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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment#770

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Merged
TheBlueMatt merged 3 commits into from
Jan 18, 2021
Merged

Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment #770

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cb83cfe
Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commit…
devrandom Jan 5, 2021
63c56a4
Panic if signing fails in OnChainTx
devrandom Jan 5, 2021
0b20cf6
Simplify handling of OnChainTx.holder_commitment
devrandom Jan 14, 2021
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86 changes: 41 additions & 45 deletions lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs
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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -969,7 +969,6 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {

let key_derivation_params = keys.key_derivation_params();
let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone());

let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

Expand All@@ -991,7 +990,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
};
(holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
};
onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);

let onchain_tx_handler =
OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx);

let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1725,28 +1726,26 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
continue;
}
} else { None };
if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
res.push(htlc_tx);
let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
continue;
}
} else { None };
if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
res.push(htlc_tx);
}
}
// We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
// The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
return res
}
Vec::new()
// We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
// The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
return res;
}

/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
Expand All@@ -1755,26 +1754,24 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
continue;
}
} else { None };
if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
res.push(htlc_tx);
let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
// We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
continue;
}
} else { None };
if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
&::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
res.push(htlc_tx);
}
}
return res
}
Vec::new()
return res
}

/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1853,15 +1850,14 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
}
if should_broadcast {
self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
self.holder_tx_signed = true;
let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
}
claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
}
if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
for ev in events {
Expand Down
41 changes: 17 additions & 24 deletions lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs
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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -233,13 +233,21 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

/// Create a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
/// the same commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
/// that it will not be called multiple times.
/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
/// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
/// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
/// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
/// the latest.
/// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
///
/// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
///
/// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
//
// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
Expand All@@ -248,18 +256,6 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;

/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
///
/// Unlike sign_holder_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
/// commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
/// commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
/// commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
/// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
///
/// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
/// commitment_tx.
fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()>;

/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
///
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -500,11 +496,14 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
}

fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
Ok(sig)
let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
}

#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
Expand All@@ -514,12 +513,6 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
}

fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
}

fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Expand Down
4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions lightning/src/ln/channel.rs
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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4742,15 +4742,13 @@ mod tests {
&chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
);
let holder_sig= chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");

let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");

let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();

// ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());

Expand Down
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment by devrandom · Pull Request #770 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment#770

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 Merged

TheBlueMatt
merged 3 commits into

from

Jan 18, 2021
 Merged


Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment
#770
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cb83cfe

Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commit…


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
63c56a4

Panic if signing fails in OnChainTx


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
0b20cf6

Simplify handling of OnChainTx.holder_commitment


devrandom Jan 14, 2021

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86 changes: 41 additions & 45 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -969,7 +969,6 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {

 let key_derivation_params = keys.key_derivation_params();
 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone());

 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

Expand All@@ -991,7 +990,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 };
 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
 };
 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let onchain_tx_handler =
 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1725,28 +1726,26 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res
 }
 Vec::new()
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res;
	}

	/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
Expand All@@ -1755,26 +1754,24 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 return res
 }
Vec::new()
return res
	}

	/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1853,15 +1850,14 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 }
 if should_broadcast {
 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
 for ev in events {
Expand Down

41 changes: 17 additions & 24 deletions
lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -233,13 +233,21 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Create a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
	/// the same commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
	/// that it will not be called multiple times.
	/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
	/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
	/// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
	/// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
	/// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
	/// the latest.
	/// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
	///
	/// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
	///
	/// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
	//
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
	// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
	/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
Expand All@@ -248,18 +256,6 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
	///
	/// Unlike sign_holder_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
	/// commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
	/// commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
	/// commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
	/// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
	///
	/// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
	/// commitment_tx.
	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
	/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
	///
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -500,11 +496,14 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
 let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
 let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
 Ok(sig)
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
 Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
Expand All@@ -514,12 +513,6 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
	}

	fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
 let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
 Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Expand Down

4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4742,15 +4742,13 @@ mod tests {
 &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
 );
 let holder_sig= chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");

 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");

 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();

 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());

Expand Down
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment by devrandom · Pull Request #770 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment#770

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 Merged

TheBlueMatt
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Jan 18, 2021
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment
#770
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cb83cfe

Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commit…


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
63c56a4

Panic if signing fails in OnChainTx


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
0b20cf6

Simplify handling of OnChainTx.holder_commitment


devrandom Jan 14, 2021

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86 changes: 41 additions & 45 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -969,7 +969,6 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {

 let key_derivation_params = keys.key_derivation_params();
 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone());

 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

Expand All@@ -991,7 +990,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 };
 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
 };
 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let onchain_tx_handler =
 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1725,28 +1726,26 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res
 }
 Vec::new()
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res;
	}

	/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
Expand All@@ -1755,26 +1754,24 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 return res
 }
Vec::new()
return res
	}

	/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1853,15 +1850,14 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 }
 if should_broadcast {
 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
 for ev in events {
Expand Down

41 changes: 17 additions & 24 deletions
lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -233,13 +233,21 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Create a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
	/// the same commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
	/// that it will not be called multiple times.
	/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
	/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
	/// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
	/// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
	/// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
	/// the latest.
	/// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
	///
	/// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
	///
	/// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
	//
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
	// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
	/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
Expand All@@ -248,18 +256,6 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
	///
	/// Unlike sign_holder_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
	/// commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
	/// commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
	/// commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
	/// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
	///
	/// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
	/// commitment_tx.
	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
	/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
	///
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -500,11 +496,14 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
 let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
 let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
 Ok(sig)
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
 Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
Expand All@@ -514,12 +513,6 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
	}

	fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
 let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
 Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Expand Down

4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4742,15 +4742,13 @@ mod tests {
 &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
 );
 let holder_sig= chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");

 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");

 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();

 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());

Expand Down
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment by devrandom · Pull Request #770 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment#770

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TheBlueMatt
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Jan 18, 2021
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment
#770
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cb83cfe

Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commit…


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
63c56a4

Panic if signing fails in OnChainTx


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
0b20cf6

Simplify handling of OnChainTx.holder_commitment


devrandom Jan 14, 2021

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86 changes: 41 additions & 45 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -969,7 +969,6 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {

 let key_derivation_params = keys.key_derivation_params();
 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone());

 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

Expand All@@ -991,7 +990,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 };
 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
 };
 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let onchain_tx_handler =
 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1725,28 +1726,26 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res
 }
 Vec::new()
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res;
	}

	/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
Expand All@@ -1755,26 +1754,24 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 return res
 }
Vec::new()
return res
	}

	/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1853,15 +1850,14 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 }
 if should_broadcast {
 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
 for ev in events {
Expand Down

41 changes: 17 additions & 24 deletions
lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -233,13 +233,21 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Create a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
	/// the same commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
	/// that it will not be called multiple times.
	/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
	/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
	/// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
	/// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
	/// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
	/// the latest.
	/// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
	///
	/// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
	///
	/// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
	//
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
	// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
	/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
Expand All@@ -248,18 +256,6 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
	///
	/// Unlike sign_holder_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
	/// commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
	/// commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
	/// commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
	/// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
	///
	/// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
	/// commitment_tx.
	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
	/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
	///
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -500,11 +496,14 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
 let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
 let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
 Ok(sig)
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
 Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
Expand All@@ -514,12 +513,6 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
	}

	fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
 let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
 Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Expand Down

4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4742,15 +4742,13 @@ mod tests {
 &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
 );
 let holder_sig= chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");

 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");

 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();

 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());

Expand Down
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment by devrandom · Pull Request #770 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment#770

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 Merged

TheBlueMatt
merged 3 commits into

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Jan 18, 2021
 Merged


Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment
#770
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cb83cfe

Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commit…


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
63c56a4

Panic if signing fails in OnChainTx


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
0b20cf6

Simplify handling of OnChainTx.holder_commitment


devrandom Jan 14, 2021

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86 changes: 41 additions & 45 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -969,7 +969,6 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {

 let key_derivation_params = keys.key_derivation_params();
 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone());

 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

Expand All@@ -991,7 +990,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 };
 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
 };
 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let onchain_tx_handler =
 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1725,28 +1726,26 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res
 }
 Vec::new()
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res;
	}

	/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
Expand All@@ -1755,26 +1754,24 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 return res
 }
Vec::new()
return res
	}

	/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1853,15 +1850,14 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 }
 if should_broadcast {
 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
 for ev in events {
Expand Down

41 changes: 17 additions & 24 deletions
lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -233,13 +233,21 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Create a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
	/// the same commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
	/// that it will not be called multiple times.
	/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
	/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
	/// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
	/// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
	/// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
	/// the latest.
	/// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
	///
	/// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
	///
	/// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
	//
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
	// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
	/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
Expand All@@ -248,18 +256,6 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
	///
	/// Unlike sign_holder_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
	/// commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
	/// commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
	/// commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
	/// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
	///
	/// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
	/// commitment_tx.
	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
	/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
	///
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -500,11 +496,14 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
 let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
 let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
 Ok(sig)
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
 Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
Expand All@@ -514,12 +513,6 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
	}

	fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
 let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
 Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Expand Down

4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4742,15 +4742,13 @@ mod tests {
 &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
 );
 let holder_sig= chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");

 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");

 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();

 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());

Expand Down
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment by devrandom · Pull Request #770 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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 Merged

TheBlueMatt
merged 3 commits into

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Jan 18, 2021
 Merged


Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment
#770
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cb83cfe

Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commit…


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
63c56a4

Panic if signing fails in OnChainTx


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
0b20cf6

Simplify handling of OnChainTx.holder_commitment


devrandom Jan 14, 2021

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86 changes: 41 additions & 45 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -969,7 +969,6 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {

 let key_derivation_params = keys.key_derivation_params();
 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone());

 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

Expand All@@ -991,7 +990,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 };
 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
 };
 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let onchain_tx_handler =
 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1725,28 +1726,26 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res
 }
 Vec::new()
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res;
	}

	/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
Expand All@@ -1755,26 +1754,24 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 return res
 }
Vec::new()
return res
	}

	/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1853,15 +1850,14 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 }
 if should_broadcast {
 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
 for ev in events {
Expand Down

41 changes: 17 additions & 24 deletions
lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -233,13 +233,21 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Create a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
	/// the same commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
	/// that it will not be called multiple times.
	/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
	/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
	/// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
	/// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
	/// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
	/// the latest.
	/// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
	///
	/// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
	///
	/// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
	//
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
	// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
	/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
Expand All@@ -248,18 +256,6 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
	///
	/// Unlike sign_holder_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
	/// commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
	/// commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
	/// commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
	/// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
	///
	/// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
	/// commitment_tx.
	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
	/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
	///
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -500,11 +496,14 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
 let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
 let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
 Ok(sig)
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
 Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
Expand All@@ -514,12 +513,6 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
	}

	fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
 let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
 Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Expand Down

4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4742,15 +4742,13 @@ mod tests {
 &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
 );
 let holder_sig= chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");

 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");

 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();

 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());

Expand Down
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment by devrandom · Pull Request #770 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment#770

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TheBlueMatt
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Jan 18, 2021
 Merged


Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment
#770
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cb83cfe

Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commit…


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
63c56a4

Panic if signing fails in OnChainTx


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
0b20cf6

Simplify handling of OnChainTx.holder_commitment


devrandom Jan 14, 2021

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86 changes: 41 additions & 45 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -969,7 +969,6 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {

 let key_derivation_params = keys.key_derivation_params();
 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone());

 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

Expand All@@ -991,7 +990,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 };
 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
 };
 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let onchain_tx_handler =
 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1725,28 +1726,26 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res
 }
 Vec::new()
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res;
	}

	/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
Expand All@@ -1755,26 +1754,24 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 return res
 }
Vec::new()
return res
	}

	/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1853,15 +1850,14 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 }
 if should_broadcast {
 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
 for ev in events {
Expand Down

41 changes: 17 additions & 24 deletions
lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -233,13 +233,21 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Create a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
	/// the same commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
	/// that it will not be called multiple times.
	/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
	/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
	/// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
	/// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
	/// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
	/// the latest.
	/// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
	///
	/// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
	///
	/// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
	//
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
	// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
	/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
Expand All@@ -248,18 +256,6 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
	///
	/// Unlike sign_holder_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
	/// commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
	/// commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
	/// commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
	/// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
	///
	/// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
	/// commitment_tx.
	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
	/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
	///
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -500,11 +496,14 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
 let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
 let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
 Ok(sig)
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
 Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
Expand All@@ -514,12 +513,6 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
	}

	fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
 let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
 Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Expand Down

4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

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Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4742,15 +4742,13 @@ mod tests {
 &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
 );
 let holder_sig= chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");

 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");

 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();

 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());

Expand Down
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment by devrandom · Pull Request #770 · lightningdevkit/rust-lightning · GitHub
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Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment#770

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 Merged

TheBlueMatt
merged 3 commits into

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Jan 18, 2021
 Merged


Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commitment
#770
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cb83cfe

Fold sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions into sign_holder_commit…


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
63c56a4

Panic if signing fails in OnChainTx


devrandom Jan 5, 2021
0b20cf6

Simplify handling of OnChainTx.holder_commitment


devrandom Jan 14, 2021

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86 changes: 41 additions & 45 deletions
lightning/src/chain/channelmonitor.rs

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Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -969,7 +969,6 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {

 let key_derivation_params = keys.key_derivation_params();
 let holder_revocation_basepoint = keys.pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
 let mut onchain_tx_handler = OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone());

 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();

Expand All@@ -991,7 +990,9 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 };
 (holder_commitment_tx, trusted_tx.commitment_number())
 };
 onchain_tx_handler.provide_latest_holder_tx(initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let onchain_tx_handler =
 OnchainTxHandler::new(destination_script.clone(), keys, channel_parameters.clone(), initial_holder_commitment_tx);

 let mut outputs_to_watch = HashMap::new();
 outputs_to_watch.insert(funding_info.0.txid, vec![(funding_info.0.index as u32, funding_info.1.clone())]);
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1725,28 +1726,26 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	pub fn get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed latest holder commitment transaction!");
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res
 }
 Vec::new()
 // We throw away the generated waiting_first_conf data as we aren't (yet) confirmed and we don't actually know what the caller wants to do.
 // The data will be re-generated and tracked in check_spend_holder_transaction if we get a confirmation.
 return res;
	}

	/// Unsafe test-only version of get_latest_holder_commitment_txn used by our test framework
Expand All@@ -1755,26 +1754,24 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	pub fn unsafe_get_latest_holder_commitment_txn<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<Transaction> where L::Target: Logger {
 log_trace!(logger, "Getting signed copy of latest holder commitment transaction!");
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_copy_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 let txid = commitment_tx.txid();
 let mut res = vec![commitment_tx];
 for htlc in self.current_holder_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
 if let Some(vout) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 let preimage = if !htlc.0.offered {
 if let Some(preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.0.payment_hash) { Some(preimage.clone()) } else {
 // We can't build an HTLC-Success transaction without the preimage
 continue;
 }
 } else { None };
 if let Some(htlc_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.unsafe_get_fully_signed_htlc_tx(
 &::bitcoin::OutPoint { txid, vout }, &preimage) {
 res.push(htlc_tx);
 }
 }
 return res
 }
Vec::new()
return res
	}

	/// Processes transactions in a newly connected block, which may result in any of the following:
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -1853,15 +1850,14 @@ impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner> {
 }
 if should_broadcast {
 self.pending_monitor_events.push(MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(self.funding_info.0));
 if let Some(commitment_tx) = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript) {
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 let commitment_tx = self.onchain_tx_handler.get_fully_signed_holder_tx(&self.funding_redeemscript);
 self.holder_tx_signed = true;
 let (mut new_outpoints, _) = self.get_broadcasted_holder_claims(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx);
 let new_outputs = self.get_broadcasted_holder_watch_outputs(&self.current_holder_commitment_tx, &commitment_tx);
 if !new_outputs.is_empty() {
 watch_outputs.push((self.current_holder_commitment_tx.txid.clone(), new_outputs));
 }
 claimable_outpoints.append(&mut new_outpoints);
 }
 if let Some(events) = self.onchain_events_waiting_threshold_conf.remove(&height) {
 for ev in events {
Expand Down

41 changes: 17 additions & 24 deletions
lightning/src/chain/keysinterface.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -233,13 +233,21 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_counterparty_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &CommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Create a signature for a holder's commitment transaction. This will only ever be called with
	/// the same commitment_tx (or a copy thereof), though there are currently no guarantees
	/// that it will not be called multiple times.
	/// Create a signatures for a holder's commitment transaction and its claiming HTLC transactions.
	/// This will only ever be called with a non-revoked commitment_tx. This will be called with the
	/// latest commitment_tx when we initiate a force-close.
	/// This will be called with the previous latest, just to get claiming HTLC signatures, if we are
	/// reacting to a ChannelMonitor replica that decided to broadcast before it had been updated to
	/// the latest.
	/// This may be called multiple times for the same transaction.
	///
	/// An external signer implementation should check that the commitment has not been revoked.
	///
	/// May return Err if key derivation fails. Callers, such as ChannelMonitor, will panic in such a case.
	//
	// TODO: Document the things someone using this interface should enforce before signing.
	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;
	// TODO: Key derivation failure should panic rather than Err
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()>;

	/// Same as sign_holder_commitment, but exists only for tests to get access to holder commitment
	/// transactions which will be broadcasted later, after the channel has moved on to a newer
Expand All@@ -248,18 +256,6 @@ pub trait ChannelKeys : Send+Clone + Writeable {
	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
	fn unsafe_sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for each HTLC transaction spending a holder's commitment transaction.
	///
	/// Unlike sign_holder_commitment, this may be called multiple times with *different*
	/// commitment_tx values. While this will never be called with a revoked
	/// commitment_tx, it is possible that it is called with the second-latest
	/// commitment_tx (only if we haven't yet revoked it) if some watchtower/secondary
	/// ChannelMonitor decided to broadcast before it had been updated to the latest.
	///
	/// Either an Err should be returned, or a Vec with one entry for each HTLC which exists in
	/// commitment_tx.
	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()>;

	/// Create a signature for the given input in a transaction spending an HTLC or commitment
	/// transaction output when our counterparty broadcasts an old state.
	///
Expand DownExpand Up@@ -500,11 +496,14 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok((commitment_sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
	fn sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<(Signature, Vec<Signature>), ()> {
 let funding_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(secp_ctx, &self.funding_key);
 let funding_redeemscript = make_funding_redeemscript(&funding_pubkey, &self.counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey);
 let sig = commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx);
 Ok(sig)
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 let htlc_sigs = trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)?;
 Ok((sig, htlc_sigs))
	}

	#[cfg(any(test,feature = "unsafe_revoked_tx_signing"))]
Expand All@@ -514,12 +513,6 @@ impl ChannelKeys for InMemoryChannelKeys {
 Ok(commitment_tx.trust().built_transaction().sign(&self.funding_key, &channel_funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, secp_ctx))
	}

	fn sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, commitment_tx: &HolderCommitmentTransaction, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
 let channel_parameters = self.get_channel_parameters();
 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
 trusted_tx.get_htlc_sigs(&self.htlc_base_key, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable(), secp_ctx)
	}

	fn sign_justice_transaction<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, justice_tx: &Transaction, input: usize, amount: u64, per_commitment_key: &SecretKey, htlc: &Option<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
 let revocation_key = match chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &self.revocation_base_key) {
 Ok(revocation_key) => revocation_key,
Expand Down

4 changes: 1 addition & 3 deletions
lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

View file


Open in desktop

Original file line numberDiff line numberDiff line change
Expand Up@@ -4742,15 +4742,13 @@ mod tests {
 &chan.holder_keys.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
 );
 let holder_sig= chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");

 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");

 let htlc_sigs = chan_keys.sign_holder_commitment_htlc_transactions(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();

 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());

Expand Down
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