuck and refuse to
persist again after a single failure from the KVStore (lightningdevkit#4597, lightningdevkit#4282).
* Dropping the future returned by
`OutputSweeper::regenerate_and_broadcast_spend_if_necessary` no longer
results in future calls to the same method being spuriously ignored (lightningdevkit#4598).
* Used async-receive offers are no longer refreshed on every timer tick once
their refresh time is reached (lightningdevkit#4672).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (lightningdevkit#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (lightningdevkit#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (lightningdevkit#4684).
* If we had exactly zero balance in a zero-fee-commitment channel, the
counterparty was able to splice all of their balance out, violating the
reserve requirements they'd otherwise be forced to keep (lightningdevkit#4580).
* Providing an `Event::HTLCIntercepted` to the `LSPS2ServiceHandler` twice no
longer results in spuriously opening a channel early (lightningdevkit#4656).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (lightningdevkit#4651).
* `AnchorDescriptor::previous_utxo` now provides the correct `script_pubkey`
for non-zero-commitment-fee anchor channels (lightningdevkit#4669).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (lightningdevkit#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (lightningdevkit#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (lightningdevkit#4707).
* `LSPS2ServiceHandler::channel_open_failed` now correctly fails intercepted
HTLCs rather than allowing them to fail just before expiry (lightningdevkit#4677).
* `StaticInvoice::is_offer_expired` was corrected to check offer, rather than
static invoice, expiry (lightningdevkit#4594).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (lightningdevkit#4595).
* Replay protection for LSPS5 signatures now detects replays which are only
different in the encoded signature's case (lightningdevkit#4701).
* When `lightning-liquidity` is configured in the background processor, there
is no longer a stream of `Persisting LiquidityManager...` log spam (lightningdevkit#4246).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (lightningdevkit#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (lightningdevkit#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (lightningdevkit#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (lightningdevkit#4537, lightningdevkit#4618, lightningdevkit#4026)
Security
========
0.2.3 fixes several underestimates of the anchor reserves required to ensure we
can reliably close channels, several denial-of-service vulnerabilities and a
sanitization issue.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. Note that this method is called from
`PaymentParameters::from_bolt11_invoice` (lightningdevkit#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (lightningdevkit#4716).
* Parsing an `LSPSDateTime` which is before 1970 no longer panics. This is
reachable when parsing messages from counterparties (lightningdevkit#4715).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (lightningdevkit#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (lightningdevkit#4718).
* When using the `anchor_channel_reserves` module to calculate reserves
required to pay for fees when closing anchor channels, zero-fee-commitment
channels were not considered. This could allow a counterparty to open many
channels, leaving us unable to properly force-close (lightningdevkit#4592).
* The `anchor_channel_reserves` module overestimated the value of `Utxo`s in
the wallet by ignoring the `TxIn` cost to spend them (lightningdevkit#4670).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (lightningdevkit#4593, lightningdevkit#4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (lightningdevkit#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (lightningdevkit#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (lightningdevkit#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
Conflicts resolved in:
* lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
* lightning/src/events/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
* lightning/src/ln/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
* lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
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@wpaulino@ldk-reviews-bot@ldk-claude-review-bot@TheBlueMatt
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Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated - #4684

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TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated
Jun 16, 2026
Merged

Clear monitor-pending RAA once regenerated#4684
TheBlueMatt merged 1 commit into
lightningdevkit:mainfrom
wpaulino:bogus-async-raa-regenerated

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The chanmon_consistency fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where signer_pending_revoke_and_ack and monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack could both describe the same owed revoke_and_ack.

The channel first received a commitment_signed whose monitor update completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret, leaving signer_pending_revoke_and_ack set. Later, receiving the peer revoke_and_ack freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor update. While that monitor update was still blocked, channel_reestablish saw the peer one state behind and recorded monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack, plus the corresponding monitor-pending commitment_signed, so the messages could be replayed once monitor updating was restored.

If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released, signer_maybe_unblocked generated and sent the RAA using signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. The monitor-pending flag was not cleared at that point, so monitor_updating_restored later generated the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and force-closed.

Fix this by clearing monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA, alongside signer_pending_revoke_and_ack. All resend paths regenerate RAAs through this helper, so successful generation through either pending path satisfies the other pending record. If generation fails, pending signer state is still left set and monitor-pending state remains available for monitor restoration to retry.

This failure was discovered in https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/actions/runs/26905971318/job/79370860747.

@wpaulinowpaulino added this to the 0.3 milestone Jun 11, 2026
@wpaulinowpaulino self-assigned this Jun 11, 2026
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👋 Thanks for assigning @TheBlueMatt as a reviewer!
I'll wait for their review and will help manage the review process.
Once they submit their review, I'll check if a second reviewer would be helpful.

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No new issues found.

The production change (lightning/src/ln/channel.rs:10262-10268) clears monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack in signer_maybe_unblocked when the signer-pending path successfully regenerates an RAA. On re-verification:

  • The clear is placed after the resend-order reblocking logic (10250-10261), so an RAA that gets nulled by the CommitmentFirst reorder correctly leaves monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack set for later retry. This placement is correct.
  • The reverse duplicate (monitor path then signer path) is already prevented by get_last_revoke_and_ack clearing signer_pending_revoke_and_ack on success (line 10352).
  • monitor_updating_restored clears monitor_pending unconditionally (10047), so the held update no longer regenerates the RAA after the signer path sent it.

Minor non-blocking observation (not a code bug): the PR description and inline comment frame the fix as happening "whenever get_last_revoke_and_ack successfully constructs an RAA," but the change is actually in signer_maybe_unblocked, not the helper. The implementation is nonetheless functionally complete and the chosen location is in fact safer than placing it in the helper would be.

The symmetric commitment_signed resend path remains untreated, as noted in my prior review — still out of scope for the bug this PR targets.

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Hey @TheBlueMatt! This PR has been waiting for your review.
Please take a look when you have a chance. If you're unable to review, please let us know so we can find another reviewer.

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

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I'm a bit confused here, why is it safe to always send an RAA (via get_last_revoke_and_ack) based on only signer_pending_... or monitor_pending_...? eg if we reconnect and find that we owe a commitment_signed that is blocked on the signer but have a blocked revoke_and_ack on a monitor update, we'll set signer_pending_raa and then send it if the signer completes even if the monitor is pending.

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The `chanmon_consistency` fuzz target found a reconnect ordering where
`signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` and `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`
could both describe the same owed `revoke_and_ack`.
The channel first received a `commitment_signed` whose monitor update
completed, but the signer could not provide the next point or secret,
leaving `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack` set. Later, receiving the peer
`revoke_and_ack` freed holding-cell HTLCs and produced a held monitor
update. While that monitor update was still blocked,
`channel_reestablish` saw the peer one state behind and recorded
`monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack`, plus the corresponding monitor-pending
`commitment_signed`, so the messages could be replayed once monitor
updating was restored.
If the signer unblocked before the held monitor update was released,
`signer_maybe_unblocked` generated and sent the already monitor-safe RAA
using `signer_pending_revoke_and_ack`. The monitor-pending flag was not
cleared at that point, so `monitor_updating_restored` later generated
the same RAA again when the held update completed. The peer had already
advanced after accepting the signer-unblocked RAA, so it rejected the
duplicate secret as not corresponding to its current pubkey and
force-closed.
Fix this by clearing `monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack` in the
signer-resume path only once a signer-pending RAA is actually being
returned.
@wpaulino
wpaulinoforce-pushed the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch from 38f6df2 to 27223fdCompareJune 15, 2026 17:29
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wpaulino commented Jun 15, 2026

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Why does this not need backport to 0.1/0.2?

I think we can, though I do wonder why this went uncaught for so long if it actually was an issue in those releases as well. Something about our current fuzz harness made this much easier to find.

EDIT: It's reachable in the fuzzer now because there's a path to reload with a stale manager.

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This is a trivial fix.

@TheBlueMatt
TheBlueMatt merged commit 55fb60b into lightningdevkit:mainJun 16, 2026
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@wpaulino
wpaulino deleted the bogus-async-raa-regenerated branch June 16, 2026 16:36
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Backported in #4706

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Backported to 0.1 in #4710.

TheBlueMatt added a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 19, 2026
v0.1.10 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Loupe de Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* Async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence operations which complete, but are
not marked as complete in a persisted `ChannelManager` prior to restart,
followed immediately by a block connection and then another restart could
result in some channel operations hanging leading for force-closures (#4377).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (#4590).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (#4684).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (#4651).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (#4707).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (#4595).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (#4537, #4618).
Security
========
0.1.10 fixes a sanitization issue and several denial-of-service vulnerabilities.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. This method is called from `payment_parameters_from_invoice` and
`payment_parameters_from_variable_amount_invoice` (#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (#4716).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (#4718).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (#4593, #4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
TheBlueMatt added a commit to TheBlueMatt/rust-lightning that referenced this pull request Jun 23, 2026
v0.2.3 - Jun 18, 2026 - "Through the Loupe"
API Updates
===========
* `DefaultMessageRouter` will now always generate blinded message paths that
provide no privacy (where our node is the introduction node) for nodes with
public channels. This works around an issue which will appear for any nodes
with LND peers that enable onion messaging - such peers will refuse to
forward BOLT 12 messages from unknown third parties, which most BOLT 12
payers rely on today (lightningdevkit#4647).
* Explicit `amount_msats` of 0 is rejected in BOLT 12 `Offer`s; `OfferBuilder`
now maps 0-amounts to an amount of `None` (lightningdevkit#4324).
Bug Fixes
=========
* `Features::supports_zero_conf` no longer clears the `ZeroConf` features and
`Features::requires_zero_conf` now correctly reports required, rather than
supported, status (lightningdevkit#4517).
* If an MPP payment is claimed but `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s for some parts are
still being completed asynchronously, further channel updates (e.g.
forwarding another payment) are pending and the node restarts, the channel
could have become stuck (lightningdevkit#4520).
* The presence of unconfirmed transactions actually no longer causes
`ElectrumSyncClient` to spuriously fail to sync (lightningdevkit#4590).
* LSPS1, LSPS2, and LSPS5 persistence will no longer get stuck and refuse to
persist again after a single failure from the KVStore (lightningdevkit#4597, lightningdevkit#4282).
* Dropping the future returned by
`OutputSweeper::regenerate_and_broadcast_spend_if_necessary` no longer
results in future calls to the same method being spuriously ignored (lightningdevkit#4598).
* Used async-receive offers are no longer refreshed on every timer tick once
their refresh time is reached (lightningdevkit#4672).
* `FilesystemStore::list_all_keys` will no longer fail if there are stale
intermediate files lying around from a previous unclean shutdown (lightningdevkit#4618).
* When forwarding an HTLC while in a blinded path with proportional fees over
200%, LDK will no longer spuriously allow a forward that pays us 1 msat too
little in fees (lightningdevkit#4697).
* Fixed a rare case where a channel could get stuck on reconnect when using
both async `ChannelMonitorUpdate` persistence and async signing (lightningdevkit#4684).
* If we had exactly zero balance in a zero-fee-commitment channel, the
counterparty was able to splice all of their balance out, violating the
reserve requirements they'd otherwise be forced to keep (lightningdevkit#4580).
* Providing an `Event::HTLCIntercepted` to the `LSPS2ServiceHandler` twice no
longer results in spuriously opening a channel early (lightningdevkit#4656).
* `Event::PaymentSent::fee_paid_msat` is no longer `None` in cases where
`ChannelManager::abandon_payment` was called before the payment ultimately
completes anyway (lightningdevkit#4651).
* `AnchorDescriptor::previous_utxo` now provides the correct `script_pubkey`
for non-zero-commitment-fee anchor channels (lightningdevkit#4669).
* Syncing a `ChainMonitor` using the `Confirm` trait will no longer write some
full `ChannelMonitor`s to disk several times per block (lightningdevkit#4544).
* `OMDomainResolver` now correctly accounts for failed queries when rate
limiting, ensuring we continue to respond to queries after failures (lightningdevkit#4591).
* Calling `ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route` without a `route_params`
and with an invalid `Route` will no longer panic (lightningdevkit#4707).
* `LSPS2ServiceHandler::channel_open_failed` now correctly fails intercepted
HTLCs rather than allowing them to fail just before expiry (lightningdevkit#4677).
* `StaticInvoice::is_offer_expired` was corrected to check offer, rather than
static invoice, expiry (lightningdevkit#4594).
* `lightning-custom-message`'s handling of `peer_connected` events now ensures
that sub-handlers will see a `peer_disconnected` event if a different
sub-handler refused the connection by `Err`ing `peer_connected` (lightningdevkit#4595).
* Replay protection for LSPS5 signatures now detects replays which are only
different in the encoded signature's case (lightningdevkit#4701).
* When `lightning-liquidity` is configured in the background processor, there
is no longer a stream of `Persisting LiquidityManager...` log spam (lightningdevkit#4246).
* Incomplete MPP keysend payments will no longer see their HTLCs held until
expiry (lightningdevkit#4558).
* `InvoiceRequestBuilder` will no longer accept a `quantity` of `0` for a
BOLT 12 `Offer`, allowing any quantity up to a bound (lightningdevkit#4667).
* `lightning-custom-message` handlers that return `Ok(None)` when asked to
deserialize a message in their defined range no longer cause panics (lightningdevkit#4709).
* Several spurious debug assertions were fixed (lightningdevkit#4537, lightningdevkit#4618, lightningdevkit#4026)
Security
========
0.2.3 fixes several underestimates of the anchor reserves required to ensure we
can reliably close channels, several denial-of-service vulnerabilities and a
sanitization issue.
* `Bolt11Invoice::recover_payee_pub_key` no longer panics if called on an
invoice which set an explicit public key, rather than relying on public key
recovery. Note that this method is called from
`PaymentParameters::from_bolt11_invoice` (lightningdevkit#4717).
* Maliciously-crafted unpayable invoices which have overflowing feerates will
no longer cause an `unwrap` failure panic (lightningdevkit#4716).
* Parsing an `LSPSDateTime` which is before 1970 no longer panics. This is
reachable when parsing messages from counterparties (lightningdevkit#4715).
* `possiblyrandom` did not properly generate random data except when it was
explicitly configured to. By default this means LDK is vulnerable to various
HashDoS attacks (lightningdevkit#4719).
* `OMNameResolver` will no longer panic when looking up payment instructions
which include unicode characters at the start of a TXT record (lightningdevkit#4718).
* When using the `anchor_channel_reserves` module to calculate reserves
required to pay for fees when closing anchor channels, zero-fee-commitment
channels were not considered. This could allow a counterparty to open many
channels, leaving us unable to properly force-close (lightningdevkit#4592).
* The `anchor_channel_reserves` module overestimated the value of `Utxo`s in
the wallet by ignoring the `TxIn` cost to spend them (lightningdevkit#4670).
* `PrintableString` did not properly sanitize unicode format characters,
allowing an attacker to corrupt the rendering of logs or UI (lightningdevkit#4593, lightningdevkit#4605).
* RGS data is now limited in how large of a graph it is able to cause a client
to store in memory. Note that RGS data is still considered a DoS vector in
general and you should only use semi-trusted RGS data (lightningdevkit#4713).
* Counterparty-provided strings in failure messages are no longer logged in
full, reducing the ability of such a counterparty to spam our logs (lightningdevkit#4714).
* Reading a corrupted `ChannelManager` or `ProbabilisticScorer` can no longer
cause us to allocate large amounts of memory (lightningdevkit#4712).
Thanks to Project Loupe for reporting most of the issues fixed in this release.
Conflicts resolved in:
* lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
* lightning/src/events/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/channelmanager.rs
* lightning/src/ln/mod.rs
* lightning/src/ln/offers_tests.rs
* lightning/src/ln/onion_utils.rs
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